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ABSTRACT 
The term `democratic deficit' often masks an unjustified presupposition that 
the EU should follow similar democratic practices to those found in national 
arenas. Attempts to replicate national democratic Institutions tend to lead to 
unsatisfactory solutions at the EU level. A legitimate and democratic Union 
may involve innovations for which there are no precedents in national 
experiences of democratic politics. 
In effect, this Thesis, "New Stories on the European Union's democratic 
deficit" reviews a range of theoretical discussions on democracy, legitimacy 
and European integration and suggests how these might be useful in framing 
practical proposals for institutional change at the EU level. These proposals 
envisage at the future direction and development of the EU towards a 
substantially democratic and legitimate Euro-polity under the conceptual and 
theoretical framework of a meta-national democracy. 
The term meta-national suggests from the very beginning that the EU is not a 
State or a Super-State, and consequently its democratic dimensions should be 
judged at a different level, the European one. Under this concept, the Thesis 
further proceeds with analysing the fundamental issues of a growing 
democracy which consists of. 
1) a system of multi-level governance, and not a government; 
2) an autochthonous civic-value driven demos; 
3) channels of civic and political participation at all levels, individual and 
collective; 
4) elements of EU constitutionalism; 
5) an on-going process of accountability; 
6) a constructive process of transparency and openness. 
This is only an indicative list of the many elements that can be generally 
attributed to the Union's continuing and growing democracy. They have 
Xlii 
particularly been selected as they involve recent changes and are currently 
supported by the White Paper on European Governance which in setting in 
motion a reform process responds to the author's expectations developed under 
the theoretical framework of a meta-national democracy. 
Finally, under that same conceptual framework, the Thesis comes to the 
conclusion that the EU is democratic and enjoys legitimacy. By opening up the 
policy-making process to enable more people and civil society organisations to 
become actively involved in the shaping and delivering of EU policies, it offers 
real opportunities for deliberation and participation. Patterns of access and 
interwoven levels indicate the existence of a system of multi-level governance 
which in turn embraces the notion of a `polity'. It promotes a new 
understanding of a European demos (a politically organised people) which is 
not based on ethno-national and cultural affinities but rather on commonly 
shared civic values. In terms of assuring a high degree of popular legitimacy, it 
provides for a Bill of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which neatly 
combines the constitutional structure, based in the founding Treaties and the 
national constitutions of the EU Member States. It elevates openness and 
transparency to fundamental principles of Community law, yet, being of a 
nascent constitutional character. Lastly, it promotes greater accountability and 
responsibility for those involved in the legislative and executive processes of 
the EU policy- making. 
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CHAPTER ONE GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER ONE 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, academics and politicians have 
constantly assessed the Union's democratic deficit and its seemingly inherent inability 
of transforming itself into a legitimate and democratic polity. In more specific terms, 
the European democratic deficiency is assessed against the following criteria: 
- 
Limited parliamentary control over decision-making; ' 
- 
Secrecy in the activities, decisions and the reasons given by the Community 
Institutions, including the Commission Committees; 
- 
Dominance of the executive, far removed from the citizens of the EU; 
- 
No access to documents and in general, no access to information; 
- 
Crucial role of the (unelected) Commission; 
- 
No government accountable via electoral process; 
- 
No mass-membership of European-wide political parties; 
- 
No European mass media; 
- 
No European demos; 
- 
The absence of a European Constitution. 
Although these above notions may seem anachronistic or simplistic in character and 
make the European Union ("EU") to appear doomed regarding its democratic 
1 Both at the European and national parliament level. 
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potential compared to a Nation-State, they have come to dominate European political 
discourse. 
The new stories as set out in the Title of the present Thesis come to express something 
that is arguably different: The EU is capable of becoming more democratic and 
legitimate in the future when seen within its own dynamic legal and political space. 
To achieve this aim, the author of this Thesis reviewed a range of theoretical 
discussions of legitimacy, democracy and European integration. With reference to 
national political systems, the term `democracy' reflects not a difference in meanings 
so much as a difference in conceptions that fall within the agreed meaning, 
"government or rule by the people". 2 Within the context of this Thesis, however, 
democracy is conceived as certainly "rule by and in the interests of the demos, of the 
common people". However, an essential part of this rule includes two requirements: 
First, that every person has a "rough equal influence over the government", which is 
dependent not only on the practice "one person, one vote", but also upon programs for 
the redistribution of economic power. Second, that "individual rights and liberties are 
protected". "Individuals should be free and equal in the determination of the 
conditions of their own lives. They should enjoy equal rights, and accordingly share 
equal obligations in the specification of the framework, which generates and limits the 
opportunities available to them, so long as they do not apply this framework to refuse 
the rights of others (the so-called principle of democratic autonomy)". 3 
2 Eliott, F. and Summerskill, M. (1964) A Dictionary of Politics, Harmondsworth: Penguin, (4t' 
edition), 89. 
3 Held, D. (1987) Models of Democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press, (Vt edition), 271. 
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The enactment of this principle calls for a process of double democratisation. This 
involves the acceptance of both the axiom that the division between "State" and "civil 
society" must be a central feature of democratic life and that the power to make 
decisions must be free of "illegitimate constraints" imposed by the private flows of 
capital. It also makes us to think what should be the forms and limits of State action 
and what should be the forms and limits of civil society. In other words, how State 
Institutions might become more accountable (the creation of accountable Institutions), 
and in what ways might individual activities become democratically ordered (a 
reordering of civil societies). 
In many countries the need to democratise political Institutions has been focused on 
questions of reforming the process whereby party leaders are selected and also of 
changing electoral rules. Other issues which are commonly raised have to do with the 
public funding of elections for all parties meeting a minimum level of support, a more 
equitable distribution of media time, the abolition of regulations concerning State 
secrecy, the defence and enhancement of local government powers against centralised 
State decisions. All these are very important issues but none of them will make the 
"polity" more democratic unless another fundamental problem is confronted. How 
can the requirements of democratic public life such as open debate, access to power 
centres, general political participation be reconciled with those political Institutions 
whose task is to uphold the rule of law, mediate disputes and negotiate among 
conflicting interests? Every State requires democratisation, but also the development 
and protection of independent powers if democracy is to maintain a shape and form 
that respects and enforces through the appropriate channels the rights and obligations 
of all citizens. 
3 
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In many countries, constitutions (written and unwritten) are regarded to be the way 
that can make requirements of both a "sovereign State" and a "sovereign people" be 
met. The limits to government's power are explicitly defined in constitutions and bill 
of rights, complemented by enhanced channels of communication and deliberation, 
which are subject to public scrutiny, parliamentary review and judicial process. Such 
a constitution and bill of rights enhance the ability of citizens to take action against 
the State in order to redress unreasonable encroachment upon their liberties. It also 
helps to tip the scales from State to parliament and from parliament to citizens. A 
national legal system thus becomes empowered by specifying the rights that can be 
fought for by individuals, groups and movements as well as by providing an effective 
and informed "participation". 
Attempts to create European democratic Institutions compared with national 
experiences of democratic politics are, however, inadequate to capture the mechanics 
and peculiarities of the EU as a new legal and political system on its own right. 
The EU as it will be argued throughout this Thesis is a complex network of 
Institutions for regulating common affairs, not really unitary and self-contained as a 
political unit. In other words, it is not a "State" that based on a national sovereignty, 
"common identity", "definite constitutionality", a taxation system as the motive 
power for its economy, and a fixed territory may claim the monopoly of the 
"legitimate" use of physical force in the enforcement of its order. On the contrary, it is 
about an emerging "polity" in a complex system of "governance" where the 
Community and the Member States work together in order to achieve economic, 
political and social integration. To this effect, the extent to which the EU is legitimate 
4 
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and democratic might entail innovations for which there are not precedents in national 
experiences of democratic politics. To democratise the EU beyond the level of the 
State, this Thesis applies the notion of a "meta-national democracy". 
The intellectual roots of the Union's meta-national democracy are not to be found in 
the NeoKantian theory which emphasises meta-theories as a priori theories that are 
transcendental. The paradigm here is rooted in the praxis of the EU whereas the term 
"meta" comes from the Greek word "µuä" which means after or above the Statel, 
Meta-national democracy comes to describe both the normative and functional quality 
of European Governance within a "polity in formations4 that can be assessed against 
the following democratic standards and principles of democratic legitimacy: 
1) Full and equal enjoyment of European citizenship contingent upon the equal 
representation in political decision-making positions. 5 
2) Institutionalisation of political rights, for example the right to consultation of civil 
society, leading to a direct, effective, efficient, accessible, multi-level participation. 
3) A strengthened electoral system, including also the strengthening of the role of the 
EP sector specific. 
4 Schmitter, P. (2001) "Symposium: Mountain or Molehill? 
-A Critical Appraisal of the Commission 
White Paper on Governance: What is there to legitimize in the European Union 
... 
and how might this 
be accomplished? ", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 6/01 
< URI, http: //www. jeanmonnetpro rQ am. org/papers/01 /011401. htm1 >. 
S This is a criterion launched by the Social Platform. In preparing its contribution to the Convention of 
Europe, the Social Platform calls for "parity democracy" to be enshrined within a new Treaty Article. 
Parity democracy emerges from the duality of human kind, equally composed of women and men, with 
the direct consequence that citizenship is premised upon an equal participation and representation of 
men and women in politics. Platform of European Social NGOs, "Contribution to the Convention on 
the Future of Europe", 15 April 2002, SP/04/2002, pp. 3,6. 
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4) Coherence regarding human rights. 
5) Solidarity among European citizens through communication and deliberation. 
6) Transparent decision-making and legitimate access to Community documents. 
7) Necessary correspondence between acts of governance and the equally-weighted 
felt interests of citizens with respect to those acts. This is meant to meet criteria of 
congruence (those affected by decisions should also be responsible for them) and 
accountabillity (the decision-makers should be held responsbible by the citizenry and 
dismiss the incompetent rulers). However, there should be an approximation: little 
congruence will lead to lack of legitimacy, while "too much" is held to reduce the 
efficiency in a large polity as in the EU. 6 
The Union's meta-national democracy is not another theory which aims to engage into 
the "battle of theories" which has often led to a series of zero-sum notions of EU 
bargaining, coupled with unjustified confidence of how the EU system actually works 
and towards what it develops. Rather, it is an exercise in concept 
- 
building both as 
part of a wider evolution of systemic explanation (or model building), and as a 
platform from which a set of realities might emerge. 
Such a set of realities embrace the fact that the EU is an unprecendented experiment 
in the peaceful and voluntary creation of a large-scale polity out of previously 
independent ones. It is, therefore, singularly difficult for "us", its citizens/subjects to 
compare this objet politique non-identifie ("this political non-identified object") with 
anything we have experienced before. No doubt, there exists a temptation to apply the 
6 Eriksen, E. (2001) "Symposium: Mountain or Molehill? 
-A Critical Appraisal of the Commission 
White Paper on Governance: Governance or Democracy? The White Paper on European Governance", 
under Title "Direct Legitimation? ", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 6/01 
< URL http: //www_ieanmonne! prouam. ore/papers/01/011201 html >. 
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standards that we are already using to evaluate our respective national authorities, but 
eventually we may learn to use other normative expectations with regard to Union's 
behaviour and benefits. 7 
Espousing the above idea, the author proceeds with analysing some of the parameters 
of the new theory encompassed in the following elements: 
a) A system of multi-level governance, not a government; 
b) An `autochthonous' civic-value driven demos; 
c) Channels of civil and political participation, individually and collectively; 
d) Elements of EU constitutionalism, complemented by a Bill of Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms; 
e) An on-going process of political accountability; 
f) A constructive process of openness and transparency. 
In examining the workings of the EU as a system of governance, the author will 
conceive the EU as a polity which according to the White Paper on European 
Governance ("White Paper") produces rules and has processes that affect the way in 
which powers are exercised at the EU level. 8 In order to support the view of a system 
of governance layered at local, regional, national and European levels, that is, a 
system of multi-level governance, the author shall consider the adoption and 
implementation of two strands of EU environmental policy in the UK, namely 
biodiversity and land use planning policy. In both cases, it will be asserted that 
7 Schmitter, P. loc. cit. supra note 4, p. 2. 
8 European Commission, European Governance 
-A White Paper, COM (2001) 428,25 July 2001, p. 8. 
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national environmental groups influenced EU actors in the decision-making process. 
In matching the discursive shift from `government' to `governance' in the EU, the 
author's new theory will also propose a conceptual shift from an ethno-culturally 
defined demos to one that is driven by civic-values. The claim for a European people 
who are not divorced from their national and ethnic identities, yet united around 
shared civic values, will be based on the one hand on the notion of citizenship rights 
and on the other on institutional avenues for political participation in producing 
legitimate decision-making. Individual and collective opportunity structures for 
citizens' participation will be realised and three categories of legitimacy, input, output 
and social will be defined. 
To tighten up the argument that the Union's legitimacy today depends on involvement 
and participation, the author will further proceed with examples of individual and 
collective input in the EU decision-making processes. In terms of collective 
participation, two case studies will be put forward. The first one will concentrate on 
two real examples of how civil society organisations become engaged by EU 
Institutions. These are: 
I. The Civil Dialogue in the field of the World Trade Organisation ("WTO") 
negotiations. 
2. The Civil Society as organised in the Economic and Social Committee ("ESC"). 
It will then be argued that both of these examples provide us with some insights 
which in turn could be important for the processing of legitimacy and redressing the 
8 
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relationship between the EU Institutions and civil society (organisations), these are 
also being incorporated into the White Paper. 9 
The second case study will analyse the role of trade unions and employers' 
organisations, that is to say, the social partners in the development and 
implementation of European social and employment policies. This can also be 
considered an excellent working example of political participation. Firstly, it offers a 
real chance to get management and labour actively involved in achieving the Union's 
objectives in these two fields. Secondly, it reveals substantial problems of legitimacy 
and democracy both addressed under the theory of meta-national democracy. With 
regard to the problem of legitimacy, the social partners' representation comes to the 
fore while problems of democracy occur in the social policy agenda when the 
representative organ of the `peoples of Europe' (the European Parliament) is 
marginalised. 
Regarding the notions of an input and social legitimacy surrounding the debate on a 
European Constitution, an assessment will be made on the drawing up of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the European Union ("Charter"). Following 
this, reflections will then be made on the European Convention of Human Rights 
("ECHR") and the Charter as competing meta-national mechanisms for the notion of 
Human Rights protection. In treating European integration as an open-ended process 
of constitution making, the Charter, an embodiment of rights and freedoms, will 
complement the existing constitutional structure found in the Treaty provisions and 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice ("ECJ"). Equally, it will complete 
9 White Paper loc. cit. supra note 8, pp. 14-15. 
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the actual and potential role of constitutional ideas and practices such as the model of 
multi-level constitutionalism that holds the EU "as a unity in substance and a coherent 
institutional system". 10 
Moreover, to prove that there is an on-going process of political accountability and 
responsibility of the EU Institutions, the author will deal with the crisis of the 
Commission in March 1999. The role of the European Parliament ("EP") in this affair 
of `misleading management', preceding the Report by an external advisory 
Committee will lead to the conclusion that the power of the EP has significantly 
increased and has opened the way towards reforms and future patterns of 
accountability in the EU. Reflections on such reforms are also made in the White 
Paper suggesting that accountability, together with openness, participation, 
effectiveness and coherence, should be one of the principles that currently underpin 
good `governance' in the EU. 
The scandal in the Commission is particularly telling on the issue of transparency and 
openness in the EU since without an informed EP and consequently an informed 
citizenry no real accountability is possible. Yet, as this whole Thesis is based on the 
notion of optimism and change under the concept of a meta-national democracy, it 
will be proposed that a fundamental principle of public access to documents have 
been gradually constructed in the Community legal order. To reinforce the argument 
put forward by this Thesis, reference will be made to: 
10 Pernice, I. (1999) "Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European 
Constitution-Making Revisited? ", 36 Common Market Law Review, p. 703 at 706. 
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1) Soft law instruments such as the internal Rules of Procedure of the Council and 
the Commission regarding public access to their documents; 
2) The new Regulation regarding public access to EP, Council and Commission 
documents; 
3) The case-law of both Community Courts; 
4) The Reports of the European ("EU") Ombudsman. 
In line with the provisions of the Charter and the constitutional ideas and practices in 
the EU, it will be urged that the time is ripe for both Community Courts to promote 
openness into a fundamental principle of constitutional status. 
Having completed the discussion concerning openness at the highest level of the 
Union's political system, the last Chapter of this Thesis will draw on the conclusions 
and suggestions, reached throughout this Thesis. Chapter Nine will argue that the EU 
is not necessarily completely deficient in what is currently regarded as a model of 
democracy at the national level and that it also has both the capabilities and potential 
to become more democratic in its future developments. 
Although the author has undertaken considerable research, this Thesis is by no means 
exhaustive in the use of her references and analysis as each Chapter has the potential 
to become a Thesis of its own. The issues which have been selected under the new 
theory are only an indication of the many that could have been addressed as regards 
the first pillar and are chosen on the basis that they involve 
-long-running 
discussions 
about constitutional and institutional reforms, as presently reinforced in the White 
Paper. Taken it thus from here, the theory could well be expanded and developed into 
11 
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other areas. For example, how to resolve the conflict that arises in the context of 
delegating powers to the ECJ and the Commission with the desire to enhance 
legitimacy and accountability in the EU. How to make legitimate and accountable the 
European Central Bank ("ECB") vis-a-vis the EP's subcommittee on monetary affairs 
that has developed ipso facto over the last two years. How to establish and monitor a 
precise delimitation of powers between the EU and the Member States, reflecting the 
principle of subsidiarity. How to make more transparent the work of natural 
administrators when implementing European law. In relation to the characteristics of a 
multi-level governance system and participation, we could examine the decision- 
making under the second and third pillar in which the initiative has been retained by a 
plurality of actors. So long as there are no aims, States, EP, Planning Committee, 
Military Committee, Political and Security Committee, Policy Planning and Early 
Warning Unit to monitor and access options are all involved at different degrees 
according to different issues. As regards Justice and Home Affairs, we could examine 
the judicial co-operation in civil matters where national and local police forces, 
agencies, customs authorities, Council, Commission and Europol collaborate. 
Additionally, we could analyse the drugs' sector looking at the co-ordination between 
the Commission, Council (especially, the Horizontal Drug Group), COREPER, the 
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drugs Addiction ("EMCDDA") based in 
Lisbon that runs the Reitox network, and a global information system of drugs in 
Europe which links EMCDDA to fifteen (15) `focal points'. 
Issues of legitimacy and transparency in the work of the Commission Committees 
have also not been covered in a specific detail for two reasons. First, because there 
has been a sizeable proportion of literature focusing on the Committees' activities. 
12 
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Second, it becomes a delicate matter to deal with them since the White Paper calls for 
their abolition and replacement by "autonomous regulatory agencies". " Nor the role 
of national parliaments and membership of European wide political parties have been 
covered in great detail. In explaining why, the author wanted to highlight the role and 
functions of the `above' said `powerless' EP within the context of the new theory. 
Considering her legal background and that being law, she wanted to delve only a little 
into politics and the political science aspects. 
11 White Paper loc. cit. supra note 8, p. 24. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE NATURE AND GOVERNANCE OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The term of democratic deficit has strong business-economic connotations: 
surplus/deficit. In the context of the EU it is more than a matter of definition. It 
entails something more than merely spelling out which aspects of the EU, as 
described in the Introduction to this Thesis, fail to adhere to conventional 
conceptions of national democracy. The question of democratic deficit as the 
White Paper also implicitly suggests has direct bearings on what type of polity 
the EU is, and what the EU aspires to be. ' 
The unsettled nature of the "European project"2 in six major dimensions - 
geographical boundaries, functional scope, integration theories, institutional 
balance and decision rules, constitutional order and demos 
- 
should not deter us 
from attempting to draw the various strands of the integration process together 
so as to characterise the EU. 
' European Commission, European Governance 
-A White Paper, COM (2001) 428,25 July 
2001, p. 7. 
2 See generally Bafikowski, Z. and Christodoulis, E. (1998) "The European Union as an 
Essentially Contested Project", 4 European Law Journal 4,341-354. 
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The purpose of this Chapter, therefore, is first to analyse the nature of the 
emerging European system, and second to explore what type of regime or 
system of governance best suits it which will deliver the democratic goods on 
which political legitimacy rests. 
In examining who or what determines European political integration, examples 
will be taken from the adoption and implementation of EU biodiversity and 
land use planning policies in the UK. The cases will reveal that national 
(mainly UK-based) and trans-national groups (mainly Brussels-based) have 
successfully gained access to EU Institutions so as to produce desirable policy 
outcomes. We will thus conclude that such patterns of `access' and 
`accomplished targeting' indicate the existence of a system of multi-level 
governance in which interest groups are purposefully engaged during all phases 
of the policy making cycle. 
"The author" has chosen EU environmental policy as a case in point for two 
reasons. First, to get a variation of policies-examples throughout this Thesis. 
Second, to show that the Union's political system might begin with the market, 
but does not necessarily end there. 
15 
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2. THE NATURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
2.1. Introduction 
The frequent qualification of the EU as an Institution "sui generis", 3 "regional 
regime", 4 "concordance system", 5 "quasi-state", 6 "regulatory state", 7 
"Staatenverbunds8 (association of States), "confederal consociation", 9 "post- 
modern", 10 "condominio", 11 `federal union", 12 "unusual international 
3 Hauser, H. and Müller, A. (1995) "Legitimacy: The Missing Link for Explaining EU 
- Institution building", 50 Aussenwirtschaft 17, p. 17 at 18. On the sui generis nature of the EU 
see also the Van Gend en Loos decision, p. 12 (Case C- 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v. 
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1, [1963] CMRL 105) where the Court 
held: "The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the Community constitutes a new legal 
order of international law for the benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign rights, 
albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also 
their nationals. Independently of the legislation of Member States, Community law therefore 
not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights 
which become part of their legal heritage. These rights arise not only where they are expressly 
granted by the Treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly 
defined way upon individuals as well as upon the Member States and upon the Institutions of 
the Community". 
4 Hoffman, S. (1982) "Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe today", 21 Journal of 
Common Market Studies 1/2, p. 21 at 35. See generally Wallace, W. (1983) "Less than a 
federation 
- 
More than a Regime: The Community as a Political System" in: Wallace, H. 
Wallace, W. and Webb, C. (eds. ) (1983) Policy-Making in the European Community, 
Chichester: John Wiley, (2"d edition), 403-436. Inter alia see Wallace, H. and Wallace, W. (eds. ) (2000) Policy-Making in the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (4th 
edition), 69. 
S Puchala, D. (1972) "Of Blind Men, Elephants and International Integration", 10 Journal of 
Common Market Studies 1, p. 267 at 277-284. 
6 Wallace, W. (1996) "Government Without Statehood" in: Wallace, H. and Wallace, W. (eds. ) (1996) Policy-Making in the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (3`d edition), 
439-460, at 451. 
See generally Majone, G. 1994 "The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe", 17 West 
European Politics 1,77-101. 
8 Joerges, C. (1997) "States Without a Market? Comments on the German Constitutional 
Court's Maastricht 
- 
Judgment and a Plea for Interdisciplinary Discourses", 1 European 
Integration online Papers (EIoP) 20, p. 5< URL http: //www. eiop. or. at/texte/1997-020 htm >. 9 See generally Chryssochoou, D. (1994) "Democracy and Symbiosis in the European Union: 
Towards a Confederal Consociation? ", 17 West European Politics 4,1-14. 
10 See generally Caporaso, J. (1996) "The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, 
Regulatory or Post-Modern", 34 Journal of Common Market Studies 1,29-52. 
11 Schmitter, P, (1996) "If the Nation-State were to wither away in Europe, What Might 
Replace It? " in: Gustavsson, S. and Lewin, L. (eds. ) (1996) The Future of the Nation-State: 
Essays on Cultural Pluralism and Political Integration, Stockholm: Nerenius & Santerus, 211- 
244, at 222,226. 
12 Hoskyns, C. and Newman, M. (eds. ) (2000) Democratising the European Union: Issues for 
the Twenty-first Century, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 7-8. 
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organisation "13 and so on, 14 reflects the difficulties which political science or 
political debates encounter on how to pin down the Union. 
In order to comprehend these difficulties, it would be useful to consider the 
political climate in which the early manifestations of integration theory arose. '5 
This, not only because different theoretical perspectives privilege certain 
elements of the account over others, but also because the immediate post-war 
period in Western Europe represents a moment when theory and practice 
merged. Two of the early perspectives considered in this section 
-federalism 
and functionalism 
- 
offer an excellent example of such overlap: That is, the 
arrangement to delegate power to a higher form of government, which could 
secure peace and efficient performance of tasks. The third, transactionalism, 
grew out of a conscious effort by socio-political scientists to bring about the 
formal separation of theory from practice where a sense of community among 
States would be a function of the level of communication between States. Neo- 
functionalism on the other hand adopted a more pluralist perspective according 
to which sovereign States may be persuaded in the interests of economic 
welfare to relinquish control over certain policy areas. That action would take 
" Villes, S. (2001) "The Path to Unity" in: Guttman, R. (ed. ) Europe in the New Century: 
Visions of an Emerging Superpower, London: Lynne Rienner, 15-27, at 15. 
14 For more characterisations see Chryssochoou, D. (1999) "Eurogovernance: Theories and 
Approaches to the EU" in: Carr, F. and Massey, A. (eds. ) (1999) Public Policy in the new 
Europe: Eurogovernance in Theory and Practice, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 3-26, at 4. 
15 Rosamond, B. (2000) Theories of European Integration, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1-96; 
Craig, P. and De Bürca, G. (1998) EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, (2"d edition), 5-6. 
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place where it could be easily proven that benefits would flow if a common 
approach to problem solving was taken. 
Neo-functional integration saw integration as a process based on "spillover". 
The spillover hypothesis sustained that the integration of the coal and steel 
sectors of a group of industrialised West European countries would yield 
substantial benefits for key economic actors. But the full integration of coal and 
steel sectors would not be accomplished without integration in cognate sectors 
of the economy. Thus spillover referred to the way in which the creation and 
deepening of integration in one economic sector would create pressures for 
further economic integration within and beyond that sector, and greater 
authoritative capacity at the EU level. 
The assumptions and spillover predictions of neo-functionalism were in turn 
challenged by what has been described as the intergovernmentalist phase of the 
Community in the 1970s. During that period the supranational EC Institutions 
appeared to lose initiative and influence whereas the interests of individual 
Member States 
- 
most clearly symbolised by the so-called Luxembourg veto 
- 
dominated the process. In that context, the arguments of neo-functionalism 
were challenged by liberal intergovernmentalism which presented States rather 
than supranational Institutions as the key actors in the integration process, 
seeking essentially to pursue their own respective preferences and to protect 
their sphere of power. This theory was also applied to the renewed dynamism 
and deepening of the integration process in the 1980s with the signature of the 
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Single European Act ("SEA") and the Intergovernmental Conferences ("IGCs") 
of the early 1990s leading to the Maastricht Treaty. 
Yet, the supranational 
- 
intergovernmental dichotomy which underpins the 
debate between what have been the two major theories 
- 
neo-functionalism and 
liberal intergovernmentalism 
- 
has been substantially questioned by a growing 
body of literature on the phenomenon of the EU as a system of multi-level 
governance. 16 Unlike the emphasis of earlier theories, this body of work 
concentrates less on explaining the dynamics of integration occuring in the EU 
context, and more on examining the nature, actors and Institutions which are 
involved at different levels in law-making and policy-making within the new 
political entity. 
2.2. Description of the Euro-polity 
The EU represents a new type of polity. 17 The term `polity' refers to a "system 
of institutionalised rule capable of producing authoritative political decisions, 
16 See generally Grande, E. (1996) "The State and Interest Groups in a Framework of Multi- 
level Decision-Making", 3 Journal of European Public Policy 3,313-338; Marks, G. (1993) 
"Structural Policy and Multi-level Governance in the European Community" in: Cafruny, A. 
and Rosenthal, G. (eds) (1993) The State of the European Community, Longman: New York, 
391-410; Smith, A. (1997) "Studying Multi-level Governance: Examples from French 
Translations of the Structural Funds", 75 Public Administration, 711-729; Scharpf, F. (1994) 
"Community and Autonomy: Multi-level Policy-Making in the European Union", 1 Journal of 
European Public Policy, 219-242; Marks, G. Hoogue, L. and Blank, K. (1996) "European 
Integration since the 1980s: State-centric Versus Multi-level Governance", 34 Journal of 
Common Market Studies 4,341-378. 
17 See generally Lindberg, L. and Scheingold, S. (1970) Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of 
Change in the European Community, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall; Inter alia see 
generally 0' Neill, M. "Between Regime and Republic: The Polity Problem in the European 
Union", Paper presented to UACES Workshops on The State of the Art: Theoretical 
Approaches to the EU in the Post-Amsterdam Era, Aston University, Birmingham, 6-7 May 
1999 (mimeo). 
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that is, political legitimacy, over a given population". 18 However, it is still not 
clear where a regime crosses a polity and where a polity moves towards a State. 
The EU is composed of national, sub-nationals and Community Institutions 
which are constituted in relation to each other. West European national 
Institutions and the EU Institutions are so closely interwoven that they can no 
longer be conceived as separate political systems. Some analysts term this "the 
new governance agenda", which means that governing is no longer exclusively 
statal, that the relationship between State and non-State actors is non- 
hierarchical and the key governance function is "regulation" of social and 
political risk, instead of resource "redistribution". 19 The congruence between 
territoriality and functional competence, underlying hierarchically ordered State 
power, have also being broken down. 20 Although many still consider the nation 
to be the only legitimate basis for democratic deliberation, 21 nationhood no 
longer supplies the socio-cultural glue political integration required to operate 
with the unconditional assent of the people living in a given territory. 22 This 
18 Chryssochoou, D. "Metatheorising the European Union", Paper presented to UACES 
Workshops on The State of the Art: Theoretical Approaches to the EU in the Post-Amsterdam 
Era, Aston University, Birmingham, 6-7 May 1999, p. 2 (mimeo). 
19 See Zürn, M. (2000) "Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation-State: The EU and Other 
International Institutions", 6 European Journal of International Relations 2, p. 183 at 185; 
Benz, A. and Eberlein, B. "Regions in European Governance: The Logic of Multi-Level 
Interaction", Working Paper RSC, No. 98/31, p. 1 
< http: //www. iue. it/RSC/WP-Texts/98 31. html >; Jachtenfuchs, M. (1995) "Theoretical 
Perspectives on European Governance", 1 European Law Journal 2, p. 115 at 120-121,123- 
125,127,129-130; Hix, S. (1998) "The Study of the European Union II: The `New 
Governance' agenda and its Rival", 5 Journal of European Public Policy 1, p. 39. 
20 Bellamy, R. and Castiglione, D. (2000) "The Uses of Democracy: Reflections on the 
European Democratic Deficit" in: Eriksen, E. and Fossum, J. (eds. ) (2000) Democracy in the 
European Union: Integration through Deliberation?, London: Routledge, 65-84, at 68. 
21 Wind, M. (2001) "Symposium: Mountain or Molehill? 
-A Critical Appraisal of the 
Commission White Paper on Governance: The Commission White Paper Bridging the Gap 
between the Governed and the Governing? " under Title "Conclusion", Harvard Jean Monnet 
Working Paper No. 6/01 < URL httu: //www. jeanmonnetpro ram org/papers/O 1/012401. html >. 
22 Bellamy, R. and Castiglione, D. loc. cit. supra note 20. 
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will be better understood in Chapter Three when contemplating a European 
demos in civic terms. Additionally, what is also interesting is that the EU does 
not have a "monopoly on the legitimate use of coercion". 23 The power of 
coercion, through police and security forces, is shared at the internal level with 
the national governments of the Member States whereas at the external level 
with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Western European Union ("WEU") 
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation ("NATO"). 
At face value, the centrality of governments in the system makes the EU seem 
like other international organisations such as the United Nations ("UN") and 
the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe ("OSCE"). But, in 
the EU, governments do not have a monopoly on political demands. 
Although Nation-States remain dominant players, particularly in the policy- 
setting decisions of the European Council, the problem of defining and 
implementing EU policies, they have been removed from "authoritative 
allocation and mediation from above to the role of partner and mediator". 24 
They sit alongside the supra-national Institutions of the European Commission, 
Parliament, the ECJ, the European Central Bank ("ECB") and a complex 
network of private groups. Supra-national Institutions develop rules that are 
considered superior to national law and employ servants that possess autonomy 
from national governments in that they have authoritative powers that directly 
affect national administrations and societies. 
23 Weber, M. (ed. ) (1978) Economy and Society 
- 
Volume I, New York: Bedminster, 54-56. 
24 Kohler-Koch, B. (1996) "Catching up with Change: The Transformation of Governance in 
the European Union", 3 Journal of European Public Policy 3, p. 359 at 371. 
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3. EU: A SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE 
3.1. Introduction 
Another descriptive element on the character of this polity is the ` governance' 
term which although used in various and somewhat ambiguous ways it has 
eventually come to be defined in the White Paper as the "rules, processes and 
behaviour that affect the way in which powers are exercised at European 
level... ". 25 According to this concept, `governance' seems to emphasise three 
major points. The first point is that we should stop relying on the State as the 
institutional form and hierarchical centre of society. The second point is that 
the idea of `governance above the State' does not mean that the State is 
reconstituted on a higher (international) level, whilst the third point underlines 
change: change away from a traditional State-centred conceptualisation of 
political systems with one centre of an accumulated legitimate authority. With 
reference to the EU such a centre of authority is non-existent. All the EU 
Institutions regard themselves as capable of `ruling' and in consequence of this 
the constitutional distinction between legislative and executive powers is 
blurred. Legislative power is in fact shared out between the Parliament, the 
Commission and the Council of Ministers whereas the Parliament's powers of 
consultation and co-decision procedures depend on the subject matter of the 
proposed legislation. Additionally, hundreds of Committees which were 
originally constructed to control delegation of powers from the Council to the 
Commission are also in operation. 
25 White Paper loc. cit. supra note 1, p. 8. 
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With regard to the existing relationships between the above EU Institutions, 
however, the Prodi White Paper amounts more to a revolution (a reversal of 
conditions) than to a reform (a suggested improvement by removing faults or 
abuses)26 If enacted, the proposals "would evolve the Commission into a 
super-ministry that decides policy9.27 
In specific terms, but still lacking in detail, the proposals call the Commission 
to acquire an executive responsibility whereas the Council and the EP should 
focus more on defining the essential elements of policy and controlling the way 
in which those policies are executed. 28 In this perspective, the Commission 
appears to have committed itself to withdraw proposals where inter- 
institutional bargaining undermines the principles of proportionality, 
subsidiarity and/or the proposal's objectives, and to push the Council and the 
EP to speed up the legislative process. 29 
On the other hand, with a view to the Union's 700 management and regulatory 
committees, it is further suggested that these should be replaced by 
`autonomous '30 regulatory agencies. "Such agencies should be granted the 
power to take individual decisions in application of regulatory measures", 31 the 
White Paper says. 
26 Pritchard, "The Prodi Plan: More a Revolution than a Reform", The Daily Telegraph, 28 July 
2001,19. 
27 Ibid. 
28 White Paper loc. cit supra note 1, p. 6. 
29 Idem., 22-23. 
30 The assertion of autonomy appears to be rather illusionary since according to the White 
Paper agencies must be subject to an effective system of Commission's supervision and control: 
loc. cit. supra note 1, p. 24. 
31 Ibid. 
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The White Paper might highlight a tangible Europe that is in full 
development. 32 Yet, the proposed division of powers which turns the 
Commission into a genuine European executive and asks the Council and the 
EP to have an equal role in supervising the way in which the Commission 
exercises its executive role rather brings Europe backwards in two 
perspectives. It creates a centre of an accumulated authority akin to that of a 
Nation-State but still deficient in legitimacy. As a result, it does not develop a 
`European model of dividing powers between the legislature and the 
executive', but rather copies national democracies, in particular some 
democratic federation which consists of an executive answering to a 
strengthened federal parliament and buttressed by a Supreme Court. 33 
3.2. Reasons for analysing the Union's system of governance 
Having completed the criticisms on the White Paper regarding the delicate 
question of the balance of power between the EU Institutions, the examination 
of the workings of the EU, as a system of governance, is important for a 
number of reasons. First, it enables us to see in more depth the workings of the 
policy process inside the Institutions of the EU; therefore it allows us to 
appreciate the polity we are dealing with. Second, it helps us to identify the 
diversity of players available to take control and thus realise who or what 
drives EU integration. Or, more fundamentally, address the question of 
32 Idem., 34. 
33 Börzel, T. and Risse, T. (2000) "Who is Afraid of a European Federation? How to 
Constitutionalise a Multi-level Governance System" in: Joerges, C. Meny, Y. and Weiler, J. 
(eds. ) (2000) What Kind of Constitution for What of Polity? 
- 
Responses to Joschka Fischer, 
Florence, Italy: RSC, European University Institute, 45-59, at 52-58. 
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organisational structure, that is, who works with whom, and in what way, to 
produce authoritative rules in the course of European integration 34 
3.3. Theories of European Integration 
From intergovernmentalists, 35 the response to this question is that Member 
States and their central administrations work together to determine EU 
integration, guided by national economic objectives, assisted by EU Institutions 
playing an ancillary role, via historical making events, for example, the various 
Treaties and other Acts. Such theorists hold that interest groups are marginal to 
European integration, as they have little or no direct involvement in EU policy 
making at the supra-national/inter-national level. Therefore they rely on 
Member State national executives to aggregate their demands and act as their 
interlocutors in the EU arena. 36 
A number of opposing views, commonly pluralistic in their approach, contest 
the intergovernmentalist account. By contrast, historical institutionalists37 
contend that Member States do not fully control integration. Gaps emerge in 
Member State control, in the form of unintended consequences, because 
politicians have short time horizons, State preferences are not fixed and 
bringing about a policy reform, for example, Structural Funds, Common 
34 Egeberg, M. (2001) "An Organisational Approach to European Integration: Outline of a 
Complementary Perspective", Arena Working Papers WP 01/18, p. 5: 
< URL http: //www. arena. uio. no/ >. 
35 See generally Moravcsik, A. (1991) "Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests 
and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community", 45 International Organisation, 19- 
56. 
36 Moravcsik, A. (1993) "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist Approach", 31 Journal of Common Market Studies 4, p. 473 at 507. 37 See generally Pierson, P. (1998) "The Path to European Integration: A Historical- 
Institutionalist Analysis" in: Sandholtz, W. and Stone Sweet, A. (eds. ) (1998) European 
Integration and Supranational Governance, New York: Oxford University Press, 27-58. 
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Agriculture Policy ("CAP"), generates massive sunk costs. In other words, EU 
policy-making is complex. Both the voting and amendment rules are unanimity 
ones under the consultation procedure while under co-operation, the voting rule 
is a qualified majority and the amendment rule is unanimity, thus making it 
difficult to amend a Commission proposal. Under these circumstances, 
therefore, it would not be surprising to see the Commission exercising 
considerable agenda power in order to push through far-reaching proposals, 
thus widening any gaps in State control. 
Some of these contentions echo arguments formulated by the early 
neofunctionalists, who suggest that EU policy is significantly shaped by the 
Commission, yet encouraged and supported by Member States and trans- 
national interest groups, with the latter transferring their loyalty, political 
activities and expectations to a new regional centre. 38 In a similar vein, the 
policy networks analysis promotes the idea that interest groups form webs of 
relatively stable and on-going relationships which mobilise and pool dispersed 
resources so that collective action, on a non-hierarchical level, can be 
orchestrated towards the solution of a common policy. On balance, this is 
actually close to the perspective in this Thesis which under the concept of a 
meta-national democracy puts emphasis on understanding the EU as a system 
of multi-level governance. 
38 Laffan, B. (1997) "The European Union: A Distinctive Model of Internationalisation? ", 1 
European Integration online Papers (EIOP) 18, p. 3: 
< URL htt: //www. eiop. or. at/eiop/texte/1997-018. htm >. 
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3.4. The notion of multi-level governance 
The central notion of the multi-level governance literature is that within the 
emerging Euro-polity, "... political arenas are 'interconnected rather than 
nested.. 
. 
The clear separation between domestic and international politics.. 
. 
is 
blurred... States... share, rather than 
... 
[exercise] control over many activities 
that take place in their respective territories". 39 The point here is that although 
the main political arenas of the Nation-State and Brussels are still there in a 
formal sense, for example, as `government structures' relating to territories, the 
possibilities of governments for unilateral control are limited. Hence, there is a 
growing gap between `government' in the Weberian sense of formal State 
structures endowed with legitimate and unchallenged authority over a 
territorially defined society, 40 and `governance' in the sense of validating 
institutional decisions as emanating from right processes. 41 While State 
authority in the former sense has remained largely unchallenged through the 
integration process, State authority in the latter sense has increasingly been 
eroded due to the rigorous involvement of supra-national, national, local and 
regional actors. The notion of multi-level governance, therefore, seems to 
mirror a meta-national forum where there is "no centre of accumulated 
39 Marks, G. Hooghe, L. Blank, K. (1996) "European Integration and the State", in: Klaus, A. 
(ed. ) (1996) Der Nationlstaat am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts: Beiträge im Rahmen der Berner 
Vortragsreihe: "Die Schweiz im Prozess der Globalisierung", Bern/Stuttgart/Wien, 91-126, at 
96 as quoted in: Conzelmann, T. (1998) "`Europeanisation' of Regional Development Policies? 
Linking the Multi-level Governance Approach with Theories of Policy Learning and Policy 
Change", 2 European Integration online Papers (EIoP) 4, p. 1: 
< URL http: //eiop. or. at/eiop/texte/1998-004a. htm >. 
ao Gerth, H. and Mills, C. (eds. ) (1948) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, London: 
Routledge, 78. 
41 Franck, T. (1999) "Democracy, Legitimacy and the Rule of Law: Linkages", Social Science 
Research Network Electronic Library, p. 1: 
< URL http: //papers ss_ rn. com/paper. taPabstract id=201054 >. 
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authority. 42 Instead, variable combinations of governments on multiple layers 
of authority 
- 
European, national, and sub-national 
- 
form policy networks for 
collaboration. The relations are characterised by mutual interdependence on 
each others' resources, not by competition for scarce resources" 43 This 
arrangement has also been endorsed by the White Paper where it is claimed that 
the Union's legitimacy depends on involvement and participation. This 
consequently suggests that "the linear model of dispensing policies from above 
must be replaced by a virtuous circle, based on feedback, networks and 
involvement from policy creation to implementation at all levels" 44 
3.4.1. Multi-level governance in vertical terms 
In vertical terms, the EU cannot function without power sharing with other 
levels of government. The sharing of power with national governments is most 
obviously expressed through the Council of Ministers, the European Council 
and a large array of intergovernmental committees across all three pillars of the 
EU. This sharing of power takes place not only at the policy-making stage but 
also in the informal advisory contacts between national civil servants and the 
Commission in the pre-legislative phase. It also occurs in the guise of 
42 Herein lies the success of multi-level governance in the EU. Otherwise, as the White Paper 
indicates multi-level interactions in the Euro-polity can become zero-sum confrontations in 
which the Commission tries to maximise its role in legislation and implementation through EU 
regulatory agencies at the expense of Member States: Scharpf, F. (2001) European Governance: 
Common Diversity vs. The Challenge of Diversity, Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 
7/01, p. 13 
< URL http: //www. ieanmonnetproeram. orglpapers/01/010701. html >. 
43 Hoogue, L. (ed. ) (1996) Cohesion Policy and European Integration: Building Multi-Level 
Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 18. 
44 White Paper loc. cit. supra note 1, p. 11. 
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implementation or execution policy Committees, 45 yet, being of a doubtful 
existence as the White Paper suggests. 
It could be argued that the broad involvement of national civil servants is a 
`watchdog exercise', or "Trojan horses"46 in the Commission's own backyard. 
However, both the Commission and the national side consider that the early 
and continuous engrenage or interlocking of all relevant actors is an important 
element for calculable joint management of the EU's policy cycle. If any major 
element is to be made responsible for the often vigorously criticised 
bureaucratisation of the `Brussels monster', it is this intrinsic set-up of multi- 
level administrative interpenetrating. 7 In any case, this bureaucracy is not an 
accidental product of personal mismanagement or just another example of 
Parkinson's law which assumes 
- 
together with the economic theory of 
bureaucracies 
- 
that such an expansion is just for the personal profit of the 
servants involved 48 This trend is an ultimately unavoidable result of the 
intensive propensity of national politicians and civil servants towards 
comprehensive participation in preparing, making, implementing and 
controlling EU decisions that affect them directly. 
45 Joerges, C. and Vos, E. (eds. ) (1999) EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics, 
Oxford: Hart, 32. 
46 See generally Ciavarini, A. (1985) "Les Experts Nationaux, Cheveaux de Troie or 
Partenaires Indispensables? " in: Jamar, J. and Wessels, W. (eds. ) (1985) The Community 
Bureaucracies at the Crossroads, Bruges: De Tempel, 99-105. 
47 See generally Trondal, J. (1999) "Integration Through Participation 
- 
Introductory Notes to 
the Study of Administrative Integration", 3 European Integration online Papers (EIoP) 4: 
< URL http: //www. eiop. or. at/texte/1999-004. htm >. 
48 Vaubel, R. (1994) "The Political Economy of Centralisation and the European Community", 
81 Public Choice, p. 151 at 168,174. 
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Moreover, as scholars working on EU structural funds will attest, multi-level 
governance extends even below national governments to include regions and 
local authorities. 9 They are also involved in the power sharing, although there 
is a lively debate as to whether sub-national governments have really been 
empowered in determining structural policy, or are merely competing for the 
available funding. 50 The structural funds, for example, have led to the creation 
of sizeable constituency of regional officials in the Community's 
underdeveloped regions, who would presumably resist any retrenchment of the 
funds. In the wealthier Member States of the north, however, the political 
importance of these groups, interested in the amount of EC funding they 
receive, is minimal, placing little if any political pressure on their governments 
to support their funding applications when they come up for renewal. 
3.4.2. Multi-level governance in horizontal terms 
In horizontal terms, the EU is also engaged in power sharing. EU governance is 
not just about vigorous, supra-national EC Institutions as the "new 
institutionalism"51 theory argues. On the contrary, the Institutions are mediating 
49 See Bache, I. (1998) The Politics of European Union Regional Policy: Multi-Level 
Governance or Flexible Gatekeeping?, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press; Evans, A. (1999) 
The E. U. Structural Funds, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Marks, G. (1991) "Structural 
Policy in the European Community" in: Sbragia, A. (ed. ) (1991) Euro-politics: Institutions and 
Policymaking in the new European Community, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 191- 
224; Long, T. (1995) "Shaping Public Policy in the European Union: A Case Study of 
Structural Funds", 2 Journal of European Public Policy 4,672-679. 
50 The White Paper also brings that debate to the fore. In effect, it takes the stand that regions, 
cities and localities are not merely competing for the available funding but are also responsible 
for implementing EU policies from agricultural and structural funding to environmental 
standards. In all cases, however, better partnerships across the various levels should be built: 
loc. cit. supra note 1, p. 12. 
51 Armstrong, K. and Bulmer, S. (eds. ) (1998) The Governance of the Single European Market, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 50-53. 
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diverse political forces coming from some thousands non-profit interest groups 
and NGOs, from socio-economic interest groups organised at the EU level 
through the ESC, both mentioned in Chapter Four, from individual firms, and 
- 
more diffusely 
- 
from wider political sources, media and public opinion. 
3.4.3. Policies and levels 
The form of creating and using channels of access and influence are numerous 
and diversified according to the policy field in question, the public instruments 
employed and the procedures used. At the meso-level, the different policy areas 
such as justice and home affairs, employment, social policy and environmental 
policy may be distinguished one from another on the basis of the style of 
governance which predominates in that area, for example, inter-governmental 
co-operation, supra-nationalism and/or pluralism. Moving down a level to the 
micro-level, it is suggested that within each policy area, more particularised 
individual governance regimes concerning particular issues co-exist. 
Governance regimes are constructed around particular policies or issues, and 
"each reflect one admixture of rules, procedures and norms (the so-called 
Institutions) embedded in the systemic context". 52 The norms must be "shared" 
by the actors, both those who rule and those who are ruled. This implies, that 
they must know who they are and what their respective roles are (institutional 
concept). Individual governance regimes are thus identified as the set of 
Institutions which shape the interaction between institutional actors and 
52 Hunt, J. "Interdisciplinary Approaches to EC Decision-Making: Law, Politics and the Multi- 
levelled `Governance Regime"', Paper presented to UACES Workshops on The State of the 
Art: Theoretical Approaches to the EU in the Post-Amsterdam Era, Aston University, 
Birmingham, 6-7 May 1999, p. 5 (mimeo). 
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regulate their activities. 53 The institutional concept also implies that the 
exercise of authority is "systemic", that is, embedded in a fragmented 
collectivity of functional systems and sub-systems of society, yet sufficiently 
interdependent and mutually trustful so that all relevant actors (national, sub- 
national and European) would lose if no policy solution were found. 
These actors and Institutions are situated at different levels within the super 
(history-making), national (policy-setting) and sub-national systems (policy- 
shaping), 54 but are linked to the extent that they participate in the same regime. 
Conceived of in this way, the governance regime template allows the multi- 
level nature of EU governance to be captured (see diagram 2.1 below). 
53 Armstrong, K. (1995) "Regulating the Free Movement of Goods: Institutions and 
Institutional Actors", in: Shaw, J. and More, G. (eds. ) (1995) New Legal Dynamics of 
European Union, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 165-191, at 167. 
sa Peterson, J. and Bomberg, E. (eds. ) (1999) Decision-Making in the European Union, 
Houndmills: Macmillan, 9. 
32 
CHAPTER TWO NA T(IRE AN! ) GOVT RNANC' 
Diagram 2.1. INTERCONNED EUROPE 
A SINGLE, MULTI-LEVEL POLITY? 
- 
POLICY NETWORKS 
COMMUNITIES AND 
SOCIAL PARTNERS 
Et 
REGIONAL NATIONAL 
l7L'DNAA[L'XTTC ISSUES nd-il 7 nIqLTIt4I 
NATIONAL 
ELECTORATES 
Source: David Earnshaw and Josephine Wood. 
"Lobbying in the New Millennium: New Approaches, New Themes", Paper 
Presented to UACES conference on Persuasion, Advocacy and Influence in the 
EU, University of Reading, 27 January 2001 (mimeo). 
Certain policy fields of the EU are of no 
- 
or lesser interest 
- 
to intermediary 
groups especially where `public goods' are produced, such as in the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy and in Justice and Home Affairs. On the contrary, 
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the interest becomes high when it comes to market integration. In this area, it 
tends to be the best-organised interest groups in Brussels together with interests 
represented by national governments that shape the policy `hot debates' 
conducted in EU Institutions. Thus on the one hand, the regulatory character of 
policy encourages the development of insider groups; on the other hand, the 
role of the intermediary groups tends to be functional depending on the 
perception of direct interests. Such a state of affairs echoes Ted Lowi's 
portrayal of regulative politics in the United States of America ("USA"), as 
disaggregated, decentralised, interest-oriented and localised. 55 
In all those sectors where regulatory and distributive activities are pursued by 
EC bodies, respective interest groups have established their representations. 
Most of the larger federations created an extensive network of working groups 
monitoring the respective agendas of the Commission and the Council. For 
instance, networks in which the CAP is dealt with are different from those 
concerned with monetary union policy. Participation of those groups in the 
policy cycle also involves the issue of relative power. The capacity to link 
several circles on different levels of the EU system, for example, is one aspect 
of the influence of persons and groups. The value of each player within this 
multi-level network, thus, depends on how this person can effectively master 
support in all relevant arenas, for instance, back home as well as in the Brussels 
buildings; the game must be played at more than one level and in more than 
one circle. In this way, the emerging interest in policy networks can be also 
ss See generally Lowi, T. (1972) "Four Systems of Policy, Politics and Choice, 32 Public 
Administration Review 4,298-310. 
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understood as a reaction to the critique of multi-level governance for 
predominantly focusing on the multi-level aspect, for example relations 
between the territorial levels of government, neglecting on the other hand 
relations between the public and private spheres. Policy networks are therefore 
perceived to offer a solution "to put governance back into multi-level 
governance". 56 
3.4.4. Advantages and disadvantages of the EU multi-level governance 
system 
Nevertheless, many empirical studies have argued that such a political setting, 
as described above, does not make the distinctions between levels clear, is too 
eclectic for actually understanding the decision-making process and also too 
fragmented to shape actors' political orientations, or even to produce consistent 
political orientation on European governance among Commission officials. 57 
Even though this holds true in some respects, it is not suggested that the multi- 
level governance system is too complicated to be democratic. The EU is a 
dynamic system and is undergoing deep changes 
- 
with regard to its range and 
scope of operations, its institutional apparatus, its effects on the Member 
56 Smith, A. (1996) "Putting the Governance Back into Multi-Level Governance: Examples 
from French Translations of the Structural Funds" Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions 
of Workshops in Oslo, 29 March 
-3 April 1996 as quoted in: Börzel, T. (1997) "What's So 
Special About Policy Networks? 
- 
An Exploration of the Concept and Its Usefulness in 
Studying European Governance", 1 European Integration online Papers (EIOP) 16, p. 10: 
< URL http: //www. eiop. or. at/eiop/texte/1997-016. htm >. 
57 Hoogue, L. (1997) "Serving `Europe 
- 
Political Orientations of Senior Commission 
Officials", 1 European Integration online Papers (EIOP) 8, p. 4: 
< URL http: //eiop. or. at/eiop/texte/1997-008a. htm >; See also Peterson, J. and Bomberg, E. op. 
cit. supra note 54, pp. 5-6,9. 
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States, 58 and its commitment to democracy and legitimacy. Since the 
breakdown of the so-called `permissive consensus' in the early 1990s, the EU 
has increased its commitment to democracy and legitimacy. 59 The basic 
principles of good governance pertaining to openness, participation, 
accountability, effectiveness and coherence offer prospects for democratising 
this trans-national governance structure. 60 By being applied to all levels of 
governance 
- 
global, European, national, regional and local 
- 
the above 
principles become the rules of conduct for institutional interactions, interest 
accommodation (or strategic group activity) and the inclusion of non- 
governmental actors in processes of meta-national policy-making. 61 
Furthermore, if a deeper integration through deliberation is to achieved, expert- 
based decision-making is not on its own illegitimate and threatening to Euro- 
democracy. Well-informed problem-solving and efficient decision-making are 
also part of good governance. Preferences should not only be stated but must 
also be justified by arguments; arguments that can be supported by scientific 
evidence have thus the best chance of convincing the parties. 
58 See, for example, European Convention CONV 21/02, OJ 2 "Description of the current 
system for the delimitation of competence between the European Union and the Member 
States". 
59 Eriksen, E. and Fossum, J. (2001) "Multi-level or Democratic Governance in the EU: 
Institutionalised Deliberations and the Question of Democracy in the European Union", Paper 
prepared for the workshop on Constitutionalism and Transnational Governance, EUI, Florence: 
Italy, 30 November-1 December 2001, p. 3: 
< URL http: //www. iue. it/LAW/ioerizes/transnationalism/documents/Eriksen-Fossum. pdf >. 
60 White Paper loc. cit. supra note 1, p. 10. 
61 Neyer, J. (2001) "Discource and Order 
- 
On the Conditions of Governance in Non- 
Hierarchial Multi-Level Systems", Arena Working Paper 01/19, p. 3 
< URL http: //www. arena. uio. no/publications/wp02 9. htm >; See also Eriksen, E. and Fossum, 
J. supra note 59, pp. 6-7,10,12. - 
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As far as the consensus-seeking is concerned, this might be cumbersome and 
costly in time, but it is "the way" of lending legitimacy to political policy- 
making in fragmented systems of decision-making lacking a collective identity. 
It is a way of "managing interdependence"62 by accommodating difference and 
of ensuring willingness to comply with actions decided in common. Multi-level 
governance cannot but be dependent on consensus building or generalised 
reciprocity to prevent any deadlock, and so participants are likely to adopt a 
more moderate political orientation. In fact, interlocking in a multi-level 
governance system induces Commission officials, pivotal in channelling 
decisions, to converge towards median orientations on European governance. 
Progress in a non-hierarchical interlocked system is usually most likely if the 
system is responsive to affected actors, and senior Commission officials as 
professional employees can be particularly sensitive to these incentives. This 
does not imply, however, that they should not be expected to identify new areas 
of European collaboration and come up with innovative solutions which 
requires autonomous thinking. 
As for the argument that it becomes problematic to develop a comprehensive 
and thorough analysis of the decision-making process, there are two 
explanations. First, the tiers or levels of EU governance are increasingly 
interdependent. "They all share the responsibility for problem solving but 
neither (level) has adequate authority and policy instruments to tackle the 
62 Papadopoulos, Y. (2000) "Modern Deliberative Forms of Multi-level Governance: 
Responsiveness and Democratic Accountability in Complex Environments", Paper presented at 
the XVIIIth International Political Science Association (IPSA) World Congress on special 
session Accountability, Transparency and Publicity, Quebec: Canada, 1-5 August 2000, p. 3< 
URL httn: //www-ssn unil ch/-IEPI/PCHPP/PDF12apado/dipsa pdf>. 
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challenges they face". 63 Second, that scholars of the European Union have the 
ambition to link different policies, different levels of analysis and different 
intellectual traditions. 64 
Here the ambition is more modest. The author will employ the aforementioned 
analytical ideas and theoretical frameworks, focusing on only one sector. The 
remainder of the Chapter will be centred on the EU environmental policy and 
its detailed processes of interest articulation as part of policy-formulation, so as 
to show that in a complex and "loosely coupled system", 65 there is considerable 
room for processes: 
Preferences x Institutions = to impact outcomes. 66 
Certainly, it might appear that this is not enough to make predictions and draw 
conclusions from one area only. Yet, it is the only way to indicate the existence 
of a system of multi-level governance in which interest groups are purposefully 
engaged during all phases of policy-making cycle. In this sense, "Brussels" is 
like Washington where corporations and/or local governments occupy a 
dominant position with respect to interest representation. 67 However, the EU 
63 O'Neill, M. loc. cit. supra note 17, p. 5 (mimeo). 
64 Andersen, S. and Eliassen, K. (eds. ) (2001) Making Policy in Europe, London: Sage, (2' 
edition), 16. 
65 Laffan, B. loc. cit. supra note 38, p. 6. 
66 Hinich, M. and Mungen, C. (1997) Analytical Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 17 as quoted in: Hix, S. (1999) The Political System of the European Union, New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 13. 
67 See generally Salisbury, R. (1984) "Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions", 
78 American Political Science Review, 64-76; See also, Jillson, C. (1999) American 
Government: Political Change and Institutional Development, Orlando: Hartcourt Brace, 167- 
205. 
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policy-making is not only pluralist, meaning that "in theorys68 at least interest 
groups are free to form and compete at multiple points for equal access to the 
political process. The EU is more like national European systems such as those 
of UK, France and Germany where representation is mainly pluralist, but there 
is also some institutionalised relation between certain actors (mainly labour) 
and government. 
In this Chapter, therefore, as well as in Chapter Five, following an analysis of 
social partners' involvement in Employment and Social Policies, we will 
assume that there is a mixture of representational styles at the EU level. That is 
why the policy-making is not always the same, and consesquently there may be 
substantial differences between policy sectors in the way policies are 
formulated and implemented. 
4. ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS 
4.1. Introduction 
Building on the earlier scholarship which concerned itself with interest groups 
in EU integration, attention is to be drawn to the contribution of environmental 
68 Perfect pluralism never really exists. First, in most societies one type of social division tends 
to dominate all others, so that the side of the divide which is numerically, economically or 
political most powerful will dominate the political process. Second, even where there are cross- 
cutting social divisions, opposing groups rarely have equal access to power. This is a product of 
the so-called 'logic of collective action': where there are motives to join a group that seeks 
benefits for only those members of the group ('private interests'), and no intention to join a 
group that seeks benefits for the whole society ('public interests'). With public interest, people 
can simply `free ride': reap the benefits of higher environmental protection, for instance, without 
helping an envrionmentalist group lobby government. Consequently, private interests, such as 
individual firms and industrial lobbies, are more able to organise than `sparce interests', like 
labour unions, consumer groups, or civil rights movements. The result is unequal access to 
political power, the capture of State officials by groups with the most resources, and outputs 
that benefit special interests at the expense of society. See Hix, S. (1999) The Political System 
of the European Union, New York: St. Martin's Press, 189. 
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groups, in particular to four legislative measures that form the basis of two 
intertwined strands of EU environmental policy. These groups and aspects of 
biodiversity and land use planning have been selected for a number of reasons. 
First, whilst a considerable body of research addresses the subject of lobbying 
in the EU, 69 a sizeable proportion of the literature focuses on the activities of 
private interests in the market, namely industrial or business associations. 70 
Euro-groups associated with the environment have not yet been subject to 
much academic research. The last section of this Chapter thus attempts to 
redress firstly that imbalance by developing on others' work that have 
examined public interests, including environmental groups. 7' Secondly, 
whereas previous studies have examined the actors involved in the 
development of the Union's environmental acquis (1972-1986), the chosen 
69 See generally Grant, W. (1993) "Pressure Groups and the European Community" in: Mazey, 
S. and Richardson, J. (eds. ) (1993) Lobbying in the European Community, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 27-45; Grenwood, J. Grote, J. and Ronit, K. (eds. ) (1992) Organised Interests 
and the European Community, London: Sage; McLaughlin, A. Jordan, G. and Maloney, W. 
(1993) "Corporate Lobbying in the European Community", 31 Journal of Common Market 
Studies 2,191-212; McLaughlin, A. and Greenwood, J. (1995) "The Management of Interest 
Representation in the European Union", 33 Journal of Common Market Studies 1,143-156; 
Greenwood, J. Strangward, L. and Stancich, L. (1999) "The Capacities of Euro Groups in the 
Integration Process", 47 Political Studies 1,127-138. 
70 See generally Pedler, R. and Van Schendelen, M. (eds. ) (1994) Lobbying the European 
Union. Companies, Trade Associations and Issue Groups, Aldershot: Dartmouth; Benett, R. 
(1997) "The Impact of European Economic Integration on Business Associations: The UK 
Case", 20 West European Politics 3,61-90; Green-Cowles, M. (1995) "Setting the Agenda for 
the New Europe: the ERT and the EC 1992", 33 Journal of Common Market Studies 4,501- 
526; Inter alia Green-Cowles, M. (1998) "The Changing Architecture of Big Business" in: 
Greenwood, J. and Aspinwall, M. (eds. ) (1998) Collective Action in the European Union: 
Interests and the new Politics of Associability, London: Routledge, 108-125; Grant, W. and 
Sargent, J. (eds. ) (1987) Business and Politics in Britain, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
71 See generally Greeenwood, J. (1997) Representing Interests in the European Union, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan; Long, T. (1998) "The Environmental Lobby" in: Lowe, P. and Ward, 
S. (eds. ) (1998) British Environmental Policy and Europe: Politics and Policy in Transition, 
London: Routledge, 105-118; Webster, R. (1998) "Environmental Collective Action: Stable 
Patterns of Co-operation and Issue Alliances at the European level" in: Greenwood, J. and 
Aspinwall, M. (eds. ) (1998) Collective Action in the European Union, London: Routledge, 
176-195. 
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policy areas have not been appraised to date and the existing literature greatly 
underplays the role of interest groups in policy formation. 72 
4.2. Used terminology 
To discuss the activities of the environmental groups, the terms `access' and 
`accomplished targeting' are used. The term `access' indicates contact between 
interest groups and policy-makers, sought by the former which might take a 
variety of forms, for example, written correspondence, transmission of briefing 
papers, face-to-face meetings, telecommunication exchanges. It can also 
encompass those actions on the part of the interest groups designed to 
`convince' policy-makers of the merits of a particular policy line, for example 
the use of lobbying. The term `accomplished targeting', on the other hand, 
refers to the successful attainment of objectives 
- 
from the point of view of the 
group. For instance, the successful achievement of a particular direction and/or 
the adoption of sought-after piece legislation at the EU or national level are 
good examples of such targeting. At this stage, it is important to make two 
observations. Firstly, access does not guarantee accomplished targeting. 
Secondly, the relationship between access and accomplished targeting is not 
necessarily sequential. For example, where interest groups are deficient in 
structural power, they form alliances with the contact groups. In doing so, we 
acknowledge that some actors do not necessarily need access to achieve their 
objectives. 
72 See generally Golub, J. (1996) "British Sovereignty and the Development of EC 
Environmental Policy", 5 Environmental Politics 4,700-728. 
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4.3. Targets and environmental interest groups 
There are several potential targets for environmental groups according to their 
organisational resources, namely funds, qualified staff, offices in close 
geographical proximity to policy-makers, knowledge, the nature of group's 
track record (reputation for effectiveness or ineffectiveness, for field-level 
project work or policy activities, for providing reliable information) and status. 
A group can be an `insider' when it is directly affected by EU Directives and 
Regulations like the French hunting lobby, "Chasse, Peche, nature et traditions" 
("CPNT")73 or an `outsider' like Greenpeace in the adoption and 
implementation of the Habitats and the Wild Birds Directives that are studied 
below. 
Bearing in mind the relationship between potential targets and sufficient 
resources, liberal intergovernmentalism theory, as referred to above, would 
seem to suggest that national central government departments should be 
targeted. Pluralist accounts, on the other hand, for example neofunctionalism 
and multi-level governance, would expect groups to seek out EU level officials. 
Ward and Lowe's account lends support to the pluralist approach, in so far as 
60% of their respondents regarded "the European Union as a more influential 
force in environmental policy than national government' 2 74 
73 Avramovic, P. "Taking Preferences Further: A Liberal Critique of Moravicsik's 
Intergovernmentalism", Paper presented to the Fourth UACES Research Conference, 
University of Sheffield, 8-10 September 1999, pp. 7-9 (mimeo). 
74 Greenwood, J. (1997) op. cit. supra note 71, p. 92. 
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5. THE EVOLUTION OF EU BIODIVERSITY 
5.1. Introduction 
At the EU level, biodiversity policy comprises an array of different statutes, 
covering subjects as diverse as forestry protection and seals. However, the two 
most important tools of EU biodiversity are Directive 79/409/EEC on the 
conservation of wild birds75 and Directive 92/43/EEC on the conservation of 
natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora. 76 
5.2. The Wild Birds Directive 
The founding Treaties of the EU contained no direct references to nature 
conservation, nor to any other aspect of environmental policy, because it was 
not considered to be a suitable area for Community competence. 77 Therefore, it 
was not until the Single European Act ("SEA") came into force in the late 
1980s, that the European Union acquired a solid legal foundation for nature 
protection or biodiversity policy. Yet, from the early 1970s, the EU had begun 
to establish environmental principles and programmes. A broad range of 
political support for the Birds Directive can be dated from that period. 
By the 1970s there was a general belief that species and habitats had to be 
protected. 78 This had resulted in the signing and adoption of some important 
75 Council Directive 79/409/EEC of 2 April 1979 on the conservation of wild birds [OJ 1979, 
No. L 103/1 as last amended by Directive 97/49/EC OJ 1997, No. L 223/9]. 
76 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of 
wild flora and fauna [OJ 1992, No. L 206/7 as last amended by Directive 97/62/EC OJ 1997, 
No. L 305/42]. 
" Dixon, J. (1998) "Nature Conservation" in: Lowe, P. and Ward, S. (eds. ) (1998) British 
Environmental Policy and Europe: Politics and Policy in Transition, London: Routledge, 214- 
231, at 223. 
78 Haigh, N. (2000) Manual of Environmental Policy, London: Cartermill, 9.9-1. 
43 
CHAPTER TWO NA TURE AND GOVERNANCE 
international conventions which were to provide the necessary impetus for EU 
level action. In particular, these were the Ramsar Convention (1971) on the 
conservation of the World's wetland habitats and the Bern and Bonn 
Conventions on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats 
and on the protection of migratory birds and mammals (1979). 
5.2.1. Proposals and British environmental lobbying 
The first EU level proposal to include an undertaking to protect birds and 
certain other species was the First Action Programme79 which exploited Article 
2 of the Treaty of Rome 1957 that refers to a harmonious economic 
development and improvement of quality of life. The signing of this 
programme signalled the endorsement by the Member States of species 
protection. 
Among the sources of pressure for nature conservation measures were the 
public, who were infuriated with slaughters of migratory birds, and interest 
groups like "Save our Migratory Birds" petitioned the EP which resulted in a 
Resolution in February 1975. This Resolution led in turn to Commission 
proposals, although this was not the Commission's first involvement in the 
policy area. Since the 1970s the Commission had already undertaken a number 
of studies, consulted national experts and reminded Member States of their 
obligations to comply with the 1950 Paris Convention on Birds and the 1971 
Ramsar Convention. 80 
79 First Action Programme on the Environment 1973-1976 [OJ 1973, No. C 112/40]. 
80 Wils, W. (1994) "The Birds Directive 15 Years Later: A Survey of the Case Law and a 
Comparison with the Habitats Directive", 6 Journal of Environmental Law 2, p. 219 at 219. 
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As a result of the broad support for protection measures on bird conservation, 
the Directive was proposed in December 197681 but was not adopted until 
April 1979. This eighteen month delay was largely the consequence of 
opposition from the French and Italian governments. Having adopted the Birds 
Directive, in due course there were a number of technical adaptations related to 
the enlargement of the EU (to include Greece, Spain and Portugal). Of much 
greater importance, nonetheless, was the amendment to the Birds Directive 
introduced via the Habitats Directive in the early 1990s. 82 
The Birds Directive places a duty upon the Member States to maintain the 
populations of wild birds at a level which corresponds to ecological, scientific, 
cultural, economic and recreational grounds. 83 It prohibits any deliberate killing 
or capture of birds by any method, deliberate destruction of or damage to nests, 
eggs, breeding and rearing sites, and the keeping of birds whose hunting or 
capture is prohibited. 84 
Additionally, under the Birds' Directive Member States were required to 
designate their own Special Protection Areas ("SPAs") and to notify the 
Commission of these sites by April 1981.85 Despite this deadline, the Birds 
Directive lacked a strict timetable for compliance (unlike the Habitats 
$1 Proposal for a Council Directive on bird conservation [OJ 1977, No. C 24/3]. 
82 Wils, W. loc. cit. supra note 80, pp. 220-221. 
83 Council Directive 79/409/EEC loc. cit. supra note 75, Art. 2. 
84 Idem., Art. 5. 
8S Idem., Arts. 4,18. 
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Directive) and the result was that some Member States (for example, France, 
Netherlands, and Italy) failed to comply with this obligation. 86 
In the UK, formal compliance with that obligation was achieved through a 
number of pieces of legislation. These included: a) the National Parks and 
Access to the Countryside Act (1949), b) the Countryside Act (1968), c) the 
Countryside (Scotland) Act (1967), and d) the Wildlife and Countryside Act 
(1981). Under UK procedures, SPAs were classified by the Secretary of State 
for Environment ("DoE"), on the recommendation of the Nature Conservancy 
Council ("NCC") and would normally have already been notified as Sites of 
Special Scientific Interest ("SSSIs"). 87 
With respect to the incorrect implementation of the Directive, the Commission 
responded to the growing concerns over the failure to implement by initiating 
infringement proceedings against every single Member State. 88 Two of the 
most important cases upon which the ECJ ruled in the early 1990s were 
Commission v. Germany89 with Britain intervening (so-called Leybucht Dykes) 
and Commission v. Spain. 90 Crucially, the Court's decisions in these two cases 
86 Note Cases: C-166/97 Commission v. France [1999] ECR I- 1719, para. 15; C-96/98 
Commission v. France [1999] ECR I- 8531, para. 16; C-374/98 Commission v. France 
judgment of 7 December 2000, para. 30 (not yet reported); C-3/96 Commission v. Netherlands 
[1998] ECR I- 3031, paras. 30,63; C-334/89 Commission v. Italy [1991] ECR I- 93, para. 10. 
87 Note, however, that SSSIs are voluntary agreements between statutory bodies and specific 
landowners, therefore they are not covered by any specific law, except those laws relating to 
endangered species on the CITES list. There are numerous examples of finest wildlife sites 
being wilfully destroyed by farmers and landowners ever since their adoption; in general, SSSIs 
have always been pretty ineffective in the protection and conservancy of flora and fauna. 
88 Note Cases: C-247/85 Commission v. Belgium [1987] ECR 3029; C-262/85 Commission V. 
Italy [1987] ECR 3073; C-159/99 Commission v. Italy [2001] ECR I- 4007; C-38/99 
Commission v. France judgment of 7 December 2000 (not yet reported). 
89 Case C-57/89 Commission v. Germany [1991] ECR I- 883. 
90 Case C-355/90 Commission v. Spain [1993] ECR I- 4221. 
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appeared to elevate ecological considerations over economic or recreational 
ones during the designation and development of protected sites. Employing the 
same principles, the ECJ also ruled against the UK government who had 
excluded an area of land from a SPA in order to allow development of a nearby 
port. The case known as Lappel Bank9' drew information submitted by the 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds ("RSPB"), a UK conservation- 
environmental group. 
5.3. The Habitats Directive 
In common with the Birds Directive, the Habitats Directive was the product of 
the efforts of more than one political actor. Governments signalled their 
recognition of the link between migratory species and habitats92 in the Third 
Environmental Action Programme. 93 National and transnational conservation 
organisations continued to campaign for increased protection mechanisms, 94 
and in actual terms they pushed the EU to fully implement the provisions of the 
Bern Convention via EU legislation. Once again, the Commission, the 
Parliament and the Court of Justice played a significant role in developing the 
Directive. 
The Habitats Directive was proposed in September 198895 but was not finally 
adopted until 1992 due to Member States' objections. In fact, one source of 
91 Case C-44/95 Regina v. Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte: Royal Society for 
the Protection of Birds [1996] ECR I- 3805, [1997] 2 WLR 123. 
92 Haigh, N. op. cit. supra note 78, p. 9.9-6. 
93 Third Action Programme on the Environment 1982-1986 [OJ 1983, No. C 46/3]. 
94 See supra note 92, p. 9.9-7. See also Dixon, J. loc. cit. supra note 77, p. 224. 
95 Proposals for a Council Directive on natural habitats and wild fauna and flora conservation 
[OJ 1988, No. C 247/3 and OJ 1990, No. C 195/1]. 
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delay was the UK, which led a determined campaign to reverse the effects of 
the Leybucht Dykes decision. This case was in progress as Habitats Directive 
was being negotiated and when the ECJ decision was announced in February 
1991 it took the UK government by surprise. In addition to the British 
resistance to the proposed habitats legislation, Spain also raised objections. In 
fact, negotiations foundered over the issue of providing financial assistance to 
it and to other countries where the Directive would have had the greatest 
economic impact. 
The UK Government's successful campaign to re-establish Member State 
discretion over protected sites, resulted in the inclusion of a number of crucial 
Articles in the final version of the Habitats Directive. Articles 6 (4) and 7 of the 
Habitats Directive replaced Article 4 (4) of the Birds Directive, thus appearing 
to make the former a rather weak piece of species protection legislation. In this 
context, the Habitats Directive and the subsequent amended Birds Directive 
appeared to give Member States great flexibility or autonomy in respect of the 
protected sites, for example to use economic reasons so as to allow damage to 
sites. 
Under Article 3 of the Habitats Directive, the protection of plant and animal 
species and their habitats is to be achieved by fusing SPAs with a new class of 
areas called Special Areas of Conservation ("SACs") that form a pan-European 
system of protected areas called Natura 2000. Member States are required to 
avoid deterioration of these sites and to carry out appropriate assessments of 
any plans or projects that might destroy the areas. 
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As with its predecessor, the correct transposition of the Habitats Directive has 
also been problematic. Despite the inclusion of a strict but quite generous, ten- 
year implementation timetable, with the first composite implementation report 
to be made on 50' June 2002, the Commission again has been very busy on 
issuing warnings and initiating infringement proceedings against a majority of 
the Member States. For instance, in December 1997, the Commission initiated 
infringement proceedings against several Member States, including the UK, for 
failure to notify the Institution of their complete lists of proposed SACs. 96 Also 
based on the complaints registered in 1998 by broad categories, bearing in 
mind, however, that they often raise more than one problem, it was found that 
one in every two complaints was concerned with nature conservation; yet, not 
involving Britain this time. 7 In the years 1999 and 2000 the Commission 
warned that where implementation of the Birds and Habitats Directive is 
particularly poor, failure to meet their commitments may jeopardise their 
chance of receiving regional funding under the Structural Funds 98 To the same 
effect, the EP in January 2001 called on the Commission to carry out a detailed 
examination of the implementation and observance of Community 
environmental legislation in all Member States' works and projects requiring 
Community funding as it considered that the Habitats Directive has shown 
problems and excessive delays in its enforcement and transposition. 9 
96 Haigh, N. op. cit. supra note 78, p. 9.9-11. 
97 European Commission, Environment Chapter of the Sixteenth Annual Report on Monitoring 
the Application of Community Law (1998), COM (1999) 301,18 June 1999, p. 8. 
98 See supra note 96. 
99 European Parliament, Resolution on the Satisfactory Implementation of Environment 
Directives, B5-0038/2001,17 January 2001, p. l. 
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5.3.1. Lobbying and implementation of the Habitats Directive in the UK 
In the UK, the Habitats Directive was enacted via the Conservation (Natural 
Habitats, Etc. ) Regulations of 1994 but these have been termed as 
"minimalist". 100 They engraft on to the existing systems of sites of special 
scientific interest ("SSSIs") and town planning, and only adding extra controls 
where necessary. When it comes to the protection of marine SACs and SPAs 
the position is even clearer. The Regulations do address the issue of marine 
sites, but do not provide an absolute framework for protection. That is why 
legal challenges have been mounted against the UK Government for failing to 
adequately protect marine sites. For example, in 1999, Greenpeace gave 
evidence against the UK Govemment, 101 arguing that all future oil licensing by 
the Department of Trade and Industry ("DTI") is illegal until the Directive is 
properly applied to oil licensing in the north east Atlantic and that the Directive 
should be applied to the 200-mile limit since the UK claims exclusive 
economic rights up to this distance. The High Court confirmed that the Habitats 
Directive has to be applied to the continental shelf and to waters up to the 200- 
mile fishing limit before new offshore oil or gas exploration licenses can be 
granted. 102 The judgment thus represents a significant extension of the 
Directive's reach, since no country has designated conservation sites beyond 
the 12-mile national territorial limit. It also suggests that the Department of 
Environment of Transport and the Regions ("DETR") will have to take 
10° Ball, S. (1997) "Has the UK Government Implemented the Habitats Directive Properly? " in: 
Holder, J, (ed. ) The Impact of EC Environmental Law in the United Kingdom, Chichester: John 
Wiley, 215-227, at 215-216. 
101 R v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry ex parte Greenpeace, (High Court, Queen's 
Bench Division, Maurice Kay J, 5 November 1999). 
102 Jans, J. (2000) "The Habitats Directive", 12 Journal of Environmental Law 3, p. 385 at 386- 
387. See also Haigh, N. op. cit. supra note 78, p. 9.9-12. 
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additional steps to ensure the protection of cold-water coral during 
hydrocarbons exploration as well as checking that whales and dolphins are not 
disturbed. 
6. EU LAND USE PLANNING POLICY 
6.1. Introduction 
The core of EU land use planning policy comprises one adopted measure, the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA Directive 85/337/EEC), 103 and another 
one, which, at the time of writing this Chapter of the Thesis, has reached a 
political agreement and deals with the Strategic Environmental Assessment 
("SEA"). 
6.2. The Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 
By the time the EU adopted an EIA Directive in 1985, some States were 
already experienced at undertaking on their own, domestic assessments (for 
example, West Germany and France since 1976 and the Netherlands since 
198 1)104 but for the rest, EIA was a novelty. '05 
6.2.1. Policy actors 
In common with the biodiversity Directives mentioned above, a number of 
policy actors contributed to the evolution of the Directive. These included the 
Commission which had begun preparing the ground in the mid-1970s by 
commissioning a series of expert reports. The European Environmental Bureau 
103 Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27, June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain 
public and private projects on the environment [OJ 1985, No. L 175/40 as amended by 
Directive 97/11/EC OJ 1997, No. L 73/5]. 
104 Wood, C. (ed. ) (1995) Environmental Impact Assessment, Harlow, Longman, 3. 
105 ldem., 31. 
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("EEB") and the European Council for environmental law tried to crystallise 
opinion by holding an information-sharing seminar in 1975 for national experts 
and Commission officials. 106 On the basis of these discussions, the 
Commission began drafting a formal proposal during 1977 and 1978. 
Nevertheless, almost from the start, progress was slow because the proposal 
represented the Union's first intrusion into national land use planning practices. 
In fact, it is reported that the proposal went through 20 different draus before 
being published in 1980.107 
Once again the UK Government together with the Danes presented a significant 
obstacle. During the drafting stages, important changes were made so as to 
accommodate British and Danish objections. Nonetheless, the final draft still 
contained a number of elements that the British opposed such as a long list of 
projects in Annex I where EIA was made mandatory, provisions for 
Commission co-ordination of the Annex II thresholds (Article 2 of the 85/337 
Directive) and a requirement to consider additional project sites where 
appropriate (Article 2 of the amending 97/11 Directive). 
The EIA Directive is a piece of horizontal environmental legislation. 
Legislation may be classified as "horizontal"108 when it relates to general 
106 Sheate, W. (1997) "From EIA to SEA: Sustainability and Decision-Making" in: Holder, J. 
(1997) The Impact of EC Environmental Law in the UK, Chichester, John Wiley, 267-285, at 
270. 
107 Wood, C. op. cit. supra note 104, p. 33. 
log European Commission, DG Environment Publications (2000) "Guide to the Approximation 
of European Union Environmental Legislation 
- 
Part 2: Overview of EU environmental 
legislation 
- 
Introduction and Horizontal Legislation ": 
<URL http: //europa eu. int/comm/environment/ ide/part2a htm>. 
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environmental management issues rather than to specific sectors, products or 
types of emissions. It concerns the collection and assessment of information on 
the environment and on the wide range of human activities which impact on the 
environment. In particular, it requires that, before governmental approval can 
be granted, certain development projects must be subject to a process in which 
potential environmental effects are assessed. Thus, on the one hand, Annex I of 
the EIA Directive lists 9 types of projects which must receive an environmental 
assessment, although exemptions in exceptional circumstances can be made 
(Article 2 (3)). Annex II, on the other hand, includes 13 categories of 
development projects covering 80 separate types of project, which require an 
EA where States consider that "their characteristics so require". 109 Article 4 (2) 
requires Member States either to specify a priori certain types of projects that 
will fall under Annex H, or establish the criteria and thresholds to determine 
which apply. In the UK the test depends on "the likely significance"' 10 of the 
project's environmental effects. 
The UK Government had considered itself to lead in this sphere of legislation 
and thought that the EU law would only formalise or rather duplicate what the 
UK was already doing as part of a well established land use planning process, 
dating back to 1948. Initially, formal compliance with the EIA Directive in the 
UK was attempted through secondary legislation, the Town and Country 
Planning (Assessment of Environmental Effects) Regulations 1988, which was 
adopted under the European Communities Act 1972. When this failed, 
109 Council Directive 85/337/EEC loc. cit. supra note 103, Art. 4 (2). 
110 Wood, C. op. cit. supra note 104, p. 120. 
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however, to produce adequate compliance with the strict terms of the Directive 
inasmuch as it did not cover developments like agriculture and forestry, the UK 
was obliged to introduce the 1991 Planning and Compensation Act, relying on 
i 
over 40 Regulations. ' 
Likewise biodiversity policy rulings by the ECJ have played an important role 
in giving the EIA Directive greater legal and political sharpness. The rulings 
which stemmed from continuing disagreements about the interpretation of the 
Directive between the Commission and the Member States 112 have proved that 
States cannot be discretionary in its implementation as they might have thought 
in the first place. Being the first to be dealt with, the most remarkable among 
the ECJ cases were Commission v. Germanyt 13 (supported by the UK) and 
Commission v. Belgium 114 (supported by Germany). The first case addressed 
concerns surrounding Annexes I and H. Germany argued that Annex I did not 
apply to a modification of an existing project. The ECJ, however, held that: 
"That project was required to undergo an assessment of its 
effects on the environment irrespective of whether it is a 
separate construction, is added to pre-existing construction or 
111 Zetter, J. (1997) "Environmental Impact Assessment: Has It Had an Impact? " in: Holder, J. 
(1997) The Impact of EC Environmental Law in the UK, Chichester: John Wiley, 257-266, at 
259-260. 
112 Note Cases C-392/96 Commission v. Ireland [1999] ECR I- 5901; C- 230/00 Commission 
v. Belgium [2001] ECR I- 4591. 
113 Case C-431/92 Commission v. Germany [1995] ECR I- 2189. 
114 Case C-133/94 Commission v. Belgium [1996] ECR I- 2323. 
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even has close functional links with a pre-existing 
construction". 115 
In the latter case, the Commission felt that Belgium with Germany had adopted 
a narrow interpretation of the applicability of Annex I. The Court agreed with 
the Commission ruling that Member States should consider projects on a case 
by-case basis and they should not establish generic thresholds or criteria for 
exempting in advance certain projects in Annex II from EIA. ' 16 
Concerning its impact on the UK, the EIA Directive instigated far more 
Environmental Assessments of developing projects than anyone expected, 
particularly in relation to activities under Annex II which the UK government 
wanted to apply with caution. 117 Between 1988 and the end of 1993, over 1000 
Environmental Impact Statements ("EISs") were produced under EU law - of 
which less than 10 per cent related to projects falling within Annex I and over 
300 outside it, thus indicating the tremendous interest in EIA generated by the 
Directive. 118 The growing popularity of EIA among statutory consultants, 
developers, environmentalists and local planning officers has led it to being 
formally applied to projects which are outside the ambit of EU rules. 119 
Interestingly, the UK's tepid enthusiasm for the EIA has grown considerably in 
1 15 C-431/92 loc. cit. supra note 113, paras. 35-36. 
116 C-133/94 loc. cit supra note 114, paras. 41-44. 
117 See generally Wood, C. and Jones, C. (1991) Monitoring Environmental Assessment and 
Planning, London: HMSO. 
118 Wood, C. op. cit. supra note 104, p. 53. 
119 See supra note 117, pp. 26-28. 
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the period since 1988 as the warnings of excessive legal actions and delays 
have failed to materialise. 120 
6.3. Developing Strategic Environmental Assessment 
The idea of Strategic Environmental Assessment ("SEA") is nothing new in the 
EU. Actually, it has been one of the Commission's political goals for almost as 
long as the Community has developed an environmental policy. In the late 
1970s, it was first recommended to the Commission and there were plans to 
introduce it in the Commission's 1980 draft EIA proposal. However, it was 
only with the fourth Action Programme on the Environment (1987)121 that the 
Member States and the Commission formally committed themselves to 
promoting SEA. In particular, environmental groups, agencies and the EP have 
always been enthusiastic campaigners of SEA, but the Commission has always 
had to treat carefully the issue in order to win over the Member States' support 
to its way of thinking. 
By the 1990s the political context had become more encouraging to having a 
SEA. Many Member States, including the UK, began to experiment with 
national level systems of SEA (for example, France, and Italy) and 
Environmental Evaluation ("EE") which is less stringent than SEA to reconcile 
needs of conservation and economic development (the so-called environmental 
sustainability)122- an emerging leitmotif in the EU environmental policy. The 
120 Haigh, N. (ed. ) (1989) EEC Environmental Policy and Britain, Longman: Harlow, (2"a 
revised edition), 353. 
121 Fourth Action Programme on the Environment 1987-1992 [OJ 1987, No. C 328/6]. 
122 Therivel, R. Wilson, E. Thompson, S. Heaney, D. and Pritchard, D. (eds. ) (1992) Strategic 
Environmental Assessment, London: Earthscan, 123. 
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Commission was then able to use the prospect of inconsistent national SEA and 
EE systems as a justification for proposing SEA at the European level, though 
not without much delay and patient negotiation. Early drafts were under 
discussion within the Commission in 1990 and implied that SEA would be 
applied to just about all policies, plans and programmes that give rise to 
development. 
In December 1992, the UK Government used a subsidiarity debate (veto 
power) to formally suspend the SEA proposal. Nonetheless, this set back did 
not deter the Commission from making efforts to extend SEA by other means, 
such as the structural funding process, in certain Directives such as those 
addressing habitats123 and also in the construction of roads. 124 Following broad 
discussions with Member States the Commission finally issued a formal SEA 
proposal in 1996125 and requires an environmental assessment of all plans and 
programmes that are adopted as a part of the town and country planning 
decision-making process, but not as originally suggested, of policies. Its scope 
was also narrowed down to land use planning decisions like local development 
plans and waste local plans, Article 2(a). Other changes were made to appease 
further Member States and included greater discretion and flexibility so as to 
tailor the Directive to fit in with national circumstances (Articles 3,4,6 of the 
original text and Recitals 2,7 of the amended text). 
123 Idem., 52-53. 
124 Sheate, W. loc. cit. supra note 106, pp. 279-281. 
125 Proposal for a Council Directive on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and 
programmes on the environment, [COM/96/511 final as amended by CON/99/73, OJ 1997, 
No. C 129/14 and OJ 1999, No. C 83/13]. 
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Since then, however, the proposal remained in limbo as a succession of 
Council Presidencies, including the UK's, ignored it. Interestingly, during its 
Presidency in 1998, the UK Government turned away from SEA and opted 
instead to push for a strategy on integration of environment into other policies 
via the intergovernmental route at the Cardiff European Council (June 1998). 
In 1999, first the Finnish and then the German Presidencies, took stock of 
progress and reaffirmed the commitment to sustainable development and 
integration which gave the SEA proposal much needed shot in the arm. 126 By 
1999, even the UK Government was said to be broadly in favour of the 
proposal as it stood. Hence, environment Ministers reached a political 
agreement on the text in December 1999127 and formally adopted the SEA 
Directive in June 2001.128 
6.3.1. The scope of the SEA Directive in a few words 
Although the EIA Directive requires an environmental impact assessment to be 
carried out before the development consent is given for projects likely to have 
significant effects on the environment, it does not require an assessment to be 
carried out before the adoption of the plans and programmes which set the 
framework for such development consent decisions. The purpose thus of the 
SEA Directive is to remedy this shortcoming by supplementing the EIA 
Directive with requirements for town and country plans and programmes to be 
126 European Commission, DG Environment (2001) "Environmental Integration ": 
< URI, http: //europa eu int/comm/enveco/integration/integration htm >. 
127 Common Position formally adopted by the Council with a view to the adoption of a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the assessment of the effects of 
certain plans and programmes on the environment, Brussels 20 March 2000: 
http: //europa eu int/comm/environment/eia/sea-leRalcontext htm . 
128 Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the 
assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment [OJ, 2001 No. L 
197/30]. 
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assessed. 129 The public and environmental authorities can give their opinion130 
and all results contained in an environmental report are integrated and taken 
into account in the course of the planning procedure. 131 After the adoption of 
the plan, programme or even policy ("PPP") the public should be informed 
about the decision and the way in which it was made. 132 In the case of possible 
transboundary significant effects the affected Member States and its public 
should be informed and have the opportunity to make comments, which are 
also integrated into the national decision-making process. '33 
7. PROCESSES TO IMPACT OUTCOMES 
7.1. Introduction 
Sketching the evolution of EU environmental policy was a prerequisite for 
understanding the processes of interest articulation as part of policy formation. 
There now follows an examination of the activities of the environmental groups 
in exerting influence over the adoption and correct implementation of the EU 
biodiversity and land use planning policy. Questions such as which policy- 
makers (who) the groups sought to access, how they achieved this, and why 
they did so will be examined. 
7.2. Who were the targets in the case study? 
The empirical evidence shows that the UK environmental groups successfully 
gained access to all levels of governance: national, sub-national and European. 
129 Idem., Arts. 1,3. 
130 Idem., Art. 6. 
131 Idem., Art. 12 (2). 
132 Idem., Art. 9. 
133 Idem., Art. 7. 
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Thus, they confirmed that contact with national officials was extremely 
important, as was their relationship with EU Institutions. 
At the national level (within the UK Government), the DETR was considered 
to be the most important target, but access was also sought to Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ("MAFF"), the DTI and the territorial offices 
within the UK such as the Scottish Office. 134 At the sub-national level (local 
and regional), voluntary organisations such as the "British Ecological Society" 
and "British Trust for Ornithology" built up their support in public opinion and 
successfully developed themselves as truly mass movements. 
At the EU level, the British conservation groups prioritised their activities and 
tended to make efforts to establish and maintain relations with the European 
Commission rather than other EU Institutions such as the Council of 
Ministers. 135 Within the Commission, the Directorate General ("DG") of 
Environment was the most sought after target, although some resources were 
expended in developing relations with the DGs of Agriculture, Fisheries, 
Transport, the EU budget and Regional Policy. In addition, groups such as 
"Save our Migratory Birds" selectively sought access to particular MEPs within 
the EP. The groups tended to pursue those MEPs who had shown a personal 
134 Fairbass, J. and Jordan, A. (2001) "Shaping EU Environmental Policy: Access and 
Leverage? ", Paper presented to UACES Conference on Persuasion, Advocacy and Influence in 
the EU, University of Reading, 26-27 January 2001, p. 16 (mimeo). This is part of an on-going 
project on the `Europeanisation of the UK Government of the Environment' undertaken at the 
Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment (CSERGE). Details can 
be found on the Internet at: < URL http: //www. uea. ac. uk/env/cserge/ >. 
135 Sharp, R. (1998) "Responding to Europeanisation: A Governmental Perspective" in: Lowe, 
P. and Ward, S. (1998) (eds. ) British Environmental Policy and Europe. Politics and Policy in 
Transition, London: Routledge, 33-56, at 36,38,42. 
. 
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commitment to environmental issues or who played a significant role of the 
Parliament Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer 
Policy. The environmental groups contacted less the ESC. The purpose of 
lobbying was to limit any threat to their interests or preferences. 136 
Moreover, for several of the environmental groups, access to the ECJ has 
played an important role in shaping EU biodiversity and land use planning. 
Groups like the RSPB, Greenpeace-UK supported the Commission and put 
duties on their Ministers to properly implement the Birds, Habitats and/or EIA 
Directives, thus exposing them to action in the UK courts as well as the 
European Court of Justice when failed to do so. For both of them, the decision 
to take legal action, via the ECJ, was a matter of strategy due to the degree of 
commitment of resources required by such an action. Although European 
integration opens up political opportunities as will be argued in Chapter Four, 
engagement in European fora is costly in both time and money. Additionally, 
for the RSPB a `cost-benefit analysis' was conducted before it had recourse to 
the ECJ over the Lappel Bank. That was, to bind the UK Government to 
respect its obligations in the event there was a State backlash, for example, the 
UK Government's vigorous campaign to dilute the Habitats Directive after the 
Leybucht Dykes ruling. 137 
136 Fairbass, J. and Jordan, A. loc. cit. supra note 134. 
137 Sharp, R. loc. cit. supra note 135, pp. 38-39. 
61 
CHAPTER TWO NA TURE AND GOVERNANCE 
To what extent is the strategy of exploiting EU Institutions and legislation 
successful to discipline the UK Government, Reynolds refers to that in respect 
of the EIA Directive. 
"There have been more complaints to the European 
Commission about the failure to implement the [EIA] 
Directive than any other piece of European legislation. This is 
partly because EIA is a new process, providing many new 
`hooks' on which compliance can be judged, and partly 
because its timing and importance opened many campaigners' 
eyes generally to the opportunities presented by lobbying in 
Europe". 138 
7.3. How did the groups seek and gain access to EU policy-makers? 
The UK based groups sought and gained access to EU policy-makers via three 
possible routes. The direct route which as suggested by the title is one in which 
the interest group establishes direct contact with EU policy-makers. The 
national route, by which the demands and policy objectives are conveyed to the 
EU level of governance via national government officials as the ones that are 
mentioned above: and the European route under which the national groups use 
European groupings to transmit their arguments to the EU level. 
138 Reynolds, F. (1998) "Environmental Planning" in: Lowe, P. and Ward, S. (1998) (eds. ) 
British Environmental Policy and Europe: Politics and Policy in Transition, London: 
Routledge, 232-243, at 241. 
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The established direct contact with EU officials, operated via trans-national 
groupings, for example, "Friends of the Earth", and they did place some value 
on their lobbying of the national executive. Smaller UK based groups which are 
relatively poorly financed and equipped such as the "Marine Conservation 
Society" have worked to influence biodiversity policy via a wider UK grouping 
namely "Wildlife and Countryside Link". At the national-EU level interface, 
the RSPB worked with, and through, the Brussels-based "BirdLife 
International". The RSPB was also member of a more heterogeneous grouping 
lobbying for biodiversity protection which consisted of the Council for the 
Protection of Rural England ("CPRE"), World Wildlife Fund ("WWF") and 
Wildlife Trust. 139 WWF's Brussels offices which host the European Habitats 
Forum tried to lever some of the considerable sums of EC aid money to be 
spent on conservation and development projects. 
In any case, however, the actual pattern of activities tended to reflect the 
importance of the policy stages, for example, policy stage would determine 
access target and the need for contact. Yet, since Directives are very difficult to 
undo, environmental groups tried to participate in the policy process at the very 
beginning. The RSPB, for instance, established close relations with the 
Commission for the initiation of the Birds and Habitats Directives. 
Furthermore, at the EU level the groups have succeeded in acquiring a 
reputation for supplying reliable information, and this has led the Commission 
to seeking the groups' advice and data. For example, by supplying 
139 Fairbass, J. and Jordan, A. loc. cit supra note 134, p. 18. 
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implementation failure data to the Commission, several ECJ court cases have 
produced favourable outcomes from the point of view of the environmentalists 
without this meaning that the relationship between the groups and EU 
Institutions is free from conflict. 
7.4. Why did the groups contact national and EU level policy-makers? 
Groups have continued to seek access to national policy-makers because they 
recognise the value of the latter as important determinants of EU policy (at the 
policy decision stage of the policy cycle in the Council of Ministers). 
Nevertheless, they regarded their access to EU Institutions more valuable under 
certain conditions. Such circumstances included the Commission's receptive 
attitude to environmental interests, its calling for data and its need to secure 
political support for its agenda especially in the face of policy blockages 
through the use of the veto power and/or implementation failure. When the UK 
Government obstructed the development of biodiversity and land use planning 
policy, the environmental groups sought and gained contact to EU Institutions 
that were prepared to pursue policy objectives that accorded with their own. 
For instance, by monitoring implementation at the national level, and reporting 
implementation deficiencies or failure to the Commission at the same time, the 
groups found that legal action could result that would compel non-compliant 
States to conform with the Directives. In this way, therefore, by establishing 
coalitions with EU level policy-makers, the UK groups achieved more 
favourable outcomes than those realised by relying on their relations with 
national bodies. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
The Chapter has demonstrated that the EU does not evolve into a State or into 
other statal parameter. The disagreements among scholars about the Union's 
nature, value and finalite prove that standards such as those of territoriality, 
power of coercion, sovereignty, formal constitutions and unique identities 
(analysed in Chapters Three and Six respectively) cannot comprehend the 
democratic legitimacy of a polity that has none of the above. Consequently, 
analysts and policy-makers who have assessed the democratic implications of 
the EU by means of terminology or standards directly employed from the 
national context should revise their views. 
The issues we analysed in this Chapter and will be followed in the subsequent 
Chapters including the `formula' we presented of `governance' are thus crucial 
in our understanding of the EU as a polity being meta-national in character and 
meta-State in form. 
In this polity, States are no longer the exclusive, privileged actors of the classic 
international relations `paradigm'. Domestic actors are also directly engaged 
with trans-national policy networks that open alternative avenues for domestic 
lobbies, prompting them to by-pass and/or press governments on behalf of 
extra-national sectoral interests. 
While conceptualising the co-existence of government, group interests and 
supra-national aspirations in the shaping of European environmental policy as 
the basis for interaction, thus representing the inter-penetration of many 
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discrete levels of EU `governance', we can conclude that environmental groups 
were not marginal to the integration process. They, in combination with EU 
Institutions, were able to make a significant contribution to the development of 
biodiversity and land-use planning policies, to the extent that the policy 
outcomes achieved were unexpected by and unwelcome to Member States, in 
particular the UK. Quite clearly the access that environmental groups secured, 
especially to European policy-makers, produced a sizeable degree of successful 
attainment of their objectives-interests over the environmental policy 
development. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE "NO-DEMOS THESIS" 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Two argued that the European Union offers crucial insights into the 
gradual shift from a Weberian form of modern `government' towards the 
institutionalisation of post-Weberian `governance'. ' It also argued that the 
emerging multi-level polity of a non-hierarchical interconnected Europe raises 
the question of which are exactly the new Institutions of governance that exist 
beyond the Nation-State, and what do they imply for the functioning (rules of 
the game) and legitimacy (democratic processes) of the political order they 
refer to. 2 
In this Chapter, the discursive shift from `government' to `governance' will be 
matched by a conceptual shift from an ethno-culturally defined to a civic, value 
driven demos. 3 As a consequence, this different concept will endow quite 
different policy prescriptions concerning the way in which the EU is 
democratising itself within the new theoretical framework. 
1 See Chapter Two of this Thesis, Section 2.2. pp. 19-2 1. 
2 See Chapter Two of this Thesis, Sections 3.4.3. and 3.4.4. pp. 31-39. 
3 In this Thesis, demos has been written in the same style as it appeared in the titles of journals 
and internet papers of Weiler's work. 
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To show that it is possible to picture a demos at the EU level, our discussion 
will adopt two dimensions. The first is the judgment of the German 
Constitutional Court4 which foreclosed any prospect for democracy in the EU. 
The second one is the seminal work provided by Joseph Weiler, particularly his 
critique on the "No-Demos Thesis" contained in the above decision. 5 
4 Ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court, Second Division, 12 October 1993,2 BvR 
2134/92,2 BvR 2159/92, Manfred Brunner and others v. The European Union Treaty, [1994] 
1 CMLR 57. 
5 See generally Weiler, J. (1995) "Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the 
German Maastricht Decision", 1 European Law Journal 3,219-258; Weiler, J. Haltern, U. and 
Mayer, F. (1995) "European Democracy and Its Critique" in: Hayward, J. (ed. ) (1995) The 
Crisis of Representation in Europe, London: Frank Cass, 4-39; Weiler, J. "Legitimacy and 
Democracy of Union Governance" in: Geoffrey, E. Pijpers, A. (eds. ) (1997) The Politics of 
European Treaty Reform. The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and Beyond, London: 
Pinter, 249-287; Weiler, J. (ed. ) (1999) The Constitution of Europe: "Do the New Clothes 
Have an Emperor" and Other Essays on European Integration, 324-357. Weiler, J. (1995) 
"The State `über alles': Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision", Harvard Jean 
Monnet Working Paper No. 6/95 
< URI, http"//www ieanmonnetproeram. org/Papers/95/9506ind html >. 
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2. THE BACKGROUND TO THE "NO-DEMOS THESIS" 
It has been a number of years since the drama over the ratification of the Treaty 
of Maastricht took place. The practical outcome or approval of the twelve 
Member States has become an uneventful historical event, taking into account 
the `welcome' national debates and the hard-fought campaigns surrounding the 
ratification of the Treaty on European Union. Among the other Member States, 
for example, Denmark, France, and the UK, as it will be stated in Chapter 
Four, Germany was also seen as a great opponent to further development of the 
EU. It was the last of the twelve Member States to ratify the Maastricht Treaty 
and could do so only after its Constitutional Court had ruled in October 1993 
that ratification was not incompatible with the German Constitution. 6 In that 
case, the German Court might have rejected individuals' constitutional 
complaints, 7 but its ruling is remarkable for the observations it made on the EC 
Treaty concerning democracy, legitimacy and identity. 
In particular, the Federal Constitutional Court declared: 
"The democratic principle does not prevent Germany from 
becoming a member of a community of States (organised at a 
supra-national basis). But it is a pre-condition for membership 
6 Ruling loc. cit. supra note 4, p. 63. 
7 The complainants claimed that the Act of 21 December 1992 amending the German 
Constitution and the Act of Accession to the European Union Treaty of 28 December 1992 
infringed their constitutional rights and equivalent guarantees under Articles 1(1), 2(1), 5(1), 
9(1) in conjunction with 21(1) second sentence, 12(1), 14(1), 38(1) and 20(4) in conjunction 
with 93(1), no. 4, of the `Basic Law'. 
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that a legitimation and an influence proceeding from the 
people is also secured inside the federation of States". 8 
At the same time, it also held: 
"... With the building-up of the functions and powers of the 
Community, it becomes increasingly necessary to allow the 
national parliaments to be accompanied by a representation of 
the peoples of the Member States through a European 
Parliament as the source of a supplementary democratic 
support for the policies of the European Union. With the 
establishment of Union citizenship by the Maastricht Treaty, a 
legal bond is formed between the nationals of the individual 
Member States which is intended to be lasting and which, 
although it does not have a tightness comparable to the 
common nationality of a single State, provides a legally 
binding expression of the degree of de facto community 
already in existence [(... Article 8b(1) and (2) of the EC 
Treaty)]. The influence flowing from the citizens of the Union 
can eventually become a part of the democratic legitimation of 
the European Institutions to the extent that the conditions 
necessary for this purpose are fulfilled on the part of the 
peoples of the European Union". 9 
8 Ruling loc. cit. supra note 4, para. 38 (b). 
9 Idem., para. 40. 
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2.1. The implications of the Court's decision 
What the Federal Constitutional Court implied, therefore, was that there cannot 
be democracy at European level on its own. There is no European people (a 
European demos) but peoples, and consequently national parliaments represent 
their national peoples at both European and national levels. As a consequence, 
democracy in the EU is not guaranteed through the EP which in this context 
plays a supporting or supplementary role to that of the national parliaments but 
it is guaranteed only through the latter as long as peoples are sufficiently 
involved in the EU decision-making. 
To support its claim for the absence of a European people, the German Court 
contended that the introduction of the Union citizenship does not entail any 
sense of European political identity between the Member States' nationals. 
Union citizenship is not as tight as State citizenship, grounded upon ethno- 
cultural ties and nationality laws, and consequently it is not capable of forming 
one people in both subjective and objective terms and is thus, incapable of 
giving legitimate effect in the decisions taken at the supra-national level. 
3. THE "NO-DEMOS THESIS" 
Challenged by the Court's scepticism about the potential for democratisation in 
the European Union, Weiler dubs the opinion of the German judges as the "No- 
Demos Thesis". 10 He points out that any discussion of democracy definitely 
presupposes the existence of some underlying demos: 
10 See supra note 5 wherever the term of "No-Demos Thesis" applies. 
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"Let us assume today that democratic government and 
governance would be necessary conditions for an objective 
determination of the legitimacy of a polity. There would, 
however, be a condition precedent to such legitimacy 
- 
namely 
the existence of a demos for which and by whom the 
democratic structure and process is to take place. Much 
democratic theory presupposes a polity (usually a State) and 
almost all theories presuppose a demos. Democracy, in a loose 
sense, is about the many permutations of exercise of power by 
and for the demos. Indeed, the existence of a demos is not a 
semantic condition for democracy". " 
When it comes to democracy at national level there is only one problem to 
address: Who is the demos? Yet, when it comes to democracy at the EU level, 
there are far too many considerations. For example, is it possible to talk of a 
European demos when it is known that the Union consists of different peoples, 
and accordingly of fifteen different demoi? Can there be democratisation at the 
EU level without there being a trans-national notion of a European people? Can 
there be a European demos around which, by which, for which, a democracy 
may be established? In what terms is this demos to be defined and how could it 
fit into a political theory? 
Weiler, J. (1997) loc. cit. supra note 5, p. 250. See also Weiler, J. Haltern, U. and Mayer, F. 
loc. cit. supra note 5, p. 5. 
72 
CHAPTER THREE THE "NO-DEMOS THESIS" 
In response to all these concerns, Weiler tries to find a solution, and that is the 
reason why his critique is important to this analysis. His starting point is to take 
issue with the conception of the demos according to the German positive law, 
notably the one that relates to citizenship and articulates the conditions of 
membership in the German polity. On this view: 
"The people of a polity, the Volk, its demos, is a concept 
which has a subjective 
- 
socio-psychological 
- 
component 
which is rooted in objective, organic conditions. Both the 
subjective and objective can be observed empirically in a way 
which would enable us, on the basis of observation and 
analysis, to determine that, for example there is no European 
Volk. 
The subjective manifestations of peoplehood, of the demos, are 
to be found in a sense of social cohesion, shared destiny and 
collective identity which, in turn, result in (and deserve) 
loyalty. These subjective manifestations have thus both a 
descriptive and also normative element". 12 
A demos in this sense is therefore perceived not so much in civic terms as in 
ethno-national ones. Only a people who share a common ethnic origin, and 
consequently a common religion, common history, common language, 
1Z Weiler, J. (1995) loc. cit. supra note 5, pp. 225-226. 
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common cultural habits and sensibilities can qualify for becoming a demos. 13 
Of course, these factors are not the only ones in capturing the essence of Volk 
(people). An insistence on a relatively high degree of homogeneity, measured 
by the above ethno-cultural criteria, and allusions to some mystical or spiritual 
elements are also critical elements to this discourse. 
The Volk, thus defined, pre-dates historically, precedes politically the modem 
State and is not even torn asunder in the split of the State itself. Speaking of the 
German Court's ruling, Germany, for instance, could not have emerged if there 
were not a German Volk. It is on this basis that the compelling case for 
German (re)unification, that is, unification of the State and reunification of the 
people on 3rd October 1990 rested. As for the word nation, it is just a simple 
appellation of the pre-existing Volk that was invented by modem political 
theorists and international lawyers. Subsequently, it is the Volk/nation which is 
understood in this ethno-national meaning and is seen as the basis for the 
modern State and the creation of statehood, thus asserting that nations `belong' 
to States and States cannot exist without nations. 14 
Additionally, the nation and its members, the Volk, constitute the polity for the 
purposes of accepting the discipline of a democratic majoritarian government 
within the State. This suggests that the minority, however this term is 
defined, 15 will/should accept the binding effect (legitimacy) of a majority 
13 Although this is an acceptable opinion, most European Member States will not fulfil all of 
these requirements. Belgium and Italy have more than one language and Germany has more 
than one religion. 
to See generally Tivey, L. (ed. ) (1981) The Nation-State: The Formation of Modern Politics, 
Oxford: Robertson, 5-6. 
15 A minority can be defined in terms of number as well as in terms of power and rights. 
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decision as both the majority and a minority are part and parcel of the same 
Volk. Thus it appears that nationality or ethnic origin is the main instrument 
that constitutes the State, hence the Nation-State, and which in turn constitutes 
its political boundaries. 
The political boundaries of a State do not only signify a political independence 
and territorial integrity, but also the very democratic nature of the polity itself. 
To realise this, just think that a national parliament, for instance, is an 
Institution of democracy not only because it provides a mechanism for 
representation and majority voting, but also because it represents the 
Volk/nation, from which it derives its authority and legitimacy of decision- 
making. In this respect, nationality is a defining feature for democracy since 
the majority rule is only legitimate as long as Germans rule Germans within the 
Volk. 
3.1. The case of the EU 
Turning to the EU, the German judges and especially Paul Kirchhof who is 
widely reputed to be the principal architect of the Maastricht Decision 
implicitly argued that there is no European demos based on the above organic 
cultural and national criteria. Neither the objective conditions nor their 
component subjective elements exist. The establishment of long-term peaceful 
relations with a thickening economic and social context should not be confused 
with the bonds of peoplehood and nationality forged by language, history, 
religion and the rest. 
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Although theorists and academics detect two versions, the `soft' and the `hard' 
to the "No-Demos Thesis", 16 the German Constitutional Court appears to have 
adopted the hard one. 17 It cannot recognise any other democratic principle at 
European level, apart from the one that is expressed at national-State level as 
follows: 
"If the peoples of the individual States provide democratic 
legitimation through the agency of their national parliaments 
(as at present) limits are then set by virtue of the democratic 
principle to the extension of the European Communities' 
functions and powers. Each of the peoples of the individual 
States is the starting point for a State power relating to that 
people. The States need sufficiently important spheres of 
activity of their own in which the people of each can develop 
and articulate itself in a process of political will-formation 
which it legitimates and controls, in order thus to give legal 
expression to what binds the people together (to a greater or 
lesser degree of homogeneity) spiritually, socially and 
politically". 18 
No matter which version we are in favour of, `sofft' or `hard, the consequences 
of the "No-Demos Thesis" for the European construct are immense. Given that 
16 Weiler, J. (1995) loc. cit. supra note 5, pp. 229-230. Whereas the `soft' version suggests that 
there is no demos now, yet, the possibility for the future is not precluded a priori, the `hard' 
version not only dismisses the possibility of forming a demos at European level as objectively 
unrealistic, but also as undesirable. 
"Ruling loc. cit. supra note 4, para. 51. 
18ldem., para. 44. 
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democracy does not exist in vacuum, but it is premised on the existence of a 
demos, an absent European demos leads to the untenable situation that the 
Union is inherently incapable of transforming itself into a democratic polity. 
European integration might have involved a certain transfer of State functions 
to the Union but this has not been accompanied by a redrawing of political 
boundaries which can occur only if, and can be ascertained only when a 
European people (demos) can be said to exist. Since this, it is argued, has not 
occurred, the Union and its Institutions can have neither the authority nor the 
legitimacy of a Demos-'cratic State'. On this view, a Parliament, without a 
demos, is conceptually impossible, practically despotic and unrealistic. Finally, 
as long as nationality enmeshes with legitimacy and democracy in a way that 
only the majority rule made within a demos is legitimate, then any majoritarian 
rule at the supra-national level does not have any legitimate effect on the 
Germans, Danes, British, French and so on. Thus to give them a vote in the EP 
is an ice cold comfort as it is for the Danes, Austrians or Italians in the 
Bundestag (the Lower House of the German Parliament). 
4. WEILER'S ANALYSIS TO THE "NO-DEMOS THESIS" 
4.1 Introduction 
In his critique, Weiler does not challenge the ethno-cultural concept of Volk as 
such, but it is the way of thinking which bestows legitimate rule-making and 
democratic authority on a polity only in Volkish terms. He also challenges the 
concomitant notion that the only way to think of a polity and its demos is in 
terms of Staat (State), Volk (nation), and Staatsangehörigkeit (statehood based 
on nationality). Finally, he opposes the implicit view in the decision that the 
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focus should be (re)allocated towards transforming the Euro-polity into some 
statal form, for example, a federation of States'9 instead of starting to imagine a 
people at the European level. To achieve these aims, he raises the following 
objections. 
4.2. Objections 
His first objection has two strands. The first strand, less compelling, argues that 
there is some European sense of social cohesion, shared identity and collective 
self-determination which ends in loyalty and which bestows potential authority 
and democratic legitimacy on European Institutions. This is not about an 
identity defined in organic-cultural terms as it might be proved weak, but rather 
an identity in civic terms. 
The second strand, picking up from the first objection, argues that peoplehood 
and national identity have to a large degree been products of a historical 
accident, social construction, deconstruction and reconstruction, than the 
organic ethno-cultural view would concede. Thus, even in the EU it would not 
be impossible to overcome its supposed lack of European peoplehood and 
identity by using methods of social engineering. 20 
19 Ruling loc. cit. supra note 4, paras. 38 (b), 39 (b. 1), 43,46. 
20 Recall the case of the USA. In a letter to Ernest de Chabrol of June 9,1831, Alexis de 
Tocquenville writes how American society "... formed of all the nations of the world.. 
. 
people 
having different languages, beliefs, opinions: in a word, a society without roots, without 
memories" could turn into one people. His answer, it seems, was that nations could be based on 
an adherence to values such as those like democracy, self-government, equality, etc. found in 
the American constitution: Boesche, R. (ed. ) (1985) Selected Letters on Politics and 
Society/Alexis de Tocquenville, Berkeley: University of California Press, 38. However, the 
major objection to the feasibility of building a common European nation is the absence of vital 
threats and the democratic Constitutions of the existing national regimes: Bauböck, R. (1997) 
"Citizenship and National Identities in the European Union" Harvard Jean Monnet Working 
Paper No. 97/4, p. 2 under Title `Three Conceptions of a European Political Identity' < URL 
hllp: //www. jeanmonnetDro. izram-org/papers /97/97-04--4 html >. 
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The second objection is related to the notion of membership which is 
conceived only in organic-cultural terms. According to the German 
constitutional tradition, there is a strong current that insists on the unity of 
Volk-Nation-State-Citizenship. 21 Being part of the German polity is normally 
the condition for attaining German citizenship. And, in turn, citizenship in this 
tradition is only understood in statal terms. 
4.2.1. `The state of affairs' in Germany 
The concept of the German State is built into the very term of 
Staatsangehörigkeit. If there is statehood, meaning to be identified with the 
State, citizenship is premised. That is why the naturalisation process in 
Germany22 
- 
other than through marriage or adoption, does not only imply 
accepting civic obligations and duties towards the State but also of 
demonstrating a "voluntary and lasting orientation towards Germany". 23 
21 The German citizenship law is governed primarily and historically by the basic principle of 
ius sanguinis (the law of blood group) saying that only descendants of German citizens can 
obtain German citizenship (Citizenship Law from 22 July 1913 (Reichs- und 
Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz 
- 
RuStAG)). The ius sanguinis concept as opposed to the concept 
of ius soli (the law of origin) reflects a negative attitude towards immigration and an 
underlying concept of citizenship. It was very carefully chosen in 1913 in order to promote and 
maintain the ethnic tradition of the German Nation-State whereas others could become German 
citizens only on an exceptional basis, after discretionary investigation of their suitability. 
Under the new reforms of the German Nationality Act, however, the principle of ius soli has 
recently been introduced in German citizenship legislation. Thus since l` January 2000 
German citizenship is attributed to a child born in Germany of foreign parents if at least one of 
the parents has continuously and legally resided eight years in Germany. At the same time, the 
acquisition of German citizenship by descent, has been restricted by the new law: if a child is 
born outside Germany to a German citizen who was born outside Germany and who has 
habitual residence outside Germany, and if the child has not been registered with the German 
Embassy or Consulate within one year of its birth the child will not acquire German citizenship 
by birth. 
22 The naturalisation process as a possibility to receive German citizenship besides birth 
requires a minimum of eight years' residence and a very secure residence status since the 1$` 
January 2000, language proficiency, payment of a fee, renunciation of the applicant's previous 
nationality and the existence of a public interest with regard to stateless persons. 
23 "Even if the naturalisation of a foreigner is seen to be in the public interest, the guidelines 
specify that he or she was expected to demonstrate a `voluntary and lasting orientation 
towards Germany" (Naturalisation Guidelines (Einbürgerungsrichtlinien), para. 3.1). 
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Even though in practice the number of discretionary naturalisations and "as-of- 
right" naturalisations is rather high since 199024 
- 
with many variations among 
the Lander (federal States)25 
- 
in principle, Germany still continues to insist on 
the avoidance of dual nationality as the only technique to prevent other cultures 
from gaining parity with the indigenous German culture. 26 The basic principle 
that is maintained in the new citizenship law of 2000, the naturalisation 
guidelines and sections 85 and 86 of the Foreigners Act (Ausländergesetz) 
giving a special right to naturalisation to long settled immigrants and their 
children is that multiple nationality can only be accepted in hardship cases. 
Germany is not the only State whose membership philosophy is so perceived. 
However, the conflation of the State, Volk/nation and citizenship is neither 
necessary conceptually, nor practised universally, nor even desirable. There are 
quite a few States where mere birth in the State creates actual citizenship or at 
24 Whereas in 1990 naturalisations that were dependent on the discretionary power of the 
administration and naturalisations to long-term residents in Germany amounted to 20,237 
(0,4%) and 81,140 (1,5%) respectively, in 1997 these numbers increased considerably to 
39,162 (0,5%) and 239,500 (3,3%) in that order: Devynck, A. Citizenship and Naturalisation in 
France and Germany, Workshop "Citizenship in a Historical Perspective", ECPR Conference, 
Copenhagen, Denmark, 14-19 April 2000, p. 19 (Table 2). See also, Coleman D. "Migration to 
Europe: A Critique of the new Establishment Consensus", Workshop on Demographic and 
Cultural Specificity and Integration of Migrants, 10-11 November 2000, Bingen, Germany, p. 
13 (Table 3) where data from OECD 1999 shows a cumulative naturalisation of 101,4 in 1990 
and 271,8 in 1997. 
25 According to a survey by the "Financial Times of Deutschland", the new citizenship law, 
which has been in force since 15` January 2000, has only led to an increased number of 
naturalisations in some areas of Germany: numbers have risen in the cities of Cologne, 
Hamburg, Munich and Frankfurt. By contrast, there has even been a decrease in naturalisations 
in cities like Berlin, Duisburg and Stuggart. This is mainly caused by the fact that many foreign 
nationals do not think they will be able to pass the obligatory German language test. 
Furthermore, especially Turkish nationals are reluctant to give up their Turkish citizenship. 
Other changes in the law which have made it easier for children that are younger than ten years 
to be naturalised, so-called "children naturalisations", did hardly produce the expected effect: 
EMFS Migration Report 2000, December 2000, p. 3: 
< URL http: //www. uni-bamberg. de/-ba6ef3/ddez00 e htm >. 
26 Green, S. (2001) "Citizenship Policy in Germany: The Case of Ethnicity over Residence" in: 
Hansen, R. and Weil, P. (eds. ) (2001) Towards a European Nationality: Citizenship, 
Immigration and Nationality Law in the EU, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 24-51, at 25,35-39,41. 
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least entitlement to citizenship without requiring to become a national in an 
ethno-cultural sense, for example, Ireland, Canada, UK, and South Africa. 
There are other States where citizenship, as a commitment to the constitutional 
values and the civic duties of the polity, is the condition of naturalisation, 
whereas nationality, in organic-cultural terms, is considered to be a kind of 
religion or a matter of individual preference, for example, the USA. Finally, 
there are States, like Germany for instance, with a strong ethno-cultural 
identity which, nonetheless, allows citizenship not only to individuals with 
other nationalities, who do not belong to the majority demos, but to minorities 
with strong, and even competing ethno-cultural identities (for example, Israel). 
Since the combinations are plenty, the Court could reconsider its opinion on 
whether citizenship should still be conflated with being a member of the Volk 
in the organic national-cultural sense, and whether the only conceivable demos 
is one the members of which are citizen-nationals, hence the State. The 
German judges could also determine whether such an understanding of a 
German polity and demos could fit into Europe, which is exactly the point. 
4.3. Specific suggestions 
In respect of these issues, Weiler suggests that searching for a demos at the 
supra-national level should not necessarily be mandated in the organic cultural 
homogenous terms. Other understanding(s) of demos or demoi can exist too 
which might lead to different conceptualisations and democratic potentialities 
for the EU. He thus conceives of a European demos which is encapsulated in 
"a coming together on the basis of shared values, a shared understanding of 
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rights and societal duties and shared rational, intellectual culture which 
transcend organic-national differences". 27 
His conception of a "supra-national civic, value driven demos"28 is very much 
empowered by the fact that the EU is not trying to be a (super)-State, and 
accordingly create a demos (one European people) in statal terms. On the other 
hand, however, the introduction of citizenship in [Article 8 EC] which was 
constructed on the prototypes of national citizenship could be regarded as a 
step in the drive towards a statal vision of Europe. 
Nevertheless, the concept behind this provision is a decoupling of 
nationality/Volk from citizenship29 and the formation of a polity the demos of 
which, its membership is understood in civic and political terms rather than in 
ethno-cultural ones. The Union belongs to citizens who by definition do not 
share the same nationality. The very substance of membership, and thus of the 
demos, is premised on a commitment to shared values, duties and rights of a 
European civic society covering discrete areas of public life, and in general, on 
a commitment to membership in a polity which privileges diversity, national 
identities and ethno-cultural divergencies. 30 Living in unity but within diversity 
27 Weiler, J. (1997) loc. cit. supra note 5, p. 263. 
28 Craig, P. and De Bürca, G. (eds. ) (1999) The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 29. 
29 However, this is not a full decoupling. On the one hand, Member States are free to define 
their own conditions of membership and these may continue to be defined in Volkish terms. 
On the other hand, the gateway to European citizenship passes through Member State 
nationality laws. It is interesting to note, however, that after the Lisbon Summit (March 2000) 
the gateway to citizenship is seen in economic participation terms: Szyszczak, E. (2001) "The 
New Paradigm for Social Policy: A Virtuous Circle? ", 38 Common Market Law Review, p. 
1125 at 1125. In this discourse, attempts to grant third country nationals ("TCNs") rights and 
obligations comparable to those of EU citizens are included. Although this is a positive step 
concerning the legal status of TCNs, it still falls short of granting them denizenship (the right 
to free movement) or citizenship. 
30 See Arts. 151 [Title IX 
- 
Culture] and 12 EC. 
82 
CHAPTER THREE THE "NO-DEMOS THESIS" 
underlies the supra-national character of the European construct. A construct 
wherein Nation-States may preserve their values and virtues and individuals 
can follow ethical norms as an authentic part of their identities. 
In this respect, the conceptualisation of a European demos is not based on real 
or imaginary trans-European cultural affinities, shared histories nor on the 
construction of European `national myths' of the type that constitute the 
identity of an organic nation. What there are instead, is a demos in civic terms 
and fifteen different organic cultural demoi (a political system of co-existing 
multiple demoi). 31 
4.3.1. The views of multiple demoi 
Weiler goes even further by suggesting that there are different views of 
multiple demoi. As a matter of fact, he proposes three. The first one is what he 
would call the "concentric circless32 view. On this approach one feels as 
belonging or being part simultaneously to two or more demoi albeit at different 
levels of intensity. Say, for instance, Germany and Europe; or Scotland, Britain 
and Europe. Yet, the problem with this view is that European citizenship is to 
be understood in statal terms like national citizenship as long as the level of 
intensity is measured against national and cultural criteria. The second view of 
multiple demoi invites individuals to see themselves as members of two 
interchangeable demoi, but based on different subjective factors of 
identification. For instance, an individual can be a British national in the strong 
sense of organic-cultural identification and sense of belonging. But also be a 
31 Weiler, J. (1999) op. cit. supra note 5, pp. 344-348. 
32 Idem., 344. 
83 
CHAPTER THREE THE "NO-DEMOS THESIS" 
European citizen in teens of one's European affinities to shared values which 
transcend the ethno-national and cultural diversity. But, this view, too, has its 
problems. For example, it is not clear how this matrix of values would be 
qualitatively different from the common organic and cultural values that are 
constitutionally practised in most European Nation-States. Member States are 
signatories to the ECHR, and thus to varying, of course, degrees, share in those 
`European values'. The third view 
- 
which he prefers most 
- 
is taken from the 
application of "variable geometry"33 as a model of European integration. This 
approach invites individuals to see themselves as belonging simultaneously to 
two demoi, based, critically, on different subjective factors of identification. 
The invitation is to embrace again the national element in the strong sense of 
an organic-cultural identification and belongingess, and (to embrace) the 
European one in terms of European trans-national affinities to shared values 
which transcend the ethno-national and cultural diversity. Yet, there are some 
critical differences to put forward between the two senses, that is, national and 
European. On the one hand, one can be an Irish without being Catholic or 
Protestant. On the other hand, one can be Catholic or Protestant without being 
Irish. In the model of European citizenship, however, the concepts of Member 
State nationality and European citizenship are interdependent. 34 Consequently, 
one cannot both conceptually and psychologically, be a European citizen 
without being a Member State national. 35 The second critical difference of this 
model of multiple demoi is related to the values that were appraised by the 
33 Idem., 346. 
34 See supra note 29. 
35 This then embraces the notion of a single demos based upon nationality. A clear illustration 
is to be found in case C-192/99 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Kaur 
[2001] ECR I- 1237 where the UK denied EU citizenship status because of a lack of a strong 
affiliation to the country. 
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second view. Here, the matrix of values is not simply a material commitment to 
human rights, social cohesion, and other such values that would hardly 
differentiate it from the modern, welfare, and constitutionally democratic 
Western State. In essence, it has a second important civilisatory dimension, 
called "constitutional tolerance". 36 
The principle of civic constitutional tolerance in the EU is the acceptance by 
the Member State nationals that in a range of areas of public life, one will 
accept democratic legitimacy and authority of decisions adopted by fellow 
European citizens. Thus in these areas preference will be given to choices 
made by the outward-reaching, in civic terms, demos, rather than by the 
inward-reaching, organic one. 
4.3.2. The problem of double or multiple loyalty 
Nevertheless, the issue of double or multiple citizenship (national and 
European) evokes the problem of double or multiple loyalty. The insistence on 
denying the status of a demos to the EU may derive from the fear that some 
flattened Euro-culture will come to replace the deep, well-articulated, and 
genuine national version of the same. It may also derive from the belief that 
double or more loyalties cannot co-exist, and therefore either one or more 
loyalties have to be compromised. 
This fear of the possibility of a double loyalty culture within the EU is a 
legitimate concern. However, this concern has to be put in context. There is no 
36 Weiler, J. (2000) "Why Should Europe be a Democracy: The Corruption of Political Culture 
and the Principle of Constitutional Tolerance" in: Snyder, F. (ed. ) (2000) The Europeanisation 
of Law: The Legal Effects of European Integration, Oxford: Hart, 213-218, at 218. 
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historical incident which indicates that loyalty by citizens of Nation-States to 
an `organisation' is greater than the loyalty towards their State. One may talk 
about the possibility of certain cultures, for example, political and economic of 
an `organisation' overwhelming or even replacing those of Member States in 
the long run. However, this does not mean that individual citizens of such 
Member States are more loyal to the `organisation' and its Institutions. What 
seems to aptly describe the scenario is that citizens are irrevocably committed 
to those civic values as may be embodied by the custom of their States or the 
`organisation'. 
As for the belief that double or more loyalties cannot co-exist, "this more than 
groundless". The organic national-cultural identities as cognitive entities are 
not so weak or fragile as to be risked by the spectre of the aforementioned civic 
loyalty to Europe due to their strong attachment to the Nation-States. Hence, 
the opposite is most likely to happen. 
Additionally, it may be proposed that the political aversion to double or more 
loyalties, like the multiple citizenship, lies in a normative approach which 
wants national self-identity 
- 
identified with the State and its organs 
- 
to rest 
very deeply in the souls of individuals. Such a claim based on the ideology of 
nationalism helps in forming one nation with a common fate and destiny. It is 
one's fate to be born into a national identity and it is one's destiny to preserve 
that identity and to realise its potentialities. 
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4.4. Concluding remarks 
The European construct that has been presented allows for a European demos 
in civic terms co-existing side by side with national organic and cultural ones. 
What is suggested is something different than simple American Republicanism 
transferred to Europe. 
The Revolutionary generation's concept of Republicanism contained certain 
imperatives like the ones of pursuing peace, thus eschewing the blood 
- 
drenched rivalries of the Old World, achieving economic and intellectual 
independence and the making of a State-constitution that would equalise access 
to government 37 
The ratification of the American Constitution, completed on the 1" of June 
1788, brought to an end the era in which the Americans won their 
independence and created a nation. It remained to build an American character 
committed to the new order which as Michael Lienesch states was "to create a 
psychology to perpcpuate their government". 38 
Out of a growing sense of national identity, Americans had sought national 
liberty, and accordingly nationhood. As Jack Pole writes: "American unity 
began as a means rather than an end. The aim in view was liberty in the widest 
sense, liberty from a form of rule that leading colonials felt to be increasingly 
37 Higginbotham, D. (1987) "The American Republic in a Wider World" in: Greene, J. (ed. ) (1987) The American Revolution: Its Character and Limits, New York: New York University 
Press, 164-170. 
t' Lienesch, M. (1988) New Order of the Ages: Time, the Constitution, and the Making of 
Modern Political Thought. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 176. 
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out of sympathy with their own interests, oppressive, and humiliating. But they 
also sought liberty to fulfill their increasingly ambitious aims for the expansion 
of territorial settlement and commerce, and political unity proved no less 
valuable as an instrument of these aims than the original act of national 
liberation". 39 
Unlike Americanism which was after all about an indivisible, nation building, 
under God, the "European project"40 is very much committed to a unity of 
many while striving for solidarity, prosperity, social cohesion and peace among 
the Member States. 
"The very existence of a Europe of individuals with individual 
identities, a Europe of nations with the boundaries created by 
distinct national identities and a Europe of States with the 
differently distinct Statal boundaries, which forces one both to 
acknowledge difference and to reach across in the deeply 
committed way which membership of the Community entails 
is what makes the European post-war experiment so special 
and, arguably, worth preserving even if it does not have quite 
the power and quite the constitutional clarity as a State 
would' . 4' 
39 Pole, J. (1977) The Idea of Union, Alexandria, Va.: Bicentennial Council of the Thirteen 
Original States Fund, 143 as quoted in: Ward, It. (1995) The American Revolution: 
Nationhood achieved 1763-1788, New York: St. Martin's Press, 371. 40 See generally BaIikowski, Z. and Christodoulis, E. (1998) "The European Union as an 
Essentially Contested Project", 4 European LawJournal 4,341-354. 
41 Weiler, J. (1998) "Europe: The Case Against the Case for Statehood", 4 European Law 
Journal 1, p. 43 at 62. 
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What is more, nationals of the Member States are invited to regard themselves 
as associating themselves as citizens in this European civic polity. The Treaties 
would have to be perceived not only as an agreement among States, a Union of 
States, but as a `social contract' among the nationals of those States 
- 
ratified in 
accordance with the democratic constitutional requirements in all Member 
States. 
On the one hand, it is accepted that in that polity an overarching national and 
cultural identity displacing those of the Member States does not exist. 
Although there are shared political and cultural traditions such as `Greco- 
Roman law, political philosophy, parliamentary Institutions, Judeo-Christian 
ethics for the original conception of Western Europe, `Renaissance humanism, 
and romanticism and classicism', it is suggested that Europe is 'not yet' an 
organic national-cultural demos. On the other hand, however, the construct of a 
demos in civic terms depends on a shift of consciousness which will not 
happen if one insists that the only way to understand demos is in Volkish 
terms. 
The occurrence of a shift of consciousness is possible, if this challenge is taken 
up seriously by both the Community Institutions and the Member States. From 
a purely theoretical point of view, it is coherent to believe that the 
centralisation and personalisation of European politics would favour civic 
consciousness and participation. Politicising the EU, and creating a clear 
deliberation of European issues, which would generate public interest, is not so 
much a question of Institutions as a problem of political attitudes. As long as 
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the Commission, which initiates policies, considers itself to be a body designed 
to bypass political conflicts and forge compromise before links with the public 
are created and political deliberation takes place, the politisation of the EU will 
remain difficult 42 Additionally, the suggestions made by the White Paper are 
not enough towards this direction. They are only designed to stimulate the 
involvement of active citizens and groups in some precise procedures rather 
than to enhance the general level of civic consciousness and participation. 
True, some proposals have been made to encourage the clarification of 
European issues, for example, why an institutional reform is needed and the 
debate on the future of the EU, but they generally remain rather vague and 
long-term prospects. 43 At the national level, there is little doubt that the 
Member States can (and should) be blamed for their role in turning their 
citizens into relunctant Europeans 
- 
at least, if we focus on the Nordic 
countries, UK and perhaps even Ireland. A lot of popular resentment towards 
the EU and its Institutions can thus be traced to national politicians themselves, 
who, in recent years, have been very busy reassuring the voters that the EU is 
not (and never will be) anything but "ordinary international politics" among 
entirely independent governments. Hence, lack of confidence in the EU has a 
lot to do with the lack of trust in national politicians, who have handed down 
promises about the development of the EU, which, clearly could not be kept. 44 
42 Magnette, P. (2001) "Symposium: Mountain or Molehill? 
-A Critical Approach of the 
Commission White Paper on Governance: European Governance and Civic Participation: Can 
the European Union be politicised? ", Harvard Jean Alonnet Working Paper No. 6/01, p. 1 
under Title "A Limited Conception of Participation": 
< URL hlig: //www. icanmonncirroanntorgZpal2ers/01`/010901. html >. 
"See supra note 42 under Title "Conclusions (summary)". 44 Wind, M. (2001) "Symposium: Mountain or Molehill? 
-A Critical Appraisal of the 
Commission White Paper on Governance: The Commission White Paper Bridging the Gap 
between the Governed and the Governing? ", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 6/01, 
p. 2 under Title "What kind of Polity? ": 
< URL httj2: llwww, netprogram. org/papers/01 /012401. html >. 
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Furthermore, ethnos/nation should be separated from demos. The decoupling 
of nation/Volk from demos and demos from State, in whole or in part, does not 
require any denigration of the virtues of nationality such as belongingness, 
social cohesion, and cultural and human richness that may be found in 
developing the national ethos. It only questions whether nationality in the 
organic sense, as a perceived guarantor of homogeneity of the polity must be 
the exclusive condition for entitling to full political and civic membership of 
that polity. 
The special virtue of a contemporaneous membership in organic national- 
cultural demoi and in a supra-national one driven by civic values is in the effect 
such double membership may have for destiny and belonging among the 
Member States and their nationals. A fate and destiny which nationalism 
continues to offer but which can so easily degenerate to racist movements, 
intolerance, xenophobia and even war. The sense of feeling to two or more 
demoi, however, creates solidarity and makes people realise that no polity 
should legitimately claim to be above the others. 45 For this reason, the 
politically fractured self and double identity that multiple citizenship involves 
must be celebrated rather than be rejected with aversion. 
Finally, as regards dcmocratisation at the EU level, the German Constitutional 
Court appears to be in a No-Win situation. Even if further empowerment of the 
EP over the decisional process, especially at the expense of the national 
45 Weiler, J. (1995) loc. cit. supra note 5, p. 24 (Ilarvard Jean Monnet Working Paper). 
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Institutions was allowed, there is an undermining of the "No-Demos" theory 
implicitly illustrated in the Court's judgment. As it was suggested above, 
absent of a demos, the EP cannot enjoy independent authority or legitimacy as 
a rule making body in the polity. At the same time, if there is no further 
empowerment, then it is difficult to ever resolve the democratic malaise of the 
EU since it is submitted that whilst democratisation at the EU level is not 
sufficient, it is at least a necessary condition to redress the democratic deficit. 
5. TIIE AUTHOR'S CRITIQUE OF THE "NO-DEMOS THESIS" 
5.1. The sense of political identity 
If democracy is conceived as "a responsive rule"46 according to the "related 
principles of popular control and political equality", 47 any political system that 
claims to be democratic should meet the following conditions: 
1. Political leaders and power to be authorised by the people. 
2. The continuous flow of decisions to be made in a manner that is 
representative of the people's needs and values. 
3. The rulers to be accountable to the people who should be the ultimate 
judges of their pcrformancc. 48 
As it can be seen, there is one general condition that cross-cuts all of these. 
That is, any political system should correspond to a felt sense of political 
46 May, J. (1978) "Defining Democracy: A Bid for Coherence and Consensus", 26 Political 
Studies 1, p. 1 at 1,3-4. 
" Beetham, D. (ed. ) (1994) Defining and Measuring Democracy, London: Sage, 28. 
41 Bcetham, D. and Lord, C. (eds. ) (1998) Legitimacy and the European Union, Harlow. 
Longman, 6-9. 
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identity. For, no political process, be it so perfect in its institutional 
construction, can function as a democracy unless its people feel themselves to 
be part of a group willing and able to engage itself in democratic discourse and 
binding decision-making. A democratic superstructure may be perfectly 
constructed as a procedural apparatus and yet be completely lacking in 
legitimacy because elements of its membership dispute the right of others to 
join in the making of decisions that bind the group as a whole. In this setting 
thus, the development of democratic politics always includes two parallel and 
related components: the evolution of the institutional structures (procedures) 
and the development of a feeling of belonging (members). 49 
5.2. The idea of ethnic uniformity 
Taking this fact into account, the Federal Constitutional Court was right to 
doubt the democratic nature of the EU as to the existence or not of a European 
demos. Nevertheless, it was not right to preclude democracy or even 
democratisation at the EU level according to its own concept of the nature of 
the Euro-polity and the criteria of membership therein. In fact, it was mistaken 
to demand a European demos based on the "tired old ideas" of an ethno- 
culturally homogenous Volk (people) as the exclusive basis for democratic 
authority and legitimate rule making. 
The German judges' concern for such a polls seems to be reminiscent of the 
Athenian democracy that flourished in the mid-fourth century B. C. We can 
recall that the Athenians cherished the belief that they were an autochthonous 
49 See generally Weiner, A. and Sala, V. (1997) "Constitution-making and Citizenship Practice 
- 
Bridging the Democracy Gap in the EU? ", 35 Journal of Common Market Studies 4,595-614; 
Weiler, J. (1997) To be a European Citizen: Eros and Civilisation", 4 Journal of European 
Public Policy 4,495.519. 
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people, a people who had always occupied Attike and had not, like the rest of 
the Greeks, dispossessed earlier occupants. As Sinclair describes: 
"... They had not been collected, like most nations, from every 
quarter, and had not settled in a foreign land after driving out 
others, but they were born of the soil, and possessed in one and 
the same country their mother and fatherland. They were the 
first and the only people in that time to drive out the ruling 
cliques in their State and to establish a democracy, believing 
the liberty of all to be the strongest bond of harmony". 5° 
It was due to these feelings of pride and superiority that the demos embodied in 
the popular assembly51 was only open to all adult males of citizen birth, and 
that the Athenian people used to impose restrictions on admission to 
citizenship. Following practices that would ensure ethno, national and cultural 
homogeneity, the Athenians created the exclusive and small-scale character of 
their polls which led Athens to become a direct democracy. 52 
However, since that time, matters have changed. In the 21St Century, it is out of 
question to dream of small-scale and direct democracies. On the contrary, what 
is likely to occur, and for individuals to witness, is the growth of large-scale 
and representative democracies that appear to accommodate the needs of all. 
50 Sinclair, R. (ed. ) Democracy and Participation in Athens, 1988, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 14. 
SI Herodotos, one of the greatest Greek historian analysts, declared that the rule of the 
multitude or people (plethos) had the fairest name of all 
- 
isonomia (Ibid., p. 17). 
52 See supra note 50. 
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Indeed, the existence of many ethnic minorities and the opening of borders to 
labour migrants in the 1950s and late 1960s led to most of the wealthy 
capitalist countries of Western Europe becoming densely populated. 
Germany is certainly one of these. Its current demographic development is 
such that, ceteris paribus, the foreign population has been predicted to rise to 
almost 17 per cent by the year 2030.53 In 1996 over 105,000 non-German 
children were born in the country accounting for 13.3 per cent of all live births 
which indicates a considerably higher birth rate than that of the indigenous 
population. 54 With such numbers, sizeable national minorities were formed: in 
1997 there were over 2.1 million Turkish nationals, accounting for 28.6 per 
cent of the total, while EU nationals numbered over 1.8 million. 55 
By discussing the issue of national minorities and immigration, the author's 
argument is that modem societies have expanded so much as to become ethno, 
national and cultural heterogeneous. 56 Given that large numbers of people 
inside and outside Europe are in a state of constant mobility, the once exclusive 
character of the polities have disappeared. Modem societies are more multi- 
cultural, multi-ethnic and multi-lingual than ever before, and thus the idea of 
ethnic uniformity as the best method of maintaining the purity of a Volk cannot 
actually apply to modem States. 
53 Green, S. loc. cit. supra note 26, p. 29. 
sa Ibid. 
55 Idem., p. 27. $6 Homogeneity can only be measured with reference to the original values of a given society, 
which remains unaltered by the subsequent multi-culturalism. 
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In essence, the continuing pressures of migration in Germany have already kept 
the issue of citizenship and naturalisation policy at the forefront of a constant 
political debate. While there is general consensus that the existing legislation 
needs to be updated and extended, opinions are divided as to the direction such 
reform should take. Meanwhile, since the number of foreigners in Germany 
continues to increase and the proportion of voters among the tax-paying, 
resident population is gradually decreasing, important questions are raised for 
the long-term democratic legitimacy of the political system. 
5.3. The separation of demos from nation 
The authors of the Maastricht judgment and their fellow travellers in German 
Constitutional Law certainly did not lack sagacity. They were aware that the 
Staatsvolk (the people of the State) which they regarded as the only basis for 
democratic authority and legitimate law making according to Article 20 of the 
German Basic Law might be understood in an old fashion way. 57 That is, `a 
natural whole' having an origin and a destiny of its own. However, they appear 
to be confused with the terms of nationNolk and demos. On the one hand, they 
conceive of demos as a community in thickly homogenous organic-cultural 
terms. 58 In their opinion, nationality in the organic sense should be the 
exclusive condition of full political and civic membership of that community. 
On the other hand, they strip the Staatsvolk of any organic connotation by 
57 Art. 20 Basic Law [Basic Principles of State order, Right to resist] reads as follows: (1) The 
Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal State. (2) All State authority 
emanates from the people. It is being exercised by the people through elections and voting and 
by specific organs of the legislature, the executive power, and the judiciary. (3) Legislation is 
subject to the constitutional order; the executive and the judiciary are bound by law and justice. 
(4) All Germans have the right to resist any person seeking to abolish this constitutional order, 
should no other remedy be possible. 
58 Ruling loc. cit. supra note 4, para. 51. 
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highlighting the pre-legal conditions which can make it a mundane community 
of political animals endowed with interests as often divergent as convergent. 59 
The contention, then, is that demos and nation are two different notions and 
should be separated. Demos should refer to membership of the political 
community whereas nation/ethnos should refer to membership of the cultural 
community. 60 The process of demos formation should be related to a situation 
wherein the members of a civil society develop a common awareness about the 
way in which public affairs should be handled rather than be conflated with the 
"art of nation building". 61 
5.3.1. Proposition for a participatory demos 
Whereas nation building suggests an architectural, mechanical or artificial 
model which can take the form of a process of inventing or even imagining a 
nation where one does not exist, the conceptualisation of demos should be 
motivated by a desire to replace an improper or even undemocratic form of 
governance. That is to say a form of governance whereby citizens do not 
identify themselves with the nation as a whole, but with the State's political 
Institutions instead. In turn, who is going to be a member of that civic polity 
(citizen) should not only be premised on nationality laws, and in general in 
59Idem., paras. 41-42. 
60 Delanty, G. (1998) "Social Theory and European Transformation: Is there a European 
Society? ", 3 Sociological Research Online (Papers) 1, pp. 4-5: 
< URL hM2: //www. socresonline. orR. uk/socresonline/3/l/l. htmi >. 
61 Chryssochoou, D. (ed. ) (1998) Democracy in the European Union, London: Tauris 
Academic Studies, 89. 
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ethno, national and cultural terms but also on residence criteria (the so-called 
residential citizenship). 62 
By redefining citizenship, from membership of the State on the grounds of 
nationality to participation, 63 we can avoid paradoxical situations. People who 
reside in the territory of a modern State on a permanent basis and contribute to 
its economy and prosperity will no longer be denied access to social and 
political life of that State. They will also be considered citizens like the 
nationals of that State who live far away from their country and be effectively 
involved in its political decision-making. Of course, the quality of citizen 
involvement in the political life of that State will be dependent on the 
existence, or not, of institutional avenues available to them in order to direct 
their claims and interests to those who actually govern. But then who is to 
determine, and how, what channels of communication are best suited for 
articulating public needs and demands that no single democratic answer exists 
`as such' is obvious. 
The making of such demos whose citizens irrespective of ethno-national 
origins exercise effective control through formal or informal means over the 
government 
- 
proposed for both national and European levels 
- 
will not suggest 
any fusion or merger of pre-existing communities into a larger unit ruled by 
62 Bauböck, R. (1997) "Citizenship and National Identities in the European Union" Harvard 
Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 97/04, p. 2 under Title "Dynamics of Inclusion in Liberal 
Citizenship" < URL http: //www. jeanmonnetproeram-oriz/papers/97/97-04--4. html >. 
63 Gawert also expresses the same idea. For him, citizenship should have as its reference point 
the problem of societal self-organisation and at its core the political rights of participation and 
communication. Therefore, he conceives of citizenship as "the legal Institution via which 
individual member of a nation takes part as an active agent in the concrete nexus of State 
actions" as quoted in: Habermas, J. (1992) "Citizenship and National Identity: Some 
reflections on the future of Europe", Special Section: Citizenship, Democracy and National 
Identity, 12 Praxis International 1, p. 1 at 5. 
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one supreme centre of decision-making. The sentiments of democratic 
consciousness among citizens will not entail any loss of national identity and 
subculture in the name of the demos. True enough, a group consciousness is 
necessary, but one based on adherence to democratic ideas, values and 
principles, rather than one based on a consciousness of sameness and 
commonality, a sense of common origins, religious and ethno-cultural ties and 
feelings of belonging to one State. 
To establish such a civic demos is not as difficult as it might appear at first 
sight. The White Paper's propositions for "better involvement" in the Union's 
decision-making process might trigger a Europeanisation of identities and it 
might activate trans-national intermediary organisations to contribute to the 
evolution of a European public space. Involvement, not just in consultation 
with EU Institutions but also in the activities of European networks, would 
transport the idea of a legitimate polity that is different from the concept of the 
modem State. However, this will only occur when we give up the idea that the 
State is the one and only blueprint for the political organisation of a society. 64 
5.4. In search of a European demos 
The discussion now moves to another level of analysis as proffered by the 
members of the German Constitutional Court and which brings us to the heart 
of the problem. That is, whether there is or can be democracy in the EU. 65 
64 Kohler-Koch, B. (2001) "Symposium: Mountain or Molehill? 
-A Critical Appraisal of the 
Commission White Paper on Governance: The Commission White Paper and the Improvement 
of European Governance", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 6/01, p. 2 under Title 
"European Governance put in a new Perspective"; See also Magnette, P. loc. cit. supra note 42. 
65 Ruling loc. cit. supra note 4, paras. 37-38,40-44. 
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Although the German judges said `no' by being based on national standards, 
they made us think that the so-called Union democratic deficit should be 
regarded as two problems and not as one. 66 If the Union is to evolve into a 
political system that deserves to be called `democracy', such a qualitative leap 
is not to be achieved merely either by granting the EP full co-decision powers 
with the Council of Ministers, or by the enactment of central legislation 
concerning the polity's democratic reorientation, or even by further 
constitutional amendments to the original Treaties. No matter how important 
these lines of democratic pursuit are, they will all fall short if they are not 
accompanied by the development of fellow-feelings among the peoples of the 
EU and the transformation of the latter into a politically-responsible 
community (demos). On the one hand, this approves of Weiler's argument that 
the "No-Demos Thesis" aggravates the democratic malaise in the EU, and 
therefore brings the German Court into a No-Win situation. On the other hand, 
however, it can be argued that the concept of demos in ethno-culturally 
homogenous terms challenges both scholars and European lawyers to think 
about `who is governed? ' in the EU, and consequently having to try and figure 
out whether there could be some demos at the EU level. 67 
66 Majone, G. (1998) "Europe's Democratic Deficit: The Question of Standards", 4 European 
Law Journal 1, p. 5 at 14. See also Chryssochoou, D. op. cit. supra note 61, pp. 4,15. 
67 With reference to the EU, Kohler-Koch, for example, has proposed that the demos might be 
simply "the idea of a European society that is willing across all divergence of opinion and 
interests to live under common rule" as quoted in: Shaw, J. (ed. ) (2000) Law of the European 
Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave, (3rd edition), 188. On the other hand, Lars-Erik Cederman has 
adopted a perspective of "bounded integration". Such a view tries to problematize the 
European demos rather than accepting or denying its existence from the outset: Cederman, L. 
(2001) "Nationalism and Bounded Integration: What It Would to Construct a European 
Demos", EU! Working Papers RSC No. 2000/34 < URL http: //www. iue. it/RSC/WP- 
Texts/00 34. pdf >. 
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If there is, or can be some demos, at the EU level, a proposition is analysed 
below, it will certainly not be defined in Volkish terms. Although the Union 
might possess considerable State-like qualities, for example, rule of law, 
bureaucracy, citizenship and under debate constitutionality and legitimacy, in 
regulating the relations among peoples and States, it is not a would-be (nation) 
State, still less State. As it was suggested in Chapter Two of this Thesis, the 
European Union does not need to support a monopoly of violence, nor systems 
of taxation, expenditure and redistribution. Nor does it need to be sovereign in 
the classic sense of the nation-State. If the Union tries to spill the blood of its 
population, dig deep into the taxpayer's pocket, function as the final rule- 
making body in all areas of policy or even impose uniform set of rules in all 
matters, it is argued that it will not last long. It might once have been claimed 
that one of the `virtues' of the State is that "it is responsible for determining the 
rules that govern all other power relations"68 without itself being subject to any 
higher authority. But this does not hold true of the EU, if we consider two 
issues. First, that the Court of Justice has already kept a close eye on 
Community Competence. The Opinion 2/94 relating to the accession of the 
Communities to the European Convention of Human Rights69 and the case 
Germany v. Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising)70 can apply here. 
Second, that its supremacy is not comprehensive in relation to all social 
relationships but sector specific and even then, those who are bound by its rules 
68 Beetham, D. (ed. ) (1991) The Legitimation of Power, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 121-123. 
69 Opinion 2/94 Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [1996] ECR I- 1759, [1996] 2 CMLR 265, para. 
27. 
70 Case C-376/98 Germany v. Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I- 8419, para. 83; For 
recent comments on the case see Hervey, T. (2001) "Up in Smoke? Community (Anti)- 
Tobacco Law and Policy", 26 European Law Review 2,101-125. 
101 
CHAPTER THREE THE "NO-DEMOS THESIS" 
have participation in their making, 71 as well as the scope to negotiate 
arrangements for their enforcement. 72 
Moreover, a demos model in organic cultural terms, if it were ever 
conceivable, would no provide a great survival capacity. It would be a great 
obstacle to the future of the European Union which cannot afford to create the 
impression of being a tightly bound political system. Externally, it will have to 
leave itself open to perspective enlargements; and in its internal affairs, it will 
almost certainly have to practise various forms of flexible integration and 
variable geometry. In turn, both of these forms preclude any sense of identity 
based on a uniform application of law and entitlements across the Union's 
territory and citizenry of its political system. 
However, as it has already been noticed, a sense of shared political identity is 
dramatically important to the formation of a democratic political system. 
Members of a democracy have to feel that they belong together in order to 
accept the decisions of some kind of majority as collectively binding on them. 
To claim therefore that there is or can be a demos/a European people who can 
legitimately carry out policies, we have to find out whether the contemporary 
71 Note Cases: C-29/69 Stauder v. Stadt Ulm [1969] ECR 419, [1970] CMLR 112 and C-4/73 
Nold KG v. Commission [1974] ECR 491. Both of these arose out of a concern that a provision 
of Community legislation infringed fundamental rights. Given the absence of explicit 
fundamental rights protection in the Treaty of Rome, the individuals involved in the above 
cases made the ECJ seriously committed to the protection of fundamental rights as part of the 
Community legal order. Since then, therefore, it has been unacceptable for the Community to 
fail to show respect for the protection of fundamental rights. 
72 Note Art. 30 EC. Member States are able to negotiate the enforcement of rules with regard to 
the elimination of quantitative restrictions on the grounds of. "public morality, public policy, 
public security, the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants, the protection of 
national treasures possessing artistic, historical or archaeological value, the protection of 
industrial and commercial property". 
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Union is underpinned by a shared political identity and if it is, whether it is of a 
kind likely to conceive of another demos in non-organic and cultural terms. 
5.4.1. The development of a European political identity 
As far as the first question-problem is concerned, the author argues that there is 
a process of constructing a sense of European identity based on the following 
elements: 
1. The concept of European citizenship; 
2. The formation of a European civil society in which full and open 
participation by all should be ensured within the Union's institutional 
arrangements; 73 
3. A common political culture of rights as it is illustrated in the Charter 
adopted by the Nice Council in December 2000.74 
5.4.1.2. The construction and status of EU citizenship 
Indeed, the defensiveness for a feeling of belonging together can be firstly 
realised from the construction and status of European citizenship [Article 8 
EC]. Apart from supporting arguments that a status of membership must be 
universal (we are all equal) but also capable of recognising differentiation (we 
are all different), citizenship implies belongingness. It comprises not only the 
bonds that link a person and the Nation-State/polity/civic society in which 
he/she lives, but also his/her relationship with others who live in the same 
73 See Chapter Four of this Thesis. 
74 See Chapter Six of this Thesis. 
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dimensions of time and space. Thus the task in respect of any attempt to apply 
citizenship ideas at the EU level is not just to show that citizens are connected 
to the system of multi-level governance outlined in Chapter Two, by sets of 
rights and duties, but also to identify what might hold them together in terms of 
a non-nationalistic cultural identity75 or a sense of civic obligation. 
Since the capacity of a State to define its own nationals is regarded as a 
component of sovereignty76 it was not surprising that when drafting the 
citizenship provisions the Member States would choose to make Member State 
nationality the gateway to Union citizenship, thus knocking-out third country 
nationals ("TCNs"). 77 
The consequential knock-on effects for TCNs who legally reside in the Union 
territory is that they became second-class citizens by being excluded from 
benefiting from the EU citizenship, and the rights which it confers. They can 
only benefit from the `right to limited circulation', and not of a free movement 
of persons (Articles 39-42 EC) upon which other rights are based, for example, 
the right to residence, to work and to travel. They have no political rights, as in 
75 The main motivation behind moves towards a common cultural policy and construction of a 
common identity in the EU appears to be the view that differences in culture and identity 
reduce the level of support for further European integration, rather than to build a European 
supernationalism: Field, H. "A Common Cultural Policy and Identity", Paper presented to the 
fourth UACES Research Conference, University of Sheffield, 8-10 September 1999, pp. 3,10 
(mimeo). Whether there is a basis for a common European culture still remains one of the most 
controversial issues in the debate about the future of the European Union. 
76 The position needs to be viewed in the light of Case C-369/90 Mario Vicente Micheletti and 
others v. Delegacidn del Gobierno en Cantabria [1992] ECR I- 4239 which effectively 
restricted the right of Spain to apply its own legislation on dual nationality. 
77 See generally Kostakopoulou, T. (2001) "Invisible Citizens? Long-term Resident Third- 
Country Nationals in the EU and their Struggle for Recognition" in: Bellamy, R. and Warleigh, 
A. (eds. ) (2001) Citizenship and Governance in the European Union, London: Continuum, 
180-205. 
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most Member States these are withheld. 78 TCNs who are entitled to entry and 
residence rights by virtue of national laws governing family reunion or by 
virtue of EU law are also excluded. 79 Last to be excluded are those benefiting 
from the Court's of Justice interpretation of the free movement of services 
provisions which allow for a form of free movement for TCNs moving as 
employees of a service provider80 or those benefiting from international 
agreements linking the EU and its Member States with third countries, some of 
which grant limited residence rights. 81 
Based on this evidence, it seems that a prerequisite for eligibility to EU 
citizenship is the acquisition of national citizenship. Non-Europeans must 
acquire the nationality of the host State in order to be entitled to EU citizenship 
and citizenship rights. To this effect, it is not a coincidence that the EU has 
been criticised for personally taking care only of its citizens or of being 
characterised as a "fortresss82 depicting the idea of a powerful and wealthy 
medieval fortress that protected its own integrity, membership and wealth. 
78 Only Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands have introduced voting rights in local elections 
for all non-EU nationals under specific conditions (age, residence) whereas in the rest of the 
Member States such an arrangement it is out of question. 
79 See Arts. 39-54 EC and Art. 10 of the Council Regulation 1612/68/EEC on freedom of 
movement for workers within the Community [OJ 1968, No. L 257/2 as later amended by 
Regulations 312/76, OJ 1976, No. L 39/2 and 2434/92, OJ 1992, No. L 245/1]. 
80 Note Case C-43/93 Raymond Vander Elst v. Office des Migrations Internationales [1994] 
ECRI-3803. 
81 Note Cases C-171/95 Recep Tetik v. Land Berlin [1997] ECR I- 329; C-1/97 Mehmet Birden 
v. Stadtgemeinde Bremen [1998] ECR I- 7747; C-262/96 Sema Sürül v. Bundesanstalt für 
Arbeit [1999] ECR I- 2685; C-340/97 Omer Nazli, Caglar Nazli and Melike Nazli v. Stadt 
Nürnberg [2000] ECR I- 957; C-329/97 Sezgin Ergat v. Stadt Ulm [2000] ECR I- 1487. 
82 See generally Geddess, A (ed. ) (1999) Immigration and European Integration: Towards 
Fortress Europe?, New York: Manchester University Press; Moylan, D. (ed. ) (1989) Bricks in 
the Wall: Or, How to Build "Fortress Europe" While Denying Intentions of Doing So, London: 
Adam Smith Institute; Lindberg-Clausen, C. "An Ever Closer Union Within Fortress Europe? 
Bringing Neofunctionalism Back In", Paper presented to the fourth UACES Research 
Conference, University of Sheffield, 8-10 September 1999 (mimeo). 
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5.4.1.3. More cited examples 
Another example for developing a sense of European identity can be built upon 
an approach to citizenship which looks, not at the formal rights under the 
Treaty identified as specifically `citizenship related', but rather undertakes an 
audit from the perspective of asking what are the practical consequences of EU 
membership. This could involve looking at a very large part of EU law through 
the lens of citizenship. What follows is but a brief sketch. 
" EU-nationals travel across the internal Community borders and remain in 
the territory of a Member State for work (market citizenship), short staying 
or travelling onward without being required to obtain a visa from the 
Member State or States in whose territory the right is exercised. 
" They are assured of their rights to housing, 83 to access to employment, 
including training in vocational schools and retraining centres, 
remuneration, social and tax advantages, 84 to family reunification 85 (social 
citizenship), to join trade unions, to be eligible for workers' 
representatives' bodies in the undertakings of any Member State where 
they work and also for administration and management posts of trade 
unions86 (industrial citizenship). 
83 Council Regulation 1612/68/EEC loc. cit. supra note 79, Art. 9. 
84 Idem., Arts. 1-9. 
85 Idem., Art. 10(1), under the conditions established in Art. 10(3). Note too the Council 
Directive 68/360/EEC of 15 October 1968 on the abolition of restrictions in respect of the 
movement and residence within the Community for workers and members of their families [OJ 
1968, No. L 257/13 as later amended by Council Directive 73/373, No. L 2/1]. Inter alia see 
Case C-249/86 Commission v. Germany [1989] ECR 1263 where the Court restrictively 
interpreted the conditions for family reunion, but still in manner that protects the Community 
worker and his or her family. 
86 Idem., Art. 8. 
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" They are assured of their rights to free establishment in another Member 
State in order to pursue activities as self-employed persons, providers or 
recipients of services. 87 
" They cross the internal borders of the Union for work without being 
required to have work permits and without the need of renewing them. 
" They address the ECJ to protect welfare benefits that are associated to the 
right of free movement and the right to non-discrimination in Article 12 EC 
(welfare citizenship). 
Characteristic examples that are worth of being mentioned here as 
demonstrations of protecting social rights while moving around the Union, is 
the Martinez Sala case. 88 
5.4.1.4. The breakthrough of the Martinez Sala Case 
The question arose whether Martinez Sala, a Spanish citizen, resident in 
Germany and dependent upon social welfare, is similarly situated, for the 
purposes of applying a non-discrimination test, to a German national worker 
drawing a child-raising allowance. Non-nationals like Martinez Sala are 
entitled to receive this benefit provided they are in a possession of a residence 
entitlement. 
87 Council Directive 73/148/EEC of 21 May 1973 on the abolition of restrictions on movement 
and residence within the Community for nationals of Member States with regard to 
establishment and the provision of services [OJ 1973, No. L 172/14]. 
88 Case C-85/96 Maria Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I- 2691. 
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The applicant attempted to challenge the German policy on social benefits by 
appealing against the decision of the Bundessozialgericht (Federal Social 
Court). Hence, the German Court put a number of questions to the ECJ under 
Article 234 EC. 
The Court held that a Spanish national who was long-term resident in 
Germany, although not clear on what legal basis her residence in that country 
could be deduced, could rely upon the non-discrimination principle of Article 
12 EC as the basis for applying for the benefit. 89 To defend the claim for 
equality of treatment the Court invoked the Union citizenship. Herein lies the 
contribution of the case, notably [Article 8 EC] which attaches to the citizen 
the rights and duties existing under the EC Treaty. Thus Martinez Sala could 
ask for equal treatment, the Court found, even if she was solely dependent 
upon welfare and could bring herself within the personal scope of Community 
law by no other means than that she was a Union citizen lawfully resident in 
another Member State. 90 Concerning the material condition, whether the 
benefit she claimed fell within the scope of EU law, the Court responded 
positively. 91 
By employing a novel combination of the principles of rationae materiae and 
rationae personae to bring the type of humanitarian issue which the case itself 
in reality involves, the ECJ firstly restricted the Member States'freedom to 
limit any rights of residence in each individual case where a particular migrant 
89 Idem., paras. 54-55,62. 
90 Idem., paras. 63-65. 
91 Idem., para. 57. 
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has become a burden upon the State. So what in practice will now occur is that 
conditions placed on benefits by Member States will be subject to scrutiny 
under the proportionality test since most of them will be indirectly rather than 
directly discriminatory and will therefore require objective justification. 
Secondly, it gave "something close to a universal non-discrimination right 
including access to all manner of welfare benefitss92 as a consequence of the 
creation of the figure of the Union citizen. No longer thus, it appears, are those 
benefits only going to be available to those able to point to a particular 
economic or family status protected under EU law. Martinez Sala has a 
significant impact, therefore, upon the welfare sovereignty of the Member 
States and mandates, in fact, that the community of concern and engagement 
by reference to which citizens of the host Member State must define 
themselves is, in certain welfare respects all those other EU nationals who have 
equal access to welfare benefits. In that respect, perhaps, the Court has gone 
significantly outside the confines of market citizenship in its early construction 
of the citizenship provisions. 93 
In a negative way to what the Martinez Sala suggested upon the extension of 
Union citizenship, more cases allowed the Court to steer social rights away 
from the purely economic concerns of market integration. 94 In Uecker and 
92 Fries, S. and Shaw, J. (1998) "Citizenship of the Union: First Steps in the European Court of 
Justice", 4 European Public Law 4, p. 533 at 536. 
93 Note Cases C-53/81 Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1982] ECR 1035, [1982] 2 CMLR 
454; C-139/85 Kempf v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1986] ECR 1741, [1987] 1 CMLR 764; 
C-149/79 Commission v. Belgium [1980] ECR 3881, [1981] 2 CMLR 413. 
94 See generally, Moebius, I. and Szyszczak, E. (1998) "Of Raising Pigs and Children", 18 
Yearbook of European Law, 125-156. 
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Jacquet, 95 for instance, a case which dealt with the right to equal treatment in 
relation to free movement of persons, the Court suggested that Union 
citizenship, established in [Article 8 EC], is not intended to extend the material 
scope of the freedom of movement rules. 
"[... ] a member of the family of a worker who is a national of 
a Member State cannot rely on Community law to challenge 
the validity of a limitation on the duration of his or her contract 
of employment within that same State when the worker in 
question has never exercised the right to freedom of movement 
within the Community". 96 
Consequently, the Union citizenship provision cannot be the legal basis for 
extending Community rights to situations regarded as purely internal to a 
Member State. 97 
Horst and Bickel98 also revealed the citizenship potential of the principle of 
non-discrimination on the basis of nationality found in Article 12 EC. There, 
the Court provided an expansive link between the exercise of free movement 
rights and the right to equal treatment in criminal procedural rights in the host 
State. 
95 Joined Cases C-64/96 and C-65/96 Land Nordrhein 
- 
Westfalen/Uecker and Jacquet/Land 
Nordrhein 
- 
Westfalen [1997] ECR I- 3171. 
96 Idem., para. 19. 
97 Idem., paras. 16,23. 
98 Case C-274/96 Bickel and Franz [1998] ECR I- 7637. 
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[... ] the exercise of the right to move and reside freely in 
another Member State is enhanced if the citizens of the Union 
are able to use a given language to communicate with the 
administrative and judicial authorities of a State on the same 
footing as its nationals. Consequently, persons 
... 
in exercising 
that right in another Member State, are in principle entitled, 
pursuant to [Article 6 of the Treaty], to treatment no less 
favourable than that accorded to nationals of the host State so 
far as concerns the use of languages which are spoken there". 99 
Horst and Bickel and Martinez Sala thus show that once the ratio materiae 
falls within the scope of application of the EC Treaty, a Union citizen derives 
legal rights which must be delivered on the basis of non-discrimination when 
compared with the treatment of nationals of the host State. This allows for a 
measure of national sovereignty as well as competition between States in terms 
of enforcement of their laws, although as Maduro points out, this may be a 
complex exercise. 100 "The principle of national treatment dependent upon the 
principle of non-discrimination determines that nationals of other Member 
States should be treated the same as home nationals, which does not mean that 
they should be subject to the same rules. In reality, equal treatment may mean 
different treatment". lot 
99 Idem., para. 16. 
10° Szyszczak, E. loc. cit. supra note 29, p. 1157. 
101 Maduro, M. "The Scope of European Remedies: The Case of Purely Internal Situations and 
Reverse Discrimination" in: Kilpatrick, C., Novitz, T., and Skidmore, P. (eds. ) (2000) The 
Future of Remedies in Europe, Oxford: Hart, 117-140, at 129. 
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5.5. An overall assessment 
The aforementioned examples originating from the status and construction of 
Union citizenship could not suggest that `top-down' strategies make Member 
State nationals feel European or relate to each other as such. After all, whether 
the meta-national polity is very much or very little `European' does not only 
depend on the structural/institutional breadth, which has just been discussed, 
but also on a `socio-psychological' one. To this direction, the development of a 
European dimension to education as well as the encouragement of mobility in 
students and teachers in programmes such as ERASMUS and youth exchanges, 
joint projects such as Euronews, `bottom-up' movements among the masses 
concerning European issues and the circulation of a single currency might have 
a role to play. 102 
5.6. A civic-value driven European demos 
Having established that a sense of European identity is constructed upon 
citizenship and having already attested that shared ethno-national and cultural 
affiliation is an implausible and undesirable basis for European identity, the 
foregoing paragraphs would seem to open the possibility of building a 
European polity around shared civic values. '03 
102 Mangkhala, S. "Constructivism and the Formation of European Identity", Paper presented 
to UACES 30M Anniversary Conference and Fifth Research Conference, Central European 
University, Budapest, Hungary, 6-8 April 2000, p. 14 (mimeo). 
103 Mouffe expresses the same idea in quite different wording. She argued that "if Europe is not 
to be defined exclusively in terms-of economic agreements and reduced to a common market, 
the definition of a common political identity must be at the head of the agenda and this requires 
addressing the question of citizenship. European citizenship cannot be understood solely in 
terms of a legal status and set of rights, important as these are. It must mean identifying with a 
set of political values and principles which are constitutive of modem democracy": Mouffe, C. 
(ed. ) (1992) Dimensions of Radical Democracy, London: Verso, 8. 
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The idea of a European demos in civic terms has already been launched and 
developed by many contributions to the literature. 104 No matter how they 
characterise the European demos, whether that is trans-national, 105 supra- 
national, 106 or post-national, '°7 characterisations which the author does not 
oppose, the present Thesis brings about the notion of `autochthonia'. Thus, it 
proposes that the demos who starts to emerge at the EU level is autochthonous 
because it is not restricted to the national patterns of the past. 108 It 
accommodates the need for preservation of cultures and national identities; in 
general the need for diversity within the unity. '09 
Ethno-cultural homogeneity might have been once an important ladder to 
nationhood; and in turn, ethnically defined nationhood might have been a 
useful ladder to liberal democracy. Recall what Schmitt once said: 
104 Smith, H. (1996) "New Thinking in Politics and International Relations", Kent Papers and 
International Relations, No. S2, Series 5, University of Kent, p. 20 at 24-25; Howe, P. (1995) 
"A Community of Europeans: The Requisite Underpinnings", 33 Journal of Common Market 
Studies 1, p. 27 at 27-46; Lord, C. (ed. ) (1998) Democracy in the European Union, Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 115-124; Chalmers, D. and Szyszczak, E. (1998) European Union 
Law, Volume two 
- 
Towards a European Polity?, Aldershot: Ashgate, 83. 
"' Chryssochoou, D. (1996) "When 'Demos' met 'Cracy': Prospects for Democracy in the 
European Union", Leicester University Discussion Papers in European Politics, No EP96/2, p. 
1 at 4-13. 
106 Weiler, J. (1995) loc. cit. supra note 5, p. 24. See also Craig, P. and De Bürca, G. op. cit. 
sura note 30. 
10, Curtin, D. (ed. ) (1997) Post-national Democracy 
- 
The European Union in Search of a 
Political Philosophy, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 51-53. 
108 The word `autochthonous' here has the meaning of being something different from what has 
been experienced at national level and therefore, is to be valued as something very special on 
its own. 
109 In fact, this need for preservation of cultural diversity is prompting great debates on whether 
implementing, or not, a European Cultural Charter, in addition to the Social Charter. "The aims 
of a Cultural Charter would be to protect minority cultures, without transgressing human rights, 
and to encourage a well-balanced network of European cultural relations, which would mellow 
the increasingly radical character of cultural conflicts, particularly in socially unstable parts of 
Europe": Garcia, S. (ed. ) (1993) European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy, London: 
Pinter, 27. 
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"Democracy requires... first homogeneity and second 
- 
if the 
need arises 
- 
elimination or eradication of heterogeneity". ' 10 
But, none of these elements are important ladders to Union's democracy since 
the EU does not aim to develop a (super)-State and thus become a `cultural 
hegemon'. In fact, cultural hegemony in the EU is very difficult to be achieved, 
some say impossible, due to its multi-level governance which was examined in 
Chapter Two. Multi-level governance implies millions and millions of multiple 
loyalties and identities at the individual level, distributing therefore a degree of 
legitimacy to each: citizens who define themselves as consumers, workers, 
wage earners, students, Catholic, Protestant in some contexts; German, British, 
French in others, and European in perhaps the broadest political context, for 
example to pay a match ticket in Euros"' and to join a common European 
army under a European flag and a European commander. 112 Thus in such a 
multi-level polity, the European demos in civic terms comes out as the new 
framework of unity out of diverse identities (cognitive entities), loyalties and 
cultures. It comes as a desire to democratically shape the common fate of a 
plurality of highly interrelated peoples, without endangering the existence of 
that plurality. "A many turned into one without ceasing to be many". 113 In this 
sense, the European demos neither destroys the subcultures that are joined 
together to form it, nor breaks the European society into a cluster of warring 
110 Schmitt, C. (ed. ) (1988) The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, Cambridge, Mass: MIT 
Press, 9. 
111 Barber, L. (2001) "Europe in the New Century: A Scenario" in: Guttman, R. (ed. ) (2001) 
Europe in the New Century: Visions of an Emerging Superpower, London: Lynne Rienner, 7- 
13, at 12. 
112 Dale, R. (2001) "Differing Views on a United Europe" in: Guttman, R. (ed. ) (2001) Europe 
in the New Century: Visions of an Emerging Superpower, London: Lynne Rienner, 29-42, at 
41. 
113 Chryssochoou, D. op. cit. supra note 61, p. 93. 
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nationalities. This is what the author would call the oxymoron of the European 
demos. It represents a segmentary-type model of belonging just by respecting 
different ethno-national identities and cultures as well as a cohesive and solid 
one (model of belonging) just because it respects them. 
Indeed, if there is anything good about the EU, it is that it tries, through 
popular political sentiments and civic values, to bring divided or conflicting 
loyalties to a balanced co-existence. The values to which member publics 
converge are universalised to the Union's Institutions. The preservation of 
peace, 114 the protection of human and political rights, "" the suppression of 
social problems, for example, drug trafficking and organised crime, " 6 the 
combat against racism, 117 the tackling of high unemployment rates, "8 
prosperity 119 and a combination of a market economy120 with a highly 
114 The guarantee of lasting peace in Europe is regarded as very important by a significant 
proportion of the young. Eurobarometer 47, November 1997. 
" 55% of European citizens call for a common European Union action concerning 
immigration policy, and 54% would like to see European Union rules on political asylum. 
Eurobarometer 47, November 1997. 
116 65% of European citizens fear an increase in drug trafficking and organised crime and seven 
in ten people want the Union to take action against drug trafficking. Eurobarometer 47, 
November 1997. 
117 With 1997 designated as the "European Year Against Racism", the Eurobarometer results 
show that only a minority of European citizens feels that people from countries outside the 
European Union, who want to work in the Member States, should be accepted without 
restrictions. Eurobarometer 48, March 1998. 
' The public is unanimous (92%) that the fight against unemployment should be a priority for 
the European Union and 70% feel that increased co-operation in the field of employment 
policy between the Member States should be a priority for combating unemployment. 
Eurobarometer 48, March 1998. 
119 Eight in ten Europeans were satisfied with the life they led and their expectations for the 
year 2000 were very optimistic. Eurobarometer 52, April 2000. Especially for the young 
people of the European Union, Europe signifies above all the hope of a better future in 
economic and employment terms and the ability to travel within the Union without formality. 
Eurobarometer 47, November 1997. 
120 After a slight drop in the spring of 1997, support for the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
and the single currency, the Euro, has returned to being 55%, whilst 37% are against it. 
Eurobarometer 54, February 2001. 
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developed system of social security are some of the values that can be 
decoupled from the particularities of the Nation-State. 
5.6.1. The one demos system of the EU 
The decoupling of nationality and citizenship in the EU might lead to a 
thinking of co-existing multiple demoi (fifteen national and one European)12' 
as Weiler recommends. However, his analysis as to the three views of multiple 
demoi is complicated. The distinction between the in-reaching and out- 
reaching sense creates confusion whether one stops to feel part of `Europe' in 
the in-reaching sense. `Europe' is an idea subject to evolution through time and 
space. As such it is subjective or intersubjective: that is, like other ideas, it is an 
abstract of thinking minds, either of individuals or amongst them, and therefore 
it is hard to suggest that the `European' element stops to exist in the in- 
reaching sense. Given that the `European' element can transcend identities and 
loyalties, it could be further proposed that the EU should not be seen as a 
political system of multiple demoi but as a political system of one demos. In 
this perspective, the conceived European demos in civic terms would be 
imagined as a framework within which all the other ethno-national and cultural 
demoi are included but without losing their integrity. Individuals would enjoy 
moving between identities and loyalties, as the situation requires. 122 A stronger 
sense of belonging to the more immediate communities, for example, national 
12. See supra note 31. 
122 For the individual, or at any rate for most individuals, identity is somewhat `situational or 
dimensional', if not always optional. That is to say, individuals usually identify themselves and 
identified by others in different ways according to situations in which they find themselves: 
Smith, A. (1992) "National Identity and the Idea of European Unity", 68 International Affairs 
1, p. 55 at 59. 
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or regional, would not imply a rejection of a European political community". 123 
Schematically it could be regarded as a spider's web or "a shelter"124 
encompassing the national demoi and their corresponding identities. 
Undoubtedly, this reminds us of what Etzioni had in his mind when he wrote 
that: 
"Communities are best viewed as if they were Chinese nesting 
boxes, in which less encompassing communities (families, 
neighbourhoods) are nested within more encompassing ones 
(local villages and towns), which in turn are situated within 
still-more encompassing communities, the national and the 
cross-national ones (such as the budding European 
Community)s125 (see diagram 3.1 below). 
123 Reif, K. (1993) "Cultural Convergence and Cultural Diversity as Factors in European 
Identity" in: Garcia, S. (ed. ) (1993) European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy, London: 
Pinter, 131-153, at 138. 
"Z4 Laffan, B. (1996) "The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe", 34 Journal of 
Common Market Studies 1, p. 81 at 100. 
125 Etzioni, A. (ed. ) (1995) The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the 
Communitarian Agenda, London: Fontana, 32. 
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Diagram 3.1: Symbolic representation of the autochthonous European 
demos 
expands 
regional 
Individual ~ 
" 15 demi 
European demos 
Source: The Author © 2001 Katerina 
- 
Marina Kyrieri 
[The blue circle symbolises the cross-national European demos in civic terms, 
whereas the black ones, including the dots, symbolise the fifteen ethno, 
national and cultural demoi. The orange, green and blue arrows symbolise the 
concentric national, regional and European identities respectively. The notion 
of concentric circles, foresees a situation in which there are multiple identities 
whose degrees vary from the highest at the most local and immediate level to 
the lowest at the most distant one, namely the European level. Individuals may 
move between them and consequently be identified in different ways according 
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to dimensions in which they act, but the European element does not stop to 
erode the chosen identities: that is, interaction]. 
Finally, as long as the Union cannot afford to be a tightly bounded political 
system, particularly in respect of the next enlargement, it could also be 
proposed that the autochthonous European demos moves to becoming a 
globalised one. Such thinking of expansion matches well with the novel 
terminology of "condominium" 126 whereby: 
"... Instead of one Europe with recognised and contiguous 
boundaries and hence, a singular and definite population, there 
would be many Europes. Instead of Eurocracy accumulating 
organisationally distinct but politically co-ordinated tasks 
around a single centre, there would be multiple regional 
Institutions acting with relative autonomy in order to solve 
common problems and produce public goods". 127 
126 Schmitter, P. (1996) "If the Nation-State were to wither away in Europe, What Might 
Replace It? " in: Gustavsson, S. and Lewin, L. (eds. ) (1996) The Future of the Nation-State: 
Essays on Cultural Pluralism and Political Integration, Stockholm: Nerenius & Santerus, 211- 
244,222,226. 
'271dem., 226. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
Within the conceptual framework of meta-national democracy, the issue of an 
absent European demos which is included in the long list of the Union's 
democratic deficit has been revisited. Ideas of ethnic uniformity as the 
guarantor of social cohesion and thus democracy have been rejected. A 
decoupling of nationality and citizenship has been regarded as necessary. 
Ethno-cultural solidarities as the basis for an under construction European 
identity have been dismissed and new understandings of a demos at European 
level have been put forward. 
A demos in civic terms which sharpens an awareness of the multiplicity of the 
different forms of life that co-exist in a multi-cultural society (unity within 
diversity) has been but the first step in this direction. 
Yet, it would be wrong to suggest that the EU is capable of transforming itself 
into a democratic polity if the Union's legitimacy were not founded on a 
redefined concept of citizenship and identity. That is, a citizenship which is 
neither exclusionary nor linked to nationality or ethnic ties but which is defined 
inclusively by reference to political and civic participation, one of the White 
Paper's principles that underpin good `governance' in the EU. 128 
128 European Commission, European Governance 
-A White Paper, COM (2001) 428,25 July 
2001, pp. 3,10,13,15-17. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EUROPEAN CIVIL SOCIETY AND CHANNELS OF 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Three tried to recast the Union's democratic deficit as defined by the 
German Constitutional Court. Based on Weiler's critique, the so-called "No- 
Demos" Thesis, it was argued that at both national and European level a demos 
should be a community of citizens irrespective of ethnic, cultural origins, 
linked to each other by strong democratic values and principles. Secondly, that 
the process of demos formation should be related to a situation wherein the 
members of a European civil society develop a common awareness about the 
way in which public affairs are handled. To this end, citizenship is redefined 
from membership of the State on the grounds of nationality to participation. 
This redefinition does not create a two-class demos considering that in modem 
democracies most citizens do not actively participate in politics, apart from 
elections, and even then the turnout is very low. Rather, it preserves `the ideal 
of the active citizen'. It requires that people be recognised as having the right 
and opportunity to participate in public affairs. However, it is one thing to 
recognise one's right, quite another to say that everyone must, irrespective of 
political preferences, actually participate in public life. Participation should be 
regarded neither as a necessity nor as an obligation. It has been argued that one 
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of the most important negative liberties established since the end of the ancient 
world is "freedom from politics", ' and that such a liberty is still an essential 
part of both European and national democracies. 
In respect of the claim that the Union is underpinned by a European political 
identity based on political participation (Chapter Three, p. 104), this Chapter 
will deal with opportunity structures for political involvement at two levels: 
first, individually and second, collectively. By discussing different ideas to 
engage European civil society, this will help to support the claim for a 
European politically organised people and, in general, for democracy in the 
EU. In particular, the focus will be initially on possible policy and polity- 
related, direct and indirect EU channels of individual political participation. 
Then, attention will be drawn on the forms of collective political participation, 
and in particular on the work of the Commission and the ESC. 
This is not an exhaustive study of all the structures, proposals and opinions that 
have been tabled so far. In the author's opinion the chosen examples suffice to 
illustrate the main ideas and to discuss their theoretical implications with 
regard to their primary goal, that is, to render European politics more 
legitimate. 
1 Arendt, H. (1963) On Revolution, London: Faber, 284. 
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2. INDIVIDUAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES FOR EU CITIZENS' 
PARTICIPATION 
2.1. Introduction 
The Union's legitimacy gap has become a matter of serious political concern. 
Following the genuine crisis over the near-failure to secure ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty and the Irish rejection of Nice (8 June 2001), the Union 
legitimacy is officially perceived as something that needs to be redressed. Thus 
measures which forge a stronger connection between the citizen and the 
European political entity are vital. 
In the context of this Thesis, the Union's legitimacy will be framed within 
three categories, all referred to in the White Paper. 2 The first category is output 
legitimacy directed at providing efficient solutions that cannot be materialised 
solely at national level, 3 for example, interest groups and NGOs. Input 
legitimacy constitutes the second category and aims to maximise equal, direct 
and effective citizen influence on European policy-making, 4 for example, the 
social partners in the Social Policy-making. 5 Additionally, a political entity is 
in need of somewhat broader foundations of legitimacy, a common identity, a 
consciousness of belonging and a deeper-going, but less constructed agreement 
with the political regime in general. Schimmelfennig, in his excellent overview 
2 European Commission, European Governance 
-A White Paper, COM (2001) 428,25 July 
2001, pp. 7-8,10-11,13-17. 
3 Schimmelfennig, F. (1996) "Legitimate Rule in the European Union: The Academic Debate", 
Tübinger: Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik und Friedensforschung No. 27, p. 12 < 
URL httn: //www. uni-tuebingen/de/uni/spi/taDs/tap27. htm >. Inter alia for an overall 
assessment on inputs and outputs, see generally Scharpf, F. (1996) "Democratic Policy in 
Europe", 2 European Law Journal 2,136-155; Smismans, S. (2000) "The European Economic 
and Social Committee: Towards Deliberative Democracy", 4 European Integration online 
Papers (EIoP) 12, pp. 2,13-14 <URL http: //eiop. or. atleiop/texte/2000-012 htm>. 
4ldem., 12-13. 
5 See Chapter Five of this Thesis. 
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of the academic debate on legitimate rule in the EU, frames this category as 
social legitimacy. 6 This is dependent on the degree of social homogeneity, the 
strength of civil society organisations 
- 
in terms of staff and funding 
- 
involved 
in the policy-making and the existence of a collective identity among citizens 
that was discussed in Chapter Three. 
In order to highlight that there may be several possible channels of political 
participation for European citizens, individually and collectively, the author 
has borrowed the term "political opportunity structures for citizens' 
participation ("OSCPs") as found in Western democratic systems. 7 Here, the 
notion and theory of political opportunity structure aims to describe and 
explain the conditions in which European people engage in a process that leads 
up to EU decision-making. 
2.2. Policy-Polity, Direct-Indirect opportunity structures in the EU 
Concentrating on the situation at the EU level, it may be observed that voting 
for the EP might be considered a polity-related and direct OSPC. It should be 
noted at this point that the distinction between direct and indirect OSPCs 
makes sense with regard to polity and policy-related channels. While national 
elections influence directly the composition of a political system, primaries 
within parties do so only in an indirect manner. In such a context, voting at 
6 Schimmelfennig, F. loc. cit. supra note 3, p. 5. 
7 See generally Kriesi, H. Koopmans, R. Duyvendak, J. and Giugni, M. (1992) "New Social 
Movements and Political Opportunities in Western Europe", 22 European Journal of Political 
Research 2,219-244. See also Nentwich, M. (1996) "Opportunity Structures for Citizens' 
Participation: The Case of European Union", European Integration online Papers (EIoP) 1, p. 
3< URI, httn: //eiop. or. at/eiop/texte/1996-001 a. htm >. 
124 
CHAPTER FOUR EU CIVIL SOCIETY AND PARTICIPATION 
national elections might be regarded as an act of indirect participation in the 
Euro-polity. In fact, it is the channel by which public opinion impacts on EC 
policy via Member State governments, the Council of Ministers and the 
European Council, and through COSAC8 and the national parliaments. The 
Commission's White Paper is remarkable for what it says as for the future role 
of the national parliaments: in particular, to become more active in stimulating 
public debates on the future of Europe and its policies. 9 COSAC, on the other 
hand, an Institution that is rarely heard of even in the White Paper, can also 
pave the way towards a deeper European integration. So far, it has made 
significant contributions to the Lisbon Summit (May 2000) on employment, 
economic reforms and social cohesion. On the drawing up of the EU Charter, it 
asked the Convention responsible for the drafting to take the opinion of 
applicant countries and of their parliaments into account. It expressed strong 
support for the enlargement process of the EU and urged the governments 
participating in the Nice Intergovernmental Conference ("IGC") 2000 to 
proceed with their work in order to make it possible to start early the 
ratification procedures of the Treaty amendments. It appealed to voters to 
participate in the fifth direct elections to the EP in June 1999. Meeting in 
Hague, in June 1997, it made a declaration on developing a culture of 
transparency. And, in its conclusions adopted in Dublin, October 1996, it 
further suggested that the flow of information from the EU Institutions to the 
national parliaments should be improved and that national parliaments should 
$ COSAC (founded in 1989) is the Conference of European Affairs Committees of the 
Parliaments of the European Union and consists in a biannual meeting of the organs in national 
parliaments responsible for European affairs with a delegation from the European Parliament. 
Its role in the European decision-making process has been recognised formally by a Protocol 
added to the Amsterdam Treaty. 
9 White Paper loc. cit. supra note 2, pp. 17,30. 
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have control over the decisions of their respective Governments. 10 Concerns 
which the White Paper replicates in a similar way. 
Returning to voting at national elections, this can also be listed among the 
policy-related Euro-OSCPs since the composition of the national legislature 
influences considerably the transposition and implementation of legislative acts 
of the Union. At this point, we should recall the implementation of the 
Working Time Directive" in the UK. 
Throughout the years of 1980s and 1990s, successive Conservative 
Governments not only repealed the majority of provisions regulating working 
time practices but also challenged the choice of legal base [Article 118a EC] 
which required a qualified majority for the Directive to be adopted. 12. During 
the premiership of John Major, the UK contested the validity of the Directive 
by arguing before the ECJ that it was not a health and safety but an 
employment law matter and was therefore social legislation. 13 Hence, because 
it opted out of the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty, the UK was not 
required to adopt such legislation. When the Labour party became government, 
the picture changed, and it was not until 1 October 1998 that the Working Time 
Directive Regulations 1998 came into force. 
10 See Conference of European Affairs Committees of the Parliaments of the European Union 
(COSAC): "Decisions and Texts adopted by the COSAC" 
< URL nsinR: //2/htti): //www. europarl. eu. int/nati)arVcosac/texts en. htm >. 
11 Council Directive 93/104/EC of 23 November 1993 concerning certain aspects of the 
organisation of working time [OJ 1993, No. L 307/18]. 
12 See generally Anderson, P. and Weymouth, A. (eds. ) (1999) Insulting the Public? The 
British Press and the European Union, London: Longman, 133-137. 
13 Case C-84/94 UK V. Council [1996] ECR I- 5755, para. 10. 
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National voting is also a control mechanism. This means that a strong political 
mandate at the national level may induce a government to hold a particular 
view on a European issue and consequently veto decisions in the Council of 
Ministers. For instance, take the case of EMU ("European Monetary Union") 
with respect to the UK. The UK citizen has an interest not to scrap the pound 
as such action would increase inflation, interest rates, unemployment and 
would risk its pension schemes, economic stability and inward investments 
mostly from the USA. He/she thus forms communities and pressure groups at 
local, regional, national and European levels such as "Britain in Europe" and 
the "European Movement" or simply becomes a member of some of them. 
When the time of national elections arrives, he/she induces his/her government 
to say `No' to EMU by exercising their right to vote. If the government ever 
tries to go against the public preference or the national political mandate and 
vote in favour of the EMU in the Council of Ministers, this might endanger its 
election to a second term in office and lose in general its public support. 14 Such 
a rationale forced Tony Blair to announce that "a referendum on abolishing the 
pound will not be held until two years after the next election". 15 As a result, 
labour's timidity has been rewarded with opinion polls which show majorities 
against entry to the Euro-zone so large (67% in March 2001)16 and persistent 
that many now doubt whether a referendum is winnable at all. 
14 Shrimsley, "Blair sets deadline for scrapping the pound", Electronic Telegraph, 17 January 
2000,1. 
15 Murphy, "Blair pledge on vote fudges Euro policy", Electronic Telegraph, 16 January 2000, 
1. 
16 Keep the Pound Polls, (March 2001): 
< URL http: //www. keot-h-Mound. or 
. 
uk/nolls/polls index. html >. 
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To illustrate what we have already proposed the following diagram might he 
useful (see diagram 4.1). 
Diagram 4.1. National voting and UK Membership of the EMI! 
1. Government + Policy for a Monetary Union = EMU + UK Membership 
Government 
- 
Policy for a Monetary Union = EMU 
- 
UK Membership 
. 
Government + Policy for a Monetary Union + People's support = EMU 
+ UK Membership + Government in Power 
Government + Policy for a Monetary Union 
- 
People's support = EMU 
+ UK Membership 
- 
Power for the Government 
Source: The Author 
Furthermore, the right of EU citizens to file petitions to the EP and apply to the 
EU Ombudsman should also be considered as active agenda-settings and 
control mechanisms. The Petitions Committee established by the EP all too 
often finds that what Member States consider expedient takes precedence over 
the rights accorded to citizens by the TEU. It so happens that, when the 
national authorities or Institutions are found to be guilty of aberrations, citizens 
are quite unable in practice to exercise their rights and are left quite helpless in 
the jaws of a lion. The Petitions Committee, therefore, speaks out against the 
failings of the authorities that deny citizens, for example, the right of mobility. 
Accordingly, it is calling on the Commission to insist that governments remove 
such impediments and bring national laws into line with Community law. The 
EU Ombudsman, makes sure through recommendations that Commission and 
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other EU Institutions properly implement Codes of Conduct and avoid acts of 
maladministration in their activities that could infringe individual rights, for 
example, the right to good administration and right of access to documents. 
More details on its role will be set out in Chapter Eight on the issue of 
transparency. 
On enhancing the role and increasing the effectiveness of the EU Ombudsman 
and of the Petition's Committee of the EP, the White Paper suggests that these 
should be complemented by creating networks of similar existing bodies in the 
Member States capable of dealing with disputes involving citizens and EU 
issues. Such a proposal, the White Paper further affirms, will improve people's 
knowledge of the extent and limits of their rights under Community law and 
help them find which Member State authorities can resolve problems. '7 
In assessing additional means of political participation, referenda create a 
direct link between the EU citizen's input and the policy outcome. The 
referendum OSCP has been frequently used to confirm accession to the EU or 
to govern the direction of integration through the ratification of new Treaties. 
National constitutional referenda are significant determinants of the future 
direction of European integration as long as they are not imposed upon the 
States arbitrarily by supra-national executives in order to promote their 
interests. For example, in relation to Ireland's ratification of the Nice Treaty, 
the President of the Commission, Mr Romano Prodi, indicated that he wanted 
17 White Paper loc. cit. supra note 2, p. 25. 
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the Irish government to put the Treaty to the people again before the end of 
2002 after loosing the first referendum. 18 
Such predetermined referenda, however, are unlikely to constitute engines for 
future reforms in the EU. This is because concerns over legitimacy and the 
democratic deficit of the EU will become more intense to the extent that it 
appears that Member States are `coerced' on how and when to hold a 
referendum. 
So far, there have been twenty-four referenda (including Ireland's `No' Vote 
on the Nice Treaty) since the first one was held in France, in April 1972. More 
are expected to take place in highly selective ways to determine specific 
aspects of the European agreement such as the UK joining the EMU. Denmark 
has already voted `No' to EMU on 28 September 2000.19 
It is interesting to note at this stage, however, that in recurring and televised 
political debates in the UK, it has been raised whether it is constitutionally 
democratic to hold a referendum on joining the Euro-zone or not. It may be 
that there are no constitutional requirements for holding such a referendum; 
yet, most of the democratic practices in the UK are embedded in their 
1$ See RTE News Interactive: Referenda News 8/6/2001, "Prodi wants second referendum on 
Nice Treaty" < URL http: //www. rte. ie/news/features/referenda/news/refD608a. html >; 
Telegraph 23/6/2001, "Prodi tells Dublin to think again on Nice referendum" < URL 
hqp: //www. no-euro. com/article. cfm? IDNO=262. Sunday Mail 10/6/2001, "Ireland EU vote 
not so Nice for Cyprus? " < URL http: //www. cyprus-mail. com/June/10 >. 
19 See generally Miller, V. (2000) "The Danish Referendum on Economic and Monetary 
Union", International Affairs and Defence Section, House of Commons Research Paper 00/78, 
29 September 2000 < URL http: //www. parliament uk/commons/lib/research/rp2000/rp00- 
078. pdf>. 
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traditions. Therefore, the absence of formal constitutional provisions does not 
ipso facto prevent referenda from being held. 
Following the Danish `No' Vote in 1992, EU Treaty referenda have made a 
great impact either directly on Brussels or on influencing the nature of the 
relationship of the EU to the people of Europe, or on the capacity to acquire a 
trans-national mobility and wreak havoc in other Member States. 
The referendum result in Denmark had immediate effect on the ratification 
processes in at least four Member States where the process was still open as it 
was engaged with domestic political issues. 20 
In France, President Mitterand announced his own Maastricht referendum 
while at the same time it was realised that defeat in the referendum, on top of 
the Danish `No' Vote, would signal the end of the EU as currently constructed. 
Whereas with a Danish `No' Vote the EU could conceivably carry on, a French 
rejection was an altogether more serious matter. In the end, however, the 
referendum passed with a 51 per cent majority (the so-called French petit oui), 
around half a million voters, on a turnout of 70 per cent. 21 
In the UK, the Danish `No' Vote caused the Prime Minister John Major 
enormous problems and marked the beginning of an immensely difficult period 
in his premiership. Political enemies who were not on the Opposition benches 
20 Most of those Member States, where there was no impact, had completed the process by 2 
June 1992. 
21 Criddle, B. (1993) "The French Referendum on the Maastricht Treaty September 1992", 46 
Parliamentary Affairs 2, p. 228 at 228. 
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but were rather the Conservative Eurosceptics within his own party compelled 
him towards a negative response. Also, the European Communities 
(Amendment) Bill faced a slow and acrimonious path through the House of 
Commons. This saga not only seriously weakened Mr Major's authority and 
leadership but it showed that, on few, rare issues the executive can be 
constrained and restrained by the legislature. However, this only applies on 
occasions when the government cannot rely on the full support of its own 
backbenchers. 
The Danish ` No' Vote also directly affected the Irish referendum campaign. 
The `No' campaigners capitalised on the Danish result hoping to encourage 
Irish waverers to vote `No' following the precedent now set. Leaders of the 
Danish `No' campaign went to Ireland while Brussels continued to provide 
documentary assistance of help to the `Yes' campaign. 22 However, the result 
was not different from that of 1987 referendum which ratified the SEA 
("Single European Act"). 
In Germany the Maastricht Treaty also ran into ratification difficulties greatly 
assisted by the confusion that the Danish `No' had wrought on Europe and the 
changed international climate. Two problems arose, the first being public 
pressure to make the third stage of EMU and the single currency subject to the 
approval of two-thirds majority of both the Bundestag (the Lower House of the 
German Parliament) and Bundestrat (the Upper House of the German 
Parliament). The second was that several Lander (federal States) claimed that 
u Similarly British politicians went to Denmark to assist in campaigning against the 
ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty. 
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the Federal Government had negotiated some of their rights, and "fortified by 
the Danish `No' they threatened to veto ratification in the Bundestrat". 23 The 
final challenge to the Treaty was through the Constitutional Court. 24 
In terms of the impact on the EU's relationship with its Citizens, the Danish 
`No' and the French petit oui exposed the facade of public support to be as 
fragile as sceptics had always considered it to be. Given the growing popular 
concern over the legitimacy and democratic deficits, the referenda proved to be 
unfortunate developments for any future EU integration and regretted by many 
of the European elites. They did however force the Union to address her 
democratic deficits, forge links to the public and confront directly its lack of 
public support by launching the idea of EU citizenship and the concept of 
subsidiarity, the Birmingham Declaration on "A Community Close to its 
Citizens"25 and the enforcement of a wider consultation with the Institutions. 
By the time of the Amsterdam Treaty referenda in 1998, the world was thus an 
entirely different place than that of the summer of 1992 since the EU had 
already won the support of many of its citizens. 
23 Nicoll, W. and Salmon, T. (eds. ) (1994) Understanding the New European Community, New 
York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 227-228. 
24 See Chapter Three of this Thesis. 
25 See Birmingham Declaration: A Community Close to its Citizens, 16 October 1992 in: 
Corbett, R. (ed. ) (1993) The Treaty of Maastricht From Conception to Ratification: A 
Comprehensive Reference Guide, Harlow: Longman, 491. 
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3. COLLECTIVE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES FOR EU CITIZENS' 
PARTICIPATION 
3.1. The Civil Dialogue on Europe 
Collectively now, European citizens enjoy more institutional devices for being 
involved in the policy making process, under the Commission's project on 
European Governance. Indeed, since the beginning of the 1990s, the 
Commission's internal think tank, the Forward Studies Unit, has been 
undertaking intensive research in the field of European Governance. Hence, by 
May 1999 it produced a report "on improving the effectiveness and legitimacy 
of EU governance", 26 which predisposed us for the launching of the White 
Paper. 
The 1999 report on effectiveness and legitimacy of EU Governance states that: 
"The entire policy process from the framing of problems 
through the formulation of policy, its implementation, 
evaluation and revision needs to be opened up and liberated 
[... ] 
- 
civil society needs to be engaged in and by European 
action". 27 
To this effect, the report proposes a new style of governance, clearly depicted 
in the White Paper, which without going into detail implies decentralisation of 
26 European Commission, Forward Studies Unit, Lebessis/Paterson, Improving the 
Effectiveness and Legitimacy of EU Governance 
-A Review of the Genval Workshop, 21-22 
May 1999 and a Possible Reform Agenda for the Commission, Forward Studies Unit, CdP (99) 
750. 
27 Idem., 11-12. See also White Paper loc. cit. supra note 2, pp. 11-19,30. 
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EU policies and the establishment of mechanisms to tackle fragmentation. The 
groundbreaking part of the concept, however, concerns the re-orientation of the 
administrative working methods. The Commission should not operate as a 
technocratic body that sets the general policy preferences and translates these 
into detailed programmes, drafts, etc. but rather as an administration that 
enables all groups affected by a policy to participate at every stage policy 
process and takes into account "pluralistic scientific expertise". 28 
The report furthermore highlights that the relationship between 
"Europe and the citizen [... ] can no longer be a paternalistic 
relationship but rather must be one of partnership". 29 
But this seems to be possible only in the field of collective representation, for 
example, in co-ordination with organised groups, and not with regard to 
individual citizens since the entire text leaves the latter question open. 
At the same time, however, it is suggested that as long as representation is 
either too broadly based (territorial representation) or too narrowly based 
(functional representation), more innovative means and channels of 
representation should be generated. 
At the international level, a number of Non-Governmental Organisations 
("NGOs") and campaigning groups have been recognised as having a 
Z$ Report loc. cit. supra note 26, p. 15. 
29Idem., 12. 
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legitimate role to play in protecting group interests in litigation. But arguments 
have been made that such groups are elites, that they are undemocratic and not 
fully representative. What is their political legitimacy? Who voted for them? 
Do they have the legitimacy to speak for the entire population? Who decides 
whether they do or not, the executive? 30 
In an effort not to replicate such privileged status at the EU level and facilate 
the Europeanisation of civil society, 31 the Commission strives at the moment 
and in particular under the White Paper for a newly defined partnership with 
NGOs. 
3.1.1. Definition of NGO 
It is not an easy task to find a common definition of the term `non- 
governmental organisation' as the NGO-sector is extremely diverse, 
heterogeneous, and populated by organisations with hugely varied goals, 
structures and motivations. Nevertheless, inspired by the list of common 
features of voluntary organisations proposed by the Commission in its 
Communication "Promoting the Role of Voluntary organisations and 
3o In response to these problems, Harlow has made a powerful call for recognising the 
particular roles which law and the political process play in a system of governance based upon 
the separation of powers, arguing that law and politics have distinctive roles to play in ensuring 
modem forms of democracy. "... Courts can legitimate the political lobbying of campaigning 
groups at the same time as the campaigners legitimate ever deeper forays into the realm of 
policy and politics". See Harlow, C. (2002) "Public Law and Popular Justice", 65 Modern Law 
Review 1, p. 1 at 17. Similarly, some time ago, and drawing upon the American experience, 
Fuller argued that where there is polycentric decision-making with a wide range of interests at 
stake such disputes are unsuited to litigation relying upon adjudication between competing 
interests because complex repurcussions might arise in other policy areas where interested 
parties are not represented. See Fuller, L. (1978) "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication", 92 
Harvard Law Review, p. 353 at 398. 
31 See generally Warleigh A. (2001) "`Europeanizing' Civil Society: NGOs as Agents of 
Political Socialization", 39 Journal of Common Market Studies 4,619-639. 
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Foundations in Europe", 32 the term "NGO" can be used as shorthand to refer to 
a range of organisations that: 
- 
are not created to generate personal profit; 
- 
are voluntary; 
- 
are distinguished from informal or ad hoc groups by having some degree of 
formal or institutional existence; 
- 
are independent, in respect of government and other public authorities and 
of political parties or commercial organisations. 
In the discussion paper on the relationship with NGOs as well as in the White 
Paper, the Commission tries to adopt a new stance towards the question of 
which role civil society organisations should play in European politics. 33 There 
are sections within both papers that can provide an answer to this. 
According to the Commission, NGOs play an important role in giving voice to 
the concerns of citizens and delivering services that meet people's needs. 34 
Hence, they should be regularly and systematically consulted and they should 
be provided with the necessary funds. 35 Timely consultation with all 
stakeholders should take place before the Commission proposes legislation in 
order to improve policy design and to increase efficacy. There is nothing to 
suggest that they should be involved in the implementation process. 
36 
32 COM (1997) 241 final, 6 June 1997. 
33 Commission Discussion Paper, The Commission and Non-Governmental Organisations: 
Building a Stronger Parternship, COM (2000) 11 final, 18 January 2000. 
34 White Paper loc. cit. supra note 2, p. 14. 
35 See supra note 33, pp. 7,13-14. 
36Idem., 5. 
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Furthermore, NGOs do not have to register, as the Commission does not 
recognise that they have an official consultative status. One reason given for 
instance in the Commission's Communication on "An open and structured 
dialogue between the Commission and Special Interest Groupss37 is that "the 
Commission has always wanted to maintain a dialogue which is as open as 
possible without having to enforce an accreditation system". 38 
Unlike the dialogue with the social partners in social policy, education, 
vocational training and youth, there is still a lack of predictability about when 
or whether consultation will take place and in what form (formal or informal). 
For the time being, this is a matter largely left to each Commission Directorate 
("DG") or Parliamentary Committee or Council Presidency. 
The informal consultation, however, should not be seen as a minimal role for 
the NGOs but rather as a problem of adopting a system of consultation which is 
in-between the institutionalised on the one hand and a `loose' or `relaxed' 
system on the other. The institutionalised system refers to a legal basis in the 
Treaty for consultation or dialogue with clear rules as to procedures and 
competencies whereas the `loose' system just ascribes to consultation but 
leaves open the question of means for attaining it. 
Under the White Paper, the Commission is striving for that means as to achieve 
formal consultation. Its efforts revolve around two commitments. The first 
commitment is to create a culture of consultation underpinned by a code of 
37 COM (1992) [OJ 1993, No. C 63/2]. 
38 Idem., 3. 
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conduct that sets minimum standards, focusing on what to consult on, when, 
whom and how to consult. Those standards are considered to create fair 
conditions for citizen participation in European politics and robust public 
debate. They are assumed to reduce the risk of the policy-makers just listening 
to one side of the argument or of particular groups getting privileged access on 
the basis of sectoral interests or nationality. They are also expected to improve 
the representativity of civil society organisations and structure their debate with 
the EU Institutions. 39 The second commitment is to develop more extensive 
partnership arrangements where consultative practices are already well 
established. Such planning, the Commission assures, entails additional 
consultations compared to the minimum standards. 40 
In addition, the new governance approach of the Commission has been lately 
paralleled by the desire to increasingly institutionalise `civic competence'. That 
is, "the institutional capacity of citizens as social equals to enter-the realm of 
political influence and sustain a vital public sphere". 1 The coupling of `civic' 
and `competence' does not exemplify any category mistake but rather acts as 
an invitation to empower EU citizens to engage in the management of public 
affairs. Particularly with regard to the preparation of policy initiatives, the 
White Paper is replete with such invitations when it makes promises of more 
communication, wider involvement, participation and consultation. To this 
effect, Sharpf's criticism of the White Paper - that a process of a `civic' 
`governance' in the EU is out of question 
- 
seems a bit too harsh. "One cannot 
39 White Paper loc. cit. supra note 2, p. 17. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Chryssochoou, D. (2001) "In Defence of the Civic: The Search for a European Res Publica", 
Arena Working Papers WP 01/12, p. 5< URL http: //www. arena. uio. no/ >. 
139 
CHAPTER FOUR EU CIVIL SOCIETY AND PARTICIPATION 
but wonder", he argues, "what would happen if the Commission's invitations 
were in fact taken seriously by most or even by many of the `civil society' 
actors all over Europe to whom they seem to be addressed". And, he further 
contends, "since not a word is lost on the practicalities of Europe-wide 
participation, one might wonder about the seriousness of the invitation itself 9.42 
As much as it is legitimate to wonder about the seriousness of the `invitation' 
enshrined in the White Paper and its superfluousness in the light of the 
`practicalities of Europe-wide participation', the significance of the civic 
process in the EU cannot be overemphasised. Yet, this does not entail that the 
White Paper cannot be seen as the beginning of a soft law approach which 
provides for an institutional face to a central task of legitimate public life, that 
of encouraging civic participation and responsible `government'. 
The prospects of institutionalising a full-working meta-national civic order are 
quite good if we take into account that some DGs already follow formal 
consultative mechanisms with respect to NGOs. This already happens in fields 
such as trade and development, employment and social affairs43 and has 
recently been proposed for fisheries. 44 This arrangement is rendered into 
organising their co-operation with them within a more regularised framework 
that has eventually been dubbed ` Civil Dialogue'. 
42 Sharpf, F. (2001) "European Governance: Common Concerns vs. The Challenge of 
Diversity", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 7/01, p. 12: 
< URL http"//www. ieanmonnetprogram. ore/Papers/01/010701. html >. 
43 Visit < URL http: //europa. eu. int/comm/secretariat generals cg /on /g en/u links htm >. 
as European Commission, Green Paper: The Future of Common Fisheries Policy, Volume I, 
COM (2001) 135 final, 20 March 2001, pp. 12-13. 
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As we will observe through the example of DG Trade's dialogue in the field of 
WTO negotiations, this type of organisation-administration relationship differs 
significantly from the envisaged institutionalised representation of civil society 
organisations in the ESC. In the first case, an approach which was meant to co- 
opt NGOs and to increase efficiency has developed the potential to alter the 
nature of European politics and cause them to be more legitimate and 
democratic. In the second case, however, there are important caveats with 
reference to the concepts of civil society and representation, and only if these 
are duly taken into consideration, changing the composition of the ESC might 
have a major impact. 
3.1.2. The Civil Dialogue in the EU Trade Policy 
The Civil Dialogue in the field of the WTO negotiations had been initiated in 
1998 by the then Commissioner Leon Brittan. At its origin were the first 
demonstrations against obstacles to a liberalised world trade at the beginning of 
the decade as well as the increasing interest of NGOs in this area. This 
development can somewhat be explained by the success of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") itself. So long as the classical 
impediments to free trade had been dramatically reduced, the States' 
protectionism was to be expressed in other fields, such as environmental issues 
and services. Consequently, the international negotiations on free trade came to 
include questions of technical barriers and services, for example, the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS"). This eventually led to a significant 
politicisation of international trade agreements. 
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As far the Commission's approach to dealing with NGOs is concerned, this 
was originally more like a public relations effort rather than a dialogue which 
offered a real chance to discuss and exchange views on trade and services 
issues. By holding meetings twice a year, during which more than 200 
participants could listen to a 20-minute speech by the Commissioner, people 
were reassured that there was nothing to worry about sustainable development, 
involving sustainable trade. However, since the inception of a "Dialogue on 
Europes45 the organisation concerned with discussion meetings between 
members of the public and European decision-makers, there was an internal 
debate in the Commission on how this could be changed. Even though different 
models of how to engage civil society are currently under discussion, and 
therefore no final format has been recommended as at the present, today's Civil 
Dialogue looks quite differently: 
"The objective of this dialogue is to develop a confident 
working relationship between all interested stakeholders in the 
trade policy field. The dialogue is open to EU stakeholders 
[... ]. The process is designed to focus successively on issues 
where in a finite period of work we can get better mutual 
understanding of concerns and better contacts between the key 
players; the choice of subjects is therefore a function of these 
needs and not of relative importance of the very many issues 
on the trade policy agenda" , 
46 
as European Commission, Dialogue on Europe: Questions and Answers on Dialogue on 
Europe, < URL http"/ eeuropa. eu. int/c mg//igc2000/dialogue/index en htm >, 18 January 2001. 
46 European Commission, Towards Sustainable Trade, Process Guidelines: 
< URL http"//www europa. eu. int/comm/trade/csc/dcsýroc htm >, 15 January 2001. 
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Hence, in addition to general meetings, a contact group as well as four issue 
groups have been established. The contact group's task is to facilitate DG 
Trade's work in the dialogue, to make sufficient information available to both 
sides of the dialogue and the wider NGO `constituency' (periphery), and to co- 
ordinate the running of the issue groups. The latter are hardly comparable to 
the classic type of Brussels Committees, for example, advisory, management, 
regulatory and policy-making/implementation Committees, where national 
representatives do not actually deliberate but only produce policy outcomes 
(opinions) within short time limits. 
During the year 2000, the four issue groups were dealing with subjects of 
Trade and Health, Trade in Services, Trade in Agriculture and Environment 
and Sustainable Development. From February 2001, a new set of groups was 
established in order to cover Investment, Competition, Trade Related 
Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS"), and WTO Reform and Transparency. 
Several mechanisms guarantee that the work of the issue groups meets the 
requirements of transparency. The proposed agendas are made available on the 
Internet at least 20 working days before the meeting; participating groups have 
the possibility to make their positions public before the meeting; and the 
outcome, a compte rendu in the format of a report gets published as well. 
The general meetings have been maintained but transformed into occasions to 
discuss wide-ranging issues of trade policy, to present the issue groups' work 
and to raise questions related to the organisation of the dialogue. As to 
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representation, their `constituencies' select the contact group members whereas 
DG Trade does not intervene in this. 
The participation in the issue groups is open to everybody who registers with 
DG Trade. The registration form is a once-off exercise and is also available on 
the Internet. It is really short and does not place any administrative burden on 
the prospective participant. Hence, no accreditation of NGOs takes place, and 
the only prerequisite consists in making the represented interest explicit so as 
private interest representatives do not give their claims more weight by 
adopting the ` disguise' of a NGO. 
DG representatives also meet separately with those NGOs that refuse to 
participate in the dialogue for ideological reasons as part of DG Trade's policy 
to reach the broader public. It is in this context of broad participation and open 
access that the Directorate undertakes efforts to listen to the views of interested 
citizens by organising Internet chats and specific fora and that a pilot project 
for funding has been set up accompanying the new round of issue groups. 
Overall, it appears that a good deal of the international trade policy process has 
indeed been "opened up and liberated from the shadowy world". 47 What at first 
place had been dominated by an elitist-paternalistic approach soon turned into 
a creative mechanism to engage civil society organisations. Certainly, it is in 
the Commission's interest to organise such a dialogue, to feed as much 
expertise as possible into the policy process, and thereby to enhance efficiency. 
47 Commission Discussion Paper loc. cit. supra note 33, p. 12. 
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Nevertheless, this kind of dialogue does not only increase output legitimacy but 
has significant ramifications in the input side too as over time positions from 
outside can influence, and partly even alter, the point of view of the 
Commission. This in turn helps to generate a European public that accepts 
opportunities granted by the Commission as to participate in the trade policy- 
making. 
3.2. The ESC: An organised European civil society 
The visions of new European governance also affect the ESC where they take 
quite a different shape. In 15-16 October 1999 the ESC held the First 
Convention on Civil Society organised at European Level in order to discuss in 
detail its opinion issued on the contribution of civil society organisations to 
European integration. 48 Since Europe's remoteness to European citizens has 
been identified as one of the main obstacles to surmounting problems of 
legitimacy, it is surely worthwhile for an Institution attempting to act as the 
`bridge' between Europe and its citizens. Of course, such efforts could at the 
same time increase considerably the Institution's political weight. The latter 
has never been great for a variety of reasons. For example, the Institution has 
been criticised for drafting Opinions which are often too general and vague due 
to the search for consensus, for intervening in the policy process late, after the 
Commission has drafted its legislative proposal and for having weak contacts 
with other EU Institutions, especially the Council. 49 Moreover, the 
strengthening of the social dialogue in the Social Policy Agreement and the 
48 Economic and Social Committee, Opinion on The role and Contribution of Civil Society 
Organisations in the Building of Europe, [OJ 1999, No. C 329/30]. 
49 Smismans, S. (1999) "An Economic and Social Committee for the Citizen, or a Citizen for 
the Economic and Social Committee? ", 5 European Public Law 4, p. 557 at 560. 
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creation of the Committee of the Regions ("COR") has further limited the 
Institution's political weight. On this issue, the Commission in its White Paper 
has already recommended that the ESC should be more active by developing 
opinions and exploratory reports in order to help shape policies at a much 
earlier stage than at present. Working arrangements between the Commission 
and ESC, similar to those under discussion with the COR, should be finalised 
to give effect to a more pro-active role. 5° 
The building of a closer relationship between the Committee and the civil 
society has been greatly pointed out by Anne-Marie Sigmund, President of 
Group 111.5 1 The rules of Procedure of the ESC structure the Committee into 
three groups (though this was not foreseen in [Article 196 EC]. Group I 
represents national employers organisations while group II represents national 
trade unions. Group III is composed of other diverse national socio-economic 
categories but outside the traditional sector of industrial production, for 
example, consumer, environmental interests, social economy, Small and 
Medium Enterprises, agriculture, liberal professions and crafts. 
Drawing on a rich theoretical background, the President of Group III has tried 
to demonstrate that civil society organisations play a key role in European 
democracy as also the White Paper asserts. 52 According to her approach, they 
represent individual citizens and thus function as mediators. They stand for 
50 ate Paper loc. cit. supra note 2, p. 15. 
51 Economic and Social Committee, First Convention on Civil Society Organised at European 
Level: Speech by President of the Various Interest Group of the European Economic and 
Social Committee Anrie-Marie Sigmund, 15-16 October 1999: 
< URL httn"//www. ces. eu. int/en/acs/SCO speeches EN. htm >. 
52 See supra note 34. 
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transparency, public awareness, democratic autonomy, a real opportunity for 
European people to establish themselves in their capacity of being European 
citizens, plurality, communication and participation. They also stand for 
`vertical' subsidiarity since preference to action is relinquished to the lowest 
level. They finally stand for solidarity in the sense that the members of civil 
society know that rights are always linked with duties and act in awareness of 
their responsibility to society. In the end, Sigmund concludes that the link 
between European democracy, civil society organisations and the ESC is to be 
determined as follows: 
"The citizens of Europe are in search of a new social contract, 
which is based on the Rousseau concept of self-determination, 
and does not look on the sovereignty of the people as the 
transfer of power from top to bottom [... ]. The representatives 
of civil society organisations, and the Economic and Social 
Committee as their legitimate representative, have the 
opportunity but also the duty to influence this development"53 
[emphasis added by the author]. 
Although the Committee does not see itself as the exclusive voice of civil 
society, it nonetheless tries in concrete terms to become that central actor in 
this field and to function as the main intermediary between the other EU 
Institutions and civil society organisations. For example, in its Opinion on the 
participation of NGOs in the WTO negotiations, the ESC proposes the creation 
53 ESC Speech loc. cit. supra note 51, p. 4 [emphasis added by the author]. 
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of an internal WTO Committee that would serve as a hub between the WTO, 
the Commission's services and the European NGOs concerned. 54 Yet, it is 
noteworthy that the document does not even mention DG Trade's civil 
dialogue, and therefore does not deal with the question how the relationship 
between individual associations and the ESC as their self-appointed legitimate 
representative should be conceived. At this stage, the recent plans to alter the 
composition of the ESC might give us some clues. 
3.2.1. ESC: Proposals for a future composition 
The Commission had proposed a new formula on the calling of the last IGC in 
Nice. This would have taken into consideration the changed institutional 
environment, and in particular the fact that the EP has evolved into a co- 
legislator in areas of Common Foreign and Security Policy ("CFSP"), Justice 
and Home Affairs (Article 24 TEU), Visas, Asylum, Immigration (Article 67 
EC), on provisions of Community Financial Assistance (Article 100 EC), and 
on measures necessary for the rapid introduction of the ECU/EURO (Article 
123(4) EC). As a corollary of the EP's extensive powers, the ESC could mainly 
act as a "relay vis-ä-vis civil society"55 thus its legislative function being one of 
minor importance. In concrete terms, this would have implied a change in 
Articles 25756 and 258 EC. 57 The Commission has suggested to replace the 
54 Economic and Social Committee, Avis sur La Transparence et la Participation de la Societe 
Civile aux 'Negociations du Millenaire' dans le Cadre de 1' Organisation Mondial du 
Commerce, CES 946/99,20 October 1999, p. 6. 
55 European Commission, Adapting the Institutions to Make Success of Enlargement: 
Commission Opinion in Accordance with Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union on the 
Calling of a Conference of Representatives of the Governments of the Member States to amend 
the Treaties, COM (2000) 34 final, 26 January 2000, p. 18. 
56 Art. 257 reads as follows: "An Economic and Social Committee is hereby established. It 
shall have advisory status. The Committee shall consist of representatives of the various 
categories of economic and social activity, in particular, representatives of producers, farmers, 
carriers, workers, dealers, craftsmen, professional occupations and representatives of the 
general public". 
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enumeration of professions in Article 257 by the term `civil society', so that the 
Nice Treaty would simply stipulate that "the Committee shall consist of 
representatives of the various categories of civil society". 58 Furthermore, that 
the distribution of seats by Member State would have been abolished, so that 
the ESC would become "more representative of the various components of 
civil society of the European Union as a whole and of its different geographical 
aspects". 59 
Despite the fact that none of these ideas were adopted in the IGC 2000, it is 
conceivable that they will remain on the table for the IGCs to come. In this 
case, the implementation of the Commission's vision, even though it would 
mainly affect Group III (Various Interests), leaving the other two Groups, 
Employers (I) and Workers (II) intact, could have far-reaching consequences. 
It would confer upon the Committee a potentially powerful competence to be 
representative of European civil society as a whole, and not only of its national 
components. Indeed, an altered composition could enable the ESC to really 
function as `relay vis-ä-vis civil society'. However, the question remains 
whether this is desirable. 
57 Art. 258 reads as follows: "The number of members of the Economic and Social Committee 
shall be as follows [... ]. The members of the Committee shall be appointed by the Council, 
acting unanimously, for four years. Their appointments shall be renewable. The members of 
the Committee may not be bound by any mandatory instructions. They shall be completely 
independent in the performance of their duties, in the general interest of the Community. The 
Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall determine the allowances of members of the 
Committee". 
58 COM (2000) 34 final loc. cit. supra note 55. 
59 Ibid. 
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At this point, two important caveats should be mentioned. The one concerns 
problems of definition and the second questions the very nature of NGOs and 
their relationship to EU Institutions. 
3.3. Problems of definition 
As long as the notion of civil society is used as a broad and sometimes rather 
catchy concept, the problem of definition becomes more and more relevant, as 
it is the answer to the question that defines who is `in' and who is `out'. In 
essence, we get a very diffuse picture of `what is civil society' if we only 
compare the four definitions inherent in the Commission's IGC proposal (a), 
those of Sigmund's speech (b), a self-definition given by a NGO (c), and of the 
already discussed Commission Forward Studies Unit (d). 
The Commission's suggested reformulation of Article 257 EC which the White 
Paper appears to have endorsed replaces an enumeration ranging from 
producers, farmers, carriers, workers, dealers, craftsmen and professional 
occupations to representatives of the general public with the term civil 
society. 60 Consequently, all members of the ESC including the employers' and 
workers' groups would be defined as representatives of civil society (a). 
For the purpose of the First Convention organised by the ESC, Sigmund has 
defined civil society organisations as "structures whose members serve the 
public interest through discussion and function as mediators between public 
authorities and the citizen". 
61 Thus such a definition embraces employer's 
60 See supra note 34. 
61 See supra note 51. 
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associations and trade unions, all other representative social and economic 
organisations, NGOs, community-based organisations and religious 
associations (b). Whereas this definition is certainly more precise and inclusive 
than the one in the Commission's proposal, they both could be replaced by 
some sort of `intermediary organisations'. 
The definition becomes much more restricted from the NGO standpoint as 
exemplified, for example, by the "Permanent Forum of Civil Society", a very 
active organisation promoting civic issues on the European stage, for instance, 
the drafting of a European Citizens' Charter on November 26,1996. Thus, 
according to the latter's definition, economic organisations or even co- 
operatives cannot become members. The same applies to charities, socio- 
cultural and sports organisations. By contrast, the European Confederation of 
Trade Unions ("ETUC") is a member, as are also organisations representing 
the "New Social Movements", such as associations promoting de- 
colonisation, 62 consumer protection, public health as well as the anti-nuclear, 
the students' or the women's movement. 63 
Finally, the least compelling definition can be inferred from the Commission's 
Forward Studies Unit report (d). In most cases, it would be more appropriate to 
62 For example, the modem Commonwealth, the NGO sub-committee on Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Apartheid and De-colonisation, Timorese and Gibraltarian political 
associations, the Unpresented Nations and Peoples Organisation ("UNPO"), the Committee for 
the de-colonisation of Palestine. 
63 Dastoli, V. (1999) 'L' Europe entre Democratic Virtuelle et Citoyennete Participative: L' 
Experience du Forum Permanent de la Societe Civile" in: Boual, J. (ed. ) (1999) Vers une 
Societe Civile Europeenne, La Tour d' Aigues: Editions de 1' Aube, 146-166, at 149. 
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replace the term civil society with either `society', people who share laws, 
organisations, and customs, 64 in contrast to State, or simply with `consumer'. 65 
Bearing this in mind, the many definitions that float around in the Community 
intellectual space, it can be commonly agreed that civil society and civil 
society organisations are not clearly defined terms. On the contrary, as Deirdre 
Curtin suggests "civil society is used as a convenient short-hand term to refer 
to non-governmental organisations, networks etc. which organise to assert 
interests outside State-based and controlled political Institutions, by distilling 
and transmitting such interests to the public sphere". 66 Sometimes they are 
even used in a mutually exclusive way which can be easily seen if one 
compares definitions (a), (b) with (c); the first two include all socio-economic 
organisations whereas the third excludes all economic ones categorically. 
Additionally, the confusion gets even worse when civil society is equated with 
`citizen' and `consumer', and thereby any particular meaning of civil society is 
ignored. 
3.3.1. EU Institutions and public interest associations: A tricky 
relationship 
The second caveat, as important as the first one, originates from the changing 
structures of civil society organisations themselves. What makes them valuable 
contributors to politics is their ability to feed civic perspectives into the policy 
process through the means of networking and channelling. To achieve this, 
64 Report loc. cit. supra note 26, p. 9. 
65Idem., 16. 
66 Curtin, D. (1999) Academy of European Law (ed. ) `Civil Society' and the European Union: 
Opening Spaces for Deliberative Democracy?, Collected Courses of the Academy of European 
Law, Volume VII, Book 1, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 207. 
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however, they need to be as close as possible to the people they represent. Two 
points should be evoked at this stage. First that the public interest can only be 
generated by the input of various groups and may not exclusively be defined by 
those who rightfully claim to speak on behalf of the public interest. Second that 
organisations least connected with EU Institutions are expected to be close 
enough to their `clientele'. 
Even though civil society organisations might have their finger on the pulse of 
society, they are not representative strictu sensu. A consumer organisation, for 
example, speaks for consumer interests, but it does not represent consumers as 
employers' organisation represents its constituency. Indeed, it would be very 
desirable to see civil society organisations as representative as the Commission 
endorsed in its proposal prior to the IGC in Nice and therefore suggested the 
amendment of the founding Treaties. Yet, what makes these organisations so 
rich in variety and scope, what makes them vivid and their claims so notable, is 
due to the very fact that they are not representative (`the paradox of non- 
representation'). And also, that they are not entirely formalised but have a more 
or less flexible organisational structure which the White Paper seeks to 
abrogate while creating a culture of consultation. 67 Certainly, there are highly 
organised groups like the Young European Federalists ("JEF") and the 
Associations Generaux des Etudiants de 1' Europe ("AEGEE") which has an 
impressive membership all over Europe but these are exceptions to the rule. 
67 See supra note 39. 
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The ESC discussed these problems at some length in an Opinion on the 
Commission's discussion paper on the relationship between NGOs and the 
Commission. There, it states: 
"Whether or not NGOs are representative can not be 
established exclusively on the basis of the number of members 
whom they represent. The judgment must also take account of 
the ability of such bodies to put forward constructive proposals 
and to bring specialist knowledge to the process of democratic 
opinion-forming and decision-making". 68 
This is a very good argument which should be recalled when analysing the 
representativity of social partners in the UEAPME case. 
Furthermore, it is true that the more the EU Institutions will count on civil 
society organisations to provide links to the citizenry and therefore help boost 
up the EU legitimacy, the more they will demand them to be representative of 
interests that are in turn defined by the Institutions. Nevertheless, it should not 
be forgotten that the relationship between EU Institutions and civic 
organisations is a tricky one, especially if the latter become more and more 
dependent on funding and power resources provided by the former. Almost 
since the inception of the then European Economic Community, the 
Commission has created or helped to build up a whole bunch of civil society 
68 Economic and Social Committee on the Commission discussion paper The Commission and 
Non-Governmental Organisations: Building a Stronger Partnership, COM (2000) 11 final, 
CES 811/2000,13 July 2000, p. 4, para. 2.2.4. 
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organisations, some of which get important core and project funds from the 
Commission, if they are not supported entirely by it. 69 The attempts to involve 
NGOs in such an institutionalised context can therefore be heavily criticised in 
this perspective. On the one hand, the profound financial dependence on the 
Commission itself might render an open and unprejudiced debate about the 
content of European integration impossible. On the other hand, efforts of this 
kind might lead to the creation of an `artificial' civil society by the EU 
Institutions. 
Taking thus into account what has been said about civil society representation, 
the strength of an Institution like the ESC might not lie in a rigid 
institutionalisation of representative civil society organisations. Rather, it 
should be built around its capacity to generate technical experience, issue 
opinions, assemble groups and individuals and, in general, provide a forum for 
discussion. 
69 Venables, T. "ECAS and NGOs: Overview of the last 10 years", Paper presented at the 
Conference on Persuasion, Advocacy and Influence in the European Union, University of 
Reading, 26-27 January 2001, pp. 7-8 (mimeo). 
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4. CONCLUSION 
The idea that has been put forward is that no common civic identity as analysed 
in Chapter Three may come into being unless all actors in European 
`governance' see themselves as part of a polity-building exercise that has to 
evolve from the lower level `upwards'. Likewise, such an identity must be built 
upon an ethos of participation. 70 
A participatory ethics of European ` governance' has been argued to lie on both 
individual and collective opportunity structures which if combined and 
reinforced can actually build a strong, enlarged, legitimate, and thus political 
Union. 
The references to national voting and referenda were enough to address 
criticisms of the kind that the EU remains dependent on only an indirect 
legitimation of its decisions through the `horizontal' co-operation of 
democratically elected national governments in the Council of Ministers and 
the European Council. 7' 
Representation is surely one of the central topics of the current debate on EU 
legitimacy. Collective types of representation like the ones that were examined 
here such as civil society organisations and the ESC become overall dominant 
as they offer access channels which enable the political expression of the 
70 See the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on Organised Civil Society and 
European Governance: The Committee's Contribution to the drafting of the White Paper, CES 
535/2001,25 April 2001, pp. 2,4-5. 
71 Scharpf, F. loc. cit. supra note 3, p. 138. 
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citizen in his or her multiple identities, particularly in civic demos-oriented 
polity. 
Yet, this should not insinuate that individual representation should be 
underestimated or that new channels of representation cannot be found and be 
efficiently activated. The Commission's dialogue in the field of WTO 
negotiations is one example of how this could be done. 
Finally we should reiterate what has already been proposed in Chapter Two: 
the very nature of the multi-level governance structures of the EU argue against 
any concentration of consultative interest representation at any one focal point 
in the policy-making process. The engine of European integration requires a 
combination of actors who form coalitions, bargain, socially network, discuss, 
and intensively negotiate in order to adopt European public policies. In this 
respect, then, it appears that the idea of a system of engrenage as was 
envisaged by Jean Monnet has not vanished but on the contrary still plays an 
important role in its main function of providing relatively smooth policy- 
making in the EU. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FROM CIVIL DIALOGUE TO SOCIAL DIALOGUE: 
THE ROLE OF SOCIAL PARTNERS IN THE DECISION- 
MAKING 
"Over the past few years, 
... 
the social dialogue was not an end in itself 
- 
it 
also gave more legitimacy to the social and economic policies, which were 
being put in place at European level". 
European Commission, Communication Concerning the 
Development of the Social Dialogue at Community Level, COM 
(1996) 448 final, 18 September, para. 14. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As shown in Chapter Four, the Commission has been involved in a permanent 
dialogue with the civil society in order to produce regulatory measures. Thus, 
spaces for decision-making are opened up to actors which are not formally 
recognised in the EC/TEU. 1 
There is no legal problem in the fact that NGOs and other actors are not mentioned in the 
Treaties but it only shows that they have not yet achieved an "official" status in an EU 
democratic process, which is oriented towards direct participation and pluralism. 
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The creation of a Civil Dialogue between NGOs, EU Institutions and an 
organised civil society and the ideas for a new European governance which 
imply institutionalisation of a `civic competence', decentralisation and re- 
orientation of the administrative working methods are all great complements to 
the existing Social Dialogue. 
The Social Dialogue has two main ingredients. First, it consists of consultation 
between the Commission and representative organisations of employers and 
workers, and second, of the mechanism contained in Article 139 EC. 2 The 
latter puts into motion a new and special form of European-level collective 
bargaining3 between representative organisations of workers and employers 
(the so-called social partners) leading to agreements which can be transformed 
into binding EU legislation through a Council decision. 
Following the themes developed in the previous Chapter concerning channels 
for political participation in the EU decision-making process, Chapter Five 
2 Art. 139 (ex Art. 118b) reads as follows: "1. Should management and labour so desire, the 
dialogue between them at Community level may lead to contractual relations, including 
agreements. 2. Agreements concluded at Community level shall be implemented either in 
accordance with the procedures and practices specific to management and labour and the 
Member States or, in matters covered by Article 137, at the joint request of the signatory 
parties, by a Council decision on a proposal from the Commission. The Council shall act by 
qualified majority, except where the agreement in question contains one or more provisions 
relating to one of the areas referred to in Article 137(3), in which case it shall act 
unanimously". 
3 Yet, this is not collective bargaining in the real sense of the term. Firstly, because social 
partners are regarded as sectoral identities and not as collective identities. Secondly, because 
bargaining in the ordinary way means an agreement, made between two people or groups, to do 
something in return for something else, whereas here the meaning is something concerning 
consultation, negotiation (deliberation) and joint opinion that opens a process for EU 
legislation. Thirdly, there is no right to strike for the unions because of the absence of any 
economic pressure: Wedderburn, L. (1997) "Consultation and Collective Bargaining in Europe: 
Success or Ideology? ", 26 Industrial Law Journal 1, p. 1 at 11; Bercusson, B. (1992) 
"Maastricht: A Fundamental Change in European Labour Law", 23 Industrial Relations 
Journal 3, p. 177 at 185; Fredman, S. (1998) "Social Law in the European Union: The Impact 
of the Law-making Process" in Craig, P. and Harlow, C. (eds. ) (1998) Lawmaking in the 
European Union, London: Kluwer Law International, 386-411, at 408-409. 
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will be exclusively concerned with the second aspect of the Social Dialogue. 
In particular, it will try to explore if and how the social partners are involved 
in producing Community legislation. Moreover, it will elucidate their potential 
and actual capabilities to shape the on-going process of integration by making 
their own contributions to decision making. 
To attain this objective, we will concentrate on a description of the different 
decision-making procedures under Title VIII on Employment and Title XI on 
Social Policy, Education, Vocational Training and Youth which were 
introduced into the mainstream of Community law following the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. 
The role of the social partners in the EU legislative process is worth looking at 
because it not only provides a novel alternative to parliamentary mechanisms, 
that is, the notion of citizens' involvement through directly elected organs, but 
it is also associated with democratic and legitimate issues under the concept of 
a meta-national democracy. 
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2. SOCIAL PARTNERS AND TITLE XI 
2.1. Introduction 
With respect to social policy, the incorporation of the social partners in the 
legislative process and in the implementation of Community law can be easily 
traced in the provisions of the Social Policy Agreement ("SPA"). The SPA 
contained in Title XI, Articles 136-145 EC, provides for their participation 
from the very start of any initiative in the social policy arena. 4 
2.2. The social partners' participation in the social policy area 
On the basis of the above Agreement, the Commission began to shape and 
formalise a general frame of reference for a two-step consultation procedure. 5 
Thus, when formulating proposals in the social policy field, the Commission 
must consult the social partners twice: 
" 
First, prior to submitting any proposal, on the possible direction of 
Community action (Article 138(2) EC); 
0 Second, and more specifically, on the content of the planned proposal 
(Article 138(3) EC). 
At stage two of the consultation process, when the Commission considers that 
Community action is advisable, the social partners should forward an opinion 
or recommendation on its proposal. In addition, they may decide to inform the 
4 See also European Commission, European Governance -A White Paper, COM (2001) 428, 
25 July 2001, p. 14. 
S European Commission, Commission Communication on the Application of the Agreement on 
Social Policy, COM (1993) 600 final, 14 December 1993, paras. 16,19,29. 
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Commission that they wish to attempt to reach a European-level agreement on 
the issue. Thus, they have the ability to substitute the Commission's proposal 
by "bargaining in the shadow of law". 6 In case they do reach an agreement, the 
social partners are unlikely to use the voluntary path allowed by Article 139(1) 
EC, that is, implementation by collective agreements in the different 
jurisdiction, since no State is under any obligation to amend national 
legislation in force in order to facilitate their implementation. 7 Alternatively 
they will ask the Commission to propose a binding instrument to the Council, 
usually a Directive, but in the same terms as their agreement, so long as it is a 
matter covered by Article 137 EC. 
If, on the other side, management and labour do not reach any agreement, it is 
the Commission which takes up the legislative process following the co- 
decision procedure of Article 251 EC, thus bringing the EP into the legislative 
process. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that even where the social 
partners have reached an agreement the Commission still has the right to 
decide on a case by case basis whether to suspend legislative action depending 
on the nature and complexity of the subject. 8 
During the negotiations or bargaining, the Commission postpones its own 
6 It has been argued that European representatives of management and labour under the 
provisions of the SPA are "bargaining in the shadow of the law" as they might feel compelled 
to negotiate rather than face the unknown content of Community action: Bercusson, B. loc. cit. 
supra note 3. 
Declaration 2 on Art. 4 (2) of the SPA. 
$ The suspension of legislative action can take place when an agreement, in light of its content, 
is not valid under Community law and when the representativity of the parties engaged in the 
negotiations is not fulfilled: European Commission, Commission Communication Concerning 
the Development of the Social Dialogue at Community Level, COM (1996) 448 final, 18 
September 1996, para. 71. 
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initiative. Time frames of six weeks, for example, for the first phase of 
consultation and nine months for the second phase of consultation and 
negotiation, 1° are indicated as safeguard measures in order to avoid deliberate 
delays of the process. However, longer periods can be mutually agreed (see 
diagram 5.1 below). 
9 It is a working practice. However, it is officially recognised at the Commission 
Communication Adapting and Promoting the Social Dialogue at Community Level, COM 
(1998) 322,20 March 1998, p. 9. Inter alia see supra note 6, para. 65; European Parliament, 
Resolution on the Application of the Agreement on Social Policy [OJ 1994, No. C 205/86, A3- 
0269/94, para. 6]. 
10 Art. 138(4) EC. 
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Diagram 5.1. Illustration of the Implementation of Article 138 EC 
Article 1 38 EC 
Commission Social Partners 
Consultation on Proposal 
in the social policy field 
possible direction 
Six weeks 
If Community 
action is desirable 
Where appropriate, 
Commission follow-up 
Consultation on the content 
of the envisaged proposal 
Opinion 
or recommendation 
Nine months, 
Where appropriate, 
Failure 
omission follow-up 
Source: European Commission (2000) Industrial Relations in Europe, 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 
12. 
2.3. The workability of the Social Dialogue 
Despite doubts expressed by observers as to its workability, the Social 
Dialogue has entered a lively phase. This is largely because the Commission 
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has used the opportunity to revitalise social policy proposals that are mired in 
the legislative process. Being channelled into the Social Dialogue 
reinvigorated the stalemated parental and family leave provisions and also the 
much-battered proposals on part-time work and fixed-term employment of the 
1980s, all of which required unanimity. 
3. THE FIRST CASE: THE PARENTAL LEAVE AGREEMENT 
3.1. Introduction 
The Agreement on parental leave'' entitles men and women workers to take 
time off work on the grounds of birth or adoption of a child. This is to enable 
them to take care of the child for at least three months taken up to the 8`h 
birthday of the child. 12 After the leave, the workers have the right to return to 
the same job, or, if this is not likely to happen, to an "equivalent or similar job 
consistent with their employment contract or employment relationship". 13 
Acquired rights remain intact until the end of the parental leave and apply 
again thereafter. '4 
The Agreement sets out only minimum standards and leaves to Member States 
and national social partners the establishment of the conditions for access and 
the modalities of application of the right to parental leave. It seems therefore 
that devolution was the best solution to suppress any disagreements in the 
Council of Ministers and between labour and industry. 
" Council Directive 96/34/EC of 3 June 1996 on the framework agreement on parental leave 
concluded by UNICE, CEEP and ETUC [OJ 1996, No. L 145/4]. 
'Z Idem., Clause 2 (1). 
13 Idem., Clause 2 (5). 
141dem., Clause 2 (6). 
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3.2. Social Partners and decision-making 
The pivotal role of the social partners is constantly reiterated. In the general 
considerations of the Agreement, it is stated that social partners are "best 
placed to find solutions that correspond to the needs of both employers and 
workers and shall therefore be conferred a special role in its implementation 
and application". 15 In this way, underlined by a cluster of "appropriateness" 16 
issues, a specific pattern of `functional subsidiarity' has been put forward as to 
regulation, not only at the EU level but also at the national one. 
Another innovative aspect related to subsidiarity is the fact that the framework 
Agreement explicitly allows for further agreements at the EU level, adapting 
and complementing its provisions with a view to taking into account particular 
circumstances. 17 Therefore, the decision-making process is envisaged to 
proceed in both horizontal and vertical `chutes' falling from the meta- to the 
national and sub-national arenas, and from the cross-sectoral to the sectoral 
and possibly even enterprise level. In this circuit, the social partners are 
expected to be the decisive actors at all levels. 18 
3.3. Evaluation of the contents of the Agreement 
Evaluating the content of the Agreement and its reformist potential in terms of 
gender equality is crucial. The general considerations of the text reveal that 
is Idem., General Considerations, para. 13. 
16 De Biuca, G. (1999) "Reappraising Subsidiarity's Significance After Amsterdam", Harvard 
Jean Monnet Working Paper No 7/99, pp. 7-8: 
< URL hqp: //www. jeanmonne! pro2ram-oriz/pat)ers-/i)apers99. htn-d >. 
"Council Directive 96/34/EC loc. cit. supra note 11, Clause 4 (3). 
18 This enhances the notion of an EU multi-level system of governance and consequently of an 
EU multi-level regulatory system. 
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parental leave is considered to be an important means of reconciling work and 
family life and promoting equal opportunities and treatment between men and 
women. The European social partners thus assumed that men should also have 
an equal share of family responsibilities and be encouraged by means of 
awareness programmes to take parental leave. 
By concluding an agreement, submitting a proposal, and passing a Directive 
that sets minimum requirements for a right to parental leave (so-called 
framework Directive in the White Paper), 19 the social partners, the 
Commission as well as the Council created a level playing field of a principle20 
granting individual social protection. 21 
It is worth noting this, given that no such statutory right existed in Ireland, 
Belgium and Luxembourg whereas in the UK, Italy, Sweden, Greece and 
Germany, the agreement resulted in improvements of the existing national 
legislation and of working relations. 22 In Greece, for example, the 2639/1998 
Act increased the maximum age of children from 2,5 years to 3,5 years for 
parents to take leave and abolished the requirement that the undertaking or 
service has to be larger than 100 employees. It also increased the parental 
19 According to the White Paper so-called "framework directives" should be used more often. 
This sort of texts are less heavy handed, offer greater flexibility as to their implementation, and 
tend to be agreed more quickly by Council and the EP: loc. cit. supra note 4, p. 20. 
20 Council Directive 96/34/EC loc. cit. supra note 11, Clause 2 (2). 
21 Note Cases: C-333/97 Susanne Lewen v. Lothar Denda [1999] ECR I- 7243 (Equal pay for 
male and female workers - Entitlement to a Christmas bonus - Application of Clause 2 (6) of 
Directive 96/34/EC); C-249/97 Gabriele Gruber v. Silhouette International Schmied GmbH & 
Co. KG [1999] ECR I- 5295 (Equal pay for men and women 
- 
Entitlement to termination 
payments for both male and female employees when exercising their right to parental leave - 
Example of indirect discrimination). 
22 European Commission (1999) Monitoring, Implementation and Application of Community 
Equality Law: General Report 1997 and 1998 of the Report of the Legal Experts' Group on 
Equal Treatment of Men and Women, DG of Employment & Social Affairs, 122-123, < URL 
http: //www eurol2a eu int/comm/d sg /employment sociaVpublicat/equ-opp/experts pdf>. 
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leave from 3 to 3,5 months and expressly provides that any termination of the 
employment relationship due to taking up parental leave is null and void. 
Furthermore, the Agreement constitutes an innovation particularly its 
provisions on lowering the age for parental leave whereas the possibility for 
part-time leave is a new option for Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain and for 
leave in a fragmented fashion for Austria, Norway and the Netherlands. 23 
Moreover, to address criticisms of the kind that the agreed minimum standards 
were low, it is important to keep in mind that even the original Commission 
proposal had not suggested far-reaching standards. The evidence of a direct 
comparison of the Commission's original proposal and the collective 
agreement suggests that the agreement actually did not fall far behind the 1983 
Commission draft (see Table 5.1 below). 
23 Falkner, G. (ed. ) (1998) EUSocial Policy in the 1990s, London: Routledge, 122. 
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arin Table com 1 the Commissi 5 n's 1983 P l d th i l p g 
. . 
o roposa an e soc a 
partner Agreement 
Subject Commission Proposal Social Partner Agreement 
Forms of leave Parental, family reasons Parental, force majeure 
Qualifications Period of work up to 1 year Period of work up to I year 
to the right 
Length of parental Min. 3 months and up to Min. 3 months and up to 
leave 3"d child's birthday 8`h child's birthday 
Time off for Unspecified Unspecified 
other reasons 
Social security Upheld Optional 
benefits 
during leave 
Pay Upheld during leave for Optional in both cases 
family reasons, and optional 
during parental leave 
Individual right Yes `in principle' yes 
Source: Falkner, G. (ed. ) (1998) Social Policy in the 1990s, London: 
Routledge, 123. 
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3.4. Concluding remarks 
With this first substantive collective agreement a taboo was broken as to the 
workability of the Social Dialogue and a pedagogical effect that there is a 
possible win-win situation under the Social Agreement was put into place. 24 
The signing of the Parental Leave Directive and its adoption in the Social 
Council of June 1996 were much celebrated events and served to underline the 
great symbolic value of the new procedures which opened up the conventional 
route for EU social policy. 
4. THE SECOND CASE: THE PART-TIME WORK AGREEMENT 
4.1. Introduction 
The success of the new law-making procedure on a peripheral issue to the 
social partners becomes more apparent with the conclusion of a second 
agreement on part-time work25 which by contrast is at the heart of the debates 
on deregulation/(re)-regulation versus worker security in the wider sense. 
The agreement which forms the basis of the Council Directive 97/81/EC26 
aims to eliminate discrimination against part-time workers and to improve the 
24 See generally Schmidt, M. (1997) "Parental Leave: Contested Procedure, Creditable 
Results", 13 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 2, 
113-126. 
2$ Many of the new employment opportunities have been for part-time or temporary workers or 
for those prepared to accept unsocial hours of employment. Between 1983 and 1994,82 per 
cent of the new jobs created in the European Union were for part-time workers: Rubery, J. 
Smith, M. and Fagan, C. (1998) "National Working Time Regimes and Equal Opportunities", 4 
Feminist Economics 1,71-101. 
26 Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the Framework Agreement on 
part-time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC - Annex: Framework agreement on 
part-time work [OJ 1998, No. L 14/9]. 
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quality of part-time work. It also seeks to facilitate the development of part- 
time work on a voluntary basis and "contribute to the flexible organisation of 
working time in a manner that takes account of the needs of employers and 
workers". 27 
4.2. The scope of the agreement 
The scope of the agreement is intentionally limited to part-time workers who 
have an employment contract or employment relationship, thus, excluding the 
self-employed. This was the employers' preferred option. 28 It is a concession 
to labour; yet in the preamble the signatory parties voice "their intention 
... 
to 
consider the need for similar agreements relating to other forms of flexible 
work" 29 
The agreement's preamble also underlines the contribution of the framework 
agreement to the overall European strategy on employment following the 
Luxembourg Council (12-13 December 1997) and the importance of part-time 
work in this strategy. 30 Social partners have given priority attention to this 
form of work because of its supposed merits as a means of reducing 
unemployment as well as of its benefits for workers and employers alike. For 
workers it may offer the chance of a better balance between working life and 
family responsibilities, training, leisure or civic activities. It can also make it 
Z' Idem., Clause 1 (b). 
28 From the outset, UNICE had rejected the trade union's desire to negotiate on all forms of 
`atypical employment' at the same time, because of what it perceived to be the divergent issues 
pertaining to each form of non-standard employment. However, the scope of any agreement as 
well as the balance between the need for flexibility and the principle for non-discrimination 
evoked considerable discussion. 
29 Council Directive 97/81/EC loc. cit. supra note 26, Annex: Preamble, first paragraph. 
30 This shows the complementarity of the social and employment policies: Szyszczak, E. 
(2000) "The Evolving European Employment Strategy" in Shaw, J. (ed. ) (2000) Social Law 
and Policy in an Evolving European Union, Oxford: Hart, 197-220, at 203. 
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easier for workers progressively to enter the labour market or retire from 
employment. From the employers' perspective, it can permit not only greater 
flexibility in responding to market requirements, for example by increasing 
capacity utilisation or extending opening hours, but also productivity gains. 
Finally, for policy-makers confronting high-levels of unemployment, the 
growth of part-time work may reduce the number of job seekers or, at least, 
the number of people registered as such. It can lower politically sensitive 
unemployment rates without requiring an increase in the total number of hours 
worked. Nevertheless, no thresholds to further restricting the number of part- 
timers covered by the agreement were formulated at the EU level. 31 
4.3. The prescriptions of the Agreement 
The prescriptions of the part-time agreement are the same minimum as in the 
parental leave agreement and concern employment conditions only. There is no 
definition of this term in the agreement and considerations of social security 
are consequently excluded. The signatories deemed that "matters concerning 
statutory social security are for the decision by the Member States". 32 
Nevertheless, the social partners reminded the Social Council of the Dublin 
Employment Declaration of December 1996, wherein the Council promised: 
"To make social security systems more employment-friendly 
by `developing social protection systems capable of adapting 
to new patterns of work and of providing appropriate 
31 International Labour Organisation ("ILO") (1997) "Perspectives 
- 
Part-time work: Solution 
or Trap? ", 136 International Labour Review 4, p. 1: 
<URL htty: //www. ilo. or5z/public/en2lish/support/publ/revue/persp/97-4 htm>. 
32 Council Directive 97/81 loc. cit. supra note 26, Annex: Preamble, second paragraph. 
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protection to people engaged in such work". 33 The social 
partners thus assumed that "effect should be given to this 
declaration". 34 
Moreover, the principle of non-discrimination 35 is not unconditional. It 
provides that part-time workers shall not be treated in a less favourable manner 
than comparable full-time workers shall, solely because they work part-time 
"unless different treatment is justified on objective grounds". 36 Additionally, 
the principle of "pro-rata-temporis shall apply where it is appropriate". 37 The 
fact that neither the objective grounds which may legitimate unequal treatment 
nor the criteria for applying the pro-rata-temporis principle are specified, 
leaves significant leeway to Member States and/or national social partners. In 
any case, however, there is ample scope for judicial activism on the part of the 
ECJ which might in the end have to interpret the standards set by employers 
and trade unions. 
4.4. Social partners and decision-making 
In short, it appears that the low substantive standards agreed on were accepted 
by trade unions in exchange for a greater involvement of the social partners at 
all layers of the European multi-level polity. This may be considered a trading 
off of women's interests, as the overwhelming majority are part-timers, against 
33 Idem., third paragraph. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Idem., Clause 4. 
36Idem., Clause 4 (1). 
37 Idem., Clause 4 (2). 
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organisational self-interests of the ETUC and its member organisations, 
national and European. 38 
The multi-faceted role for the national social partners is foreseen in the 
Agreement and in particular in the specification of details during the 
implementation and in the periodical review of certain aspects. Member States 
and/or national social partners may for "objective reasons, exclude wholly or 
partly from the terms of this agreement part-time workers who work on a 
casual basis". 39 Also, when "justified by objective reasons... Member States... 
and/or national social partners may, where appropriate, make access to 
particular conditions of employment subject to a period of service, time 
worked or earnings qualification". 40 
Both variants of exclusion form the scope of the principle of non- 
discrimination should according to the agreement be reviewed periodically so 
as Member States and/or national social partners establish that the objective 
reasons for making them remain valid in every case. 1 
4.5. Evaluation of the contents of the Agreement 
Concerning its contents, the parental leave agreement allowed for different 
provisions only "as long as the minimum requirements provided for in the 
38 At the beginning of the 1990s, 28 per cent of all women and 4 per cent of all men in 
employment in the Union worked part-time: European Commission (2000) Draft Joint 
Employment Report 2000 
- 
Part I. 
- 
The European Union, Part II: The Member States, DG of 
Employment and Social Affairs, Manuscript, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of 
the European Communities, 17; also in COM (2000) 551 final, VOLUME I, 6 September 
2000. 
39 Council Directive 97/81/EC loc. cit. supra note 26, Clause 2 (2). 
ao Idem., Clause 4 (4). 
41 Idem., Clause 5 (1) (a) and (b). 
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present agreement are complied with". 42 The part-time deal, on the other hand, 
departs from this approach into a somewhat unclear direction. Again, the 
implementation of the agreement "shall not constitute valid grounds to reduce 
the general level of protection afforded to workers in the field of this 
agreement". 43 Nevertheless, this does not prejudice the right of Member States 
and/or national social partners, analysed above "to develop different 
legislative, regulatory or contractual provisions, in the light of the changing 
circumstances". 44 Additionally, it does not prejudice the application of 
opportunities of part-time work "as long as the principle of non-discrimination 
is complied with". 45 Because the principle of non-discrimination is subject to 
conditions which are not specified in the agreement itself Euro-level activity 
and devolution have an even more far-reaching quality in the second collective 
agreement. 46 
4.6. Concluding remarks 
The social partners were mindful of the importance of their agreement. Not 
only from the point of view of improving the image of a form of employment 
increasingly seen as a solution to the employment crisis, but also with regard 
to the political standing of the European social partners and the decision- 
making process under the SPA. It is important to consider the timing of the 
accord, coming, as it did, on the eve of the conclusion of the IGC of June 
1997, and the debate surrounding the inclusion of the Social Policy Protocol in 
42 Council Directive 96/34/EC loc. cit. supra note 11, Clause 4 (2). 
43 Council Directive 97/81/EC loc. cit. supra note 26, Clause 6 (2). 
as Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Falkner, G. op. cit supra note 23, p. 145. 
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the Amsterdam Treaty. The events surrounding the Renault Vilvoorde affair47 
(April 1997) which called for a constructive response from the social partners 
can also be seen to have been of some importance, as the agreement could be 
regarded as improving the somewhat dented image of the European social 
dimension. All these factors were certainly at the back of the minds of the 
negotiators keen to impress on the Commission and the Council of Ministers 
the ability of the social partners to reach a useful compromise. Given all the 
failed attempts to legislate for equal rights for part-time workers for over a 
decade, it appears that the flexible nature of the social partners' agreement was 
an unavoidable option. 
The analysis that proceeded reveals that, in fact, the part-time agreement 
consolidates the contractual relations at the EU level by being less heavy- 
handed. It merely outlines the procedures to be followed (procedural) rather 
than the substance (substantial) characterised by specific standards or 
unconditional rights. 48 Thus it leaves the Member States and/or national social 
partners to fill in the technical detail via implementing national rules. 
Additionally, a new feature as opposed to the parental leave case, is that a 
review process takes place not only at the EU level but also at the lower levels 
where barriers to part-time work as well as the presence of objective reasons 
for exemptions have to be reviewed periodically. 49 Once again, this implies 
47 In the wake of Renault's announcement of the closure of its plant at Vilvoorde, the EU was 
blamed for a lack of specific strategy for the European car industry. Padraig Flynn, the 
Commissioner responsible for Industrial Relations, called Member State governments and EU 
Institutions, in co-operation with social partners, to take tough measures in order to protect the 
ii}terests of employees in the event of large-scale redundancies, business transfers and 
relocation. Mass demonstrations demanding EU action to defend jobs took place in Brussels 
whereas at the same time Belgian and French Courts condemned the actions of Renault. 
48 Falkner, G. op. cit. supra note 23, p. 143. 
49 ibid. 
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that the proper implementation at the Euro-level and further improvement of 
the terms of the agreement at the national level is, to a large extent, contingent 
on the amount of effort that the trade unions and employers are committed to 
deploy to that effect. 
5. THE THIRD CASE: THE FIXED-TERM WORK AGREEMENT 
5.1. Introduction 
Bearing in mind the social partners' intention to negotiate on other forms of 
non-standard work, it came as no surprise that two years later they approved 
the terms of another agreement on fixed-term work. 5° 
5.2. The scope of the Agreement 
This framework agreement also implemented through a Council Directivesl 
under Article 139(2) EC had a twofold aim. The first was to improve the 
quality of fixed-term work by ensuring the application of the principle of non- 
discrimination between fixed-term and permanent workers. 52 This is 
particularly important if we consider the recent dispute between BECTU and 
the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry relating to the entitlement to 
annual paid leave. 53 There, the ECJ by combining funding, employment, 
health safety and working time issues considered that fixed-term and 
permanent workers should be treated equally so long as the right to annual 
5o See generally Weiss, M. (1999) "The Framework Agreement on Fixed-term Work: A 
German Point of View", 15 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations 2,97-103. 
s' Council Directive 99/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed- 
term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP 
- 
Annex: Framework agreement on fixed- 
term work [OJ 1999, No. L 175/43]. 
12 Idem., Clause 4. 
53 Case C-173/99 Broadcasting, Entertainment, Cinematographic and Theatre Union (BECTU) 
v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2001] ECR I- 4881. 
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paid leave is a fundamental social right and therefore should be granted to 
every worker. 54 
The second aim, also apparent in the above case, " was to establish minimum 
requirements that can prevent abuse arising from the use through renewals of 
successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships. S6 This is 
particularly important in respect of the reasons for which employers prefer 
fixed-term contracts to open-ended ones: a) short-term funding, b) desire for 
flexibility over stuffing levels and c) advantages of control; it is easier not to 
replace them than to discipline or dismiss staff or make them redundant. 
Nevertheless, there should be a sort of balance between the employer's 
flexibility to conclude definite or indefinite work contracts and the worker's 
security as part of the modernisation of working conditions within the 
European Employment Strategy ("EES"). 
5.3. General evaluation 
Like the part-time agreement, the fixed-term agreement is also characterised 
by process law rather than by unconditional rights. It seems again that both 
sides of industry UNICE/CEEP welcome that. As a consequence of their 
agreement, social partners will be involved in relevant policy-making 
processes on all layers of the EU multi-level governance. The features of 
exclusion of social security rights, exemptions on the scope of the principle of 
non-discrimination and a periodic review of the objective grounds that can 
justify exemptions are also applicable here. The only new element is in respect 
sa Idem., paras. 43,47-48,51-53. 
ss Idem., paras. 63-64. 
56 Council Directive 99/701oc. cit. supra note 51, Clause 1. 
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of information and consultation upon industrial issues. Member States and/or 
national social partners shall make sure that fixed-term workers are informed 
and consulted by their employers in accordance with national law, collective 
agreements or practice. 57 
5.4. The results 
The assessment of the above agreements acknowledges that had it not been for 
the collective bargaining of the EU cross-sectoral social partners, the Union 
would not have successfully moved towards the protection of workers in 
general, as in the case of parental leave, and part-time and fixed-term workers 
in particular. 58 Whereas the Commission and the Council of Ministers failed to 
provide workers with equal opportunities and balance employers' and 
employees' interests, the social partners succeeded. 
By concluding framework agreements, the social partners firstly offered a 
pragmatic solution to overcoming the European social policy "regulatory 
dilemma" 
, 
S9 that is to regulate in the name of integration while respecting 
striking labour and social diversities within the Union concerning historical, 
legal, institutional and ideological traditions. 
Secondly, they responded adequately to the challenge that Europe is constantly 
facing, (for example, the attempt to link social justice with growth), and thus, 
57Idem., Clause 7. 
S$ At the time of writing, June 2001, there are on-going discussions on temporary agency work, 
lifelong learning, skills' development and the operation for an Observatory on change. 
59 Lo Faro, A. (ed. ) (2000) Regulating Social Europe: Reality and Myth of Collective 
Bargaining in the EC Legal Order, Oxford: Hart, 21. Inter alia see Dolvik, J. (ed. ) (1997) 
Redrawing Boundaries of Solidarity? ETUC, Social Dialogue and the Europeanisation of 
Trade Unions in the 1990s, Oslo: Arena; Fafo, 112-115,453. 
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fulfilled the Commission's high expectations for further political and 
economic integration. 
6. SOCIAL PARTNERS AND TITLE VIII 
6.1. Introduction 
The fundamental role of the social partners in formulating public policies is 
increasingly visible at national level too. Collective bargaining has continued 
in Member States on the issues of employment creation and adapting the 
operational rules of the labour market under the auspices of the EES. 
The processes for involving social partner concertation are further enhanced in 
the spirit of "a new open method of co-ordinations60 ("OCM") and pluralism. 
The open method of co-ordination, as outlined by the Portuguese Presidency, 
extended by the Spring Stockholm European Council (23-24 March 2001) and 
espoused by the White Paper61 is composed of four elements: 
1) Fixed guidelines set for the Union with short, medium, and long term 
goals; 
2) Quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks; 
3) European guidelines translated into national and regional policies and 
targets; and 
60 Lisbon European Council, Presidency Conclusions (23-24 March 2000), para. 7: 
<URL http //eur pa. eu. int/counciUoff/conclu/index. htm>. 
61 White Paper loc. cit. supra note 4, p. 21. 
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4) Periodic monitoring, evaluation, and peer review, organised as a mutual 
learning process. 62 
OCM is considered to be a pragmatic effort by the EU to find a "Third Way"63 
between the traditionally conflicting imperatives of economic efficiency and 
equality, and between the extremes of European harmonisation and national 
autonomy. Tipping that balance is what Sabel calls "experimentalism", 64 and 
which in turn transforms the EU into a new form of post-regulatory 
governance. In such a context thus, there is a preference for procedures or 
standards with wide allowances for variation rather than detailed rules, for 
intensive consultation to set and modify standards, for standards that are 
wholly or partly voluntary, and for adjustment over time in response to 
feedback (Council Recommendations). 65 
Under this new form of governance, social partners are invited to be involved 
at all levels in order to tackle the explicit interdependencies between social 
protection, labour law, employment and broader economic policies while 
promoting a high level of employment. 
62 ECSA Review Fora (2000) "The Lisbon Council and the Future of European Economic 
Governance, 13 ECSA Review 3, p. 3< URL http: //ecsa. org/lisbonforum. html >. 
63 See generally Kenner, J. (1999) "The EC Employment Title and the `Third Way': Making 
Soft Law Work? "; 15 The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations 1,33-60. 
64 Sabel, C. and Gerstenberg, 0. "Democratic Experimentalism and its Constitution", Paper 
presented to the Academy of European Law - Eleventh Session: The Law of the European 
Union, European University Institute: Florence, Italy, 3-14 July 2000, p. 2 (mimeo). 
6$ See supra note 62, p. 7. 
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6.2. The Employment Chapter 
The war on unemployment as part of a medium- and long-term vision of 
European society is incorporated in the Employment Title, Articles 125-130 
EC. Its principal themes are those of consensus, in the form of non-binding 
soft laws, shared responsibility and a decentralising conception of subsidiarity 
in which the Community enables and the Member States deliver. For instance, 
Article 126(2) places responsibility on the Member States, who "shall regard 
promoting employment as a matter of common concern". 66 In addition, the 
Community's task, under Article 127(1), shall be to "contribute to a high level 
of employment" by supporting and, if necessary, complementing action at 
national level. This shared ownership of the strategy is especially explicit in 
Article 125 EC whereby: "Member States and the Community shall... work 
towards developing a co-ordinated strategy for employment and particularly 
for promoting a skilled, trained and adaptable workforce and labour markets 
responsive to economic change... ". 
The Employment Title also attempts to reconcile potentially conflicting policy 
themes. It addresses widely shared anxieties about the imbalance of priorities 
between economic matters, like the EMU convergence criteria, 67 and the 
pursuit of social and employment objectives. It is in this perspective therefore 
that Article 126(1) requires that employment and labour market policies shall 
be consistent with the broad Economic Guidelines adopted by the Community 
on an annual basis. 
66 However, the implementation and scrutiny of the EES based on Council Recommendations 
for 2000 reveals a less than strict adherence to the wording of Art. 126(2) EC. 
67 Price stability, government finances, exchange rates and long-term interest rates: Art. 121 
EC. 
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However, the core provisions are to be found in Articles 128(1)-(5) (known as 
the "Luxembourg processi68) where it is clearly stated that the Economic 
Guidelines will be supplemented by annual Employment Guidelines to be 
implemented by Member States. 69 Employment conditions in the Member 
States are to be considered by the European Council on the basis of an annual 
Joint Report from the Commission and the Council 70 Even though the 
Guidelines are formulated by way of a proposal from the Commission in the 
customary way, the proposal itself is based on conclusions reached by the 
European Council. 7' The role of the EP is merely consultative. Once the 
Guidelines have been issued, concerning four pillars, employability, 
entrepreneurship, adaptability and equal opportunities between men and 
women, each State must produce a National (Employment) Action Plan 
("NEAP or NAP"), setting out the principal measures taken to comply with 
them. 72 Any examination of these plans and any other evidence is a matter for 
the Council and not for the Commission. On the correct implementation of 
these plans there is an interface with the Council and the Employment 
Committee73 whose both opinions must be taken into account. At this stage, 
there is no input from the EP. While the Council may move to qualified 
majority voting on a proposal from the Commission they are only empowered 
68 The Employment Title was brought into practical effect at the Extraordinary European 
Council on Employment in Luxembourg (20 - 21 November 1997), some eighteen months in 
advance of Amsterdam Treaty ratification. It actually allowed early implementation in 1998 of 
the provisions of the future Article 128 EC on co-ordination of Member States' employment 
policies. Process is a form of governance which signifies the importance of the inter- 
governmental decision-making in shaping public policies and outlines legitimacy. 
69 Paras. 3,13 of the Luxembourg Presidency Conclusions: 
< URL http: //europa eu. int/comm/employment social/elm/summitlen/papers/conclu. htm >. 
7O Art. 128(1) EC. 
" Art. 128(2) EC. 
72 Art. 128(3) EC. 
73 The Standing Committee on Employment was set up in 1970. This is a tripartite consultative 
body consisting of the Council, the Commission and representatives of the social partners. It 
underwent a major reform in 1999 in order to improve its functioning. 
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to adopt non-binding recommendations. 74 The cycle is completed by the next 
Joint Report to the European Council on the implementation of the Guidelines 
and the employment situation in the Community. 75 By the end of 2000, the 
Luxembourg Process had completed three full cycles. 
With regard to the institutional arrangements for the cross-sectoral European 
social partners' participation in the EES, there is no explicit reference as in the 
Social Policy provisions. Social partners have `a voice' only under the 
`umbrella' of the Standing Committee on Employment (see diagram 5.2 
below). 76 
The Committee must consult management and labour "where appropriate"77 
while having a drafting input, including monitoring, on Employment 
Guidelines. 
74 Art. 128(4) EC. 
75 Art. 128(5) EC. 
76 Yet, it is highly expected that their role will become more formal in due course considering 
that the Commission already calls for the institutionalisation of the OCM as a part of a general 
t, rocess to promote `civic governance' in the EU: White Paper loc. cit. supra note 4, pp. 21-22. 
Art. 130 EC. 
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5.2. Diagram of Institutional Arrangements for the European 
Employment Strategy (EES) 
Employment Committee 
2 nominees from Member States and Commission; consultation of 
social partners Drafting input on Guidelines 
Drafting input Monitoring1 of Guidelines 
Commission Council 
Annual Summit of Heads of State 
Initiates proposal agrees on broad Policy Approves Employment Guidelines 
(by QMV) (after consultation with 
EP, Committee of Regions, 
Member States ECOSOC) 
Submit National 
Action Plans (NAPs) 
Source: adapted and updated from Bogai (1998, Arbeitsmarktpolitik in der 
Europäischen Union, WSI Mitteilungen, 12, p. 852 as quoted in: Milner, S 
"Employment Policies in the European Union and the European Social 
Model: Towards a New Orthodoxy? ", Paper Presented at The UACES 301h 
Anniversary Conference and 5th Research Conference, CEU: Budapest, 
Hungary, 6-8 April 2000, pp. 6-7 (mimeo). 
The social partners might have welcomed the Council Decision 1999/207/EC78 
that the Standing Committee on Employment should be a forum for continuous 
78 Council Decision 1999/207/EC of 9 March 1999 reforming the Standing Committee on 
Employment and repealing Decision 70/352/EEC I01 1999, No. L 72/331. 
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dialogue and consultation between the Council, Commission and themselves 
on the co-ordinated Employment Strategy. 79 However, it is still bizarre why 
they never became `Institutions', as explicitly mentioned in the Amsterdam 
Treaty ("AT"), particularly if one considers that most of the 1998 NAPs, that 
is before the AT comes into force (1 May 1999), were the result of 
employment pacts between governments and social partners. 
6.3. The non-institutionalisation of social partners: An issue of hypotheses 
To address this enigma, the author shall consider some hypotheses, yet, none 
of these offers a clear-cut answer. 
The first hypothesis proposes that in the employment policy, the social 
partners' participation should remain more procedural than substantial 
characterised by specific competencies, leaving room for improvement in 
establishing effective partnerships in support of national strategies. 
80 
Although this hypothesis appears to be convincing at first sight, it can be 
easily observed that after the Lisbon Summit there is a tendency from the 
Community Institutions to frame the social partners' competencies. Asked to 
bargain in modernising work organisation and develop policies particularly in 
improving employability, encouraging adaptability of businesses and their 
79 Idem., para. 8. 
80 European Commission (2000) Employment Policies in the EU and in the Member States: 
Joint Report 1999, DG of Employment of Social Affairs, Manuscript, Luxembourg: Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, 13. 
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employees and strengthening equal opportunities between men and women are 
some examples of this trend. 81 
In relation to the first one, the second type of hypothesis advocates that social 
partners should be used only as "regulatory techniques"82 or "instruments"83 of 
a regulatory capability in order to bypass the Union's above regulatory 
dilemma. 
In essence, there are two facts which support this statement. Firstly, in the 
Standing Committee on Employment, the social partners are consulted where 
it is appropriate. However, the term of appropriateness is no further defined. 
Secondly, when the Community regulators (Commission and Council) fail to 
proceed with legislation, the social partners take over. Recall, for example, that 
the Council adopted the European Works Council Directive84 and the Burden 
of Proof Directive85 following a failure of the social partners to reach an 
agreement. Vice versa, they used the social partners when Commission 
proposals on parental leave and part-time work fell flat. On the other hand, the 
a' Council Decision of 19 January 2001 on Guidelines for Member States' employment policies 
for the year 2001 (COM 2001/63/EC) [OJ 2001, No. L 22/18]. 
82 Lo Faro, A. op. cit. supra note 59, pp. 146-154. 
83 Keller, B. and Sörries, B. (1998) "The Sectoral Social Dialogue and European Social Policy: 
More Fantasy, Fewer Facts", 4 European Journal of Industrial Relations 3, p. 331 at 331. 
84 Council Directive 94/45/EC of 22 September 1994 on the establishment of a European 
Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups 
of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees [OJ 1994, No. L 
254/64]. At the time of writing this Thesis, June 2001, there are on-going discussions for its 
revision. $S Council Directive 97/80/EC of 15 December 1997 on the burden of proof in cases of 
discrimination based on sex [OJ 1997, No. L 14/6 as later amended by Council Directive 
98/52/EC of 13 July 1998 on the extension of Directive 97/80/EC on the burden of proof in 
cases of discrimination based on sex in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland [OJ 1998, No L. 205/66]. 
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Council has legislated on sexual harassment86 and is about to legislate on 
national-level information and consultation several years after the collapse of 
negotiations between the social partners on these issues. 87 
Nevertheless, what could possibly prompt the institutionalisation of the social 
partners in social policy and not in employment, even though collective 
bargaining functions as a "a regulatory resource"88 in both ways, is the 
existence of different needs. In social policy, the need is to make sure that 
legislative harmonisation will take place `at all costs'. That is why collective 
bargaining has usefully facilitated progress on occasions where agreement in 
the Council was doubtful. In employment policy, however, the need is just to 
build the conditions for full employment through a balanced and mutually 
reinforcing policy mix of economic reforms, labour law and social cohesion. 89 
6.4. Social partners and National Action Plans: An overview (1998-2001) 
6.4.1. Introduction 
Despite the non-institutionalised participation of management and labour in 
the Employment legislative activities of the EU, the Commission9° as well as 
86 Commission proposal for amending Directive 76/207/EC on the implementation of the 
principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational 
training and promotion, and working conditions [OJ 1976, No. L 39/40], COM (2000) 334 
final, 7 June 2000; Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of 
equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and 
promotion, and working conditions, COM (2001) 321 final, 7 June 2001. 
Proposal for a Council Directive establishing a general framework for informing and 
consulting employees in the European Community, COM (1998) 612,17 November 1998. 
88 Lo Faro, A. op. cit. supra note 59, p. 132. 
89 See generally Szyszczak, E. (2001) "The New Paradigm for Social Policy: A Virtuous 
Circle? ", 38 Common Market Law Review, 1125-1170. 
90 COM (1996) 448 final loc. cit supra note 6, para. 4; COM (1998) 322 loc. cit. supra note 7, 
pp. 2-3,12; Inter alia see Commission Communication to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
- 
Acting 
188 
CHAPTER FIVE SOCIAL DIALOGUE: THE ROLE OF PARTNERS 
the Council91 have been keen to get the social partners involved in deliberating 
and implementing the Employment Guidelines. 92 
6.4.2. Improving Employability (Guidelines 1-8) 
6.4.2.1. Training Policy 
Under the employability pillar, one of the most important fields of intervention 
is training policy. Social partners participate in the establishment of 
information systems on labour market and companies' needs in Sweden, 
Finland and Portugal, and the funding of a national vocational training 
programme in Greece. In Germany, they are involved in ensuring easy access 
for training for older workers. In Luxembourg, they play an important role in 
the continuing training of workers or enterprise-based training courses for 
young people or adults and have adopted a framework law on continuing 
vocational training. Finally, in France they have been consulted on an 
individual right to training which can be transferred from one business to 
Locally for Employment: A Local Dimension for the European Employment Strategy, COM 
(2000) 196 final, 7 April 2000, para. 3.1.5.; Commission Communication on Modernising the 
organisation of work 
-A positive approach to change, COM (1998) 592 final, 9 November 
1998, paras. 5-6. 
91 Florence European Council (21-22 June 1996), paras. 1-3; Extraordinary European Council 
on Employment (Luxembourg, 20-21 November 1997), paras. 7,18,22; Cardiff European 
Council (15-16 June 1998), para. 8; Vienna European Council (11-12 December 1998), para. 
29; Cologne European Council (3-4 June 1999), paras. 8,11; Helsinki European Council (10-11 
December 1999), para. 39; Extraordinary European Council (Lisbon, 23-24 March 2000), para. 
28. 
92 Main sources: 
< URL http: //www. europa. eu. int/comm/emplovment social/empl&esf/index en htm > 
< http: //europa. eu. int/comm/employment social/empl&esf/ees en. htm > 
NAP on Employment 2001: 
< http: //europa eu int/comm/employment social/news/2001/maynaps2001 en html > 
2000 NEAP < httv: Heuropa. eu. int/comm/employMent-sociaVempl&esf/na]2sOO/naps en htm > 
1999 NEAP < http: //europa eu int/comm/employment sociaVempl&esf/naps99/naps en htm > 
1998 NEAP < http: //eurona. eu. int/comm/employment social/empl&esf/naps/naps en htm > 
Commission Communication, From Guidelines to Action: The National Action Plans for 
Employment COM (1998) 316: 
< http: //europa eu int/comm/employment social/empl&esf/naps/commen pdf > 
Backgound Report (1998) Guidelines to Action: The National Action Plans for Employment < 
http: //europa eu. int/comm/employment social/empl&esf/naps/reporten pdf>. 
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another and from one sector of activity to another and which is guaranteed 
collectively, for the benefit of all employees and job seekers. 
6.4.2.2. Lifelong learning 
In conjunction with the social partners again, national governments undertake 
to explore new ways for lifelong learning, as in Austria, France, Denmark and 
Portugal, or create more positive conditions for lifelong training, Spain. The 
Belgian National Framework Agreement 1999-2000 is an example of 
comprehensive commitments by the social partners on a wide range of issues 
including lifelong learning. In Netherlands, the social partners have a first 
responsibility for lifelong learning through sector training funds and they are 
also directly involved in solving the sector bottlenecks that arise due to skills' 
shortages. In Ireland, they contribute to the modernisation of apprenticeship 
systems whereas in the UK social partners have an important role in promoting 
workplace learning through initiatives like the "Union Learning Fund" and the 
"Partnership Fund" in order to tackle basic skill levels and helping address low 
labour productivity. 
6.4.2.3. Integration of disadvantaged groups in the labour market 
(Guideline 9) 
Among the policies mentioned in NAPs, those which can most effectively 
address the problem of integration of ethnic minorities are: awareness-raising 
of employers, a more consistent involvement of the social partners, and an 
increased role of the organisations representing the ethnic minorities, as well 
as those dealing with anti-discrimination. Mainstreaming, that is, taking into 
account the needs of the ethnic minorities within the framework of the 
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measures and activities planned for other pillars, is considered by Ireland, 
Sweden, Finland, the UK and Netherlands. Particularly, in the UK, a joint 
action was taken at Ford by the managers to fight racism within the company. 
Elsewhere, initiatives to integrate minorities are taking place in Denmark. The 
aim of many collective agreements is to put ethnic equality on the same 
footing as gender equality. In a draft proposal, the unions said that they would 
train and educate their shop stewards to help them absorb people from ethnic 
minorities into the labour market. 
6.4.3. Developing Entrepreneurship and Job Creation 
6.4.3.1. Regional policies (Guideline 12) 
The involvement of the social partners in regional policies varies in the 
different Member States. In Italy and Spain, for instance, the social partners 
continue to work with regional Governments through specific pacts. The 
Swedish regional growth agreements which aim at better aligning the overall 
policy activities with needs of and conditions for business at regional level is 
another example of these broad partnerships. Issues, related to knowledge 
growth and the promotion of lifelong learning, have been important 
ingredients of the agreements. 
6.4.3.2. Tele-sector (Guideline 13) 
Another focus for the attention of governments and the social partners has 
been tele-working and distance work. The liberalisation of the tele-sector in 
Denmark and Sweden has led to huge investments in the development of 
communication services which are used in connection with IT-based services 
and electronic trade. In. both those countries, governments and social partners 
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have taken a number of initiatives in order to create a solid foundation for 
future employment based on the use of Information Technology. Some of 
these include the drawing up of action plans on how to integrate IT in concrete 
education programmes, the revision of the legislation on distance work in 
Sweden and the Danish government's practice of abolishing tax on home- 
based tele-work stations paid by the employer. 
6.4.4. Strengthening Equal Opportunities Policies for Men and Women 
6.4.4.1. Combating gender discrimination (Guideline 20) 
Furthermore, to desegregate the labour market in Finland, the NAP of 2000 
introduces a major initiative "Equal Labour Markets", where the social 
partners play a key role. In Ireland too, partnerships aim at social inclusion and 
equality dimensions. 
6.4.4.2. Reconciling family life and career (Guideline 21) 
Additionally, in Luxembourg the social partners play an important role in 
improving the position of women on the Luxembourg labour market in terms 
of parental leave and childcare. 
6.5. Employment Guidelines 2001 
Several of the Employment Guidelines for 2001 recognise that the social 
partners are critical players to their implementation. This is particularly so in 
relation to Guidelines under the Adaptability and Equal Opportunities Pillars 
relating to working time and leave arrangements. Guidelines 13 and 14, on the 
modernisation of work for example, invite the social partners to negotiate and 
implement at all appropriate levels agreements to modernise work and allow 
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work to adapt to structural change. Flexible contracts, with management 
security, are encouraged alongside new forms of work such as part-time work 
and career breaks. These are some of the new areas where the quality of jobs 
should be enhanced. In the same context, the social partners are invited to co- 
operate with the Member States to improve the regulatory framework by 
reducing barriers to employment and modernised work organisation and by 
applying health and safety legislation while modernising labour law with a 
balanced approach to flexibility and security. 93 
The social partners are nonetheless also critical of Guideline 6 with regard to 
lifelong learning and Guideline 10, job creation at the local level and in the 
social economy. Their role is additionally recognised in two new areas. First, 
Guideline 6, on active policies to develop job matching and combat labour 
shortages, invites the social partners, where appropriate, to work with the 
Member States to create jobs and to prevent bottlenecks in order to improve 
the functioning of the labour market, including the promotion of mobility. 94 
Secondly, Guideline 9 allows the Member States to involve the social partners 
in tackling undeclared work. 95 
Furthermore, in the Commission's proposal for the Employment Guidelines 
2001, a new dimension to the role of the social partners is unveiled. The social 
partners 
"... are invited to develop, in accordance with their national 
93 Council Decision 2001 loc. cit. supra note 78, p. 24. 
94 Idem., 22. 
95 Idem., 23. 
193 
CHAPTER FIVE SOCIAL DIALOGUE: THE ROLE OF PARTNERS 
traditions and practices, their own process of implementing the 
guidelines for which they have the key responsibility, identify 
the issues upon which they will negotiate, and report regularly 
on progress as well as the impact of their actions on 
employment and labour market functioning. The Social 
Partners at European level are invited to define their own 
contribution and to monitor, encourage and support efforts 
undertaken at national level". 96 
The role of reporting is addressed in the Adaptability Pillar and in particular 
under Guideline 13 in 2001 which in essence gives full autonomy to the social 
partners as to its implementation. 
The social partners are invited 
"- within the context of the Luxembourg process, to report 
annually on which aspects of the modernisation of the 
organisation of work have been covered by the negotiations as 
well as the status of their implementation and impact on 
employment and labour market functioning". 97 
The task of reporting has two consequences upon the social partners. First, it 
creates a new dimension to the EES. In specific terms, it puts into motion a 
'6 Idem., Annex 
- 
The Employment Guidelines for 2001: Horizontal Objectives 
- 
Building 
Conditions for Full Employment in a Knowledge-based Society, Objective C, p. 20. 
97 Ibid., (Guideline 13 in 2001). 
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process (reporting) within a process (full employment) 
- 
whereby the social 
partners are called upon to develop and report on actions that fall within their 
autonomous remit, based on the overall objectives defined by the Employment 
Guidelines. 
Secondly, the Commission implicitly argues that a synergy between the 
national and European social partners is built up. Thus, at the national level the 
social partners can define the benchmarks and areas upon which best practices 
and systems are to be found and evaluated, and develop areas where new 
action in various forms, negotiations, partnerships, framework agreements, and 
territorial pacts, can be launched. At the EU level, the social partners can 
monitor and consolidate contributions from the national level social partners. 
Consistently, they are viewed as being in a position to give advice to the 
national level social partners with respect to their input into NAPs. 
6.6. Why is the role of the social partners so important in the Employment 
policy? 
To further assess the contribution of the social partners to the production of 
EU level decisions, the question which needs to be addressed is why the role 
of the social partners is so important in implementing the Employment 
Guidelines. 
The answer is that the shaping and implementing of employment policies is a 
question of managing change. That is what the EU policy-makers 
(Commission and Council) are actually facing; the need to strike a balance 
between flexibility for enterprises and security for workers. 
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The cited examples can easily convince us that the social partners are best 
placed to strike that balance through consensus building and empowerment. 
The more they can do together in their bilateral social dialogue, through 
negotiations, agreements and joint initiatives, the better the outcome. That is 
what the third pillar, adaptability for Member States' employment policies for 
the year 2001, is about. It is an invitation to the social partners to take 
responsibility for the modernisation of the organisation of work, for lifelong 
learning, for the re-organisation of working time and many other workplace- 
related issues. 
Under the new process, labelled the "open method of co-ordination", the social 
partners are also needed for the shaping of public policies, from the economic 
framework to tax and benefit systems and active labour market and social 
protection policies. 
Whereas before the Lisbon Summit, the social partners were in practice 
lobbying the Heads of State during lunchtime breaks as non-institutionalised 
actors and thus participated in a rather informal way, under the new form of 
`governance' the social partners are promoted as dynamic official legislators 
who can carry on a democratic process. The invitations to make reports, to 
develop benchmarks and indicators, to support statistical databases to measure 
progress in actions for which they are responsible and the Commission's 
Recommendations (2000) to the Member States which singled out the 
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insufficiency of commitments taken by the social partners, can be used to back 
up this assertion. 98 
7. DEFINING THE ROLE OF THE SOCIAL PARTNERS 
7.1. Introduction 
Even though under both procedures the use of the social partners enhances the 
quality of the EU decision-making in terms of an input legitimacy, 99 it is still 
regrettable that the social partners are regarded as only "regulatory 
techniques", 100 a term that equates them with quasi 
- 
not yet complete 
- 
legislators. 
7.2. Social partners: Quasi-Legislators 
Under Title VIII the social partners do not have real competence to regulate 
internally. As discussed above, by prescribing the necessary measures to be 
taken in order to improve employability and by instructing them to arrange 
partnerships on specific issues, the Council encroaches upon their autonomy to 
freely associate and consequently to regulate independently their own national 
labour markets. To tighten up this argument, the concept of `co-operative 
subsidiarity' might be of some help. 
98 European Commission, Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the 
Implementation of Member States' Employment Policies, COM (2000) 549 final, 6 September 
2000 < URL http: //europa. eu. int/eur-lex/en/com/pdf/2000/com2000 0549en01 pdf >. See also 
Council Recommendation of 19 January 2001 on The Implementation of Member States' 
Employment Policies (COM 2001/64/EC) [OJ 2001, No. L 22/27]: 
<URLb=: //www. europa. eu. int/comm/eMployinent social/empl&esf/ees en htm>. 
99 See Chapter Four of this Thesis, Section 2.1. pp. 124-125. 
100 See supra note 82. 
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By the term `co-operative subsidiarity', we mean the `pooling' and `mixing' of 
European (the European cross-sectoral social partners), national (Member 
States) and sub-national (the national social partners) competencies with 
Community competencies (Council). In an arrangement of co-operative 
subsidiarity, each level should operate in co-ordination with the other level and 
all levels should share in the responsibility for problem solving. This is 
implicitly affirmed in the new chapter of the EES for 2001 which identifies a 
number of key horizontal objectives and principles and states that "the 
achievement of these objectives requires simultaneous efforts by the 
Community and the Member States". '°' By applying, therefore, the principle 
of co-operative subsidiarity to the European employment policy it does not 
have to be decided whether the Community or the Member States and the 
social partners should act. They all act: yet, according to the Council's 
mandates concerning means and measures to be taken in order to achieve the 
employment objectives such as negotiations and conclusion of agreements on 
explicit issues. 
Additionally, the social partners' capacity to regulate particularly in 
developing entrepreneurship, in job matching and encouraging adaptability 
hinges upon the Member States' capacities in view of their lack of efficiency, 
or resources, their underdeveloped social security schemes and other economic 
reasons. 
101 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision on Guidelines for Member States' 
Employment Policies for the year 2001, COM (2000) 548 final, 2000/0225 (CNS), 6 
September 2000, p. 8< http: //130.104.105.148/Bede/EBED302000/com2000 0548en01 pdf >. 
See also supra note 81, p. 20. 
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At the same time, it hinges upon the Community's commands for job creation 
and its consistency with the economic guidelines set out to underpin EMU, for 
example in wage bargaining. 102 Both points which were highlighted at the 
Essen Summit (11-12 December 1994) and then reiterated at the Madrid 
European Summit (15-16 December 1995) were also adopted at a Social 
Dialogue Summit (21 October 1995). Thus it comes as no surprise to hear the 
social partners announcing that: 
"It is in particular important to ensure that the Economic and 
Monetary Union goes together with an active employment 
strategy and that the economic guidelines exercise and the 
Essen employment process should be seen as a whole". 103 
Furthermore, under Title XI, their capacity to regulate hinges upon the 
Community's commitment to legislate. As neither collective labour law, nor 
organisational will and capacity to develop voluntary European collective 
bargaining have been established, the central Social Dialogue is completely 
dependent on the Community's capacity and commitment to bring European 
social policy forward. In the absence of any will by the employers to engage in 
voluntary relations and in the absence of industrial rights to negotiate at the 
EU level, the fuel to the engine is the Community's legislative initiatives. '04 In 
102 European Commission (2000) Industrial Relations in Europe, Manuscript, Luxembourg: 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 52-55. 
103 As quoted by Delvik, J. "The ETUC and Development of Social Dialogue and European 
Negotiations after Maastricht, Arena Working Paper No. 97/2, p. 33: 
< URL httn: //www. arena. uio. no >. 
104 Yet, even in the absence of conflictual means at the EU level, the chance of reaching a 
framework agreement is highly dependent on the character of the legislative proposal, thus 
placing again the Commission and the Council in a decisive role. 
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this context, the idea that legislative abstention from concluding voluntary 
agreements must be regarded as a value in itself, that is, functional to the 
development of an autonomous collective bargaining, is negated. '°5 
Another weakness of the current bargaining system is the genuine lack of 
autonomy on the part of the social partners. 106 From the outset, their agenda is 
curtailed by the existing limitations of Community competencies. The 
possibility offered in the EC Treaty for the social partners to make agreements 
on areas beyond the Community jurisdiction have limited value given the fact 
that they cannot be implemented by way of a Council decision (Article 139(2) 
EC). Yet, even in those areas within the competence of the Community, it 
could be submitted that the autonomy which underpins the agreements reached 
is later compromised by the intervention of the EU Institutions. That is, the 
Commission as a guarantor of the legality of the agreement's individual 
clauses, and the Council as the only body able to confer binding force on the 
agreements. Equally, the interventionist approach of the Commission, itself, 
might reflect latent concerns about the strength and representativeness of the 
European social partners. More autonomy could increase their importance and 
consequently could lead to their institutional growth. These matters are 
discussed in the next section. 
pos Lo Faro, A. op. cit. supra note 59, p. 94. 
106 Idem., p. 106; Bell, M. (2001) "Book Review: A. Lo Faro, Regulating Social Europe: 
Reality and Myth of Collective Bargaining, Oxford: Hart", (mimeo): Review Article to be 
published in the forthcoming issue of 2001 MJCEL. 
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8. SOCIAL PARTNERS AND PROBLEMS OF LEGITIMACY 
8.1. THE ISSUE OF REPRESENTATIVITY 
8.1.1. Introduction 
The incorporation of the SPA into the Treaties has been a great step towards a 
full recognition of the crucial role to be played by the social partners in 
shaping European Social Policy. Nevertheless, it should not be underestimated 
that their participation raises important questions of democratic legitimacy in 
respect of representativeness. 
8.1.2. The plea for substantive legitimacy 
Even though in Community law there exists no explicit provision requiring 
that the management and labour organisations participation in the legislative 
process under Articles 138-139 should be representative, this requirement can 
however be distilled from a general demand for "substantive legitimacy". 107 
This is a necessary supplement to the notion of democratic legitimation which 
should be attached to the exercise of State power. It requires that State 
measures capture the `actual' will of the people in the sense that citizens 
recognise their own interests within the legislative measures. In fact, the 
degree of attention which decision-makers pay to diverse opinions is a 
yardstick against which individuals may measure the extent to which their will 
is represented in the final decision. 
Turning the argument to the EU level, the Commission partly fulfils the 
requirement of substantive legitimacy. On the one hand, it might consult a 
107 Britz, G. and Schmidt, M. (2000) "The Institutionalised Participation of Management and 
Labour in the Legislative Activities of the European Community: A Challenge to the Principle 
of Democracy under Community Law", 6 European Law Journal 1, p. 45 at 66. 
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number of European workers and employers organisations on any new social 
policy proposal, including a whole range of cross-industry advisory 
committees, sectoral level joint committees, informal working parties at 
sectoral level or inter-professional level and the like. On the other hand, 
however, it clearly prefers collective negotiations that lead to final agreements 
to be conducted by a small but workable group of Euro-associations only. 
8.1.3. Representative organisations and negotiations 
In its 1993 Communication, 108 the Commission published the criteria'09 for 
becoming a social dialogue partner. It selected a number of organisations, 
which fulfilled these criteria. On the workers side, for instance the ETUC 
("European Trade Union Confederation"), CEC ("Confederation Europeenne 
des Cadres") and Eurocadres. On the employers side, the UNICE ("Union of 
Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe") and CEEP ("European 
Centre of Public Enterprises"), UEAPME/EUROPMI ("European Association 
of Craft, Small and Medium - Sized Enterprises") for small and medium size 
enterprises (SMEs), EUROCOMMERCE (for SMEs), and 
EUROCHAMBRES. The list which is under constant review developed 
gradually and now consists of about 44 organisations. ' 10 
108 COM (1993) 600 final loc. cit. supra note 5, para. 24. 
'09 The criteria are three. 1) Social dialogue partners must be cross-industry or relate to specific 
sectors or categories and be organised at European level. 2) They must consist of organisations 
which are themselves an integral and recognised part of Member State social partners 
structures and with the capacity to negotiate agreements, and which are representative of all 
Member States, as far as possible. 3) They must have adequate structures to ensure their 
effective participation in the consultative process. 
110 COM (1998) 3221oc. cit. supra note 9, Annex I. 
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Even though these parties have been consulted on every proposal, so far, they 
have not played a part in the actual negotiation procedures. So far, only 
UNICE, CEEP and ETUC have participated in the negotiations on the 
agreements on parental leave, part-time and fixed-term work, including the 
failed attempt to conclude an agreement on the European Works Council. For 
its part, the Commission has maintained that it cannot select the negotiators 
and leaves it to the good will and co-operation of the social partners to 
decide. 11' That was the central point of UEAPME's challenge of the parental 
leave Directive. UEAPME's complaint was that although it fulfilled the 
conditions for becoming a partner in the negotiations, it had been 
systematically disregarded at all stages, even though it did participate in the 
earlier stage of consultations. Thus, its members did not feel represented by 
the signatory parties, although they were bound by the agreement. 
8.1.4. The UEAPME challenge 
To express the disappointment for exclusion in the negotiating procedures, 
UEAPME decided to get legal redress before the Court of First Instance 
("CFI"). ' 12 Although the main issue at stake was that of representativity, ' 13 
from a legal technical point of view UEAPME had no choice but to ask the 
Court to test the Directive against the EC Treaty. On the basis of [Article 173 
111 COM (1996) 448 final loc. cit. supra note 8, para. 70; COM (1998) 322 loc. cit. supra note 
9, p. 12. 
112 Case T-135/96 European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises v. 
Council [1998] ECR II 
- 
2335. 
113 Idem., para. 58. In relation to representativity, see Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs 
delivered on 28 January 1999, Case C-67/96 Albany International BV v. Stichling 
BedrÜspensioenfonds Textielindustrie [1999] ECR 1-5751, para. 73; Inter alia note Cases C- 
382/92 Commission v. United Kingdom [1994] ECR I- 2435, paras. 29-30, and C-383/92 
Commission v. United Kingdom [1994] ECR I- 2479, paras. 26-27. 
203 
CHAPTER FIVE SOCIAL DIALOGUE: THE ROLE OF PARTNERS 
EC] it submitted that clause 2(3)(f) of the Council Directive fails to satisfy the 
requirements of Article 137(2) EC. First, because medium-sized undertakings 
are not mentioned. Second, because an obligation to "avoid imposing 
administrative, financial and legal constraints in a way which would hold back 
the creation and development of small and medium-size undertakings" had 
become a possibility. Based on these grounds, UEAPME requested the CFI 
either to annul the Directive, or, alternatively, to annul it solely with respect to 
its application to the SMEs referred in the relevant provision of the SPA. The 
organisation pleaded breaches of the principles of equality, subsidiarity and 
proportionality, as well as an infringement of the principle of patere legem 
quam ipsefecisti ("to accept the law which one by himself/herself has made") 
in that the Commission had recognised UEAPME as a representative 
organisation. No matter how well prepared the arguments were, UEAPME lost 
the case. The Court dismissed the application for annulment as inadmissible 
since [Article 173(4) EC] in its strict wording did not empower claimants like 
the UEAPME to file such an application. 14 
8.1.5. The lack of locus standi in the context of representativity 
Although the social partners are elevated to the role of political and 
institutional actors' 15 in the EU decision-making process, their powers have 
not been extended by a parallel extension of the rules governing their right of 
action under Article 230 EC. Yet, since the EU is claimed to be based on the 
rule of law 116 as emphatically stated in Chapter Six, it should include a general 
14 Similar dismissal of application because of inadmissibility was also judged in another Court 
action provoked in the mid-1970s. Note Case C-66/76 CFDT v. Council [1977] ECR 305. 
'" Szyszczak, E. (2000) EC Labour Law, London: Longman, 3. 
116 Stated by the ECJ in Case C-294/83 Parti Ecologiste `Les Verts' v. European Parliament 
[1986] ECR 1339, para. 23. 
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principle according to which any person or Institution holding a right under 
Community law must also be capable to protect it by his own right of action 
and instituted in his own name. 117 
In the UEAPME case, the Court must have been uneasy with the situation of 
inadmissibility or lack of locus standi, given the offered considerations in the 
judgment. 118 It must have felt that a Council Directive based on a social 
agreement with an alleged insufficiently representative basis, should be at least 
open to a legal attack by the social partners concerned. Yet, it decided 
otherwise as it deemed that it is not the Commission who actually chooses its 
negotiators. 119 
The issue of inadmissibility is not new going back to a case initiated by the 
EP. 120 Until 1992, the EP was also deprived of the right to bring an action for 
annulment of a Council decision under the relevant Article. However, in a 
landmark judgment of the ECJ, it recognised the EP's locus standi. It thus 
stated that: 
"An action for annulment brought by the Parliament against an 
act of the Council or the Commission is admissible provided 
that the action seeks only to safeguard its prerogatives and it is 
founded only on submissions alleging their infringement". '2' 
117 Note Case C-70/88 European Parliament v. Council [1990] ECR I- 2041, paras. 7,23,25- 
26. 
1" T-135/96 loc. cit. supra note 112, para. 62 et seq. 
"9 Idem., paras. 75-79. 
120 See supra note 117. 
121 Idem., para. 27. 
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This remarkable decision to protect the institutional balance was later codified 
by the Maastricht Treaty in Article 230(3) EC. It comes as no surprise 
therefore that the provision explicitly entitles the EP to bring an action before 
the ECJ for the purpose of protecting its prerogatives. 
8.1.5.1. Solutions to address the social partners' lack of locus staiidi 
The striking similarities between the position of the EP before 1992 and the 
present position of the European social partners make us realise that the EP 
construction of a right to annulment should also apply to cases concerning the 
social partners. Thus as Franssen and Jacobs argue all the organisations of 
management and labour should have the possibility in the first place to bring a 
legal challenge against their exclusion from the negotiations on agreements if 
such agreements are turned into EU legislation. 122 In all events, the 
organisations which are already recognised by the Commission in its 1993 
Communication as being representative enough to be consulted should have 
access to the Court. For the rest of the organisations that comply with these 
criteria but are not recognised by the Commission, the Court should submit the 
complaining organisation to a simple test of the Commission's three criteria on 
representativity to determine whether the organisation is admissable or not. 
Subsequent case law will then increasingly clarify which organisations are 
entitled to secure, in the best way, the necessary legitimacy of agreements 
forming the basis of EU law. 123 
122 Franssen, E. and Jacobs, A. (1998) "The Question of Representativity in the European 
Social Dialogue", 35 Common Market Law Review 4, p. 1295 at 1308. 
123 Ibid. 
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Additionally, it could be wise to adapt the text of the Treaties as in the case of 
the EP in order to insert the words "management and labour" into Article 
230(3) EC. By combining their role with an enhanced right of legal action, 
management and labour could become under the new theory real actors in the 
formulation of European social policy and at the same time defeat problems of 
legitimacy over implemented agreements. ' 24 
8.1.6. The representative status 
The problem of dubious foundations of legitimacy, and in particular of 
substantive legitimacy, becomes serious when under the new notion of a meta- 
national democracy, only a handful of organisations play a powerful role in 
building the European social dimension. 125 
Three sources are responsible for curtailing substantive legitimacy. The 
Commission 
- 
though hard to attest that it had designated by decree a 
monopoly status for a few interest groups 
- 
the social partners' organisations 
which are not representative strictu sensu just as the civil society 
organisations, discussed in Chapter Four, and the jurisprudence of the CFI. 
8.1.6.1. The Commission 
As far as the first source is concerned, the Commission was convinced that 
UNICE/CEEP and ETUC were representative when striking their deals on 
parental leave and atypical work. In its explanatory memoranda accompanying 
'24 Idem., p. 1312. 
125 For a parallelism to the American model of exclusive representation see generally, 
Summers, C. (1998) "Exclusive Representation: A Comparative Inquiry Into A 'Unique' 
American Principle" in Engels, C. and Weiss, M. (eds. ) (1998) Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations at the Turn of the Century: Liber Amicorum in Honour of Professor Roger Blanpain, 
The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 568-591. 
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its proposals for Council Directives, the Commission explicitly stated that the 
three organisations that had concluded the Agreements "... fulfil the conditions 
of representativeness". 126 They were classified as the only cross-sectoral 
federations with a general purpose fulfilling the conditions mentioned in the 
Commission Communication on the application of the Social Agreement. Thus 
the claim that the Commission has no control over the social partners' access 
to the post-consultation negotiation stage is clearly a falsification. 127 
The main reason for the Commission to support an oligopolistic approach of 
collective negotiations lies on the beneficial effect of negotiation economy (the 
less the actors, the more the chances for compromise). 128 The same strategic 
move also extends to its relations with NGOs. When discussing its relationship 
with them, the Commission submitted that whether or not NGOs are 
representative should not only be based on the number of members whom they 
represent, but also on the ability of such bodies to bring specialist knowledge 
and open the route for decision-making. 129 
8.1.6.2. The social partners' organisations 
With regard to the second source, the question is whether they represent a 
majority of workers and employers in Europe. Other European federations, 
apart from UEAPME, have argued that they are as representative as these 
126 Commission Communication, Proposal for a Council Directive on the framework 
agreement on parental leave concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC, COM (1996) 26 
final, 31 January 1996, para. 14; Commission Communication, Proposal for a Council 
Directive on the framework agreement on part-time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the 
ETUC, COM (1997) 392 final, 28 July 1997, para. 19. 
127 Lo Faro, A. op. cit. supra note 59, p. 111. 
128 Falkner, G. op. cit. supra note 23, p. 167. 
129 See Chapter Four of this Thesis, Section 3.3.1. pp. 152-155. 
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three, so there is no reason not to recognise them fully as social partners in the 
negotiation procedures. Additionally, it may be safely assumed that 
UNICE/CEEP and ETUC may be the most representative of all organisations, 
but still they do not represent the majority of employers and workers in Europe 
due to the worldwide collapse in union membership. 130 
A second question related to the representative status of the three negotiating 
parties concerns their `internal' mandate. There are a number of consultations 
of national members of the organisations but it is not yet clear how the 
decision to go ahead is taken, for example, a simple majority, qualified 
majority, or unanimity. With reference in particular to the ETUC whose 
members are not only organisations established in the EU, it decides through a 
carefully considered but rather complicated double procedure which can be 
based on two principles. The majority of its member organisations should 
reach an agreement and a qualified majority of those organisations should be 
established in the Community territory. 13 1 The puzzle is that there is no 
10 Although in autumn 2000 union membership among those in employment was 7,3 million, a 
small increase of around 63,000 members (0,9%) from 1999, it is statistically accepted that 
since 1990s' there has been a decrease in membership of 1,5 million, a fall over the ten year 
period (2000) of 17,1%. In 1997, it was reported that membership fell to less than 20% of 
workers in 48 out of 92 countries surveyed. In France, it was 9,1%. In Britain, 33% of workers 
were union members. Germany followed closely with 29% of workers in unions. Spain had 
19% whereas the Nordic countries easily retained the lead with 79% of union membership for 
Finland and 91% for Sweden. The fall in union membership has been steeper for males than for 
females. Male union density was 43,0% in 1990 and 29,9% in 2000, wheareas female density 
was 32,0% in 1990 and 28,9% in 2000. See Sneade, A. Employment Relations Directorate, 
Department of Trade and Industry "Trade Union Membership 1999-2000: An Analysis of Data 
from the Certification Officer and the Labour Force Survey", pp. 433,43 < URL: 
hqp: //www. dti. gov. uk/er/emar/trade. htm >; See also Ebbinghaus, B. and Visser, J. (1998) 
"When Institutions Matter: Union Growth and Decline in Western Europe 1990-95", Working 
Papers, Arbeitsbereich I/Nr. 30, Mannheim: 
< URL http: //mzes uni-mannheim. de/publications/wp/wpl-30 pdf >. Schmidt, M. (1999) 
"Representativity 
-A Claim Not Satisfied: The Social Partners' Role in the EC Law - Making 
Procedure for Social Policy", 15 The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and 
Industrial Relations 3, p. 259 at 265. 
13 1 ETUC Internal Rules of Procedure, paras. 6-7 and Art. 19 of the ETUC Constitution < URL 
http: //www. etuc. org >. 
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requirement of unanimity. But even if there were such a requirement, still only 
a fraction of workers in Europe would be represented in this law making 
procedure considering the low membership rate. 
8.1.6.3. The jurisprudence of the CFI 
In its judgment in the UEAPME case, the CFI did not shrink from dealing with 
the material aspects of the representativity issue. On the contrary, it stated that 
the essential thing is whether the "... signatories, taken together, are 
sufficiently representatives132 to justify the Council turning a social agreement 
into a Directive. If agreements of European social partners' organisations do 
not cover a substantial part of the workers and employers of the EU, they will 
lack as suggested in advance the necessary legitimacy, and so will any EU 
legislation implementing these agreements. 
Even though it considered that the subject matter of parental leave was an all- 
industry agreement covering all types of working relations, the CFI opted for a 
representation-based model rather than a participatory or an industrial relations 
one. 133 It thus held that the various signatory parties should represent all 
categories of workers and enterprises at the EU level (para. 94). To confirm 
this it developed some criteria on the employers' side representativeness. 
Firstly, it established that the cumulative representativity of UNICE/CEEP of 
the contested agreement was sufficient (para. 96). Secondly, it pointed out that 
132 T-135/96 loc. cit. supra note 112, para. 90. 
133 See generally Bernard, N. (2000) "Legitimising EU Law: Is the Social Dialogue the Way 
Forward? Some Reflections Around the UEAPME Case" in Shaw, J. (ed. ) (2000) Social Law 
and Policy in an Evolving European Union, Oxford: Hart, 279-302. 
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the number of SMEs represented by UEAPME could not be decisive since the 
parental leave is granted to workers and therefore could hardly affect these 
SMEs (para. 102). Thirdly, it stated that among the SMEs represented by 
UEAPME in the 14 Member States concerned by the Agreement, "... a third, 
... 
perhaps as many as two-thirds... of those SMUs are also affiliated to one of 
the organisations represented by UNICE" (para. 103). 
Nevertheless, the CFI expressed no view at all on whether or not the 
Commission criteria were appropriate to their intended purpose and therefore 
questions of this kind remain unanswered: 
1) Can an inter-professional agreement bind the civil service sector, as 
UNICE/CEEP represent only employers in industry? 
2) If the employers' world is split along non-sectorial but policy lines, how is 
the representativity of the organisations to be measured? By counting the 
numbers of enterprises, the numbers of all the staff of the enterprises, or 
the numbers of the staff of the enterprises represented by the signatory 
parties on the trade union side? 
3) What are the consequences of the Court's points for the trade union's side? 
If one has to count members, is the ETUC really representative, bearing in 
mind the low figures of unionisation in many European countries? 
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Although it is remarkable that the CFI ventured to develop criteria of 
representativity itself, yet, its attempt was purely confined to verifying whether 
the Commission criteria had been applied correctly: 
"It follows that the Commission and the Council 
... 
properly 
took the view that the collective representativity of the 
signatories to the framework agreement was sufficient... ". 134 
So even after the UEAPME judgment, the question of representativeness of 
collective industrial organisations at Community level remains at square one. 
8.1.6.4. Suggestions for the future 
Since the problem of representativity is only new in appearance, but not in 
substance, 135 the remainder of this section proposes that it should be handled 
with care and prudence by taking it seriously and establishing proper 
procedures. 
The establishment of a Study Group, consisting of experts from both national 
and European level, as proposed by the Commission in its latest 
Communication 136 might be the start of such approach. A Committee of "Wise 
Persons"137 could do the fine work needed, of thoroughly examining the 
representativity of every organisation protesting against its exclusion from the 
negotiations. Their work would consist of fact-finding, developing and 
134 T-135/96 loc. cit. supra note 112, para. 110. 
135 Case C-66176 Confederation francaise democratique du travail (CFDT) v. Council [1977] 
ECR 305. 
136 COM (1998) 322 loc. cit. supra note 9, p. 19. 
137 Franssen, E. and Jacobs, A. loc. cit. supra note 122, p. 1311. 
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refining the Commission's criteria. If the Committee does this work well, it 
would significantly lighten the task of the Commission and the Council in 
checking the representativeness of the parties of the agreements which are 
offered to them for implementation by means of Directives. It would also 
relieve the CFI of the task of developing criteria of its own and the latter could 
claim responsibility for accepting or correcting the criteria developed by the 
Committee of experts. 
In respect of the procedures, any request by management and labour to have an 
agreement implemented by a Council decision should be published in the 
Official Journal of the EU accommodating thus needs for transparency and 
openness. Organisations which oppose such implementation can lodge a 
complaint within a short period of time, for example, two or three months, of 
its publication, by sending a letter to the Commission where they would 
express their views. The Commission asks the advice of the Committee of 
experts who will hear both the claimant and the signatory parties involved and 
make further investigations if necessary. Taking into account the proposals of 
the Committee, the Commission decides on the complaint before sending the 
agreement to the Council to become part of EU law. Only then can 
organisations start proceedings before the CFI. For its part, the CFI can take 
the opinion of the Committee of experts into account but it can nevertheless 
deviate from this advice in its judgment. 138 
138 Ibid. 
213 
CHAPTER FIVE SOCIAL DIALOGUE: THE ROLE OF PARTNERS 
In no way would the outcome of such proceedings impinge on the autonomy 
of the social partners in the European Social Dialogue. They are free to select 
their negotiating parties as they desire and will remain as such. As for the 
agreements which are not concluded by the necessary minimum of 
representative organisations and therefore cannot be fit for implementation by 
a Council decision, they can still be implemented in accordance with the 
processes and practices specific to management and labour and the Member 
States. 139 
Notwithstanding the fact that the chance has been lost in respect of the 
approved text of the Nice Treaty, it might still be wise to amend the text of the 
Treaties just as in the case of admissibility, so that their provisions are less 
ambiguous on the matter of representativity. 140 This could be done by inserting 
the words `provided they are representative under the Commissions criteria 
for becoming a social dialogue partner , 141 following the words "management 
and labour" in Article 138(4) EC, and after the words "signatory parties" in 
Article 139(2) EC. Such an amendment would be more than useful to stop 
fringing representative organisations of management and labour eager to 
conquer a place at the bargaining tables of the Social Dialogue. 
139 Ibid. 
"' Idem., 1312. 
141 Ibid. 
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9. SOCIAL PARTNERS AND PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRACY 
9.1. THE ROLE OF THE EP 
9.1.1. Introduction 
Equally serious to the issue of legitimacy that arises in the context of 
representativity, is the extent to which the public (Commission/Council) and 
private (labour and management) constellation appears to bypass other 
important democratic Institutions in particular the EP. 
Indeed, the legislative procedure established by Articles 138-139 EC is also 
very sensitive with regard to democratic prerequisites, that is the democratic 
fundamental principle, explicitly recognised in Article 6(l) TEU, that the 
European people must share in the exercise of power through a representative 
assembly. 
9.1.2. Defining the problem 
When recalling the social policy provisions, it is observed that once 
management and labour have reached an agreement, the Commission needs to 
put the agreement before the Council142 which then has to decide either by a 
qualified majority voting or unanimity whether to turn this into EU 
legislation. 143 As for the EP, however, it does not play a formal role at all in 
the early stages; yet the Commission keeps it informed throughout the 
process. 144 
I42 Weiss called this the 'waitress' function of the Commission: Weiss, M. (1992) "The 
Significance of Maastricht for European Community Social Policy", 8 International Journal 
for Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 1, p. 3 at 12. 
143 Arts. 137(2) and 139(2) EC. 
144 The Commission's policy is to inform the EP whether or not it is formally obliged to do so. 
COM (1993) 600 final loc. cit. supra note 5, p. 27. 
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Notwithstanding its support for the conclusion of the discussed agreements, '45 
the EP has expressed its dissatisfaction when it passed a resolution calling for 
an interinstitutional agreement with the Commission and the Council on joint 
arrangements for implementing social partner agreements. '46 
In addition, its influence is also weak in respect of the social Directives 
adopted unanimously (Article 137(3) EC). Under this procedure, the EP can be 
consulted and the Council without further consequences can disregard its 
opinion. 147 The reason for its mere consultation lies on the slim probability that 
Directives will be adopted unanimously which seems to suggest that in the 
unlikely event that the Council is unanimous, there is no place for any stronger 
parliamentary influence. However, this is an irrational approach considering 
that the EP represents the European people, and therefore it should have an 
enhanced role in any type of decision-making, irrespective of the Council's 
position in the voting procedures. 
145 European Parliament, Resolution on the Application of the Agreement on Social Policy [OJ 
1994, No. C 205/86, A3-0269/94, paras. A and H] where it stated: "Whereas the European 
social dialogue and an enhanced role for the social partners constitute an essential condition 
for the achievement of the social dimension of the internal market in parallel to economic 
integration; whereas the social partner's extensive right to be consulted in the decision-making 
process provides the Community with an opportunity to shape the European welfare scene in a 
way, which is close to current practice and the citizen". 
146 European Parliament, Resolution on the New Social Dimension of the Treaty on European 
Union [OJ 1994, No. C 77/30, A3-0091/94, para. 9] where it stated: "... that the Council and 
the Commission should conclude with the European Parliament, in the framework of an inter- 
institutional agreement, a code of good conduct to strengthen its rights in the legislative 
procedure and give it a right of initiative enabling it, if an agreement by management and 
labour is rejected, to request the Commission to initiate the legislative procedure at an early 
date". 
147 There are no further consequences as long as the Council waits until it has actually received 
the EP's advisory opinion according to the Draft Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments. 
Article 1.1 reads that all Commission documents "shall be promptly forwarded to national 
parliaments (... )". And then, Art. 1.3 adds that a six-week period shall elapse between making 
the proposal available in all languages and the date when it is placed on the Council agenda. 
Thus the wording suggests an absolute obligation, confirming the obligation to consult the EP. 
Inter alia note Case C-138/79 Roquette Freres v. Council [1980] ECR 3333. 
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9.1.3. Positive approaches of the problem 
Even though the whole set of the above circumstances indicates that the EP 
does not have any influence in an area of direct interest to Europe's citizens, 
this is not entirely true. The EP has a formal role to play, but it is rather 
unclear, it is not great but neither is it marginalized, due to the complex, non- 
hierarchical, interlocking and evolutionary legal phenomena such as the 
decision-making procedures in social policy and the involvement of the social 
partners in producing EU legislation. '48 
To elaborate, however, on the role of the EP, it should be first noted that it is 
informed and consulted even if the social partners have `hijacked' a 
Commission's proposal. The effect of a rejection by the social partners of a 
Commission's proposal may enhance the role for the EP. Since the 
Commission can continue with the proposal and bring it to the Council, the EP 
and ESC for consideration, the EP might grab this chance `to throw a spanner 
into the works' of the social partners' dominant position in social policy law 
making. Although this appears to be unlikely in view of the EP's resolution on 
the role of the social partners, 149 it may however occur, when in the opinion of 
the EP the requirement of representativeness is not fulfilled. '50 
148 In the wider context of the EU, rather the ESC risks marginalisation due to the strengthening 
of the Social Dialogue in the SPA and the creation of the COR. Recall the many initiatives that 
the ESC took in early 1990s in order to respond to its difficult situation: Smismans, S. (1999) 
"An Economic and Social Committee for the Citizen, or a Citizen for the Economic and Social 
Committee? ", 5 European Public Law 1, p. 557 at 558,560-561. 
149 European Parliament, Resolution on the Role of the Social Partners in the Labour Market 
IOJ 1986, No. C 322/51, A2-144/86]. 
50 Betten, L. (1998) "The Democratic Deficit of Participatory Democracy in Community 
Social Policy", 23 European Law Review, p. 20 at 30. 
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Furthermore, apart from being informed about each Commission proposal, the 
EP can take over when a proposal falling under Article 137(1) EC goes 
through the institutional channels of co-decision procedure (Article 251 EC) 
- 
hence when the social partners are unable to agree. By applying thus the co- 
decision procedure, the EP gets on a par with the Council. The Council cannot 
any longer adopt a proposal against the Parliament's will and also the 
Parliament cannot vice-versa approve a proposal against the Council's will. 
Additionally, the study of theories of European integration and especially the 
policy-networks analysis as suggested in Chapter Two (pp. 19-20,25-26) puts 
`governance back into the pattern of multi-level governance', can offer a richer 
insight into the dynamics of the relationship between the EP and the social 
partners. 
Bearing in mind that a governance in networks is characterised by co- 
operation instead of competition between all relevant actors, in no way should 
it be considered that the Commission uses the EP as a `threat' against the 
social partners in case the latter do not conclude an agreement. This is so 
because a corporatist community policy for social policy has evolved which 
the Commission would not like to jeopardise. The term corporatism has two 
meanings here. First, it provides the social partners a historically new co- 
regulating role-151 Second, it induces the central social partners to undertake 
institutional reforms which imply stronger Europeanisation and more binding 
'st Delvik, J. op. cit supra note 59, p. 453. See also Roberts, I. and Springer, B. (eds. ) (2001) 
Social Policy in the European Union: Between Harmonisation & National Autonomy, London: 
Lynne Riener, 52-53. 
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co-operation among the affiliated organisations in the shaping of public 
policy. 152 
Under this new co-regulating role, the social partners are invited to network 
with the EP in terms of interests. A policy network as a typology of interest 
intermediation1S3 can be a valuable analytical tool to connote the structural 
relationship, interdependency and dynamism between the public (EP) and the 
private (the social partners) actors in politics and social policy-making. ' 54 The 
network concept therefore draws attention to their linkage or co-operation so 
as to dispose of the same interests, to represent the European people at the 
workplace, and implicitly suggests that the roles of the two Institutions are 
regarded as complementary and overlapping, rather than threatening and 
clashing. 
'52 Falkner, G. op. cit. supra note 23, pp. 34-35. 
'S' A model of interest intermediation implies an institutional arrangement whereby policy is 
worked out through an interaction between EU Institutions and the leadership of a limited 
number of industrial corporations on the one hand and labour unions on the other. Under this 
arrangement the corporate organisations are granted a deliberate representational monopoly 
within their respective areas of interest in exchange for submitting themselves to certain limits 
imposed in this instance by the Commission: Etzioni-Halevy, E. (1983) Bureaucracy and 
Democracy: A Political Dilemma, London: Routledge, 63. 
154 See supra note 152, pp. 43-52. 
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10. CONCLUSION 
The incorporation of the SPA into the Treaties and the invitation to have the 
social partners involved in developing and implementing the Employment 
Guidelines have been a great step towards enhancing forms of input, output 
and social legitimacy as discussed in Chapter Four. 
In terms of substantive legitimacy, the Chapter gave an optimistic outlook 
under the theoretical framework of a meta-national democracy. It explored the 
potential of the UEAPME decision to legitimate developments in the EU 
Social Dialogue and outlined how some initiatives, for example, the 
Committee of wise persons and the structuring of group based interest 
representation, can contribute to further increasing this type of representation. 
Finally, in respect of democracy, the Chapter proposed that the role of the 
social partners as quasi 
- 
not yet complete 
- 
legislators does not weaken the 
role of the EP. It was said in this context that a policy network as a typology of 
interest intermediation is a valuable analytical tool to revel into the 
relationship between the EP and the social partners in the social policy area. 
The Chapter concluded that neither the EP nor the social partners is considered 
to be a `threat' to each other. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
LEGITIMACY AND THE ON-GOING PROCESS OF 
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Alongside discussions about the multi-sided political legitimacy, the multi- 
dimensional nature of a `Constitution for the European Union' has become a 
hotly debated issue. During the process of European integration, academic 
lawyers cannot even agree as to whether the EU has a constitution, let alone 
whether it needs one. 
Some argue that the founding Treaties and their various amendments might 
amount to a constitution; that is, an international treaty-based constitution, if 
the EU is to be seen as an international organisation. 1 Others believe that the 
EU does not have, and therefore does not need a constitution in order to 
establish a legitimate federal European State, a sort of United States of 
Europe. 2 Meanwhile, a third approach suggests that the EU already possesses a 
1 De Witte, B. (1996) "International Agreement or European Constitution? " in: Winter, J. et at. 
(eds. ) (1996) Reforming the Treaty on European Union, The Hague, Netherlands: T. M. C. 
Asser Institut, 3-25, at 4-5,11-14,18,21. See also Curtin, D. and Dekker, I. (1999) " The EU 
as a `Layered' International Organisation: Institutional Unity in Disguise" in: Craig, P. and De 
Birca, G. (eds. ) (1999) The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 83-136. 
2 See generally Lenaerts, K. (1990) "Constitutionalism and the many faces of federalism", 38 
American Journal of Comparative Law, 205-263; Koopmans, T. (1992) "Federalism: The 
wrong debate", 29 Common Market Law Review, 1047-1052; Fischer, T. and Neff, S. (1995) 
"Some American Thoughts about European "Federalism"", 44 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, 904-915; Inter alia, Börzel, T. and Risse, T. (2000) "Who is Afraid of a 
European Federation? How to Constitutionalise a Multi-level Governance System", Harvard 
Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 7/2000: 
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significant degree of legally regulated public power independently of its 
constituent States and to that extent it has its own species of constitutional law. 
Most of this law is to be found in the provisions of the EC Treaty after 
Amsterdam and in the jurisprudence of the ECJ. 3 
In this Chapter, the author attempts to unravel some of the reasoning behind 
these divergent positions which addresses the issue of democratic political 
legitimacy. 
However, after describing the key elements of the EU constitutional debate 
which would hopefully reveal some of the tensions and dissatisfactions with 
the current situation in terms of constitution making, the author will proceed 
with a suggestion. By trying to give the EU a constitution which traditionally 
implies fixity and consistency at national level, the legitimacy of the Union 
will not be enhanced. This will rather happen by identifying the ever-shifting 
terrain of multi-level polity with the idea of a dynamic constitutional process. 
The concept of a multi-level constitutionalism and the drafting and adoption of 
the Charter in the Nice Council (7 December 2000) are but the first steps in this 
direction. 
< URL hqp: //www. jeamnonne! prozram. orp, /papers/00/00fol0l >; Weale, A. (1995) 
"Democratic Legitimacy and the Constitution of Europe" in: Bellamy, R Bufacchi, V. and 
Castiglione, D. (eds. ) (1995) Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of Europe, 
London, Lothian: Foundation Press, 81-94; Siedentrop, L. (2000) Democracy in Europe, Allen 
Lane: The Penguin Press, 231. 
3 See generally Hix, S. (ed. ) (1999) The Political System of the European Union, New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 99-129; Stone-Sweet, A. (1995) "Constitutional Dialogues in the European 
Community", EUI Working Paper RSC No. 95/38; Shaw, J. (2000) Law of the European 
Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave, (3`d edition), 179-209. 
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2. DEFINING A CONSTITUTION 
2.1. Introduction 
The discourse on EU constitutionalism or meta-constitutionalism 
- 
the idea to 
restrain and empower not only the individual through the rule of law but also to 
restrain and empower any other authoritative polity beyond the State such as 
the EU4 
- 
presupposes that constitutions are not exclusively attributes of States. 
Secondly it demands a certain definitional effort, principally in order to justify 
the use of the much-loaded terminology of constitution, constitutional law, and 
constitutionality5 in relation to the EU. 
2.2. Reasons for definition 
At first sight, the question of definition may seem to be a simple one. However, 
it is worth considering whether people ruminate on constitutional matters, if for 
no other reason than to confirm that our definition of a constitution has not 
changed. Constitutions are living, working entities that span both the legal and 
political spheres of society. In turn, both spheres exist to serve society. Equally, 
society develops and progresses with each age as do the law and politics in 
order to continue to serve society best. This means that the nature of 
constitutions may also change. Europe is an example of a society changing and 
progressing. Therefore, when considering the constitutional `government' in 
the EU, an issue which is integral to any account of how this multi-level polity 
4 Walker, N. (1996) "European Constitutionalism and European Integration", Public Law, p. 
266 at 270. See also Walker, N. (2000) "Flexibility within a Metaconstitutional Frame: 
Reflections on the Future of Legal Authority in Europe", Harvard Jean Monnet Working 
Paper No. 12/99 < URL http: //www. ieanmonnetpro am org/papers/99/991201 html >. 
s The loyalty to the terms of an existing constitution, whatever they are: (Walker, N. (1996) 
supra note 4, p. 269). 
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in fact operates and is legitimised, it is worthwhile considering `what a 
constitution is' and if the definition has changed in a European context. 
2.3. Definitions and meanings 
When discussing constitutions, there is often confusion as to whether a country 
can be said to have a constitution in the absence of a single legal document. 
Indeed, definitions may vary depending on the legal tradition, of which one is a 
part. The more pragmatic common law tradition recognises that the existence 
of a constitution does not depend upon that constitution being contained in a 
single, written document, for example, the UK, though ironically, the 
archetypal example of a written constitution comes from a common law 
country, the USA. However, those from a codified tradition, the majority of 
Western Europeans and the academics writing about such matters in a 
European context, tend to require a written legal document. 6 That is why when 
defining a constitution one should tend not to say what a constitution is, but 
what a constitution does. 
As the fundamental law of a Nation or a State, a constitution is supposed to 
rationalise and explicate the sovereign power of the State. Hence, its objective 
is to authorise, organise, legitimise and limit sovereign power. This, as a result, 
tends to create a sphere of societal autonomy and individual freedom and 
integrate individuals into the political system. That process ends with the 
transformation of passive subjects into citizens able to participate internally in 
the polity that they make up. 7 
6 Grimm, D. (1995) "Does Europe Need a Constitution? " 1 European Law Journal 3, p. 282 at 
289. 
7Preuss, U. (1996) "Prospects of a Constitution for Europe", 3 Constellations 2, p. 209 at 213. 
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In the post-Reformation Europe of the 17`h Century, Divine Right could no 
longer be claimed as the basis for the authority of law. Constitutionalism 
addressed the issue of how to legitimise State authority and legally bind State 
power, when it was the State that made the law. Positive law was divided into 
two sets of norms: (a) those concerning Institutions and the exercise of power, 
and (b) those concerning the relationships and conduct of individuals. 8 
Based on this law, a constitution, whatever its form, written or unwritten, 
performs four functions. First, it describes the Institutions of government and 
their functions. In some way, it portrays the State structure or government 
regime it seeks to provide legitimacy for. Second, it defines the inter- 
relationship between the Institutions of government, for example 
administration, legislature and courts. Third, it sets out the relationship 
between the government and the citizens, usually including a list of rights for 
the individual and guarantees for their protection. Fourth, it offers a series of 
checks and balances in order to limit the State's power to coerce. 9 
The existence of the above elements is, admittedly, not necessary for a 
constitution. Nevertheless, "a document not showing any desire for legal 
bindings or excepting major bearers of governmental functions or expressions 
of public power from regulatory intervention would no longer be termed a 
constitution, but a case of semi or spurious constitutionalism". 10 
9 Grimm, D. loc. cit supra note 6, p. 286. 
9 See generally Alivizatou, N. (1981) Introduction to the Hellenic Constitutional History, 
Volume A, Athens: Sakkoula. 
10 See supra note 8, p. 287. 
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In addition to the constitution's normative elements, there are symbolic 
elements aimed at creating social integration. In that context, discussions of 
constitutions and constitutionalism tend to be closely linked to notions about 
identity, especially political identity, loyalty, and citizenship. " In this sense, a 
successful constitution sets out a society's covenant about its members' co- 
existence and the resolution of disputes between its members and its 
government. It joins together people with different beliefs and concerns and 
enables them to live in a condition approaching harmony by providing for the 
resolution of their disputes, be they political or legal. This can be done in both 
contexts. Either in a legal context where the constitution is the providence of 
the lawyers enforced by the courts as the supreme law of the nation as in the 
classic examples of America, France, and later Germany. Or, in a political 
context, where the constitution is observed and protected (if at all) by those in 
parliament as in the UK. 12 
Empirically, there is nothing to suggest that one form of constitution is better 
than the other. Yet, written constitutions have been more popular than 
unwritten ones considering the fact that very few countries since the 
Enlightenment practice unwritten constitution. Certainly, there must be some 
reasons for this such as the separation of powers, clarity and visibility of 
individuals' rights, the preservation of cultural diversity and elimination of 
ethnic tensions with particular reference to newly emergent African States from 
Abromeit, H. and Hitzel-Cassagnes, T. (1999) "Constitutional Change and Contractual 
Revision: Principles and Procedures", 5 European Law Journal 1, p. 23 at 29. 
12 Whilst the basis of English law is determined by Parliament, the law itself supersedes the 
authority of the Parliament. In essence, the UK Constitution is contained with the laws of the 
UK and not the political structure. 
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colonisation. 13 The section below examines whether some of these reasons may 
or may not exist at the EU level for adopting a written constitution mode. 
3. CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE WITHIN THE EU 
3.1. Introduction 
The constitutional debate at the EU level has received a strong impulse from 
the experiences of the Danish referendum, in which the Treaty of Maastricht 
was rejected14 and the challenge which emerged out of the decision of the 
German Constitutional Court in the Brunner case. '5 Consequently, it has 
become a European public issue since then. 
3.2. The case for a written European Constitution 
A number of reasons may explain why a written constitution has become an 
appealing notion for debate. First, the production of a complex patchwork of 
rules and regulations, already hard enough for legal experts to understand but 
almost incomprehensible to laypersons, have led to complexity and lack of 
clarity with regard to the Treaties. 16 The shear volume of the primary 
" The surge in the number of States adopting the written constitution mode is best illustrated 
by newly emergent African States from colonisation. The need to clearly specify powers, 
functions and the authorities of new African leaders was very crucial motivation for these 
States to adopt the written constitution mode. Thus, States, such as Ghana, Nigeria, Gambia, 
and so on which had been colonies of Britain decided to adopt the written constitution mode. 
This mode can also be illustrated in the growth of international documents setting out basic 
rights such as the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), the 
International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"), the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR"), the European Convention for the Prevention of 
Torture and inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("ECPT") and other more. 
14 See Chapter Four of this Thesis, Section 2.1. pp. 115-117. 
15 Ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court, Second Division, 12 October 1993,2 BvR 
2134/92,2 BvR 2159/92, Manfred Brunner and others v. The European Union Treaty, (1994] 
1 CMLR 57. 
16 Amato, G. (1995) "Distribution of Powers" in EUI Working Paper Robert Schuman Centre 
No. 95/9, A Constitution for the European Union? Proceedings of a Conference, 12-13 May 
1994, organised by the Robert Schuman Centre with the Patronage of the European 
Parliament, 85-88, at 88. 
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Community and European Union law consisting of over one thousand Articles, 
some interwoven others possessing parallel applicability, contained in more 
than twelve constitutionally relevant documents (Protocols), result in a legal 
and political system that is difficult for the public to understand. 17 The bulk of 
the provisions of the primary law are purely of a `technical nature' and of 
sectoral significance appertaining to commercial, administrative and procedural 
law. 18 Thus, the actual constitutional core, for example the rights, allocation of 
competencies and institutional balance, of the Treaties is buried. Also, large 
parts of the Amsterdam Treaty ("AT") are outdated, for example EC Treaty 
provisions on the transitional periods for the customs union, internal market, 
and EC 1992, and therefore should be replaced by simpler principles. 19 
Additionally, and in order to make visible the trans-national citizenship rights 
and preserve the common civic values and principles, a clearer, understandable 
European constitution could serve an educative role, strengthening "European 
identity", 20 and could promote support for EU law by the "citizens of the 
Union". 21 
Moreover, in considering the constitution's content, the call for an improved 
delimitation of the competencies between the Community and its Member 
States is postulated. Only recently, the judgment of the ECJ in Tanja Krei122 
attracted major frustration in Germany on the basis of the allocation of 
17 Dorau, C. and Jacobi, P. (2000) "The Debate Over a 'European Constitution': Is It Solely a 
German Concern? ", 6 European Public Law 3, p. 413 at 419. 
'8 ldem., 420. 
19 See for example, Art. 14 EC. 
20 See Preamble to the TEU, ninth indent. 
21 See Art. 17(2) EC. 
22 Case C-285/98 Tanja Kreil v. Bundesrepublic Deutschland [2000] ECR I- 69. 
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competencies. The Court had applied the Directive on equal treatment for men 
and women in order to enforce equal access to the German armed forces 
(weapon electronics) though the defence policy remains within the Member 
States' sphere of sovereignty. 23 In doing so, it held that: 
"The Directive precludes the application of national 
provisions, such as those of German law, which impose a 
general exclusion of women from military posts involving the 
use of arms and which allow them access only to the medical 
and military-music services". 24 
The German Bundesländer (federal States) have in particular called for an 
enumeration of competencies such as those contained in the Grundgesetz 
(Basic Law) defining the competencies between the Bundesrepublik (Federal 
Republic) and the Länder (States). 25 Such an enumeration could well provide 
an example for more clarity and transparency in earmarking competence at the 
EU level between the Community and its Member States. 
The third reason for the deeply felt need for a concise and intelligible European 
constitution is the further strengthening of the EP. The same demand has also 
2' Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of 
equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and 
Promotion, and working conditions [OJ 1976, No. L 39/40]. 
4 C-285/98 loc. cit. supra note 22, para. 32. 
25 See Arts. 30 [Competencies of Federation and States], 83 [Competencies of Federation and 
States], 84 [State execution and Government supervision], 85 [Execution by the States as 
agents of the Federation], 91b [Cooperation of Federation and States], 105 [Legislative 
powers], 109 [Budget management in the Federation and the States], 115c [Extension of 
legislative powers of the Federation] Basic Law. 
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been put forward by the EP itself in its Resolution on the Constitution of the 
European Union in 1994 where it suggested that: 
"The laws of the Union shall be made by the European 
Parliament and by the Council. Legislative initiative in respect 
of constitutional laws shall lie with the European Parliament, 
the Commission, the Council or a Member State". 26 
Even though EU citizens are greatly affected by Community decisions and are 
subject to its legal norms, the EP that they directly elect has only a slight 
influence on these decisions. Although listed first among the EU Institutions, it 
nonetheless has the least weight. The double-headed executive that is, the 
Commission and Council determines EU decisions including those of a 
legislative nature and the EP by and large only participates in the decision- 
making process by either exercising `veto' powers or giving its assent and 
delivering no binding-advisory opinions. 
The lack of parliamentary legislation at the EU level 
- 
linked to an indirect 
democratic legitimacy 
- 
and the inadequate transparency and parliamentary 
accountability of EU decision-making processes recalling the events of March 
1999 reveal the necessity for a fundamental reorganisation and reorientation of 
the legal basis of the EU. 
26 European Parliament, Resolution on the Constitution of the European Union 
- 
Annex: Draft 
Constitution of the European Union, A3-0064/94 [OJ 1994, No. C 61/155], p. 163. 
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Even though both transparency and accountability have long been key themes 
and problems in the European constitutional scholarship, none has been clearly 
accorded the legal status of a general and justiciable principle of Community 
law which the ECJ would claim to protect. On the contrary, they are only 
administrative values that the EU Institutions purport to uphold as duly attested 
in the White Paper, despite using the term 'principle'. 27 Or, they are simply 
expressions which refer to the collection of various relevant Treaty provisions 
and institutional rules and practices. 
Usually, it is assumed that a written constitution enhances the transparency of 
public authority which in turn is likely to increase its acceptance. In the case of 
the EU, however, the existing `Constitutional order'28 is still lacking some 
central element of transparent and unequivocal rules regarding the relationship 
between the EU Institutions, the Member States and the Union's citizens'. The 
White Paper aims to fill in that gap. To this effect, it is thus realised that the 
Institutions should work in a more open way, 29 otherwise it is implicitly 
suggested that the opaqueness of the Union's legal structure may undermine 
the legitimacy of the Union at large. 30 
Without doubt, the Charter adopted at the Nice European Council of December 
2000 is regarded to be critical to induce a culture for transparency, visibility 
and clarity explications. Only a person who knows his/her rights can claim, and 
27 European Commission, European Governance 
-A While Paper, COM (2001) 428,25 July 
2001, p. 10. 2$ Put in quotation to express doubt. 
29 See supra note 27. 
30 Preuss, U. loc. cit. supra note 7, p. 209. 
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make use of them. A charter of fundamental rights is also the manifestation of 
a European `community of values' and therefore could have a legitimising 
effect for the whole Union. However, the law making processes of the EU, for 
example, in the closed Council meetings, are devoid of transparency or 
democratic legitimacy and they are too complex for a Union of fifteen or more 
Members. It might be the case that the national parliaments can review the 
negotiating positions of their governments before the meetings of the Council 
of Ministers. Having said that, the discretionary regulatory powers of the 
specialised Councils such as those on agriculture or transport have often 
operated as an invitation to promote protectionist group interests, for example, 
those of farmers and other import-competing producers without adequate 
regard to the general interest of consumers. 31 Additionally, due to their sectoral 
focus and the inadequate political and budgetary checks and balances they have 
favoured wasteful protectionism. 32 
Considering the relations between the EU Institutions, we should recall that the 
EP had it adopted a draft Constitution for the EU in order to increase among 
other things "the efficacy, transparency and democratic vocation of its 
Institutions". 33 To this end, it urged for more democracy and transparency 
which would be open both within itself and within the national parliaments and 
public opinion. 34 
31 Petersmann, E. (1995) "Proposals for a New Constitution for the European Union: Building- 
Blocks for a Constitutional Theory and Constitutional Law of the EU", 32 Common Market 
Law Review, p. 1123 at 1125-1126. 
32 Ibid. 
33 EP Resolution loc. cit. supra note 26, p. 157. 
34Idem., 156. 
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An institutional reform of the Community is also imperative. The crisis of the 
European Commission in spring 1999 which eventually culminated in the 
collective resignation of all Commissioners has illustrated that Europe is 
struggling because of the outdated existing legal and political `constitution' 
than of its corruption. 35 It has become evident that the legal structure and the 
transparency of the decision-making process in the EU have to be improved 
through an institutional reform instigated by a written constitution. 
Furthermore, faced with the challenges of the Union's forthcoming 
enlargement by several applicants from East and Central Europe, the necessity 
for reforming the Institutions and resolving the question of the ability of the 
Union to enlarge has grown even stronger. Enlargement without reforming 
both Institutions and institutional processes is bound to lead to a `watering- 
down' of the EU. We might remember that the institutional equipment of the 
EC (formerly: EEC) was devised for no more than six Member States. The 
enlarged Community, however, will soon extend from Portugal in the West to 
Poland and probably the Baltic States in the East, thus covering a vast 
heterogeneity of political systems, economic structures, and cultural legacies. 36 
The last reason for a constitutional document is the obvious expansion in the 
Community's power that many EU citizens suspect is not being matched by an 
equal increase in legitimation through their consent. This belief is confirmed by 
the gap between fairly elaborate devices of democratic legitimation in the 
several national Member States and the advancing exodus of the latter's 
35 Dorau, C. and Jacobi, P. loc. cit. supra note 17, p. 415. 
36 Preuss, U. loc. cit. supra note 7, p. 209. 
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powers to organs of the supra-national Community. Thus, according to some 
estimates, around 80 per cent of the legal regulations in the economic domains 
of the Member States originate from the Community and hence are beyond 
their control. 37 Whilst the national governments subject to rigid and demanding 
requirements of democratic legitimation find their public authority ever more 
emptied, the powers of the Community are steadily increasing without a 
parallel rise in the requirements for their legitimation. 38 This equally implies 
that the loss of opportunities for democratic participation on the Member State 
level is not compensated by a like gain at the EU level. A European 
constitution is thus rightly expected to cure this evil. 39 
3.3. The case against a written European Constitution 
Not everyone shares this expectation. The opposite point of view, therefore, 
argues that the EU has a constitution `in practice', embodied in the founding 
Treaties, albeit not a traditional written constitution in the historical sense. 
They claim that there are many kinds of danger in trying to give the EU a 
constitution of a different kind from the treaty-based constitution which 
currently underpins it. First, drafting a constitution can restrict or attempt to 
restrict a historically specific set of social relations into some political structure 
which then limits and curtails future choices about the EU. The issue is not just 
the traditional political science question as to whether a flexible rather than a 
rigid constitution is preferable but how to conceptualise a constitution for a 
37 Idem., 210. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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dynamic legal space in which the traditional notion of a constitution in any of 
its forms may be losing its relevance. ao 
Second, there seems little doubt that, if `giving the EU a constitution' means 
replicating the model of a representative parliamentary democracy that exists in 
the Member States, the limitations of that form of democracy are likely to be 
greatly exacerbated at the EU level. Each member of the EP may well come to 
`represent' around 700,000 EU citizens and without the reinvigoration of 
existing democratic mechanisms and the invention of new participatory forms, 
the gap between representatives and represented may become unbearably large. 
Thus modelling European parliamentary politics on national parliamentary 
practice in Western Europe is not a solution. 41 What could instead be proposed 
is to amend the Treaties so as to extend the powers of the EP over the 
appointment or dismissal of the Commission and make the co-decision 
procedure a general requirement. 42 Propositions of this type would actually 
supplement the White Paper's proposals to turn the Commission into `a 
genuine European executive'. 43 
The advantage of a directly elected chief executive is evident. There would be 
a single office holder of strategic importance that the electorate could hold 
accountable for the performance of the EU. Nevertheless, it is still questionable 
40 Kuper, R. (2000) "Democratisation: A Constitutionalizing Process" in: Newman, M. and 
Hoskyns, C. (eds. ) (2000) Democratising the European Union, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 156-173, at 160. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Lord, C. (2000), "Legitimacy, Democracy and the EU: When Abstract Questions Become 
Practical Policy Problems", Policy Paper 03/00, p. 14: 
< URL htty //www. one-eurone. ac. uk/pdf/P3Lord. PDF >. 
43 White Paper loc. cit. supra note 27, pp. 6,29-30. 
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whether the public or Member States are yet prepared to invest so much 
democratic legitimacy in the hands of one supranationally elected office- 
holder. This difficulty may be lessened to the extent it is still necessary for the 
Commission to function within a complex balance of powers in which the final 
decisions remained with the Member States. 44 
Third is the issue of flexibility. It would seem somewhat unsuitable to take a 
fixed catalogue of competencies through similar constitutional processes that, 
say, exist in Germany and use that as a model for the EU. That would 
jeopardise the flexible nature of the Euro-polity which in essence helps to 
reduce the Union's legitimation problems, for example, countries adopt 
policies at different speeds and possibilities for participation vary markedly 
across issue areas. 45 What would instead be preferable is to rely on the existing 
objectives and tasks as set forth in the Treaties and combine the allocation of 
positive competence to the Community with negative elements precluding 
Community action. The negative preclusive elements would in particular lay 
down limits for the Community which the ECJ would have to observe. 46 
Finally, as long as the call for a constitution is linked up with the argument to 
make the Union's goals and structures more transparent for EU citizens, this 
could be accomplished by separating the Treaty elements from the numerous 
regulations that have crept into the Treaties. In addition, nothing seems to come 
out of adopting a different form of constitution because this simply conceals a 
44 Lord, C. loc. cit. supra note 42, p. 16. 
as Idem., 12. 
46 Dorau, C. and Jacobi, P. loc. cit. supra note 17, p. 422. 
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different way of applying institutional reforms to the EU. 
EU Institutional reforms are necessary, particularly if we consider that the next 
enlargement is threatening to strain organisational structure and decision 
procedures to the limits of their capacity. Yet, these can also be achieved by 
amending the Treaties, the example of Nice applies here, without having to 
turn them into a constitution based on a national pattern. 47 
4. THE AUTHOR'S CRITIQUE OF THE DEBATE ON A EUROPEAN 
CONSTITUTION 
4.1. Elements of a top-down EU constitutionalism 
While the Union has no formal written constitution akin to many national 
constitutions as it was suggested previously, nonetheless, there exists a set of 
basic ground rules which govern the exercise of the many governmental 
functions and powers, which have been ascribed to the EU and its Institutions. 
The EU also operates these ground rules on the basis of a number of key 
constitutional principles which in turn are based upon recognisable 
`constitutional' value systems and anchored into the constitutional heritages of 
the Member States. 48 However, it is not claimed here that the EU constitutional 
framework is complete. 
47 Grimm, D. loc. cit. supra note 6, p. 298. 
48 Shaw, J. (2000) "Process and Constitutional Discourse in the European Union", 27 Journal 
of Law and Society 1, p. 4 at 11. 
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4.1.1. Constitutional principles 
(a) Democracy 
The most notable example of these principles is to be found in Article 6(1) 
TEU which declares that the Member States' systems of government are 
"... founded on the principles of... democracy". 
In a democratic system, government action cannot exist unless it is founded 
upon, and representing the will of the people in relation to the procedures laid 
down in the constitution. Consistently, Article 48 TEU provides for the 
ratification of each amendment to the Treaty by all the Member States 
"according to their respective constitutional requirements". The Irish `No' to 
the Nice Treaty (8 June 2001) is a characteristic example of this practice. 49 
Whereas, Treaty amendments are not in accordance with provisions of national 
constitutions, constitutional amendments are necessary in some Member States, 
for example, France and Germany, as a precondition for ratification. S° Such 
national procedures firstly guarantee that the process of European integration 
receives, at least indirectly, a specific degree of legitimacy from the Nation- 
States. Secondly, that the founding Treaties as well as each amendment agreed 
by the governments appear as the direct expression of the common will of the 
European people. 
49 However, the practice to ratify Treaties according to the respective national constitutional 
requirements works well as long as the EU in developing a multi-level constitution respects 
national constitutions: see Chapter Four of this Thesis, Section 2.2. pp. 130-131 in relation to 
Section 4.4. of this Chapter pp. 250-252. 
50 Peace, I. (2000) "Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European 
Constitution-Making Revisited? ", 36 Common Market Law Review, p. 703 at 717. 
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(b) The Rule of Laws' 
The oldest and most prominent attempt to justify the European enterprise 
(polity) in pursuance of the legitimacy theory is the idea of a "Community 
governed by law". 52 Law, has acquired within the European constitutional 
system, not only a functional property in terms of guaranteeing legality in all 
its dimensions but also a stronger ideological function in expressing what some 
have grandly termed the "identity and universality of Europe". 53 
In addition to the very general statement about the rule of law in Article 6(1) 
TEU, central to the second group of provisions dealing with this principle is 
Article 220 EC which provides that: 
"The Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation and 
application of this Treaty the law is observed". 
Building on this, the ECJ binds the Member States to the rule of law, 54 and in 
particular through the path of Article 10 EC. The Article establishes Member 
States' loyalty to the Treaties they have signed up, their duty to comply with 
Treaty-derived obligations and sets up the Commission's primary and 
51 According to Arnull the concept relates to the mechanics of the system rather than the 
content of the rules it produces: Arnull, T. (2001) "The Rule of Law in the European Union", 
Paper presented to a two-day interdisciplinary conference Legitimacy and Accountability in the 
European Union After Nice, Birmingham University, 5-6 July 2001 (mimeo). 
sZ Obradovic, D. (1996) "Policy Legitimacy and the European Union", 34 Journal of Common 
Market Studies 2, p. 191 at 196. 
53Idem., 197. 
sa Note Case C-294/83 Parti Ecologiste 'Les Verts'v. Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, [1987] 2 
CMLR 343, para. 23 where the Court emphasised that the Community "is a Community based 
on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member States nor its Institutions can avoid a review 
of the question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic 
constitutional charter, the Treaty". 
239 
CHAPTER SIX EU CONSTITUTIONALISM: AN ON-GOING PROCESS 
centralised powers of enforcement of EU law against non-conforming Member 
States in Articles 226 and 228 EC. 
Nevertheless, like the direct effect and remedies' principles as announced in 
Van Gend en Loos" and Bonifaci, 56 the rule of law, in the sense of binding 
Member States to the law they have created, has lost its unitary effect by being 
enforced in a decentralised way. 57 First, through the Court's evolutionary case 
law on the relationship between EU and national law, particularly the case law 
on direct effect and supremacy. Second, through the more recent obligation 
imposed on national authorities to make good the loss (the provision of 
remedies) caused in certain circumstances by a failure to apply or properly 
enforce EU law in breach of a Treaty obligation. 58 
Vis-ä-vis the other EU Institutions, the rule of law is instantiated in the 
provisions on judicial review by the ECJ regarding the acts and omissions of 
the Institutions. Depending on its findings, the Court might approve the 
annulment of unlawful acts, sanction upon unlawful failures to act, and bind 
the Community to a principle of tort liability for certain limited types of loss 
(Articles 230-233,235 and 288 EC). 
ss Case C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 
1, [1963] CMLR 105. 
56 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and others v. 
Italian Republic [1991] ECR I- 5357, [1993] 2 CMLR 66. 
57 Shaw, J. loc. cit. supra note 48, p. 16. 
58 See generally De Witte, B. (1999) "Direct Effect, Supremacy and the Nature of the Legal 
Order" in: Craig, P. and De Bi rca, G. (eds. ) (1999) The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 177-214. 
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(c) Procedural guarantees 
The third group of principles brings together guarantees of procedural law. In 
particular, guarantees that organise the internal operation of the Institutions 
(Articles 189-248 EC) as well as their legal and political functioning within the 
system of the Treaties. There are also norms which govern the exercise of 
power within the EU, that is the allocation of competencies. Included here are 
those provisions that grant specific or general competencies to the Community, 
for example, Articles 2,3,14,149-152,310 EC, and its various Institutions, for 
example, 15,37-38,93-111,138-145,300-302 EC, and the limitation exercise 
of such competencies, for example, Articles 5,16,103 EC. 
For the policing of many of these limits, account should be given to the Court's 
powers of judicial review which allow it both to ensure that the correct 
Institutions participate in the decision-making according to correct procedures 
and to annul an act based upon an insufficient or incorrect legal basis. 59 In 
Germany v. European Parliament and the Council, 60 for instance, a case that 
was concerned with the annulment of the tobacco advertising Directive, 61 the 
Court argued: 
59 Note Case C-45/86 Commission v. Council (Generalised Tariff Preferences) [1987] ECR 
1493, para. 11 where the Court emphasised: "... the choice of the legal basis for a measure may 
not depend simply on an Institution's conviction as to the objective pursued but must be based 
on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review". 
60 Case C-376/98 Germany v. European Parliament and the Council [2000] ECR I. 2247. 
61 Directive 98/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
relating to the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products [OJ 1992, No. L 213/9]. 
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"Other articles of the Treaty may not, however, be used as a 
legal basis in order to circumvent the express exclusion of 
harmonisation laid down in [Article 129(4) of the Treaty]". 62 
Having examined the legal base for the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market, it must be held that: 
"The Community legislature cannot rely on the need to 
eliminate obstacles to the free movement of advertising media 
and the freedom to provide services in order to adopt the 
Directive on the basis of [Article 100a].., "63 
The third group of principles also includes general concepts such as: 
a) the principle of limited powers, orpouvoirs attribues itself (Article 5(1) EC 
for the whole Community, and Article 7 EC so far as it pertains to each 
individual Institution), 
b) the notion of implied powers (Article 308 EC, and the Court's case law on 
implied powers) 
, 
64 
62 C-376/98 loc cit. supra note 60, para. 79; [Art. 129(4)] (now Art. 152(4)) reads as follows: 
"The Council acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 and after 
consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, shall 
contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in the Article through adopting: (c) 
incentive measures designed to protect and improve human health, excluding any 
harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States. 
63 Idem., para. 114. 
64 Note Cases: C-281/85 Germany v. Commission [1987] ECR 3203; C-22/70 Commission v. 
Council [1971] ECR 263; C-3,4,6/76 Cornelis Kramer and others [1976] ECR 1279. 
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c) the principles of subsidiarity, though used as a double-edged sword, and 
proportionality (Article 5 EC, second and third paragraphs), 
d) the alleged legal and political principle of institutional balance assured 
through the mechanics of parliamentary oversight versus the Commission's 
independence (for example, Articles 251 and 272-280 EC) and through a 
number of inter-institutional agreements. Although these are more akin to 
political declarations, they do not entirely lack legal effects in the sense of 
being binding on the Institutions65 internally and of generating legitimate 
external expectations on the part of the Member States. 66 
(d) Consent, Utility and Efficiency 
In the constitutional framework of the EU, three more principles of legitimacy 
co-exist: consent, utility and efficiency which are not mutually exclusive. 67 The 
utility principle focuses on the perception that the Union gains its legitimacy 
through an appeal to its economic welfare. An emphasis, however, on the 
material rewards of Union co-operation is insufficient to guarantee sustained 
legitimacy. When the going gets tough, whether through strains in the economy 
or political conflicts, material needs become harder to satisfy and support 
becomes more conditional. To this effect, the utilitarian pattern exists as long 
as the EU citizens accept the policy because of support for its substantive 
content, for example, policies of internal market, employment and 
environment. 68 If not, disagreement with the policy content results in citizens' 
65 Note Case C-25/94 Commission v. Council (FAO) [1996] ECR I- 1469. 
66 Shaw, J. loc. cit. supra note 3, pp. 247,288. 
67 Preuss, U. loc. cit. supra note 7, p. 219. 
68 Obradovic, D. loc. cit. supra note 52, p. 200. 
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withdrawing their support from the Euro-polity, the process of enlargement and 
EMU need to be recalled here. Yet, it is still very difficult to empirically 
measure legitimacy by means of surveys and opinion polls, as it is too 
unwieldy and complex a concept to be tackled in such a frontal assault. 69 
4.1.2. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECJ 
4.1.2.1. Introduction 
The move towards a European constitutional settlement was additionally set in 
motion as a doctrine of the ECJ over a period of careful and gradual 
reappraisals of the original Treaties. 70 To that extent the ECJ became part of 
the existing constitutional legal order. 
More specifically, what is innovative 
- 
what is constitutional 
- 
about the 
Court's jurisprudence is that it has wisely rewritten the Treaties and in doing so 
it has required national judges to apply EC law as if it were an integral part of 
the national legal order. 7' To put it differently, it has transformed a set of legal 
arrangements binding upon sovereign States into a vertically integrated legal 
regime conferring judicially enforceable rights and obligations on all legal 
persons and entities, public and private, within EC territory, that being a 
catalyst in the so-called process of constitutionalisation 72 
69 Ibid. 
70 See generally Chalmers, D. (1998) European Union Law 
- 
Volume One: Law and EU 
Government, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 271-335. 
71 Whether it was legitimate for the ECJ to usurp powers of the EU by interpreting Treaty 
provisions in a way that exceeded the original intent of contracting governments can only be 
judged in the light of cultivating a set of values able to sustain the new political order. 
Z Sweet, A. loc. cit. supra note 3, p. 1. 
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The process of constitutionalisation has both a tremendous symbolic value and 
enormous formal and socio-political implications for the Community. For it not 
only challenges traditional assumptions about Nation-State sovereignty but also 
makes the aggressive claim that at least within the area of its jurisdiction, 
ultimate political authority lies with the EC/EU. 
4.2. Four waves of constitutionalisation 
There have been at least four significant waves of constitutionalisation. In the 
first wave, the Court secured the constitutional character of the Treaties. In its 
Opinion No. 1/91,73 the Court noted, firstly, that the Community Treaty is much 
more ambitious than an international agreement setting up a free trade area by 
emphasising that: 
"... The EEC Treaty aims to achieve economic integration 
leading to the establishment of an internal market and 
economic and monetary union" (para. 17). 
At the same time, it stressed that the ultimate objective of the Community is 
not only socio-economic but also political: 
"... The objective of all the Community Treaties is to 
contribute together to making concrete progress towards 
European unity" (para. 17). 
73 Opinion 1/91 of 14 December on the Draft Agreement on a European Economic Area [1991] 
ECR I- 6079, [1992] 1 CMLR 245. 
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The Court showed, thirdly, that the Community Treaty is radically different in 
nature from other international agreements: 
"The EEA is to be established on the basis of an international 
Treaty which 
... 
merely creates rights and obligations as 
between the Contracting Parties and provides for no transfer of 
sovereign rights to the intergovernmental Institutions which it 
sets up. 
... 
The EEC Treaty, albeit concluded in the form of an 
international agreement, nonetheless constitutes the 
constitutional charter of a Community based on the rule of 
law. 
... 
The Community treaties established a new legal order 
for the benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign 
rights, in ever wider fields, and the subjects of which comprise 
not only Member States but also their nationals" (para. 20). 
In the second wave, the constitutional `boom' concerned the relationship 
between EC law and national law and the introduction of fundamental 
principles although they were not contained in the founding Treaties. To this 
effect, the ECJ laid down the rule that in any conflict between an EC legal 
norm and a norm of national law, the EC law must be given primacy (the 
doctrine of supremacy). 74 Actually, according to the ECJ, every EC norm, from 
the moment it enters into force, "renders automatically inapplicable any 
conflicting provision of... national law" (para. 17). 75 
74 Case C-6/64 Costa v. Enel [1964] ECR 585, [1964] CMLR 425. 
7S Case C-1007 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, 
[1978] 3 CMLR 263. 
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Since Community law is to take precedence over national law in cases of 
conflict, then, logically, the Court had to develop rules to determine when a 
conflict exists. In Commission v. Council, 76 for instance, the Court alleged that 
such a conflict might arise in areas like the conclusion of a European Road 
Transport Agreement ("ERTA") where the competence of the Community is 
exclusive (para. 30). Subsequently, for the sake of the unity of the Common 
Market and the uniform application of Community law, the Member States are 
held to have lost their power to act independently (para. 31) (the doctrine of 
pre-emption). 
In respect of the doctrine of direct effect the Court established that provisions 
of EC law could confer on individuals rights that public authorities must 
respect and national courts must protect. 77 In essence, the ECJ found that 
Treaty provisions and directives were directly effective and strengthened the 
applicability of regulations. Hence, individuals and companies are empowered 
to sue Member-State governments or other public authorities for either not 
conforming to obligations contained in the Treaties or regulations, or for not 
properly transposing directives' provisions into national law. The jurisprudence 
of supremacy inhibits national authorities from relying on domestic law to 
justify their failure to comply with EC law and requires national judges to 
resolve conflicts between Community and national law in favour of the 
former. 78 The ECJ thus constituted a Community legal order which based on a 
76 Case C-22/70 Commission v. Council [1971] ECR 263, [1971] CMLR 335. 
77 C-26/62 loc. cit. supra note 55, p. 16. 
78 C-6/64 loc. cit. supra note 74, p. 593. 
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sophisticated monism forbids the use of traditional dualist solutions to conflicts 
between national and Community law such as the lex posteriori doctrine. 79 
In the third wave of constitutionalisation, the ECJ supplied national judges with 
enhanced means of guaranteeing the effectiveness of Community law. In Vag: 
Colson and Kamann, 80 a case of discrimination regarding access to 
employment, the Court established the doctrine of indirect effect according to 
which national judges must interpret, in essence, rewrite the national law in the 
light of the wording and the purpose of Community law (para. 26). Once 
national law has been so constructed, EC law can be applicable too in legal 
disputes between private persons. 
Finally, the ECJ has buttressed the argument that individuals may derive rights 
from EC law which national authorities and Courts must respect, by finding 
that there is a general principle of State liability (the doctrine of governmental 
liability). 81 According to this doctrine, a national court can hold a Member 
State liable for damages caused to individuals, due to the failure on the part of 
the Member State to correctly implement or apply a directive. In this sense, the 
national court may order the Member State to compensate the individual for 
his/her losses (paras. 44-46). 
79 Sweet, A. (1997) "The European Court and the National Courts: A Statistical Analysis of 
Preliminary References, 1961-95 '; Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 14/97, p. 1 
under Title "Theories and Debates", < URL http: //www jeanmonneipro ram org/papers/97/97- 
14-html >. 
Case C-14/83 Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein 
- 
Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891, 
11986] 2 CMLR 430. 
'Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 loc. cit. supra note 56. 
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4.3. Concluding remarks 
In summary, it appears that the Court construed the constitutional principles of 
EC/EU law at two levels. At level one, it announced that EC law penetrates 
into the national legal orders and is a superior source of law within those 
orders. 
Its jurisprudence of supremacy envisages a working type of relationship 
between the European and national courts. 82 As a matter of fact, it imagines a 
quite effective partnership in the construction of a constitutional Community. 
In that relationship, national judges become Community judges whenever they 
resolve disputes administered by EC law. 
At level two, it developed a number of techniques for ensuring that EC/EU law 
can be enforced such as justiciability (direct effect), responsibility (State 
liability), interpretation (indirect effect) and pre-emption. 
4.4. Multi-level Constitutionalism and European integration 
Although the Court has contributed to the Union's constitution in a motionless 
way, meaning that it is not going any further than the announced constitutional 
principles-doctrines, European integration is not a static project. In contrast, it 
is a dynamic process, as already maintained in many parts of this Thesis, and 
multi-level constitutional in the making. 83 
82 Sweet, A. loc. cit. supra note 79, p. 4. 
83 Pernice, I. loc. cit. supra note 50, p. 709. 
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The advantage of the term `model of multi-level constitutionalism', as the 
author contends in this section, is that it treats European integration as an open- 
ended process of constitution making instead of a sequence of international 
Treaties which establish and develop an organisation of international co- 
operation. 84 In other words, it highlights the actual and potential role of 
constitutional ideas and practices holding the EU together. In evaluating the 
EU, the point is to develop a perspective which 
"views the Member States' constitutions and the Treaties 
constituting the European Union, despite their formal 
distinction, as a unity in substance and as a coherent 
institutional system, within which competence for action, 
public authority or 
... 
the power to exercise sovereign rights is 
divided among two or more levels". 85 
The fact that the EU is formally based on international Treaties neither 
prohibits considering its foundations as constitutional, nor compels one to 
adopt a dualist approach as to the relation between Community and national 
law. 86 As to what happens to the primacy of EC/EU law in such a system, this 
appears to have been decided through a common decision of the peoples of the 
Member States, expressed in the Amsterdam Protocol on the application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 87 It is confirmed there that these 
84 Idem., 707. 
85 Idem., 706. 
86 Idem., 710. 
87Idem., 719. 
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principles do not affect the Court's case law regarding the relationship between 
national and Community law. 88 
As the wording implicitly states, this new notion creates a multi-level political 
arrangement based on a holistic constitutional system of delegated, reserved 
and/or shared powers between relatively autonomous, yet interrelated 
structures of government and `governance' through the policy networks. Their 
interactions aim to preserve the integrity of the segments while leading to a 
living, pluralist and organic political order at the EU level which "builds itself 
from the grounds upwards". 89 
The polity building exercise that has to evolve from the lower level ` upwards' 
is plainly depicted in the drafting process of the Charter9° which in effect 
harness the democratic ethos of those who form the `constituent power' of the 
Euro-polity. 
5. THE CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
5.1. Introduction 
The call for a deeper and wider debate about the future development of the EU 
prior to the Treaty revision process of 2004 which was announced in the 
Declaration on the Future of the Union adopted at Nice suggests that the 
88 See Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, para. 2. 
89 Burgess, M. (1993) "The European Tradition of Federalism: Christian Democracy and 
Federalism" in Burgess, M. and Gagnon, A. (eds. ) (1993) Comparative Federalism and 
Federation: Competing Traditions and Future Directions, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
138-153, at 149. 
90 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [OJ 2000, No. C 364/1]. 
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traditional IGC process may not survive long 91 The appeal to a more visible, 
deliberative and inclusive method of polity building commenced by the 
drafting of the Charter has instead taken hold. 
To the extent that we adhere to a democratic concept of a European 
constitution, the Charter also functions as a catalyst of exchanging ideas on the 
constitutionalisation of the founding Treaties. 92 Its symbolic value is three-fold. 
First, it enhances the visibility of the rights enshrined into Community law 
which consequently opens up to democratic scrutiny. Second, it tilts the 
balance of power in favour of the political process away from the judicial one. 
Once the Charter enumerates a given right, the ECJ would not be able to deny 
its fundamental character. Finally, by rendering explicit the rights that 
Europeans mutually recognise each other, it supplements the concept of a 
European multi-level constitution. 93 
5.2. Constitutionalism and Charter: Building the methodology 
In determining how the Charter might complement the notion of a multi-level 
meta-national constitution, section 2 analyses the place of the Charter in the 
legal background of fundamental rights protection in the EU. That analysis 
should give some insight in the specific nature and potentiality of the Charter 
to contribute to European constitutionalisation. Section 3 explores in generic 
91 Treaty of Nice, declaration 23 on the Future of the Union, European Council of Nice 07- 
11/12/2000, para. 6. 
92 For a general assessment on the impact of the Charter on the de facto constitution of the EU, 
see Engel, C. (2001) "The European Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Changed Political 
Opportunity Structure and its Normative Consequences", 7 European Law Journal 2,151-170. 
93 European Parliament, Resolution on the Drafting of a European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Rights [(C5-0058/1999 
- 
1999/2064(COS)), [A5-0064/2000 of 16 March 2000], 
point V states: "whereas the Charter of Fundamental Rights should be regarded as a basic 
component of the necessary process of equipping the European Union with a constitution". 
252 
CHAPTER SIX EU CONSTITUTIONALISAf " ANON-GOING PROCESS 
terms the contents rationae materiae and rationae personae of the Charter 
which should clarify its aims and scope. This will inevitably lead to the 
question of the relation between the Charter and other competing supra- 
national mechanisms for human rights protection, in particular the ECHR. 
Section 4 explores whether the Charter confirms, enhances or replaces the 
existing protection of fundamental rights in the EU legal order whereas Section 
5 examines in relevance to the above whether it could be seen as first step 
towards a genuine European constitution independently of its legal status. 
5.2.1. Section 1: Democratic Legitimacy and the Convention 
Even though discussion of the desirability of a Charter or otherwise EU Bill of 
Rights is far from new considering the many Sage reports or working group 
proposals, 94 the origin of this particular initiative lies with the German 
Presidency in the first half of 1999.95 The stated purpose, as eventually 
reflected in the preamble, was to strengthen the protection of fundamental 
rights in the EU, not by changing the rights as such, but by making them more 
visible to the EU citizens. 
Thus the drafting of a European bill or Charter was not an ordinary policy 
initiative, as it did not aim primarily 
- 
or at all 
- 
at the policy-maker or the 
lawyer, but largely at the citizen. In fact, this visibility or "showcase"96 
9a See Report of the Expert Group on Fundamental Rights, Affirming Fundamental Rights in 
the European Union: Time to Act, chaired by Prof. Spiros Simitis, European Commission, DG 
of Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs, February 1999: 
< URL htty //europa eu indcomm/employment social/fundamri/expertgroup/report en pdf>. 
95 See European Council Conclusions from Cologne, Annex IV, "Decision on the drawing up 
of a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union", (3-4 June 1999): 
< URL http: //europa. eu. int/council/off/conclu/iune99/june99 enpdf>. 
96 Lord Lester of Herne Hill, (2000) "Introduction" in: Feus, K. (ed. ) (2000) An EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: Text and Commentaries, London: Federal Trust, 3-11, at 5. 
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exercise, a terminology used by members of the UK government, was a way of 
pronouncing and confirming what the EU already claimed to have done in the 
area of human rights. Alternatively, it could be seen that it was a way of 
declaring its commitments to a public process which would help to support a 
degree of popular legitimacy still contested and questioned in the Euro-polity. 
As far as the Convention process itself is concerned, it is significant to note that 
this was an unprecedented forum in the history of the EU. Both in terms of its 
composition, its decision-making processes as well as its openness to input 
from a broadly based civil society, it compares very favourably with the 
secretive horse-trading among Ministers which has traditionally characterised 
Intergovernmental Conferences. 
5.2.1.1. Composition 
The very novelty, including the apparent lack of an existing legal basis, of the 
process has generated interest, given its comparatively broad representative 
composition. 
The composition of the drafting body, what became known as the Convention, 
was specified to include representatives of personal, national, and European 
constituencies. More specifically, the Member State governments (1), the 
Commission {one} (2), the European Parliament (3), and national parliaments 
(4), bringing the number to 62 in total. Additionally, observer status was given 
to two representatives of the Court of Justice and two of the Council of Europe, 
one of which was to be drawn from the European Court of Human Rights 
(` ECtHR"). The Convention and its drafting group called `Praesidium', 
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comprising Members from each of the four categories of representatives and 
the President of the Convention, was assisted by a Secretariat staffed by the 
Legal Service of the Council. 
5.2.1.2. Working Methods 
In addition to the significantly representative nature of the body's composition, 
the working method was expressly prescribed in a way which immediately 
contrasts with other constitutional processes within the EU - if indeed this 
process of drafting the Charter can be termed a constitutional one. 97 Thus on 
this occasion, the European Council in Tampere specified that: 
"Hearings held by the Convention and documents submitted at 
such hearings should, according to the mandate, "in principle" 
be public during and after the process". 98 
This procedure has been followed throughout. The website on the Europa 
server has been useful for containing information on the various draft texts, 
records of the Convention's meetings and in general for making the process to 
be followed reasonably closely from outside. Similarly, the European Council 
indicated that certain other EU Institutions which were not involved in the 
Convention 
- 
the ESC, the COR and the EU Ombudsman 
- 
should be invited to 
97 It is interesting to note that while the Charter process could hardly be characterised as a 
moment of constitutional baptism for the EU, some aspects of its functioning might be seen as 
prototypical for a European constitutional development as it will be asserted below. 
8 See point B (ii) of Annex to the European Council Conclusions from Tampere, 
"Composition, Method of Work and Practical Arrangements for the Body", (15-16 October 
1999), < URL http"//europa. eu. int/council/off/conclu/oct99/oct99 en. htm#annex >. The "in 
principle" reservation and the fact that only documents submitted at hearings of the Convention 
would be covered by this transparency provision is, however, problematic. 
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give their views systematically. 99 A draft had to be ready within one year for 
the European Council in Nice in December 2000.10° 
Along the way, NGOs, independent experts and the applicant countries for 
Union membership were also invited to give their views. 101 Notwithstanding 
this exclusion of representatives of civil society from formal involvement in 
the drafting process and in particular from membership of the Convention, a 
number of well-attended hearings took place. Also a vast number of 
submissions, including amendments, and representations were made by a wide 
range of organisations and interests, therefore testifying to the actual and 
potential vibrancy of a European civil society. 102 
5.2.1.3. The decision-making process 
Indeed, the very choice of procedures ensured an almost unprecedented 
momentum for the initiative which would make it very difficult for any 
effective opposition to emerge as long as the final product was not patently 
unacceptable in some respects. Having said that, over one thousand 
amendments were submitted and successive drafts of the Praesidium which set 
out with the ECHR provisions as a baseline were based on an attempt to 
represent some kind of compromise between the different views. 103 Further, 
some eight or nine rights which did not form part of the list originally drawn up 
" Idem., point iv. 
100 See Nice European Council (7-9 December 2000): Presidency Conclusions: 
< URL http: //eurona. eu. int/council/off/conclu/dec2000 >. 
101 Tampere European Council Conclusions loc. cit. supra note 98, points v and vi. 
102 Shaw, J. (2000) "Process and Constitutional Discourse in the European Union", 27 Journal 
of Law and Society 1, p. 4 at 36 where she suggests that allowing for this dialogue with non- 
overnmental interests "dramatically opens upon the dialogic potential" of the process. 
103 Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 20 September 2000, CHARTE 
4477/00, COM (2000) 559 final, para. 4. 
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by the Praesidium, for example, the right to equality before the law, the 
protection of intellectual property and children's rights, were included in the 
latest draft. 104 It was agreed that there would not be any numerical voting but 
rather an attempt to proceed by consensus in order to finalise a draft Charter in 
a relatively short space of time but also to overcome complicated issues and 
divergent opinions. Thus it came as no surprise that the final draft was 
approved with the "almost unanimous agreement of the Convention's 
members". 105 Guy Braibant, representative of the French Government to the 
Convention suggested that the Convention's mechanism of consensus could 
serve for other European projects such as the Union's constitutional 
development. 106 
5.2.1.4. The Convention and constitutional development 
The significant features of the aforementioned drafting process and the 
symbolism of a `Convention' of this kind have readily been seized upon as a 
possible model for European constitutional processes in the future, and 
particularly with a view to reforming the much-criticised IGC procedure. 107 
In particular, since the conclusion of the Charter, the Commission has been 
supporting the elaboration of some version of the convention method as part of 
104 Idem., para. 20 < URL http: //db. consilium. eu. int/df/default. asp? Ian, =en >. 
los See translation of the letter sent to President Chirac by former President Herzog upon 
completion of the Convention's proceedings, 5 October 2000, CHARTE 4960/00. 
106 See "How the Charter was drawn up 
- 
Sound bites": 
< URL http: //europa. eu. int/comm/justice home/unit/charte/en/charter03. htm l >, p. 3. This idea 
was also approved by de B6rca in her ELRev Article: De Bürca, G. (2001) "The Drafting of 
the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights", 26 European Law Review 2, p. 126 at 
138. 
107 See generally Vitorino, A. (2001) "The Convention as a Model for European 
Constitutionalisation" in Walter Hallstein 
- 
Institute for European Constitutional Law Paper 
(WHO, Humblot 
- 
University of Berlin < URL hqp: //www. whi-berlin. de/vitorino. htm >. 
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a re-fashioned Treaty-revision mechanism, if not quite as an alternative, then at 
least, as a substantial adjunct to and improvement of the IGC process. 
Nevertheless, it seems that several of the Member States are much less 
supportive of such a process. Despite their calling for a `deeper and wider 
debate on the future of the EU leading up to the 2004 IGC, the Member State 
governments clearly seek not to lose their pivotal role in the treaty-making 
process and therefore in the core processes of European constitutional 
development and change. ' 08 
However, the outpouring of praise and support for the idea of a convention- 
type deliberative body which entails the benefits of openness and participation 
runs the risk of idealising and placing excessive faith in the Charter process 
and the desirability of its application to future constitutional tasks and 
procedures, for example, the national ratification process. A number of 
criticisms have already been voiced, including many by NGOs which made 
submissions or sought to be engaged in the Charter process109 but also by 
participants in the procedure1° and academic observers. 
Olivier de Schutter, for example, has pointed to the various shortcomings in the 
Convention process, in particular those affecting the civil society 
108 See the Report on the Debate on the Future of the European Union: Report from the 
Presidency to the European Council at Götenborg (16 June 2001), paras. 51,54 and 57: 
< URL httn //ue. eu. int/en/Info/eurocouncil/index. htm >. 
109 See for example the comments made to the House of Lords, Select Committee on European 
Union, Eighth Report: EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Part 3: EVIDENCE The content of 
the Charter A HIGH LEVEL OF PROTECTION, paras. 83-86 :< URL 
http"www parliament. the-stationery-office. co. uk/pa/Id99900/Idselect/ldeucom/67/6701 htm >. 
1 10 See Opinion of the COR on the `Process of drawing up a Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union' [OJ 2000, No. C. 156/1, paras. 3.1 and 4.1]. 
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organisations. "' In the first place, he argues that some degree of organisation 
of civil society is necessary if a diffuse right to make views known is to be 
facilitated. A right to participate or even, less ambitiously, a right to reply 
would be more feasible if relevant actors within the civil society could be 
identified. Representativity and competence/or expertise could be some of the 
grounds for such identification, whereas an organisation promoted in a specific 
way would enable them to become more directly participative, rather than 
simply a multitude of different voices raised. Secondly, he argues that a 
preliminary document setting out and defining the key issues in advance should 
be drawn up. The absence of such a document during the Charter-drafting 
process seemed to amplify the imbalance of knowledge among non-experts, 
lawyers for example, and supposed `expertise' amongst the Convention 
participants. In the absence of changes of this kind, he concludes, the 
participation of civil society will remain no more than a `weak right to be 
heard' rather than a fuller consultative role, if not ultimately a `seat at the 
table'. 
For her part, Deirdre Curtin expresses the same ideas. ' 12 Firstly, she suggests 
that the role of organised civil society should become more formal. Although 
the Charter initiative may have been aimed at the citizen, and a virtue made of 
the openness and novel nature of the process, this was not a genuinely 
111 De Schutter, O. "La 'Convention': Un Instrument au Service de 1' art de Gouverner dans 1' 
Union Europeenne? ", Paper presented to the Arena Workshop on the Charter of Rights as a 
Constitution-making vehicle, Oslo, 8-9 June 2001, pp. 4-9: 
< URL http: //www. arena. uio. no/events/charterrights. html >. 
112 Curtin, D. "Democratic Legitimacy and the Convention: The "Cunning of Reason? ", Paper 
presented to a one-day conference The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights: 
Context and Possibilities, University of Notre Dame, London Law Centre, 29 June 2001, pp. 1- 
2 (mimeo). 
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participatory process but one which, albeit deliberative in nature, was to be 
composed only of institutional representatives from national and European 
levels. Secondly, she wonders whether the Council Secretariat should be 
allowed to assume such a pivotal role in terms of back up legal, technical and 
administrative support or should the Convention be given its own (temporary) 
support drawing from different interests and expertise. Thirdly, a technical 
preparation should take place in advance of the convening of the Convention 
whilst the role of experts in that process and during the various stages of 
discussion and drafting should be defined. 
Furthermore, the issue of a fuller participation of an organised European 
citizenry is related to the question of how the Convention actual operated in 
practice. Since the plenary operated without voting, `consensus' had to be 
reached, and this obviously gave the drafting group (the Praesidium of five 
assisted by the legal secretariat) a considerable margin of discretion. 113 Even if 
most of the proceedings, hearings, and plenaries were held openly, the drafting 
group did not operate so openly. So, apart from the explanatory memorandum 
ultimately produced by the secretariat, it is difficult to resolve why particular 
drafts were accepted or rejected at different stages. Moreover, although the 
plenary sessions did not vote, voting did take place within the various 
delegations, for example, of national parliamentarians and European 
parliamentarians. Nevertheless, the quality of deliberation was considerably 
113 De Bürca loc. cit. supra note 106, p. 133; Liisberg, J. (2001) "Does the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights Threaten the Supremacy of Community Law? 
- 
Article 53 of the Charter: 
A Fountain of Law or Just an Inkblot? Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 4/01, under 
Title "Consultations Between Secretariat and Commission Behind Closed Doors" < URL 
http //www. jeanmonneturoaram. or/naners/01/010401 html>. 
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lower in the delegations and particularly in the later stages where decisions had 
to be made rather than in the Convention plenary. Where power was at stake 
and the requirement to produce a text existed, the differences within the 
delegations became polarised and decision-making was characterised much 
more by closed bargaining and less by open deliberation. 114 
It also became apparent that the institutional discussions of the possibility of 
adapting the Charter method to future EU constitutional processes instigate the 
development of a model of direct democracy at the EU level. Thus a further 
phase of structured reflection including a broad and open preparatory `forum', 
instead of a `Convention method', has already started to be launched. 115 
Certainly, whether the term `forum' reflects a governmental desire to 
distinguish a reformed IGC procedure involving a wider number of participants 
from the particular type of procedure used for drafting the Charter, or whether 
it reflects something else is not clear. Nevertheless, it suggests something 
different from a `Convention'. Whereas a `Convention' implies the power to 
take some kind of decision, to produce significant output at the end of 
deliberation, the term `forum' implies a space for debating and discussing. In 
other words it may be described as an `entity' which is not mandated or 
empowered by the Council of Ministers to adopt decisions. 
114 Schönlau, J. "Drafting Europe's Value Foundation: Deliberation and Arm-twisting in 
Formulating the Preamble to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights" (mimeo) as quoted in: De 
Bürca, G. "European Constitutionalism and the Charter", Paper presented to a one-day 
conference The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights: Context and Possibilities, 
University of Notre Dame, London Law Centre, 29 June 2001, p. 7 (mimeo). 
115 Curtin, D. loc. cit. supra note 112. 
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5.2.1.5. Concluding remarks 
The combination of the weakness' which emerged within the Charter-drafting 
process itself and the evident intention of the Member States in the European 
Council to keep down any stronger form of popular participation does not give 
cause for sufficient complacency about the Union's democratic legitimacy. 
Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the very act of a new forum of this 
kind (Convention) is suggestive of the potential for newer and more 
experimental forms of a `bottom-up' than an `top-down' constitutional 
development in the EU. 
5.2.2. Section 2: The Charter against the judicial human rights protection 
Internally, the EU is keen to highlight its commitment to fundamental rights. 
Although the original Treaties did not contain a general commitment upholding 
fundamental rights, there was some recognition of specific rights in a more 
economic context in the Treaty of Rome. The prohibition of discrimination on 
grounds of nationality, 116 the right of free movement of workers and rights of 
establishment for nationals of Member States, "7 for equal pay without 
discrimination on the grounds of sex 118 and improved workers' conditions and 
standards of livings were some of them. 119 
More recently, the Amsterdam Treaty added a set of procedural guarantees and 
introduced some provisions designed to further the protection of fundamental 
116 [Art. 6 EC] (see Annex II). 
7 [Arts. 48-58 EC] (see Annex II). 
"a [Art. 119 EC] (see Annex II). 
119 [Arts. 117-122 EC] (see Annex II). 
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rights, for example, (Articles 6(1), 6(2), 7,46(d) TEU, 3(2) EC, 136 EC and 
141(4) EC). 
The inclusion of references to fundamental rights followed sustained pressure 
over a number of years from the EU Institutions who were aware of the 
potential impact that the Community, and later the Union, could have on the 
issue of fundamental rights. 
Until the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, the protection of fundamental 
rights was largely developed on a sporadic basis by the ECJ. Its recognition of 
fundamental rights was initially triggered by a legal challenge to the 
"supremacy of Community law from Member States which felt that 
Community legislation was encroaching upon important rights protected under 
national law". 120 From 1969 and onwards, the ECJ has recognised that 
fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of 
Community law, the observance of which it ensures. 121 
Considering the fact that the EU is not only a common market122 but has wider 
political, economic or social perspectives which should be accommodated 
within a pluralistic system, the Court has continued within the framework of a 
multi-level constitutionalism to highlight the importance of fundamental rights. 
In particular, it has indicated that it draws inspiration from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States so "it would annul any Community 
120 Craig, P. and De Bürca, G. (eds. ) (1998) EU law, Text, Cases and Materials, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, (2°d edition), 298. 
12' Note Case C-29/69 Stauder v. Stadt Ulm [1969] ECR 419, para. 7, [1970] CMLR 112. 
122 Opinion 1/91 loc. cit. supra note 73, para. 20. 
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measures which are incompatible with the fundamental rights recognised by 
the constitutions of those States". 123 Additionally, the ECJ has declared that 
"international treaties for the protection of human rights to which the Member 
States have collaborated or of which they are signatories can supply guidelines 
which should be followed within the framework of Community law". 124 
The ECJ has also held, firstly, that its powers of review extended to the acts of 
Member States'25 and secondly, that Member States must respect fundamental 
rights when they implement Community law or rely on derogations provided 
for under the Treaty. 126 References to the ECHR followed in subsequent 
cases. 127 Equally, both Community Courts have lately issued a number of 
judgments with human rights implications. 128 Finally, from Kronibach v. 
Bamberski (a case concerning recognition of foreign judgments) it could be 
argued that whenever the Court reviews the legality of a normative act, it 
123 Note Cases C-4/73 Nold KG v. Commission [1974] ECR 491, para. 13, second indent; C- 
11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125, para. 3, [1972] CMLR 255. 
124 Note Case C-44/79 Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pflaz [1979] ECR 3727, para. 15, [1980] 3 
CMLR 42. 
us Note Case C-5/88 Wachauf v. Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft (Federal 
Republic of Germany) [1989] ECR 2609, para. 19, [1991] 1 CMLR 328. 
126 Note Case C-260/89 Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorasi (ERT) v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis 
(DEP) [1991] ECR I- 2925, para. 43, [1994] 4 CMLR 540. 
1Z' Note Case C-13/94 P v. S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECR I- 2143, paras. 16,19, 
IRLR 347. 
128 Note Cases C-17/98 Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v. Aruba [2000] ECR I- 675, paras. 16- 
19 (Art. 6 ECHR: Right to a fair trial); C-361/00 P (R) Cho Yang Shipping v. Commission, 
Order of 15 December 2000 (not yet reported), on appeal from the order of the Court of First 
Instance in Case T-191/98 RII, [2000] ECR II 
- 
2551, paras. 84-85,92 (Art. 6 ECHR in 
competition law); C-65/98 Eyüp v. Landesgeschaftsstelle des Arbeitsmarrktservice Vorarlberg 
[2000] ECR I- 4747, paras. 32-34 (Art. 8 ECHR: Right to respect for private and family life 
- 
Definition of `family'); C-329/97 Ergat v. Stadt Ulm [2000] ECR I- 1487, paras. 65,67 (Art. 8 
ECHR: Family reunion); T-82/99 Cwik v. Commission, [2000] ECR IA-155; II-713, paras. 50- 
51,57-58 (Art. 10 ECHR: Freedom of Expression); C-274/99 P Bernard Connolly v. 
Commission, [2001] ECR I- 1611, paras. 29-41,46,49,51,64 (Art. 10 ECHR: Staff 
Regulations): note also Opinion of the A. G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, paras. 4-28; C-369/98 R v. 
Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex parte Fisher, [2000] ECR I- 6751, paras. 1-2 
of the Court's ruling (Implicit application of Art. 10 ECHR); T-30/99 Bocchi Foods v. 
Commission, [2001] ECR II 
- 
943, paras. 74-83 (Art. 14 ECHR: Prohibition of Discrimination 
- 
Right to property and to carry on business). 
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would submit that act to the test whether human rights or fundamental 
freedoms have been infringed. 129 
The absence of a catalogue of fundamental rights and the fact that the 
protection of these rights must be deduced from the case law certainly makes it 
difficult to assess the rights of individuals under Community law. 
Furthermore, as the Court cannot produce a systematic set of rules for the 
protection of human rights, it might be difficult for a party to assess whether or 
not it is worthwhile to raise such a question in the context of Community law 
litigation. 
The difficulties inherent in the fact that the Community Courts can deal with 
the protection of human rights only if the question in issue arises in the context 
of Community law cannot be overcome without a fundamental redefinition of 
the objectives of the Community and the competence of the Community 
Courts. 
In order to overcome the absence of a systematic protection of human rights 
many aspirational political initiatives took place. The EP adopted a Declaration 
of fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms13o and eleven of the then 
129 Note Case C-7/98 Krombach v. Bamberski [2000] ECR I- 1935, paras. 37-38. 
130 European Parliament, Resolution on Adopting the Declaration of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms [OJ 1989, No. C 120/51, A2-3/89]. 
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twelve EU Member States signed the Community Charter of the Fundamental 
Social Rights of Workers. 131 
Despite these advances which had been made within the EU to promote 
awareness of fundamental rights the EU still lacked a codified system of rights 
protection. 
The question of accession was then pursued in 1994 when the Council of 
Ministers asked for the Court's opinion on the issue whether the Community 
could accede to the ECHR without, however, amending the Treaty. That 
question was answered in the negative. 132 
In the light of such a negative environment, many interested parties such as the 
Council and the Parliament and representatives of the civil society, were later 
prompted to renew their calls for a single Charter of fundamental rights in the 
run-up to the negotiations of the AT. In that context, the European Council of 
Cologne made its request to draw up a Charter. '33 
5.2.3. Section 3: Rationae materiae and rationae personae of the Charter 
The Preamble of the Charter reaffirms that the Union is founded on a vast 
range of constitutional principles: indivisible, universal values of human 
131 The UK did not sign the Community Charter on 9 December 1989. Yet, by ratifying the AT 
and by adopting SPA Directives such as the work-councils, parental leave, part-time work and 
burden of proof in sex discrimination cases which were re-issued using the old [Art. 100 EC], 
it agreed to last. 
132 Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [1996] ECR I- 1579, [1996] 2 CMLR 265, para. 
35. 
133 See supra note 95. 
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dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity, democracy and the rule of law. It also 
places the individual at the heart of its activities, by creating an area of justice 
and security and by the establishment of Union citizenship. 134 
In terms of rationae personae, the Charter protects both EU citizens and non- 
EU citizens who find themselves in a situation linked to Community law 
against actions taken by the Community Institutions and Member States' 
authorities as long as the latter act within the framework of Community law. 
The Charter also makes reference to its stated purpose which it proclaims is to 
"strengthen the protection of fundamental rights in the light of changes in 
society, social progress and scientific and technological developments by 
making those rights more visible". 135 The Charter is thus a "fairly predictable 
document"136 insofar as it comprises civil and political rights, newer forms of 
such rights which take account of scientific, technological and eugenic 
developments, social and economic rights and other rights, which are common 
to both categories, for example Article 47. Rationae materiae, therefore, the 
Charter appears to contain more fundamental rights than the ECJ has so far 
effectively guaranteed, yet still less than the Court of Justice could guarantee 
on the basis of Article 6(2)137 in combination with Article 46(d) TEU which 
provide for a more expansive human rights protection within the EU. There are 
two reasons which can justify this. First, to the extent that the Charter contains 
fundamental rights which are based on EC or EU Treaty, for example, Article 
134 Charter loc. cit supra note 90 
- 
Preamble. 
135 Ibid. 
136 See Scottish Parliament European Committee, 2°d Report, 2001 "Report into the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights", p. 23. 
137 Including an outline of ECHR system for derogations (see Art. 18). 
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45(1) on freedom of movement and residence, these rights shall be exercised 
under the conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties (Article 
52(2)). However, this is not the case if by doing so the level of protection of 
fundamental rights stated in Member States' constitutional traditions or a 
number of international human standards would be threatened (Article 53). 
Second, insofar as the Charter contains rights which are not based in the EC or 
EU Treaty, 138 these rights can offer legal protection only to the extent that they 
present a nexus with Union law. 139 
The new concept of "Union law" 4° indicates that the Charter covers the entire 
range of Union activities, including the sensitive questions of second and third 
pillars. With due regard to the principle of subsidiarity, the Charter does not 
establish new powers or tasks for the Community or the Union. Nevertheless, 
as the Charter is not part of the constitution of a federal entity, 141 it might be 
surprising to find a number of provisions concerning subject matters, for 
example family life, 142 death penalty, '43 or education'44 that fall outside the 
present competencies of the Union. The answer to this challenge, however, is 
that such provisions are the expression of common values against which the 
138 For example, a number of grounds on which discrimination is prohibited by virtue of Art. 
21(1) of the Charter are not listed in [Art. 6a EC] (colour, social origin, genetic features, 
language, political and any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property and 
birth). 
139 See Art. 51(1) of the Charter: Scope. 
140 Ibid. 
14' See Chapter Two of this Thesis, Section 3.1. p. 24. 
142 See Art. 9 of the Charter: Right to marry and right to found a family. 
143 See Art. 2(2) of the Charter: Right to life. 
144 See Art. 14 of the Charter: Right to education. 
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EU Institutions and Member States could not make a stand even if they do not 
have to implement them. '45 
In any case, the Charter does not replace the protection of fundamental rights at 
present offered by the Court of Justice. Rather, it constitutes a compilation of 
the main tenets of the case law of the Court whereas beyond that it consolidates 
citizens' identity in enshrining the common inheritance as regards fundamental 
rights just as other European catalogues of rights do (for example, the 
ECHR). 146 
5.2.4. Section 4: The relationship between the Charter and the ECIIR 
Since 1974 all Members of the EU have been Contracting Parties to the ECHR 
of 1950, under the auspices of the Council of Europe. 147 The ECHR and the 
case law from the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") have served as 
important points of reference, both in the case law of the ECJ148 and for the 
Convention drawing up the Charter. It is not a coincidence that the Charter 
contains rights stated in the ECHR, but mostly without taking over their 
145 Editorial Comments, (2001) "The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights still under 
Discussion", 38 Common Market Law Review 1, p. 1 at 4. 
146 The analysis of this Thesis is restricted to the relation between the Charter and the ECHR 
because of the specific place of this Convention in the EU legal order (see Arts. 6(2) TEU and 
52(3) of the Charter). 
147 See ETS No. 5. The ECHR was adopted in 1950 and entered into force in 1953. France 
joined the ECHR, as the last Member of the Communities, in 1974. On the ECHR, see 
generally Harris, D. O'Boyle, M. and Warbrick, C. (eds. ) (1995) Law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, London: Butterworths. 
148 Note Joined Cases C-60 and 61/84 Cinetheque SA and others v. Federation nationale des 
cinemas francais [1985] ECR 2605, [1986] 1 CMLR 365, paras. 25-26; C-12/86 Demirel v. 
Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd [1987] ECR 3719, [1989] 1 CMLR 421, para 28; Inter alia note the 
Opinion of A. G. Capotorti in Case C-149/77 Gabrielle Defrenne v. Societe anonyme beige de 
navigation aerienne [1978] ECR 1365, pp. 1385-1386, and C- 260/89 loc. cit. supra note 126, 
para. 42. 
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wording: (a) the ECHR restrictions are mostly excluded, 149 and (b) in some 
cases the scope of the right was widened1S0 or reduced. '5' 
Whatever the formulation of a fundamental right in the Charter, if it 
corresponds to a right guaranteed by the ECHR, the latter serves, by virtue of 
Article 52(3), as a minimum in determining the meaning and scope of the right 
in question. In this sense, the Charter, as part of Union law, might provide 
more extensive protection than the ECHR, not a narrower one. 152 Under Article 
52(3) also, the exercise of the rights contained in the Charter which correspond 
to a right guaranteed by the ECHR may be subjected to limitations by a 
competent legislative authority, that is the national courts and the ECJ, to the 
extent authorised by the ECHR. At all times, however, these limitations must 
satisfy the strict conditions of Article 52(1) of the Charter, namely the 
principles of proportionality and the rule of law. 
Furthermore, according to Article 52(2) of the Charter, rights which are based 
on EU or EC Treaty need to be exercised under the conditions and within the 
limits defined by EU or EC Treaty. If the application of Article 52(2) of the 
Charter leads to a higher level of protection of fundamental rights regarding 
their meaning and scope than that offered by the ECHR, the latter catalogue 
does not affect the content of the Charter right. 153 If, by contrast, the 
149 Compare, for example, the absolute formulation of the right to life in Art. 2(2) of the 
Charter to Art. 2(2) of the ECHR which describes the circumstances in which a deprivation of 
life is not regarded as a violation of that fundamental right. 
"0 Compare, for example, Art. 49 of the Charter (Principles of legality and proportionality of 
criminal offences and penalties) to Art. 7 of the ECHR (No punishment without law). 
13' Compared to Art. 5(2)-5(5) of the ECHR, Art. 6junctis Articles 47-50 of the Charter does 
not mention any rights of the people who are arrested or detained. 
152 See the last sentence of Art. 52(3) of the Charter. 
133 Ibid. 
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application of Article 52(2) of the Charter leads to a lower level of protection 
of fundamental rights than that offered by the ECHR, it conflicts with Article 
52(3) of the Charter. In such case, Article 53 of the Charter applies, ruling in 
favour of the ECHR. Indeed, according to this provision, the Charter cannot 
"be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights and 
fundamental freedoms as recognised by", among others, the ECHR. 
Consequently, rights contained in the Charter, corresponding to rights 
guaranteed by the ECHR and based on the Treaties are to be exercised under 
the conditions and within the limits defined by the Treaties so long as these 
limitations do not interfere with the meaning and scope of the ECHR rights. 
By way of concluding this section, it can be stated that the Charter mainly 
attests the role of the ECHR in the EU legal order. Almost all fundamental 
rights are covered in the Charter. Where the text of the Charter departs from 
that of the ECHR, it can never be at the expense of the level of protection 
offered by the ECHR as it was maintained above. It follows that the Charter 
cannot firstly be qualified as a substitute for the ECHR in the EU legal order. 
This Convention continues to inspire the ECJ while developing the general 
principles of Community law. Secondly, it is not an alternative for accession of 
the EU/EC to the ECHR. 
Even a legally binding Charter could not form an obstacle to the accession of 
the EU/EC as an entity of States to the ECHR. 154 By analogy with the national 
level, it is not inconsistent for a meta-national legal order to have its own 
154 On the status of the Charter, see infra section 5: The Charter as a Component of an EU 
Multi-level Constitution. 
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catalogue of fundamental rights and at the same time to adhere to an 
international mechanism for human rights protection like the ECI: UR. As a 
matter of fact, we are already in a pluralistic setting on what concerns the 
protection of fundamental rights in the EU. The competencies of national 
constitutional courts, the ECtHR and the ECJ are overlapping within the field 
of application of Union law regarding fundamental rights. '55 Therefore, a 
pluralism of sources and institutional mechanisms could be endorsed at the EU 
level. 
Such an accession to the ECHR, after the adoption of the Charter, would surely 
add something to the present system of protection of fundamental rights in the 
EU. Theoretically, three reasons can be invoked for the EU/EC acceding to the 
ECHR: 
1) The ECHR would offer a broader protection rationae materiae. 
2) It would offer a broader protection and/or rationae personae. 
3) It would contribute to a uniform interpretation of fundamental rights in the 
EU. '56 
iss Menendez, A. (2001) "Chartering Europe: The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union", Arena Working Paper 2001/03, p. 14 < URL http: //www. arena. uio. nol >. 
156 Yet, according to the author's opinion, for defining the jurisdiction of the ECtHR and the 
ECJ an inter-institutional agreement between the Council of Europe and the EU would still be 
necessary. 
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As far as the first two reasons are concerned, these are not very convincing 
since the ECHR is rationae materiae and personae covered by the existing 
system of protection of fundamental rights in the EU. Furthermore, the Charter 
constitutes rationae materiae a partial, considering the issues of 
interpretation, '57 and rationae personae a full confirmation of this state of the 
law. 158 The main reason then remains for the EU/EC to accede to the ECHR is 
to enhance the uniform protection of fundamental rights in the EU. '59 
"The duplication of protection systems runs the risk of 
weakening the overall protection offered and undermining 
legal certainty in this field. The adoption, of one system of 
protection for the Union countries and another for non- Union 
countries, whether they can be candidates or not, calls into 
question the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law in 
Central and Eastern Europe on the basis of common minimum 
standards guaranteed by a system of collective enforcement. 
The Strasbourg system exists, has proved itself over several 
decades, and is evolving and will continue to evolve. There 
should be no double standards, no Europe of two, three or four 
157 See supra section 3: Rationae materiae and rationae personae of the Charter. 
158 Apart from the `citizens' rights', (which with the exception of the right to good 
administration (Art. 41)) - are all reserved for special categories of people, only Art. 15 
(Freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work) distinguishes between EU 
citizens and citizens from third States. Moreover, to address criticisms that the Charter has 
failed to adhere to the principle of universality by ascribing fewer rights to non-citizens of the 
EU than the EU citizens, these should be seen in the perspective of redefining Union 
citizenship based on nationality towards citizenship based on participation. See Chapter Three 
of this Thesis, Section 5.3.1. pp. 97-99. 
159 See generally Russell-Johnston, L. "The ECHR and the EU Charter: Competing 
Supranational Mechanisms for Human Rights Protection? " in: Feus, K. (ed. ) (2000) An EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights: Texts and Commentaries, London: Federal Trust, 53-56. 
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speeds" (Speech delivered by judge Wildhaber, President of 
the European Court of Human Rights, 7 March 2000). 160 
Beyond that, the key to accession is to solve two problems currently faced by 
the EU in protecting fundamental rights and for which the Charter provides no 
solution. Explicitly: 
1) The possible divergence of interpretation of the ECHR by the ECJ and the 
ECtHR161 as both have jurisdiction, thus creating a situation of forum 
shopping, 162 
2) The absence of a procedure of direct external scrutiny by the ECtHR of the 
compatibility of acts of EU Institutions with the ECHR. At present such 
scrutiny might take place only indirectly in a case brought against an EU 
Member State163 whereas a formal external control would have a 
uniformity effect on the way in which rights guaranteed by the ECHR are 
interpreted in relation to the Member States and the Union itself. ' 64 
160 See Appendix to the Reply from the Committee of Ministers adopted at the 711`h meeting of 
the Ministers' Deputies (31s` May 2000) to Recommendation 1439 (2000) on the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, "Intervention made before the Ministers' 
Deputies", Rapporteur Group on relations between the Council of Europe and the European 
Union (GR 
- 
EU), p. 2. 
161 Note existing diverging interpretations in: C-374/87 Orkem v. Commission [1989] ECR 
3283, [1991] 4 CMLR 502; Funke v. France [1993] 16 EHRR 297; Series A, No. 256-A 
(1993). 
162 Note Matthews v. United Kingdom [1999] 28 EHRR 361; Pafitis and Others v. Greece 
[1999] 27 EHRR 566; C-159/90 Societyfor the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd 
(SPUL) v. Stephen Grogan and others [1991] ECR I -4685, [1991] 3 CMLR 849. 
163 Note Matthews v. United Kingdom supra note 157; Pafitis and Others v. Greece supra note 
157. 
164 See supra note 160, p. 4. 
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5.2.5. Section 5: The Charter as a component of an EU Multi-level 
Constitution 
Even though representatives of the Member States decided not to give the 
Charter formal constitutional rank by inserting it into the Treaties on which the 
Union is founded or by referring to it in Article 6(2) TEU, the Chartcr still 
serves as a supplement to a European multi-level constitution. It evokes, as 
shown above, the foundational values, principles and rights which the EU 
Member States have in common while respecting and protecting the diversity 
of constituent cultures, traditions and identities within the context of a civic- 
demos oriented relationship between the EU and its citizens. 165 
On top, it is constructed as an invitation to engage into constitution making on 
the side of citizens. By rendering clear the rights that citizens can make use, 
especially political ones, they might give themselves a political constitution. 
Filling petitions against the EU when an infringement takes place, for example, 
might signal the beginning of such a process. It also states that it does not 
confer any new competencies or tasks on the EU. 166 Such a language is 
obviously of constitutional character. It further becomes a political aspiration 
for exerting influence on future policies. This is particularly evident to the 
Commission's new approach to immigration where it states that the Charter 
may have an auditing effect. 
"The Charter 
... 
could provide a-reference for the development 
165 See Chapter Three of this Thesis, Section 5.6. pp. 112-116. 
'66 See Preamble of the Charter, fifth indent. 
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of the concept of civic citizenship in a particular Member State 
... 
for third country nationals. Enabling migrants to acquire 
such citizenship after a minimum period of years might be of a 
sufficient guarantee for many migrants to settle successfully 
into society or be a first step in the process of acquiring the 
nationality of the Member State concerned". 167 
Moreover, in its search for fundamental rights as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, the Court is inspired by 
the Charter so as to confirm that the fundamental rights, that it guarantees as 
general principles of Community law, are acceptable in the national legal 
orders. In its recent case law thus, (BECTU) v. Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry 168 which concerned a worker's entitlement to annual paid leave the 
Advocate General ("A. G. ") Tizzano concluded that the "Charter provides us 
with the most reliable and definitive confirmation of the fact that the right to 
paid annual leave constitutes a fundamental right". 169 Although the Court was 
more cautious in its approach, given that the reference document was the 1989 
Social Charter of Workers Relations, it was nevertheless more emphatic on the 
status of the right to annual paid leave which made Advocate General Tizzano 
to declare that: 
167 European Commission, Communication form the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament on a Community Immigration Policy, COM (2000) 757 final, 22 
November 2000, pp. 19-20. 
168 Case C-173/99 Broadcasting, Entertainment, Cinematographic and Theatre Union 
(BECTU) v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2001] ECR I- 4881. 
169 Ibid., Opinion of A. G. Tizzano delivered on 8 February 2001, para. 28. 
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"The entitlement of every worker to paid annual leave must be 
regarded as a particularly important principle of Community 
social law from which there can be no derogations and whose 
implementation by the competent national authorities must be 
confined within the limits expressly laid down by Directive 
93/104". 170 
It would appear from the Court's dictum, therefore, that it recognises the right 
as having become a customary Community law, 17' law which no derogation 
can be permitted and which national law cannot seek to restrain. 
While the Court was firstly inspired by the Charter as to the hierarchy of the 
above right in the Community legal order, it then used the Charter as a 
teleological tool for human rights protection where it has been concerned about 
interpreting and/or affirming fundamental rights. The method of introducing 
the Charter as such a tool has been adopted in subsequent cases. In 
Mannesmannröhren-Werke AG. v. Commission, 172 for example, a case which 
dealt with the right to refuse to provide answers that imply admission of an 
infringement of competition rules, the CFI recognised that the Charter could 
serve as an aid to interpretation of Community law and to that extent influence 
the development of case law. 173 Nevertheless, it did not use it as a wholly 
170 C-173/99 loc. cit. supra note 168, para. 43. 
171 Customary Community law can be defined as the corpus of legal norms that have been 
generally accepted as binding on members of a given community, and from which no 
derogation can be entertained. The validation of customary Community law, whenever such 
right be a contested issue, depends on the pronouncement of the Court of Justice. 
17 Case T-112/98 Mannesmannröhren-Werke AG v. Commission [2001] ECR II 
- 
729. 
173 Idem., para. 76 in relation to para. 15. 
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independent ground for challenging the validity of the contested Commission 
decision because the act was adopted before the Charter was proclaimed, that is 
7 December 2000. This position, however, still remains inconsistent with the 
Advocate-Generals' views for two other cases which refer to annulment actions 
on appeal to the ECJ, and so inevitably relate to measures adopted well before 
the Charter was agreed. 174 
The most profound opinion, yet, on the Charter as a process, which could result 
in a multi-level constitution for the EU has come from Advocate General Leger 
in the appealed case Council v. Heidi Hautala, 175 concerning access to 
documents. There, the Advocate General has vigorously pronounced that: 
"The clearly-expressed wish of the authors of the Charter not 
to endow it with binding legal force should not be overlooked. 
However, aside from any consideration regarding its 
legislative scope, the nature of the rights set down in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights precludes it from being 
regarded as a mere list of purely moral principles without 
consequences. [... ] The Charter has undeniably placed the 
rights, which form its subject matter at the highest level of 
values common to the Member States (para. 80). 
174 Opinion of A. G. Mischo in Joined Cases C-122/99 P and C-125/99 PDv. Council, [2001] 
ECR I- 4319, para. 97; Opinion of A. G. Jacobs in Case C-270/99 PZv. European Parliament, 
delivered on 22 March 2001, para. 40 (pending case). 
175 Opinion of A. G. Leger in Case C-353/99 P Council v. Heidi Hautala delivered on 10 July 
2001 (pending case). 
278 
CHAPTER SIX EU CONSTITUTIONALISM, AN ON-GOING PROCESS 
The sources of those rights, listed in the preamble to the 
Charter, are for the most part endowed with binding force 
within the Member States and the European Union (para. 82). 
As the solemnity of its form and the procedure which led to its 
adoption would give one to assume, the Charter was intended 
to constitute a privileged instrument for identifying 
fundamental rights. It is a source of guidance as to the true 
nature of the Community rules of positive law" (para. 83). 
5.2.5.1. What holds for the future? 
The cases that have just been mentioned including the opinions of Advocate 
Generals clearly suggest that the Charter is no longer a mere proclamation. 
Community Courts are indeed inspired by the Charter as to how they will 
interpret fundamental rights in the EU legal order. With reference to future 
developments, the author's estimation would be that the Community Courts 
would easily overcome the obstacle of non-bindness, simply by using the 
Charter as mere confirmation rather than legal basis of their rulings on 
fundamental rights issues. 176 It is well known that Courts are perfectly capable 
of playing with those notions. In other words, it is relatively easy for the Courts 
to characterise an element of law as mere confirmation of the Court's 
reasoning, whereas that element can be effectively the basis for the Court's 
decision, if we consider the above suggestions regarding the BECTU case. In 
regard to this perspective, therefore, the EU will gradually throw itself into 
176 Piet Eeckhout expresses the same idea: Eeckhout, P. (2000) "The Proposed EU Charter: 
Some Reflections on Its Effects in the Legal Systems of the EU and of its Member States" in: 
Feus, K. (ed. ) (2000) An EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: Texts and Commentaries, 
London: Federal Trust, 97-110, at 104-105. 
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constitutionalism through soft law, based principally on the Courts' 
jurisprudence. '77 
177 This view was also endorsed by Heidi Hautala, Finnish MEP. Interview with the author 
(Academy of European Law (ERA): Trier, Germany, 12 July 2001). 
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6. CONCLUSION 
Chapter Six has argued for an on-going process of EU constitutionalism. It has 
suggested that within the theory of a meta-national democracy functional 
constitution building and polity formation within and in relation to the EU 
should continue alongside any conceptual, theoretical and normative debate 
about the European Union's legitimate deficiencies. 178 In connection with this, 
it has put forward a model of a European multi-level constitution. 
The perspective of a European multi-level constitution viewed the Member 
States' constitutions and the Treaties constituting the EU, as a unity in 
substance and as a coherent institutional system, within which competence for 
action is divided among two or more levels. The issue was not about linking 
the different levels of `governance' but rather about creating avenues of 
participation and communication among the distinct ethno-nationally and 
culturally demoi in the affairs of the Euro-polity. 
In that respect, the drafting of the Charter completes the picture. To the extent 
that we adhere to a democratic concept of a meta-national multi-level 
constitution, the legitimacy credit required for writing the fundamental law of 
Europe can only be satisfied by direct legitimacy inputs. It was quite clear that 
a process like that experimented for the Convention is far more democratic 
than an ordinary IGC but still far from the normative ideal type. 
178 Craig, P. (2001) "Constitutions, Constitutionalism and the European Union", 7 European 
Law Journal 2, p. 125 at 150. 
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In addition to claims for an input legitimacy, the Charter was also said to 
reinforce social legitimacy. By institutionalising fundamental rights within the 
EU, it strengthens the credibility of commitments undertaken by the member 
polities to protect fundamental rights of all persons residing within their 
territory and makes their overriding importance and relevance more visible to 
the EU citizens. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE AND THE EU: 
CONSTRUCTING ACCOUNTABILITY 
"It is not a crisis... quite the contrary... it is the best thing that 
has happened to the course of European unity in many 
years.. 
. 
For the first time, democracy is breaking through at the 
European level 
... 
The resignation of the Commission... looks 
similar to the fall of a European national government that has 
lost its parliamentary majority". ' 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the debate for a written European Constitution, the issues of democratic 
accountability and transparency also come to the fore. 
As the European integration project grows and becomes more deeply 
ingrained, affecting many aspects of our lives, EU citizens need to be assured 
by means of a constitutional text that they have a right to know how and why 
decisions are made and implemented (i. e. the right to have rights in the Euro- 
polity). 
1 Reginald Dale in the "International Herald Tribune" (19 March 1999) as quoted in Piris, J. 
(2000) "Does the European Union have a Constitution? Does it Need One? ", under Title "flow 
Could the Constitutional Charter of the European Union be transformed into a Constitution like 
that of a State and does this look feasible? " Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 5/2000, 
p. I< URL hgp: //www. ieanmonne! proizram. orR_/pal? ers/00/000501-03. litml >. 
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Linked to this is the ability to require the Community administration to give an 
account of actions taken in the name of public interest. These are very 
important points if one cogitates that in the EU political system there is `no 
government' which is accountable via an electoral process and both the 
Commission and the Council are using practices which are far from transparent 
or amenable to opening their documents to the EU citizens. 
It might be the case that in the collective exercise of political leadership in the 
Council, the governments can claim legitimacy indirectly via national general 
elections. However, the legitimacy of the political leadership role of the 
Commission is more problematic, as this has already been proved in the recent 
allegations of 1999 for fraud, financial mismanagement, nepotism and cover- 
up which indisputably revealed the unaccountable and undemocratic character 
of the EU. 
To restore the real parameters of these issues, however, this Chapter will give a 
new perspective, and in order to achieve this, it will move into two directions. 
First, it will maintain that this institutional crisis which has thrown Brussels 
into deep confusion and challenged a culture of complacency and a lack of 
accountability proves to be an excellent opportunity to improve democracy in 
the EU. Second, by introducing two models of individual and joint 
responsibility, it will outline a set of mechanisms that could increase the 
accountability of the Commission to the EP, and so favour improved powers in 
the latter as necessary for its political legitimacy. 
284 
CHAPTER SEVEN CONSTRUCTING EUACCOUNTA1ILITY 
2. THE FALL AND RENEWAL OF TIIE COMMISSION 
2.1. Introduction 
Following the publication of a report by a Committee of Independent Experts 
("CIE") on 15 March 1999,2 the Santer Commission imploded in ignominy and 
mass resignation. It was the most dramatic week in the forty-two year history 
of the European Community. This unprecedented act left the EU without its 
`executive' confronting a number of important issues: the negotiations on 
enlargement to the East, the future financing of the Union, the Agenda 2000 
programme3 and the trade dispute with the USA over bananas. 
From a practical standpoint, the Commission would have to be re-appointed in 
order for the EU to continue to function and in the meantime the Santer 
Commission would continue in a caretaker role in accordance with Article 201 
EC. 
2.2. The motion of censure 
The Commission was subjected to a motion of censure over allegations of 
fraud in January 1999, but Members of the European Parliament ("MEPs") 
voted against dismissing the entire body of Commissioners. In fact, the 
Commission survived the motion of censure by a margin of only 293 votes to 
232 (i. e. with fewer than half the MEPs voting in favour of the Commission) 4 
2 Committee of Independent Experts, First Report on Allegations regarding Fraud, 
Mismanagement and Nepotism in the European Commission, 15 March 1999; Main sources: < 
URL http: //www. europarl. eu. int/dR3/experts/en/default. htm > 
< URL http: //www. europarl. eu. int/d23/experts/default en. htm > 
<URLhttp"//www. europarl. eu. int/dg3/experts/reportl en. htm>. 
3 In particular, the reform of the Common Agriculture Policy. 
° Tomlcins, A. (1999) "Responsibility and Resignation in the European Commission", 62 
Modern Law Review, p. 744 at 746. 
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The price of survival was the Commission's reluctant agreement to the 
establishment of a special CIE to examine independently the allegations which 
had been made and to report back to the Parliament within two months. 5 Thus, 
a subsequent EP resolution called for a committee of independent experts to 
look into specific allegations of financial mismanagement, 6 the conclusions of 
which Mr Santer pledged to respect. 
2.3. The CIE and its composition 
A five-member CIE, the so-called "Committee of the Wise %97 was 
designated by Parliament's Conference of Presidents; the leaders of the 
political groups attending a meeting on 27 January 1999. This followed 
consultations with the Commission and was in accordance with the Resolution 
of 14 January 1999, adopted by the EP by 319 votes to 157, with 54 
abstentions. 8 Out of the five people who were appointed to the Committee, 
only three acted as auditors whereas the rest were lawyers and former members 
of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights and the European 
Court of Justice respectively. 
The choice for such a Convention was appropriate in terms of moral ethos. The 
Committee might have the aim to arrive at an independent, authoritative and 
final view as to the allegations that had already been made in Parliament and 
S See summary of the parliamentary debate held on 11-01-99 on the 1996 budget discharge 
- 
The Motion of Censure < URL htW: //w-wNv. europarl-eu. int/dg3/experts/en/n9901112, htm >. 
6 European Parliament, Resolution of 14 January 1999 on Improving the Financial 
Management of the Commission, B4-0065,0109 and 0110/99: 
< URL http: //www. europarl. eu. int/dg3/experts/en/reso I 4en. htm >. 
7 House of Commons Library (1999) "The resignation of the European Commission", 99 
Research Paper 32, p. 13 < URL http: //www. parliament. uk >. 
8 Ibid. 
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elsewhere. However, at the same time, it had a general interest in protecting the 
rights of the Commissioners individually though it was not an investigative 
Committee in the sense of it doing its own detective work. 9 
2.3.1. The CIE's assigned tasks 
The primary task of the Committee, as defined in the terms of reference laid 
down by Parliament at its sitting of 14 January, was to seek 
"to establish to what extent the Commission, as a body, or 
Commissioners individually, bear specific responsibility for 
the recent examples of fraud, mismanagement or nepotism 
raised in Parliamentary discussions, or in the allegations, 
which have arisen in those discussions". 10 
The Committee began its report by defining those primary terms. Thus, fraud 
was taken to mean "intentional acts or omissions tending to harm the financial 
interests of the Communities", 11 including the misappropriation of funds. 
Mismanagement was said to be a broader concept and encompassed "serious or 
persistent infringements of the principles of sound administration, and, in 
particular, applied to acts or omissions allowing or encouraging fraud or 
irregularities to occur or persist". 12 Nepotism was used to refer to "favouritism 
shown to relatives or friends, especially in appointments to desirable positions 
9 The Committee had no formal investigative powers at all. It derived its authority solely from 
the agreement of the Parliament and the Commission, and saw itself as a non-Community 
temporary advisory committee operating by consent. 
10 See the full text of the terms of reference at: 
< URL hqp: //www. curol2ari. eu-int/dg3/experts/en/mandaten. htm. >. 
CIE First Report loc. cit. supra note 2, para. 1.4.2. 
12 Idem., para. 1.4.3. 
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which are not based on merit or justice". 13 The Committee accordingly 
examined six specific cases: tourism, the Mediterranean programmes, 14 the 
European Community Humanitarian Office ("ECHO"), the Leonardo da Vinci 
programme, 15 the Commission Security Office, nuclear safety, and specific 
allegations of favouritism. 
2.4. The sources for the allegations of fraud and mismanagement 
Allegations of fraud and mismanagement against the Commission had been the 
topic of great concern for some considerable time. They came to light from 
different sources. Newspaper reports revealed instances of fraud in the 
Common Agricultural Policy. MEPs found instances of mismanagement of 
certain Community policies such as tourism. The EP threatened to freeze ten 
percent of the Commissioners' salaries, given the Commission's painfully slow 
rate of response to such allegations. 16 
By the end of the 1990s, the Commission's own anti-fraud unit, known as 
UCLAF, 17 disclosed in greater details the ways in which Community funds 
were being misused, for example, the Commission's humanitarian aid budget 
for the years 1993-1995. In its report for the financial year 1997, the European 
Court of Auditors ("ECA") also found instances where money had been 
wasted, lost, embezzled or unspent, for example in the case of repairing and 
making safe the nuclear power plants of the old Soviet bloc. It further 
13 Idem., para. 1.4.4. 
14 programmes for strengthening political and economic co-operation with the Southern 
Mediterranean countries. 
15 A five-year vocational training programme. 
16 Tomkins, A. loc. cit supra note 4, p. 744. 
11 Unite de Co-ordination de la Lutte Anti-Fraude. 
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complained of the Commission's "inaccurate or incomplete disclosure in the 
financial statements of fixed assets, debtors, cash and off balance shcct 
commitments". 18 
Another source of information on many of the above allegations was a report 
by Paul van Buitenen, one of the Commission's internal auditors. He passed to 
the EP and the ECA a dossier in which he brought a number of charges against 
senior Commission officials for attempting to suppress investigations into 
fraud. He further made a number of claims that officials in the Commission 
were in the habit of awarding lucrative contracts to family contacts and 
associates. The most famous example of nepotism became the case of the 
French Commissioner Edith Cresson's dentist who was appointed to the 
position of a `visiting scientist' in the Commission. 19 
On the basis of a number of cases of fraud and malfunctioning, it appeared that 
the Commission was never accountable due to the absence of an effective 
scrutiny mechanism. It had never been accountable or asked for an explanation 
of actions taken and, where appropriate, to take political responsibility for such 
actions, in other words to be judged, and remedy mistakes. As UCLAF 
intimated in 1998 many of the instances of financial mismanagement did not 
come to light previously because the Commission had not kept the ECA 
properly informed. 20 
18 The quotations are taken from the ECA's Information Note on the Annual Report of the 
ECA concerning Financial Year 1997 < URL http: //www. eca. eu. int/EN/menu/htm >. 
19 CIE First Report loc. cit. supra note 2, paras. 8.1.2-8.1.36. 
20 House of Commons Library loc. cit. supra note 7, p. 11. 
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3. THE ROLE OF THE EP 
3.1. Introduction 
The role of the EP in this affair of `misleading management', followed by the 
en masse resignation of the Commission following the report by the CIE, was 
considerable. An examination of the censure motion and Commission's 
resignation may well demonstrate the increasing ability of the EP to control 
and push the Commission to act more effectively from now on. 
3.2. The Commission's resignation 
The resignation of the Santer Commission did not destroy the EU as was 
initially asserted, but rather improved both the political legitimacy and supra- 
national role of the EP. Its success to use all the procedures that it had at its 
disposal, (Articles 193,201 and 215 EC, including Rules 32 and 33 of its Rules 
of Procedure) and bring to an end its crusade against fraud by employing an 
external advisory committee (CIE) has two-fold aims. First, it shows that the 
pre-March 1999 European Commission represented a closed, secret, non- 
transparent and, ultimately unaccountable Institution in the EU political 
system, and, second, it supports the argument for an increased accountability of 
the Commission to the EP, and subsequently, to the European public which it 
directly represents. 
3.3. The censure motion 
Furthermore, it can be suggested that the 1999 censure vote and the resignation 
of the entire Commission marks the most serious blow to the credibility of the 
institutional architecture of the Community since as early as 1958 in the light 
of the following observations. First, the censure motion which for a long time 
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had been considered one of the central features of the EP 
- 
Commission 
relationship was never implemented completely by the EP before 1999, and has 
been thriftily tabled since 1979.21 Second, the prosecution of fraud and 
corruption on a pan-European base is difficult to be achieved in terms of both 
ways and means. 
3.4. Reasons to violate norms, rules and laws in the EU 
At this stage it might be important to recognise and outline some of the main 
reasons that can lead public representatives to violate norms, rules and laws 
through the means of illegal transactions and operations. 
Firstly, there is a fundamental problem in the Community's internal 
institutional arrangement. In particular, the weakness of a true representative 
body (for example, the EP) to legislate and implement necessary institutional 
controls over the activity of bureaucrats. 
Secondly, the problem of Commission mismanagement, discovered and 
validated by an independent Committee, is closely connected to the collective 
nature of responsibility within the Commission. While the structure and 
general activity of the Commission presupposes the reflection of views of 
individual members of the Commission, in terms of policy-making and policy- 
implementation, the environment of broad and barely-identified collective 
responsibility contributes greatly to the problem of the Commission's lack of 
21 Muntean, A. (2000) "The European Parliament's Political Legitimacy and the Commission's 
'Misleading Management': Towards a 'Parliamentarian' European Union? ", 4 European 
Integration online Papers (EIoP) 5, p. 10 < URL http: //eiop. or. at/eiop/texte/2000-005. htm >. 
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accountability and legitimacy. Indeed, in the Committee's view, the 
Commissioners did not have sufficient control over their section of the 
administration. There were no cases found in which Commissioners were 
directly or personally involved in fraudulent activities. Only protestations by 
the Commissioners that they were unaware of the problems which were later 
brought to light and were 
"tantamount to an admission of a loss of control by the 
political authorities over the Administration that they are 
supposedly running". 22 
Additionally, there were some 
"instances found where the Commissioners or the Commission 
as a whole bore some responsibility for instances of fraud, 
irregularities or mismanagement in their services or areas of 
special responsibility". 23 
Thirdly, the whole bureaucratic system of the Commission itself greatly 
contributed to the resignation of the Institution in March 1999. Undoubtedly, it 
was isolated from the public as a whole and operated in a rather self-created 
culture of silence and internal solidarity against any attempt of external 
u CIE First Report loc. cit. supra note 2, para. 9.2.2. 
23 Idem., para. 9.2.3. 
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scrutiny, particularly the scrutiny of the EP. 24 In this context, the resignation of 
the Commission was in some way a reaction to the public's demand for a more 
transparent, publicly accessible and openly effective European Commission; in 
other words a kind of `public-face accountability'. 
3.5. The success of the EP 
The crisis also showed that the EP was actually successful in securing 
accountability. It obtained the technical experience to investigate, vote and 
ultimately force the resignation of individual Commissioners, including the 
Commission President. It was for the first time able to scrutinise and exercise 
strong administrative sanctions against another European Institution. This is 
particularly important due to the fact that the powers of the EP increased, not 
only in the legislative domain through the co-decision procedure (Article 251 
EC), but also in the area of exercising effective control and keeping the 
bureaucratic body accountable for its actions. 25 
Additionally, it demonstrated its ability to hold accountable and control 
individual Commissioners rather than the entire body. This factor is worth 
mentioning because the issue of individual responsibility which involves the 
ability to consider some members of the Commission culpable in misleading 
activities and fraud had not been previously addressed. It was only afterwards 
that this issue was reappraised in the administrative environment of the Prodi 
Commission. 
24 For example, it never informed the EP of the inadequacies in resources 
- 
especially staff 
- 
in 
order to launch and undertake the MED programmes and ECHO policies: CEI First Report loc. 
cit. supra note 2, paras. 9.2.5-9.4.6. 
25 Muntean, A. loc. cit. supra note 21, p. 5. 
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4. THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF TIIE CIE 
4.1. Introduction 
In the light of fraud and financial irregularities, the CIE suggested a number of 
recommendations aimed at resolving particular weaknesses found in the 
Commission's codes of conduct, including the Staff Regulations. 26 Its exercise 
was based on the premise that it was not possible to legislate for a culture of 
integrity, responsibility and accountability, but that it was possible to take 
action to nudge an organisational culture into a positive direction by 
identifying its core values. 
The Committee's recommendations concerned three main subject areas 
(para. 7.1.5): 
" 
Standards of personal conduct that apply to Commissioners, their cabinets, 
director generals and the officials working under them. 
9 The chain of responsibility from the Commission President, through the 
Commission itself to individual Commissioners and their cabinets, thence 
to the senior levels of the hierarchy and the officials and other agents below 
them. 
26 Committee of Independent Experts, Second Report on Reform of the Commission 
- 
Analysis 
of Current Practice and Proposals for Tackling Mismanagement, Irregularities and Fraud, 
Volume Two (2), Chapter 7: Integrity, responsibility and accountability in European political 
and administrative life, paras 7.16.1-7.16.19,10 September 1999: 
Main sources: < URL hM: //www. curoparl. eu. int/dg3/experts/en/default. ht > 
< URL http: //www. europarl. eu. int/d23/experts/default en. htm > 
< URL htt-p: //www. europarl. eu. int/dR3/experts-/l)df/rep2-2en. pdf >. 
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9 Institutional accountability of the Commission, Commissioners and 
officials vis-ä-vis other democratic Institutions of the EU, mainly the EP, 
both positively (in terms of giving account) and negatively (in terms of 
being held to account). 
With regard to the first area, the Committee considered that the Codes of 
Conduct, as elaborated by the Commission, remain insufficient and are not yet 
backed up by the necessary legal framework (para. 7.16.1). It therefore 
suggested that the Code of Conduct for Commissioners should redefine the 
concept of collective responsibility so as to encompass not only a prohibition 
on calling into question decisions adopted by the college, but also the right and 
the obligation of each Commissioner to inform the others (para. 7.16.2). 
Additionally, every Commissioner must ensure that his/her cabinet is multi- 
national in character and rules must be introduced in order to exclude any 
unduly favourable treatment of his/her cabinet members at the end of their 
service (para. 7.16.3). Full transparency and elimination of the possibility of 
favouritism based on personal relationships must be ensured (para. 7.16.4). 
Commissioners are also required to carry out their duties with complete 
political neutrality and not use any undue influence in order to favour fellow 
nationals or wider national interests as they can become in serious breach of 
their obligation of independence, and therefore be subject to appropriate 
sanctions (para. 7.16.5). 
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Furthermore, an independent standing "Committee on Standards in Public 
Life" should be established in order to formulate, supervise and, where 
necessary, provide advice on ethics and standards of conduct in the EU 
Institutions (para. 7.16.9). All Commission staff should undergo professional 
training aimed at raising awareness of ethical issues and providing guidance on 
how to deal with practical situations as they arise (para. 7.16.10). Finally, the 
rights and obligations of officials to report instances of suspected criminal acts 
and other reprehensible behaviour to the appropriate authorities outside the 
Commission, should be created in the Staff Regulations and the necessary 
mechanisms put in place (para. 7.6.8-1 1). 
In respect of the second area issues, the Committee deemed that the attribution 
of responsibilities and chain of delegation between the Commission, single 
Commissioners and the departments are ill-defined and ill-understood by those 
concerned. Thus, it proposed that each Commissioner should be responsible for 
both policy formulation and the implementation of policy by his/her 
department(s). Only in this manner, will the Commissioner be answerable to 
the Commission as a whole for the actions of the department(s), and held 
accountable to the EP. As for the officials in the departments, they shall answer 
to the director-generals which shall in turn be accountable to the competent 
Commissioner (para. 7.16.1 1). 
Moreover, the Secretary General should be regarded as the prime interface 
between the political and administrative levels of the Commission. In all 
circumstances, he/she should ensure that decisions of the Commission are 
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effectively followed up by the administration (para. 7.16.12). As far as the 
members of cabinets are concerned, these should not be permitted to speak on 
behalf of their Commissioners. The primary function of cabinets is to provide 
information and to facilitate communication both vertically (between the 
Commissioner and the services) and horizontally (between Commissioners). In 
no way should the cabinet prevent direct communication with the 
Commissioner but rather stimulate such communication (para. 7.16.13). 
Also, with respect to the third subject matter, the Committee believed that the 
concepts of political responsibility and accountability remain unclear and the 
mechanisms for their practical application inadequate. To this end, it 
recommended that the Commission should be under a constitutional duty to be 
accountable to the EP. It should be fully open with Parliament and provide it 
with complete, accurate and truthful information and documentation so as to 
carry out its institutional role, as for example in the discharge procedure. 27 
Once acts and decisions have been taken, they should be made as publicly 
known as possible, including the processes by which the Commission arrived 
at those. Access to information and documentation should only be refused in 
exceptional circumstances and in accordance with procedures agreed between 
the institutions (para. 7.16.14). 
27 Mr Blak, EP Rapporteur on the 1999 General Discharge has suggested that in recent years 
the discharge procedure have become an informal vote of confidence in the European 
Commission. The present Commission has been very co-operative and more open than the 
Santer Commission. EP Rapporteurs have received more information and documentation than 
even before in the history of the discharge procedure: Press Release 27/03/2001: EP/1999 
Discharge < URL http: //www europarl eu int/pes/Es/News/press release/prsO2678 htm >. 
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As for the enforcement of the individual political responsibility of 
Commissioners, it was recommended that this should be a matter for the 
Commission's President. Yet, in any case, the President should be empowered 
to dismiss individual Commissioners, modify their responsibilities and take any 
other measure in respect of the composition, organisation of the Commission 
that he/she deems necessary in order to enforce political responsibility. 
Successively, the President of the Commission shall be accountable to the EP 
for any action or inaction (para. 7.16.15). 
A further recommendation was that any Commissioner who knowingly 
misleads Parliament, or omits to correct at his/her earliest convenience 
inadvertently erroneous information provided to the EP should be expected to 
offer his/her resignation from the Commission. In the absence of such an offer, 
only the President of the Commission can take appropriate action (7.16.16). 
Although the management of Community programmes, and in particular all 
questions of financial management are the sole responsibility of the 
Commission, the latter should be able to refuse to assume new tasks for which 
administrative tasks are not available and cannot be provided through 
redeployment. That is why Council and Parliament should be bound by the 
principle of budgetary discipline to take into account the resource requirements 
attached to any policy initiative before they make a request from the 
Commission (para. 7.16.18). 
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4.2. The CIE's new principles upon recommendations 
Upon a closer examination of the above recommendations, it is very obvious 
that the work of the Committee makes us think of new principles, the future 
direction and structure of `governance' in the EU. Such a new principle is the 
notion of `ethical responsibility'. 
While the founding Treaties are not wholly silent on the question of 
responsibility, they are rather terse. Article 213(2) EC provides that: 
"The Members of the Commission, shall, in the general 
interest of the Community, be completely independent in the 
performance of their duties.. 
. 
They shall refrain from any 
action incompatible with their duties". 
Article 216 EC further provides that: 
"If any Member of the Commission no longer fulfils the 
conditions required for the performance of his duties or if he 
has been guilty of serious misconduct, the ECJ may, on 
application by the Council or the Commission, compulsorily 
retire him". 
It is notable in both circumstances that the EP has no standing at all to bring 
such an application. However, this is not to say that the EP has no power. 
Article 201 EC provides, for example, that: 
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"If a motion of censure on the activities of the Commission is 
tabled before the EP [and] 
... 
is carried out by a two-thirds 
majority of the votes cast, representing a majority of the 
Members of the EP, the Members of the Commission shall 
resign as a body". 
Hence, it is clear that the Treaties envisage both a `legal responsibility' which 
is owed by the Commission to the ECJ, and a `political responsibility' which 
the Commission owes to the EP. 
Nevertheless, the events of March 1999 fit uncomfortably into any category. 
There was no legal action, and no motion of censure was adopted in 
Parliament. Does this then exhaust the Commission's responsibilities? 
The answer from the CIE was in the negative. In an important passage of its 
first report, the Committee stated that: 
"Reprehensible conduct of the Commission as a body, or of 
Commissioners individually [... ] obviously involves the 
responsibility of the Commission as a whole, or of individual 
Commissioners". 28 
This responsibility, as the Committee later explained, dealt with `ethical 
responsibility', or "responsibility for not behaving in accordance with proper 
28 CIE First Report loc. cit. supra note 2, para. 1.6.2. 
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standards in public life". 29 This `ethical responsibility' was thus regarded by 
the Committee to exist in addition to the Treaty obligations of legal and 
political responsibility which the Commission owes to the ECJ and the EP 
respectively. To this effect, the work of the Committee marks a peculiarly great 
moment in the continuing construction of a multi-level European Constitution, 
as discussed in Chapter Six. What the Committee was reaching for in its first 
report, and further elaborated in its second one, was the generation of 
principles of constitutional responsibility. Principles, in other words, that 
transcend and underpin the narrower Treaty-based obligations provided for in 
Articles 201,213 and 216 EC. 
5. THE FUTURE DIRECTION AND STRUCTURE OF EUROPEAN 
'GOVERNANCE' 
5.1. Introduction 
Generating principles 
- 
or at least expectations 
- 
of responsibility is but the first 
step in the establishment of an open, efficient, accountable and thus democratic 
European Commission. A central issue is, however, to identify to whom any 
obligations of constitutional responsibility should be owed under the new 
theoretical framework of this Thesis. Four principal alternatives have been 
suggested with a view to the future direction and structure of `governance' in 
the EU. 
29 Ibid. 
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5.2. The four alternatives of constitutional responsibility 
a) to the European Parliament, 
b) to the European Court of Justice, 
c) to some newly elected ad hoc body, and 
d) to the Commission's President. 30 
The above are not mutually exclusive alternatives. Hence, some combination 
might be thought to be a better solution. 
As for the first alternative, making the Commissioners individually and 
collectively responsible to the EP, there is a daunting challenge to be 
encountered. This proposal requires very wide and sweeping constitutional and 
operational changes which may lead to the fusion of powers between the 
Commissioners and the Parliamentarians. While this is the system that features 
prominently in the British constitutional order, this does not mean to say that 
this model can be transposed to the EU level. On the contrary, if this system 
works well, as it does in Britain, Germany and Denmark where cabinet 
ministers do not have to be members of the Parliament, although most of them 
are, it is because there is a huge mixture in terms of personnel in governments. 
In Britain, for instance, every member of the executive (all 120 ministers) is 
also a member of one of the two Houses of Parliament. The separation of 
constitutional power is fused. A hereditary peer cannot sit in the House of 
Commons but may serve as a government minister in the House of Lords. 
Conversely, an individual, not directly elected to the House of Commons, may 
3o Tomkins, A. loc. cit supra note 4, pp. 760-762. 
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serve as a government minister and be chosen by the Prime Minister to serve at 
Cabinet level. 
Apparently, this is not the case in the EU, and any development of the 
constitutional principles of responsibility in the UK will have to be viewed in 
this context of fusion rather than separation of powers. Yet, even if we arc 
ready to develop straightforward constitutional principles taken from pre- 
existing norms and practices at the national level, we must be aware that the 
emergent European order should remain exactly European and not a British 
`mark-two model'. 
As to the second alternative, some might suggest that the reason why the 
Commission is insufficiently effective in its consideration of fraud, 
mismanagement and favouritism is that it does not have to account in law for 
its administrative behaviour. If there were some well-organised or more 
sophisticated system of administrative law and of legal responsibility, there 
would be less concern about the Commission running amok. However, this 
argument should be challenged. 
Having the ECJ enforce a Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, 31 or 
Standards in Public Life, would be a backward-looking step for a number of 
reasons. First, because access to the Court is difficult and expensive and 
matters of locus standi should be dealt with as well. Second, these are issues of 
31 ANNEX, `Annex' 
- 
Code of Good Administrative Behaviour for the Staff of the European 
Commission in their Relations with the Public, Commission Decision of 17 October 2000 
amending its Rules of Procedure (2000/633/EC, ECSC, Euratom) [OJ 2000, No. L 267/63] 
< URL http //euroýa eu. int/comm/secretariat/ general/code/ docs/code en pdf>. 
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essentially political and administrative nature, rather than strictly legal ones, 
and therefore they call for administrative regulation away from the relatively 
narrow confines of the ECJ. Third, the problems of public administration 
which the cases investigated by the CIE illustrate are situations where judicial 
mechanisms tend not to be so effective at reviewing. In essence, the problems 
on which the Committee focused were associated mainly with powers of 
dominium inside the Commission (i. e. financial and human resources and the 
granting of contracts) rather than with powers of imperium, the notion of rule 
making. Nevertheless, judicial review as a technique of administrative law is 
based on an image of reviewing powers of imperium, for example, the legality 
of Commission decisions which intend to produce legal effects vis-a-vis third 
parties, rather than of dominium). 32 Such a review is, therefore, not in a prime 
position to lead the charge in holding the Commission responsible for the way 
in which the attribution of powers between the Commission, single 
Commissioners and the departments were exercised. 
The third alternative is to develop an ad hoc body in order to monitor or 
supervise good administrative behaviour. This proposition was also included in 
the recommendations of the CIE in its second report (Recommendation 81, 
para. 7.7.1-5) with regard to the Committee on Standards in Public Life. It 
certainly makes more sense in the broader context of EU public administration 
than enhancing the role of the EP would undertake. Yet, however attractive it 
looks, it has still not taken shape. 33 The problem to establish such a Committee 
32 See Art. 230 EC. 
33 Note that the target date for an inter-institutional agreement, December 2000 has already 
passed: European Commission, Reforming the Commission -A White Paper (Part 11), Action 
Plan, vol. II, COM (2000) 200 final, 1 March 2000, p. 3. 
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via an inter-institutional agreement might lie in the fact that the details for 
creation would need to be carefully worked out. For instance, who would 
appoint such a Committee; who would refer matters to the Committcc; to 
whom would the Committee report; how would such a body relate to the 
existing Institutions (Court of Auditors and EU Ombudsman), also entrusted to 
secure accountability in the EU, and so on. Definitely, these issues arc of detail 
rather than principle, but still need to be addressed as they bring considerable 
legal and operational changes in the EU `governance'. 
All of which leads to the final alternative: namely, to make the Commissioners 
responsible to the Commission's President who could perhaps then 
himself/herself be responsible to the EP not only upon appointment, but also 
during the course of his/her tenancy. In many ways, this model would reflect 
the practice 
- 
if not the theory 
- 
of contemporary British government. Yet, as 
the European "constitutional" power between the Commission and the 
Parliament is not fused but rather shared, it might be impractical to envision the 
EP copying the UK tradition of ministerial responsibility with each 
Commissioner being called to give an oral account every four weeks or so. 
However, it is less unlikely, perhaps, to imagine a scenario by which the 
Commission President is called to give an oral account to each parliamentary 
plenary session. An hour, for example, could be set aside during each such 
plenary during which time the President might be asked a number of questions 
of particular interest to MEPs about current events in the Commission. 
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It might well be argued that making Commissioners responsible only to their 
President without adding any element of external control is not likely to go far 
enough in securing a sufficiently accountable Commission. Nevertheless, if the 
President were forced to place his/her political neck on the block every month 
or so in Strasbourg that might encourage him/her to institute closer checks and 
controls within the Commission. And, in fact, it would make sure that never 
again would a Commission President be placed in the awkward position that 
Mr Santer found himself while trying to defend Mme Cresson. 
The above proposal should not be seen as over-centralising the executive 
decision-making structures in the Commission as the academic observer, Adam 
Tomkins, is afraid of. 34 Rather, it should be regarded as an effective and 
sufficient exercise of the White Paper's `good governance' which is based on 
ensuring both individual and collective accountability. 35 Indeed, this is a very 
strong argument if one considers that before the resignation crisis the 
Commission has only been accountable to the EP as a collegium, thus entailing 
the fall of the whole body for the faults and omissions of some Commissioners. 
Even if after the resignation it becomes clearer that censorship of individuals is 
essential, we can hardly find another way to achieve this at the EU level. The 
Commission is not a government in a traditional sense. It is rather a form of an 
executive legislature which has specific supra-national powers in specific 
policy areas. It is at the same time not a separate executive authority in the EU 
34 Tomkins, A. loc. cit. supra note 4, p. 761. 
35 European Commission, European Governance 
-A White Paper, COM (2001) 428,25 July 
2001, pp. 10,31-34. 
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system of `governance', though it tends to become one under the White 
Paper, 36 but rather a `second executive' which shares governmental 
responsibilities with the Council of Ministers and legislative ones with the 
EP. Consequently, a common democratic scheme in which government or 37 
members of a government are accountable to the parliament cannot be 
adequately applied to the EU system. 38 
Furthermore, the fear of centralising the executive decision-making structures 
in the Commission is not real. With regard to the new Treaty provisions of 
Nice (Article 217 EC) the powers of the President, for example the right to 
hire, fire and reshuffle, are not untrammelled. If the President requests the 
resignation of individual Commissioners or wants to appoint Vice-Presidents, 
he/she should, firstly, get the collective approval of the Commission who 
would have to ensure that the request for resignation is not based on a simple 
difference of views. Thus the authority of the Commission President is not 
unlimited. Additionally, the Article provides that the allocation of 
responsibilities amongst the Members of the Commission is not a matter of 
who has the power to do so, but is rather an issue of good administration, and 
in particular, of resources and internal organisation. 
36 Idem., 34; See also Chapter Two of this Thesis, Section 3.1. p. 24. 
37 Muntean, A. loc. cit supra note 21, pp. 9-10. 
38 Ibid. 
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COUNTA8rr ITr 
5.3. An individual parliamentary accountability: Is it really hard to be 
achieved? 
5.3.1. Introduction 
Certainly, an individual accountability for the Commissioners to the 
Commission's President who will in turn be responsible to the EP can be seen 
to be greater progress in enhancing the democratic dimension of the 
Commission. However, within the theory of a meta-national democracy, there 
is an opportunity to push things even further. 
5.3.2. National constitutional laws and models of political responsibility 
If we look at the national constitutional laws of the EU Member States, we will 
observe that there are two models of responsibility. The first model is that of 
ministerial responsibility adopted, for example, by Ireland, France and the UK. 
It provides that ministers are responsible to their National Assemblies for the 
acts carried out by commission or omission within their competence. If there is 
a motion of censure against them they should resign whereas the Prime 
Minister and the other members of the Government remain in office. 39 The 
second model is that of joint responsibility which, for example, Italy, Greece 
and Portugal use in their respective systems. It states that if a Prime Minister 
resigns from office because of an impeachment, then the other members of the 
Government shall be deemed to have resigned from office too. Conversely, if a 
Minister no longer enjoys the confidence of the national Parliament he/she 
should be dismissed. Thus it offers both individual and collective censurability. 
39 The resignation of Michael Haseltine and Leon Brittan over the 'Westland Affair' in 1986 
can be recalled. 
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5.3.3. Building a working model of European accountability 
Transposing the practice into the theory, the author's suggestion is that such a 
model of joint responsibility could well exist at the EU level through some 
form of inter-institutional agreement. For example, Commissioners would be 
directly responsible to the EP for their acts or omissions within their sphere of 
competence. 40 Consequently, the EP would retain control of the 
Commissioners and be able to take action if and when the need arose. In 
addition, if a motion of censure were to take place against the Commission 
President, the Commission would have to resign en masse because of the 
principle of `collegiality'41 which is intended to produce discipline in support 
of the decisions taken. 
The proposition for parliamentary accountability, whereby the Commissioners 
are responsible both individually and collectively to the EP in such a context, 
appears to endorse quite successfully what accountability should mean in 
today's world. In other words, 
"Rulers (in this case, Commissioners individually + 
Commission (EC) as a whole) should be liable to be required 
to give an account or explanation of actions to the people (EP), 
who should be the ultimate judges of their performance. Where 
appropriate, they should suffer the consequences, take the 
40 Such proposals to overcome the problems of bureaucratic Europe by means of a directly 
elected Parliament to which the Commission would be responsible are not new and rather date 
back to 1970s: see Petland, C. (1973) International Theory and European Integration, London: 
Faber and Faber, 182-183. 
41 Spence, D. (2000) "Plus ca Change, Plus C'est la Meme Chose? Attempting to Reform the 
European Commission", 7 Journal of European Public Policy 1, p. 1 at 6-10. 
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blame or undertake to make amendments if it should appcar 
that errors have been made. In this sense, accountability is 
closely related to responsibility, transparency, answerability 
and responsiveness, terms which are often used 
interchangeably". 42 
42 The definition of accountability is a synthesis of the meanings that have been found in the 
literature: Lord, C. (1998) Democracy in the European Union, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic 
Press, 15; Oliver, D. (1991) Government in the United Kingdom: The Search for 
Accountability, Effectiveness and Citizenship, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 22,28. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
The resignation of the EC in 1999 due to `misleading management' not only 
emphasised that the power of the EP has significantly increased, but also that 
immediate action should be taken so as to reinforce the political and 
democratic dimensions of the EU. Thus, innovations upon innovations have 
been proposed in order to improve the situation regarding the Commission's 
internal composition and external accountability; thus showing that the issue of 
accountability at the EU level is an open-ended process. 
As part of this process, President Prodi, together with his new team of 
Commissioners, has started to launch an internal reorganisation and a 
reformation of the Commission and its departments based on the 
recommendations of the CIE. According to the Action Plan set out in the White 
Paper on the Reform of the Commission, 43 the old system of regulation and 
supra-national policy making which represented an environment that was very 
difficult to monitor and supervise on a regular basis belongs to the past. Areas 
such as budget and money transfer, structural funds allocation, and auditing 
procedures which also represented particular difficulties in identifying the 
transparency of Commission's activities have come under the rigid scrutiny of 
the newly-established Planning and Co-ordination group on Internal Audit. 44 
43 European Commission, Reforming the Commission 
-A White Paper (Part I), Vol. 1, COM 
(2000) 200 final/2; and Reforming the Commission 
-A White Paper - Part II, Action Plan, Vol. 
II, COM (2000) 200 final, 1 March 2000. 
as Olivier de Schulter, Notis Lebessis and John Paterson criticise the reforms of financial 
management and the changes to human resources policy for failing to represent the maximum 
to be put in place in an organisation with the position and responsibility of the Commission. 
Yet, they seem to forget that the Commission did not have even this `bare minimum' before the 
resignation crisis of 1999: De Schutter, O. (eds. ) (2001) 'Cahiers' of the Forward Studies Unit: 
Governance in the European Union, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, 263-264: 
<URL http //europa. eu. int/comm/cdp/cahiers/resume/gouvernance en päf>. 
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At the same time, an independent office ("OLAF") to fight fraud in the EU has 
been created based on the agreement concluded between the EP and 
Commission. 5 Thus, administrative arrangements to fight the lack of strong 
responsibility held by the Commission were also introduced in order to 
improve the environment of responsibility in the EP 
- 
Commission relationship 
and overall in the EU. 
These are all important and progressive moves which show that it is not 
possible to legislate for a culture of integrity, responsibility and accountability, 
if hearts and minds are not the crux of any discussion of an organisational 
culture. Above all, they live up to our expectations that the accountability of 
the Commission and individual Commissioners will be less murky and 
facelless. The individual accountability of the Commissioners to the President 
- 
already constitutionally codified in the Nice Treaty - is but the first level of the 
Commission's accountability, followed by the President's accountability to the 
EP, and final accountability of the latter to the European people. If this chain of 
accountability is actively followed, it will greatly increase the chances of the 
EP to hold the Commission more accountable and responsible for all its 
actions. 
45 See the inter-institutional agreement of 25 May 1999 between the EP, the Council and the 
Commission relating to internal investigations conducted by OLAF [OJ 1999, No. L 136/15); 
see also European Commission, Report by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), First 
Report on Operational Activities, 1 June 1999 - 31 May 2000,23 May 2000, p. 8. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
DEVELOPING A EUROPEAN CULTURE OF 
TRANSPARENCY AND OPENNESS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The case study of financial mismanagement in the European Commission 
reveals how the power of the EP significantly increased in 1999 giving the EP 
a legitimate basis in keeping the Commissioners responsible and accountable 
for their actions. It also demonstrates that the old-style of bureaucracy can no 
longer exercise its administrative powers on the meta-national level without 
external scrutiny from the meta-national legislature. If the Commission is 
willing to play a significant and important role in the European `governance', it 
has to undergo some form of reorganisation and reform of its internal and 
external effectiveness to increase its accountability. 
It also stresses that an unaccountable, "secretive, bureaucratic regime cannot 
possibly be as credible as a liberal transparent regime when claiming to have 
established a People's Europe". ' From the standpoint of openness to the 
European populace at large, the present situation is also defective. 
1 Davis, R. (1999) "Public Access to Community Documents: A Fundamental Human Right? ", 
3 European Integration online Papers (EIoP) 8, p. 1: 
< URL h //eiop. or. at/texte/1999-008a. htm >. 
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Yet, the real significance of a substantive development, of a notion concerning 
the fundamental principle of openness in EU decision-making, is not 
unthinkable for the foreseeable future as this Chapter sets out to suggest and 
explore. Since the democratisation of the EU is an on-going process, 2 the same, 
or similar, approach to legitimacy will ensure that it is not too long before the 
Community Courts recognise public access as an intrical, or important, part of 
the general principles of Community law. 
2 Although a theme running through this Thesis, this has been particularly noted on the issues 
of constitutionalism and accountability, see Chapters Six and Seven of this Thesis. 
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2. Definitions 
As with any broad political concept, there is a realised need to define from the 
very beginning what transparency and openness actually mean, so as to avoid 
any danger of these becoming empty words, liable to take on only the 
meanings that their practitioners want to apply. 
When perceived in a liberal democratic polity, transparency is often regarded 
as a three-dimensional concept: 
a) access to information, 
b) access to the thinking behind decisions, 
c) opening of the decision-making process to non-governmental 
participation. 3 
However, the Chapter only concentrates on the first dimension which is the 
minimalist approach to transparency. Therefore, any system lacking in this 
could hardly be described as transparent. Firstly, it signifies that information 
can be easily obtained from whatever source and understood. Secondly, it 
involves the comprehensibility of decision-making procedures, for example, 
who makes decisions, when and where, the publishing of documents in a 
language which is understood by the individual seeking the information, and 
the cost of the access procedure. 4 
3 O'Neill, M. (1998) "The Right of Access to Community-Held Documentation as a General 
Principle of EC Law", 4 European Public Law 3, p. 403 at 404. 
4 Ibid. 
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On the other hand, openness describes the citizen's right of access to 
documents. It is defined as the possibility for everyone to acquire knowledge of 
a government's activities in two ways. First, by granting access to the fora 
where decisions are taken. Second, by making available information carriers, 
for example documents, visual and/or audio instruments, by which these 
decisions are recorded and which provide an insight into the preparation of 
these decisions. 5 
Notwithstanding their difference in concept, it is still hard to actually 
distinguish between these due to an essential and indispensable link: 
The right of access to documents = openness and the provision 
of information by the Institutions = transparency. 
That link is a very simple one. Only if the right of access to documents is 
finally established, and defended, is there any guarantee that the information 
made available will not be partial, limited, or tailored to the Institutions' 
perspective. 
3. ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL TERMS 
3.1. Introduction 
However, within the EU, this is not the case. In constitutional terms, as 
primarily maintained in Chapter Six on the debate for a written European 
S Curtin, D. and Meijers, H. (1999) "The principle of open government in Schengen and the 
European Union: Democratic Retrogression? ", 32 Common Market Law Review p. 391 at 393. 
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Constitution, none of the above principles has been established in order to 
acquire the status of a general Community principle that the Courts would 
claim to uphold. They are only administrative values that the EU Institutions 
purport to accept. As such just before the proclamation of the Charter6 and the 
coming into force of the new Regulation regarding public access to the EP, 
Council and Commission documents, 7 they were mentioned in the various 
Treaty provisions, 8 Institutional rules, practices, resolutions, 9 and inter- 
institutional declarations. '0 
3.2. From the Code of Conduct" to the new Regulation 
Prior to the adoption of the new Regulation, the legal context of `openness', 
basically preserved in Article 255 EC, had found its expression in the validity, 
or effect, of the internal pre-existing Rules of Procedure of the Council12 and 
the Commission regarding public access to their documents. 13 
6 See Art. 42 of the Charter. 
7 Council Regulation 1049/2001/EC of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European 
Parliament, Council and Commission documents [OJ 2001, No. L. 145/43]. 
8 See for example, Arts. 207 (third paragraph), 255,286,287 EC and Art. 1 TEU. 
European Parliament, Resolution on the Compulsory Publishing of Information by the 
European Community [OJ 1984, No. C 172/176]. This was followed by two similar 
Resolutions: 1) Resolution on the Compulsory Publishing of Information by the European 
Community [OJ 1988, No. C 49/174], 2) Resolution on the Transparency of Community 
Legislation [OJ 1994, No. C 205/514]. Inter alia, Resolution on Democracy, Transparency 
and Subsidiarity and the Inter-institutional Agreement on Procedures for Implementing the 
Principle ofSubsidiarity [OJ 1993, C 329/132, A3-0356/93]. 
10 Declaration of the European Parliament's delegation concerning Democracy, Transparency 
and Subsidiarity [OJ 1993, C 329/142]; The European Council's Declarations on 16 October 
1992 entitled "A Community Close to its Citizens", (Bull. EC 10-1992, p. 9) and on 12 
December 1992, (Bull. EC 12-1992, p. 7). Inter alia, Declaration (No. 17) on The Right of 
Access to Information Annexed to the Final Act of the Treaty on European Union signed at 
Maastricht on 7 February 1992 [OJ, 1992 No. C 191/95]. 
11 Council and Commission Code of Conduct (97/730/EC) of 6 December 1993 [OJ 1993, No. 
L 340/4 1, and in corrigendum in OJ 1994, No. L 23/34]. 
12 Council Decision 93/731/EC of 20 December 1993 on public access to Council documents 
[OJ 1993, No. L 340/43 as last amended by Council Decision 2000/527/EC on the 
improvement of information on the Council's legislative activities and the public register of 
Council documents, OJ 2000, No. L 212/9]. 
13 Commission Decision 94/90/ECSC, EC, Euratom of 8 February 1994 on public access to 
Commission documents [OJ 1994, No. L 46/58 as amended by Decision 96/567/ECSC, EC, 
Euratom]. 
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3.2.1. Developments: Positive and negative 
a) Positive 
With the new Regulation there are both positive and negative developments. 
Firstly, in respect of the positive ones: 14 
1) A common set of rules has been established among the Institutions. 
2) The scope has been widened. Any legal or natural person can request 
documents which the Institutions have either drawn up 
- 
except: Council 
documents on security and defence policy 
- 
or have received, including 
`sensitive' documents as these are defined in Article 9.15 
3) The exceptions of Article 4(2) for the protection of commercial interests, 
court proceedings, legal advice and inspections, investigations and audits 
do not apply as long as there is an overriding public interest in 
disclosure. 16 
4) Partial release is not prohibited if only parts of a document are covered by 
an exception. 17 
5) Each Institution should provide for public registers on documents on the 
Web and direct access to documents, in particular legislative documents. 18 
14 See generally European Commission, Secretariat General 
- 
Directorate B SG. B. 2: 
Transparency, Access to Documents, Relations with Civil Society, Information Memo, 11 June 
2001, Brussels, SG. BNJ/pdf/D(2001)350245: 
<URL http: //www. europa. eu. int/comm/secretariat general/s cg /ý doc/en/index htm#1 >. 
11 Council Regulation 1049/2001/EC loc. cit. supra note 7, Arts. 2,3. 
16 Idem., Art. 4(2). 
17 Idem., Art. 4(6). 
18 Idem., Arts. 11,12. 
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6) Future improvements are on their way such as the establishment of an inter- 
institutional at two levels, civil servant and political or higher level 
Committee to examine best practice, 19 measures on internal organisation of 
the Institutions20 and publication of annual reports. 21 
7) Legitimate expectations are given for either extending or leading to 
concrete new Regulations for other European bodies. 22 
b) Negative 
With respect to the negative developments, the new Regulation still treats the 
right of access to documents more as a right to good administration rather than 
an `in principle' absolute fundamental right. 23 The Regulation does `not' set 
out a presumption in favour of access in all areas. Or, subject individual 
documents to explicit scrutiny as to the applicability of an exemption 
protecting justified interests. On the contrary, it lists several categories of 
documents that `shall' not be released in any circumstances. By being accepted 
as an administrative right, it is open to third parties and/or the EU Institutions 
to refuse to release third-party and/or internal documents according to the 
`exceptions' in Article 4 juncto to Article 9 of the Regulation. Short time limits 
for processing initial applications, that is 15 or 30 working days for `very large 
documents', have been invented in the event of a total or partial refusal for 
191dem., Art. 15(2). 
20Idem., Art. 18(1). 
21 Idem., Art. 17(2). 
22 The EU Ombudsman, Annual Report 2000, "Rules on Public Access to Documents held by 
Europol, p. 195 < URL http: //www. euro-ombudsman. eu. int/report/en/default. htm >. 
23 This is implicitly suggested in Art. 15(1) of the Regulation (loc. cit. supra note 7). 
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disclosure. 24 Whereas in the light of a possible clash between the right to 
privacy and the right to access, the former prevails, 25 thus assuring the 
recognition of a fundamental right as a constitutional principle of Community 
law. 26 
Furthermore, it is not a coincidence that the new code of access to EU 
documents has been heavily criticised for striving to create the so-called `space 
to think' for officials (civil servants) and permanently deny acccss to 
innumerable documents. 27 The `space to think' for officials is apparently more 
important than the people's right to know. But there is another problem with 
the `space to think' for officials. It would also give them the `space to act'. 28 
Many of the documents hidden by this current `rule' would concern the 
implementation of measures 
- 
the practice that flows from the policies, and as a 
result officials would become unaccountable for their actions. Democracy is 
not just about information and participation in policy-making, it is also 
crucially about the various ways such policies are put into practice, that is "as 
openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen". 29 To this effect, the 
White Paper urges both the EU Institutions and the Member States to create a 
24 Idem., Art. 7(2), (3). 
25 Idem., Art. 4(1)(b). 
26 See Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data [OJ 1995, No. L 281/31], para. 10 which states: "Whereas the object of 
the national laws on the processing of personal data is to protect fundamental rights and 
freedoms, notably the right to privacy, which is recognised both in Article 8 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and in the general 
principles of Community law". 
27 Bunyan, T. Curtin, D. White, A. (2000) "Essays for An Open Europe", Paper presented to 
The Citizen's Right of Access to Documents in the EU, Academy of European Law (ERA), 
Trier: Germany, 12-13 July 2001, p. 5 "Space to Think also means space to act" (mimeo). Also 
available at: < IJRL hn: //www. statewatch. org >. 
28 Ibid. 
29 See Preamble of the 1049/2001 Regulation, first indent. 
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"viable communicative space"30 wherein the general public is informed on 
European issues. 31 This new challenge for co-operation on information and 
communication policy in the EU32 is an occasion to reinforce and rethink the 
Union's emerging commitment to a policy of openness, transparency and 
accountability, and a strategic tool of generating a sense of belonging to 
Europe. 
3.3. The `original' approach of the Courts 
In addition, the role of the Community Courts is not less exiguous than the new 
Regulation on the question of the nature of access to information. In essence, 
before the new Regulation was accepted, both Courts had been rather 
concerned with implementing the measures of the old Code of Conduct 
concerning public access to Community documentation rather than with 
recognising a formal constitutional right. Some of the Courts' responses to the 
challenges brought in the Carvel v. Council, 33 Netherlands v. Council, 34 and 
Bavarian Lager Co. v. Commission35 suffice to confirm this claim. 
The first case concerned a journalist's request for access to a number of 
Council documents, in particular, preparatory reports, minutes and voting 
records which were refused essentially on the ground of the confidentiality of 
3o Cederman, L. (2000) "Nationalism and Bounded Integration: What It Would Take to 
Construct a European Demos", EUI Working Paper RSC No. 2000/34, p. 23: 
<URL hqp"//www. iue. it/RSC/WP-Texts/00 34. pdf>. 
31 European Commission, European Governance 
-A White Paper, COM (2001) 428,25 July 
2001, pp. 11-12. 
32 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, European 
Parliament, Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions, COM (2001) 354 
final, 27 June 2001. 
33 Case T-194/94 Carvel and Guardian Newspapers v. Council [1995] ECR II 
- 
2765. 
34 Case C-58/94 Netherlands v. Council [1996] ECR I- 2169. 
35 Case T-309/97 Bavarian Lager Co. v. Commission [1999] ECR 11 
- 
3217. 
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the Council's deliberations. 
The applicant spoke of a fundamental principle of Community law of access to 
the documents of the EU Institutions. 36 The CFI, however, like the Court of 
Justice later, did not address the matter at this level of analysis. It mcrely 
pointed out that: 
"Decision 93/731 [... ] is the only legislative measure, which 
deals with public access to documents", 37 
and in this sense remained steady on interpreting and applying the Council's 
rules of Procedure. Nonetheless, it failed to remember that these rules were not 
drafted in an open and public debate with the participation of other Community 
Institutions or the citizens of the EU, 38 and therefore, the Council had the 
control of the legal space in which claims about access to information are 
made. 
The same approach was also endorsed in the second case. Both the EP and the 
Netherlands argued that the principle of openness of the legislative process was 
an essential requirement of democracy, and that the right of access to 
information was an internationally recognised fundamental human right. 39 But 
36 T-194/94 loc. cit. supra note 33, para. 36. 
37 Idem., para. 62. 
38 The principal plea in law forwarded by the Dutch government as an intervening party in 
support of Carvel's proceedings' against the Council was that the subject-matter of the 1993 
Decision and the Council's own Rules of Procedure go beyond simple matters of the internal 
procedural litigation of the Council and concern issues which directly affect the citizens of the 
EU: see supra note 33, para. 36 on admissibility. 
39 C-58/94 loc. cit. supra note 34, paras. 29-36. 
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the Court found again that the right of access was fulfilled through the 
Council's 1993 decision. In fact, it referred approvingly to the progressive 
affirmation of that right on the part of the Council, and rejected the Dutch's 
government's argument that such a fundamental right should not be dealt with 
purely as a matter of the Council's own internal rules of procedure. 40 
As regards the third case, the applicants, in dispute with the UK Government 
over monopolies in the brewery industry asked for a copy of documentation 
leading up to a "reasoned opinion" made under Article 226 EC. The 
Commission argued both that the document was internal, and that it was 
covered by the implementation of Community law exception, that is the 
protection of the public interest. After lip service to "the principle of the widest 
possible access for citizens to information", found in the Code of Conduct 
annexed to the Commission and Council Decisions concerning public access to 
documents, the CFI took a firmly instrumentalist line, upholding the 
Commission's viewpoint on the following ground: 
"Member States are entitled to expect confidentiality during 
investigations which may lead to an infringement procedure. 
[... ] The disclosure of documents relating to the investigations 
stage could undermine the proper conduct of the infringement 
procedure. [... ] The safeguarding of that objective warrants, 
under the heading of protection of the public interest, the 
refusal of access to a preparatory document relating to the 
ao Idem., paras. 37-43. 
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investigation stage of the procedure under [Article 169] of the 
Treaty". 4 1 
In subsequent cases, this exception in the public interest has tended to be 
construed broadly by the Institutions in question. In practice, they have 
accepted that the defence of the public interest is not limited to the list between 
brackets in the Decisions, but that these are merely examples of the public 
interest and that the public interest may embrace more. 
The same question arises in the context of the new Regulation too. Indeed, it 
does not expressly suggest if the list of `derogations' in Articles 4 and 9 is 
either exhaustive or inclusive, and thus the fear of interpreting and applying the 
exceptions in a broad manner both by the Courts and the Institutions is very 
much eminent. 
In applying the public interest exception in the Carlsen case, 42 for example, the 
Council argued against disclosure of the opinions of its Legal Service on the 
grounds that the public interest in the maintenance of legal certainty and the 
stability of Community law could be damaged. 43 Neither of these grounds was 
actually mentioned in the relevant Access Decision or the Code of Conduct as 
interests which could be invoked under the heading of public interest. The CFI, 
however, approved of the reasoning of the Council by pointing out that the list 
of interests mentioned between brackets are simply specific examples of public 
41 T-309/97 loc. cit supra note 35, para. 46. 
42 Case T-610/97 Carlsen and others v. Council [1998] ECR II 
- 
485. 
43 Idem., para. 1. 
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interest, but that access may also be denied under the general notion of public 
interest. 44 
Another example of a wide interpretation of "public interest" exception has 
been cases where any aspect of the administration of justice is at stake. For 
instance, in Van der Wal45 the CFI upheld the Commission's refusal to give 
access on the basis that granting access would create a conflict, or better imply 
a violation of the fundamental right to a fair hearing under Article 6 of the 
ECHR. 46 The documents in question were not internal legal opinions but 
contained the Commission's official opinion on the application of [Articles 85 
and 86 EC] concerning competition and customary practices. But because they 
had been produced at the request of a national Court for use in national Court 
proceedings, the fundamental right to a fair hearing in the view of the CFI took 
precedence over the citizen's right of access. 47 
WWF UK48 and Interporc49 also concerned access to Commission documents 
but again the Court was willing to whittle down any constitutional concept of 
transparency and openness by suggesting that the Code of Conduct was 
capable of regulating and even conferring rights on individuals 5.0 In this 
context, therefore, it annulled the decisions of the Commission refusing access 
to its documents, `not directly' on the ground of having infringed individuals' 
44 Idem., para. 2. 
45 Case T-83/96 Gerard van der Wal v. Commission [1998] ECR II 
- 
545. 
46 Idem., paras. 45-49. 
47 See supra note 45, paras. 50-51. 
48 Case T-105/95 World Wildlife Fund (WWF) v. Commission [1997] ECR II 
- 
313, [1997] 2 CMLR 55. 
49 Case T-124/96 Interporc Im-und Export GmbH v. Commission [1998] ECR II 
- 
231. 
50 See supra note 48, para. 54. See also supra note 49, para. 66. 
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right of access to Community-held information, but rather because of the 
insufficiency of the reasons given by the Commission for such refusals' 
The Court also scrupulously avoided the plea of a breach of the fundamental 
principle of public access to Community documents in Svenska 
Journalistförbundet v. Counci152 and Hautala v. Council. 53 Although the CFI 
seemed to consider the right of information in fundamental terms, 54 it did not 
elevate this to the status of an explicit general principle of Community law, 
presumably in line with its view of the highly specific and voluntary nature of 
the principle as assumed by the Institutions. 
3.3.1. Concluding remarks 
From the above judgments, it can be concluded that access to documents is a 
limited procedural right the extent of which was to be `moulded' by the EU 
Institutions. 
Although the Court(s) did not transform the right into a general principle in a 
legal sense, yet, Carvel and the other cases highlighted the full individual value 
of the right, encouraging, in the decisions, to perceive its possible evolution 
into a principle of administrative law. 
In essence, the principle of public access to Community documents was mostly 
viewed as a voluntarily assumed specific principle of administrative law - this, 
51 See supra note 48, paras. 64,72,74,77-78. See also supra note 49, paras. 55-57. 
52 Case T-174/95 Svenska Journalistförbundet v. Council [1998] ECR II 
- 
2289. 
s' Case T-14/98 Heidi Hautala v. Council [1999] ECR II 
- 
2489. 
54 See supra note 52, para. 66. See also supra note 53, para. 83. 
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however, has changed in the light of the new Regulation, 
- 
which had gradually 
through the medium of case-law, acquired some procedural flesh and 
substance. That flesh and substance had not been in terms of an elaboration on 
the nature of the principle itself or its putative primordial status within the 
relevant legal hierarchy. Rather, it had only taken the form of judicial 
elaboration of the exceptions to refuse access and the correct procedures to be 
followed once the Commission or the Council had assumed a specific 
obligation in that regard. Allegedly, it is not expected that even with a view to 
the new Regulation the Courts will act differently except other than to 
judicially develop its exceptions. 
4. OPENNESS: A NEVER ENDED PROCESS 
4.1. Introduction 
In spite of a low level of support for openness, as a constitutional principle 
within the EU legal order, a Community-wide understanding of the importance 
of public access as a fundamental right has progressively materialised in the 
recent years. 
4.2. (1) EU Ombudsman: Promoting a culture of openness and awareness 
First, the EU Ombudsman has made the first step. In general terms, it has had a 
great role and impact in access to Community documentation and the 
transparency of the EU decision-making. In specific terms, it has changed, 
through recommendations and its powers of coercion, the voluntary assumed 
principle of access to Community documents into a compulsory principle of 
administrative law. 
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4.2.1. (a) Recommendations 
Working under both aims and with the view of setting a good example to other 
EU Institutions, bodies and agencies, the EU Ombudsman set out in his first 
Annual Report of 199555 to act as openly as possible and has adopted 
implementing provisions on public access to its documents. In June 1996 we 
see the EU Ombudsman launching with his own-initiative an inquiry into 
public access to documents of the EU Institutions and bodies with the 
exception of the Council and the Commission which had already adopted such 
rules. Recalling the case-law of the Court of Justice in Netherlands v. 
Counci1,56 the EU Ombudsman came to the conclusion that, in relation to 
requests for access to documents, Community Institutions and bodies have a 
legal obligation to take appropriate measures to act in conformity with the 
interests of good administration. The EU Ombudsman assumed too that the 
adoption of such rules promotes transparency and good relations between 
citizens and the Community Institutions, bodies and agencies in several ways: 
a) The process of adopting rules requires the Institution, body or 
agency to examine, for each class of documents, whether 
confidentiality is necessary or not. 
b) The above process itself encourages a higher degree of openness. 
ss The EU Ombudsman, Report for the year 1995, at: 
< URL http: //www. euro-ombudsman. eu. int/report/en/default. htm >. 
56 See supra note 34, para. 37 which states: "So long as the Community legislature has not 
adopted general rules on the right of public access to documents held by the Community 
Institutions, the Institutions must take measures as to the processing of such requests by virtue 
of their power of internal organisation, which authorises them to take appropriate measures in 
order to ensure their internal operation in conformity with the interests of good 
administration". 
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c) If rules are adopted and made publicly available, citizens who 
request documents can know their rights. 
d) Clear rules can promote good administration as they can also be 
subject to public scrutiny and debate and help officials to deal 
accurately and promptly with public requests for documents. 
Bearing in mind the Court's suggestion, the Union's commitment to 
transparency [Article 191a EC] and the existence of a single institutional 
framework for the EU, the EU Ombudsman concluded: 
"Failure to adopt and make easily available to the public rules 
governing public access to documents could constitute an 
instance of maladministration". 57 
He thus urged 
- 
through the mechanism of making draft recommendations - 
fifteen Community Institutions and bodies to adopt such rules for all 
documents not already covered by existing legal provisions allowing access or 
requiring confidentiality and make them easily available to the public. It was 
not until April 1999, that the EU Ombudsman launched a further own-initiative 
inquiry (OI/1/99/IJH) addressing four more EU bodies (the European Central 
Bank, the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, the Community 
Plant Variety Office and the European Police Office ("Europol") which were 
not yet operational during the earlier enquiry. So far, only the ECJ has not 
S' EU Ombudsman Decision and Recommendation in the own initiative inquiry into public 
access to documents (616/PUBAGF/IJH) of 20 December 1996. 
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drawn-up rules, claiming that it has an extreme difficulty in establishing a clear 
separation between documents which relate to its judicial role and those which 
do not. Lastly, in its special report, addressed to the EP in April 2000, the EU 
Ombudsman suggested that the Institution which democratically represents EU 
citizens should consider using the procedure referred to in [Article 192(2) EC] 
in order to initiate the adoption of a European administrative law. He thus 
concluded the report by making the following recommendation: 
"In order to achieve rules of good administrative behaviour, 
which apply equally to all Community Institutions and bodies 
in their relations with the public, the Ombudsman recommends 
the enactment of a European administrative law, applicable to 
all the Community Institutions and bodies. This law could take 
the form of a Regulation". 58 
Yet, so far, no other Institution or, body has adopted a Code of good 
administrative behaviour apart from the Commission. 59 
Taking this fact into account, one might then argue that the achievements of the 
EU Ombudsman by his own-initiative inquiry into public access to Community 
held-information are not so impressive after all. Consequently, he did not make 
any recommendation concerning the substance of the rules to be adopted and 
"The EU Ombudsman, Annual Report 2000, p. 207: 
< URL http: //www. euro-ombudsman. eu. int/report/en/default. htm >. 
59 ANNEX, `Annex' 
- 
Code of Good Administrative Behaviour for Staff of the European 
Commission in their relations with the public, Commission Decision of 17 October 2000 
amending its Rules of Procedure (2000/633/EC, ECSC, Euratom) [OJ 2000, No. L 267/63): 
< URL http: //europa. eu. int/comm/secretariat/ general/code/ docs/code en pdf >. 
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conversely, he only advised that the adoption of rules on public access to 
documents should be as identical as possible for all European Institutions and 
bodies. Nothing in detail was ever specified. 
Even if it is so, were it was not for the EU Ombudsman, public access to 
documents would still lie on the goodwill and voluntarism of the EU 
Institutions, bodies, centres and agencies. By drafting, however, 
recommendations and making inquiries, the EU Ombudsman appears to make 
two points. 
1) Even those Institutions and bodies for which there is no positive right of 
access to documents must have rules about such access. 
2) Where rules of access to documents are established, uniformity is necessary 
in order to secure more effectively the right. 
4.2.1.2. (b) The power of coercion in public access 
In the case where a request of access to documents is refused, either the new 
adopted Regulation or the rules on public access to documents for the rest of 
the Institutions allow EU and non-EU citizens to complain to the EU 
Ombudsman. For the EU Ombudsman, the issue is to investigate whether the 
refusal of access constitutes maladministration. For example, whether the 
Institution in question has properly applied its rules on public access or the new 
Regulation in the future, and whether it has acted within the limits of its legal 
authority in exercising any discretionary power. Once the EU Ombudsman 
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considers that an Institution has wrongly applied the rules, he can call on the 
Institution to reconsider the matter, this time applying the rules correctly. 
This procedure of pursuing a complaint within the EU Ombudsman shows that 
some of the deficiencies in the internal rules of the Institutions may well be 
dealt with internally within that Institution. However, the author predicts that 
under the current dispensation the EU Ombudsman will have the power to 
remedy deficiencies that may arise from the new Regulation. This assertion is 
due to the fact that the EU Ombudsman may only make recommendations 
which are not legally binding. 
Additionally, lodging complaints to the EU Ombudsman demonstrates that any 
natural or legal person is provided with a relatively informal, inexpensive and 
less-time consuming alternative to judicial review when challenging refusals of 
the Institutions to provide access to a requested document. 
An example of the EU Ombudsman's powers of coercion in public access is 
illustrated by one of the six complaints in the Statewatch case. 60 There, the EU 
Ombudsman held that the Council was wrong not to consider a British 
journalist's application for access to agendas of the "Senior Level Group" and 
the "EU 
- 
US Task Force". The Council rejected the application on the grounds 
that the agendas in question were not prepared under `the sole responsibility' of 
the Irish Presidency (July 
- 
December 1996), but `jointly' by the Presidency, 
the Commission and the US authorities. The EU Ombudsman recommended 
60 Case 1056/25.11.96/STATEWATCH/UK/IJH against the Council of the European Union. 
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that the Council must also apply its rules on public access to documents which 
it had co-authored. The EU Ombudsman's decision therefore meant that the 
Council would have to reconsider the application of the complainant and apply 
the rules correctly. As a result of the EU Ombudsman's investigation, the 
Council has already changed its practice and has made available the timetable 
of meetings in the field of Justice and Home Affairs planned under each 
Presidency. It has also accepted that the Presidency is not `another Institution' 
within the meaning of Article 2(2) of the formerly Decision 93/731/EC. As a 
result, the public is being empowered to apply to the Council for access to 
documents that a Member State has written in its capacity as Presidency of the 
Council. 
The Council has been further pushed to make available a list of all measures 
that it has approved in the field of Justice and Home Affairs and keep a registry 
of its documents in general. 61 Advocating that "a basic principle of good 
administrative behaviour is that a public authority should maintain adequate 
records", 62 the EU Ombudsman has already asked the Commission to create a 
public register of documents. 63 This has not been fulfilled, as yet. However, 
there is much expectation that the respective `authorities' will soon comply 
with this, considering the provision of Article 11 of the new Regulation. 
61 Decision of the EU Ombudsman on complaint: 
1055/25.11.96/STATEWATCH/UK/IJH against the Council of the European Union. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Decision of the EU Ombudsman on complaint 633/97/PD against the European Commission. 
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4.3. (2) Community Courts and their latest approach: A fundamental 
principle 
Whereas the EU Ombudsman prepared the ground for promoting a culture of 
openness and an awareness of public access to documents within the EU 
Institutions, the Community Courts went a step further. As a matter of fact, 
they recognised an individual's right to access to documents as a general 
principle of Community law. 
In Interporc II v. Commission, 64 a case which dealt with the interpretation of 
the exception based on protection of the public interest (court proceedings), the 
CFI noted: 
"Decision 94/90 was adopted with the objective of making the 
Community more open, the transparency of the decision- 
making process being a means of strengthening the democratic 
nature of the Institutions and the public's confidence in the 
administration. 65 Exceptions must be interpreted strictly, in 
order not to frustrate the application of the general principle of 
giving the public the widest possible access to documents held 
by the Commission". 66 
64 Case T-92/98 Interporc v. Commission [1999] ECR II 
- 
3521. 
65 Idem., para. 39. 
66 Idem., para. 38. 
334 
CHAPTER EIGHT A CULTURE OF OPENNESS FOR THE EU 
Consistently, in JT's Corporation Ltd v. Commission, 67 which concerned the 
reading of the exception based on protection of the public interest (inspection 
and investigation tasks), the Court reaffirmed: 
"Application of the general principle of conferring on 
the public the widest possible access to documents held 
by the Commission should not be thwarted". 68 
Repeatedly, in Hautala v. Council69 and Aldo Kuyer v. Council, 70 the CFI, 
while analysing public interest (international relations) exceptions, not only 
lifted the right to access to documents to that of a general principle, but also 
suggested that partial access to Community documentation should become a 
principle on its own. 7' In this context thus stated: 
"[... ] Article 4(1) of Decision 93/731 must be interpreted in 
the light of the principle of the right to information and the 
principle of proportionality. 72 It follows that the Council is 
obliged to examine whether partial access should be granted to 
the information not covered by the exceptions". 73 
67 Case T-123/99 JT's Corporation Ltd v. Commission [2000] ECR II 
- 
3269. 
68 Idem., para. 33. 
69 See supra note 53. 
70 Case T-188/98 Aldo Kuder v. Council [2000] ECR II 
- 
1959. 
71 In the recent Case T-204/99 Olli Mattila v. Council and Commission judgment of 12 July 
2001 (not yet reported), however, the ECJ did not find that the defendant Institutions infringed 
the principle of proportionality by failing to grant partial access to the documents at issue: see 
paras. 72-75. 
2 Note Case C-222/84 Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] 
ECR 1651, [1986] 3 CMLR 53, para. 38 where the Court stated that: "[... ] the principle of 
proportionality requires that `derogations remain within the limits of what is appropriate and 
necessary for achieving the aim in view". 
73 T-14/98 loc cit. supra note 53, para. 87. See also supra note 70, para. 54. 
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In view of the above findings, it therefore appears that the CFI has adopted a 
less cautious and somewhat hesitant behaviour by not trying to avoid pleas of 
breaches of a fundamental right of access to Community documents. It clarified 
the scope and legal status of the Commission and Council rules in the light of 
the existence of a general principle of public access in Community law, and 
accordingly annulled Commission and Council decisions insofar as they refuse 
such access. 
The ECJ, for its part, also adopted the same stance, yet in a less unequivocal 
style than the CFI. In the appeal against the judgment of the CFI, in the case of 
Van der Wal v. Commission, 74 seeking to have that judgment set aside, the ECJ 
did not avoid the need to examine in detail the reasons why access had been 
refused. Based on its findings, it concluded that the scope of decision 94/90 is 
to provide for the widest public access possible and therefore any exception to 
that right of access must be interpreted and applied strictly. 75 Hence, the CFI 
erred in law, with the result that the plea alleging infringement of the 94/90 
Commission decision in terms of access to documents was well founded. 76 
To complete the picture, a landmark statement on the right to access to 
documents as a fundamental principle of Community law has come from 
Advocate General Leger while delivering his opinion in the appeal of Hautala 
74 Joined Cases C- 174/98 P and C- 189/98 P, Kingdom of the Netherlands and Gerard van der 
Val v. Commission [2000] ECR I-1 appealing the judgment of the Court of First Instance 
(Fourth Chamber) of 19 March 1998 in Case T-83/96 Van der Wal v. Commission [1998] ECR 
11-545. 
75 Idem., para. 27. 
76 Idem., para. 30. 
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v. Council, 77 a case which involved the interpretation of public interest 
exception (international relations). There, he emphatically pronounced as 
follows: 
"[... ] The right of partial access is required by both the 
wording and the context of Decision 93/73 1. They add that the 
latter should be interpreted and applied in accordance with the 
general principles of Community law, which include the right 
to information. Entitlement to partial access to documents 
follows directly from the fundamental principle of Community 
law that European Union citizens should be granted the widest 
possible access to documents of the European Institutions". 78 
He further proclaims: 
"Examination of the case-law reveals, however, that the 
convergence of the constitutional traditions of the Member 
States may suffice in order to establish the existence of one of 
those principles without the need to obtain confirmation of its 
existence or content by referring to international rules". 79 
He finally concludes: 
77 Opinion of A. G. Leger in Case C-353/99 P Council v. Heidi Hautala and others delivered 
on 10 July 2001 (pending case). 
78 Idem., para. 35. 
79 Idem., para. 68. 
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"Since the right of access to documents, being a fundamental 
principle, should be understood in the broad sense, Article 4(1) 
should be interpreted as requiring the Council to consider 
granting partial access to information not covered by 
exceptions" 
. 
80 
The view of the Advocate General thus marks a landmark in the history of the 
EU for the protection of this right by explicitly suggesting that the right to 
access to documents is a fundamental principle of Community law that should 
be observed in a broad manner. 
4.4. (3) From the Courts to the Charter: A fundamental principle with a 
constitutional status 
In order to confirm the principle of access to documents at Community level 
and define its status and content, the Advocate General as maintained in the 
previous Chapter on constitutionalism seized the opportunity to refer to the 
Charter. 81 In particular, to Article 4282 which provides for a next generation 
`fundamental civil right': 83 
"Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person 
residing or having its registered office in a Member State, has 
a right of access to European Parliament, Council and 
Commission documents". 
80 Idem., para. 117. 
81 [2000] OJ C 364/1. 
82 C-353/99 loc. cit. supra note 77, paras. 51,73. 
83 Idem., para. 78; See also the Opinion of A. G. Tesauro in Case C-58/94 Netherlands v. 
Council [1996] ECR I- 2169, para. 16. 
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Based on this provision, he then added: 
"Classification of the right of access to documents as a 
fundamental right constitutes a further stage in the process of 
recognising that principle and establishing its ranking within 
the Community legal order". 84 
Indeed, in the process of recognising that principle and establishing its position 
within the Union's legal order, the Charter has become the locus classicus. 
Bearing in mind that it serves as a supplement to a European multi-level 
Constitution and is inspired by national constitutional traditions and laws, 85 the 
Charter might promote the public access into a constitutional fundamental 
principle and as such should be placed at the highest level of that system. 86 
Having said that, however, this does not entail that a general right to access 
will be unlimited. As the Court made clear in Nold v. Commission87 and 
subsequent cases88 fundamental rights of this kind "should, if necessary, be 
subject to certain limits justified by the overall objectives pursued by the 
84 C-353/99 loc. cit. supra note 77, para. 79. 
85 For recent comments on the legal status of the Charter see De Witte, B. (2001) "The Legal 
Status of the Charter: Vital Question or Non-Issue? ", 8 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 1,81-89. 
86 It should be remembered that that principle was constitutionally enshrined by the adoption of 
Article 255 EC, if one of course recognises the constitutional character of the Treaties. 
However, the difference between the Treaty provision and the Charter is that under the latter 
the right to access to documents is no longer moulded out of the internal Rules of Procedure of 
the Community Institutions. 
87 Case C-4/73 Nold KG V. Commission [1974] ECR 491. 
88 Note Cases C-44/79 Hauer v. Land Rheinland 
- 
Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727, [1980] 3 CMLR 
542, paras. 23,32; C-62/90 Commission v. Germany [1992] ECR I- 2575, para. 23; C-404/92 
PXv. Commission [1994] ECR I- 4737, paras. 17-18; C-84/95 Bosphorus v. Minister for 
Transport, Energy and Communications and others [1996] ECR I- 3953, para. 21; C-293/97 
The Queen v. Minister ofAgriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Standley and others (1999] 
ECR I- 2603, paras. 54-58. 
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Community, on condition that the substance of these rights is left untouched". 89 
Therefore the Community Courts will be bound, not only to uphold the general 
principle, but also to ensure the existence of effective and reasonable 
exceptions to protect the overall interests of the Community and its Institutions. 
Advocate General made the same comment when he evaluated the 'absolute' 
form of the right to access to documents in the Charter and the new Regulation: 
"Its content is to be defined in the regulation to be adopted 
under Article 255(2) EC, which is currently being negotiated, 
and the future decisions of the Court of Justice". 90 
This, then, suggests that the right to public access lies for the moment on a 
`dormant seat'. In other words, the extent to which that right will blossom, 
despite the non-binding effect of the Charter, 91 will depend on how much the 
Community Courts are prepared to adhere to the provisions of the Charter in 
the judicial process, and following this to construe restrictively any exceptions. 
Yet, even if the Courts do not mention the Charter as such in their future 
judgments, this fact does not stop them from characterising that element of law 
as a mere confirmation of their reasoning, whereas that Charter element was 
effectively the basis of the Court's decision. 92 
89 C-4I73 loc. cit. supra note 87, para. 14. 
90 C-353/99 loc. cit. supra note 77, paras. 74,106. 
91 De Witte, B. loc. cit. supra note 85. 
92 See Chapter Six of this Thesis, Section 5.2.5.1. pp. 279-280 on the idea of constitutionalism 
through soft law. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
Overall, this Chapter of the Thesis has focused upon developments towards a 
greater access to information and has suggested that recognition of a 
fundamental principle of public access to Community documentation has been 
gradually established. The exceptions to the public's access to documents, as 
laid down in the internal rules or the new Regulation of the EU Institutions, 
must be construed or interpreted in a manner which will make it not impossible 
to attain the objective of openness. 
To this effect, the EU Ombudsman's inquiries into the public access to 
documents and his decisions on individual complaints of maladministration, 
have provided an efficient and cost-effective recourse for both EU and non-EU 
citizens. 
Whereas the EU Ombudsman predisposed us for a more open and transparent 
`state of mind', the Advocate Generals and Courts took over by explicitly 
recognising, in recent years, the existence of a fundamental principle of 
Community law. 
Now it remains to see if, in the light of the Charter's provisions and the 
statements in the White Paper, the Courts will seize the opportunity of taking 
the next step of making the process more open, transparent and the Community 
administration more accountable. That is, to promote public access to 
Community documents into a fundamental principle of constitutional status. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
GENERAL CONCLUSION 
As Lord has explained, the issue with the European Union's democratic deficit 
is that each person writing about it tends to identify one basic problem: 
"The implication is plain: find some means of solving the 
specific problem that concerns the author in question and the 
democratic deficit will disappear. But what if all [these issues] 
form an interconnected complex? What if they relate to certain 
common difficulties of developing democratic politics in a 
political system which is both new and trans-national? What if 
we take the view that it is equally important to analyse the 
shape of such democratic politics that do exist in the European 
Union as it is to probe the system for gaps, not least because it 
may be impossible to understand the one without the other? "' 
So, as Lord suggests, it may be just as important to make a record of those 
aspects of democratic practice which do exist, as it is to point out the self- 
evident gaps. 
This Thesis has been a move in that direction. The EU is a new political system 
and it is difficult to compare it with existing political systems. New theories are 
1 Lord, C. (1998) Democracy in the European Union, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 11. 
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needed to understand the extent to which the EU is legitimate and democratic. 
This is where the new theory of meta-national democracy fits into the broad 
argument concerning the democratic deficit within the EU. 
By applying the concept of meta-national democracy, this Thesis has tried to 
develop democratic theories for which there are no precedents in national 
experiences, and, to offer a wide variety of solutions, suggestions and new 
ideas to overcome legitimate and democratic inadequacies. 
The term meta-national has suggested that the EU should not be viewed as a 
static project, one, in which citizens define their relation to their State. It might 
be that the core of any definition of the modern State goes back to Max 
Weber's body that successfully monopolises the means of legitimate force over 
a territorial area. The EU is not a State in that sense but is a unique and 
dynamic system of non-hierarchical, regulatory, heterogeneous (a hybrid mix 
of State and non-State actors) governance, embracing the notion of a polity. 
Most of these qualifications became apparent through the notion of an EU 
multi-level governance system, endorsed also in the White Paper which opens 
the road for a plurality of authorities, organisations, Institutions, agencies, 
networks to perform at all levels, held together by shared values and 
objectives. 2 
2 European Commission, European Governance 
-A White Paper, COM (2001) 428,25 July 
2001, pp. 12-15,21. 
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Even though multi-level governance might have its weaknesses as an analytical 
category, it nonetheless captures something of the emerging reality of decision- 
making in this modem interdependent Euro-polity. 3 It alerts us to the nccd to 
disentangle the various levels of governance, decision-making and power, and 
identify the relevant constituencies as the case studies in this Thesis havc 
showed in order to find representative forms and processes of involvement 
appropriate at each and every level. 
The case study on environmental policy is particularly revealing. The adoption 
and implementation of two strands of EU environmental policy in the UK, 
namely biodiversity and land use planning policy, disclosed the activities of 
interest groups who can successfully shape the course of European political 
integration. In essence, they proved that national groups (mainly UK-based) 
and trans-national groups (mainly Brussels-based) have successfully gained 
access to the EU Institutions, a strategy designed to improve their output close 
to their interests, having previously been kept at the margin in national political 
arenas. We firstly concluded that such patterns of access and targeting 
(successful attainment of the objectives from the group's point of view) 
indicate the existence of a system of multi-level environmental governance in 
which interest groups are purposefully engaged during all phases of the policy 
making cycle. Secondly, that the surveyed environmental groups have 
contributed significantly to the development of EU environmental policy and 
have supported supra-national actors (the Commission, the Council and the 
3 See Chapter Two of this Thesis, Section 3.4.4. pp. 35-38. 
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ECJ) in extending the acquis further and faster than EU Member States (the 
UK included) would have expected. 
In elaborating the theory of meta-national democracy, it has been further 
argued that like any other modem polity that aspires to democratic shared rule, 
the EU has to be underpinned by a political identity that is strong enough to 
carry the weight of its democratic politics. Starting from Weiler's critique 
which coined the judges' ruling in the Brunner decision as the "No-Demos 
Thesis", Chapter Three has claimed for the existence of a workable community 
at the EU level, based primarily on citizenship rights. 
The democratic potential of Union citizenship has been based on a two-fold 
assertion. Firstly, that the establishment of a nzeta"national system of political 
rights can advance integrative popular sentiments, motivating greater 
democratic participation. Secondly, that it strengthens the bonds of belonging 
to a rising active polity, facilitating the process of positive EU awareness. 
formation at the grassroots. For such measures to build on the occurrence of a 
meta-national civic identity there is a need to detach Union citizenship from the 
nationality requirement, and to place it on an independent sphere of civic 
entitlements. 4 
Such an analysis of a civic European identity by no means has presupposed 
that a demos will actually emerge at the EU level. To this effect, a more civic- 
4 For recent comments on Union citizenship as an autonomous concept of Community law see 
generally Reich, N. (2001) "Union Citizenship 
- 
Metaphor or Source of Rights? ", 7 European 
Law Journal 1,4-23. 
345 
CHAPTER NINE GENERAL CONCLUSION 
value, demos-oriented process of EU polity building was undertaken. In this 
perspective, there was a need to define demos as a political community 
participating meaningfully in the processes by which people define and 
implement values, priorities and policies. Similarly, there was also a need to 
discover a normative process to transform a plurality of demoi into an 
expanding pluralistic demos. Such a demos is not restricted to the national 
patterns from the past. It is autochthonous and schematically is seen as a 
spider's web that encompasses without suppressing then all national and 
cultural demoi however these are defined. To this extent, it is flexible enough 
to accommodate high levels of segmented diversity, yet solid enough to stand 
firm against the multiplicity of the different forms of life that co-exist in the 
Union's multi-cultural society. 5 
The question to ask then is whether Union citizenship would simply entail a re. 
arrangement of existing civic entitlements for the constituent demoi or 
contribute to an effective civic competence based on the power of a new, multi- 
layered civic contract between peoples, States, central authorities and EU 
Institutions. 6 
The White Paper in supporting the notion of an EU multi-level governance 
system answers this question in the affirmative. By calling on participation, 
coherence, effectiveness, and greater responsibility for all those involved in 
s For recent comments see generally Fossum, J. (2001) "Identity Politics in the European 
Union", Arena Working Papers WP 01/17: 
< URL http: //www. arena. uio. no/publications/wp01_I 7 htm >. 
6 Chryssochoou, D. "Democracy and Integration After Amsterdam", Sixth Biennial ECSA-USA 
Conference, Pittsbourgh, Pennsylvania, 2-5 June 1999, p. 10 (mimeo). 
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developing and implementing EU policies at whatever level, the White Paper 
affirms that the distribution of civic competence should pass through, rather 
than go beyond, the capacity of citizens to determine the political functions of 
their polity. 7 For, what additionally remains vital to contemporary European 
democratic politics is the existence, explicitly or not, of a civic contract 
between `governors' and `governed'. An arrangement of this type hopefully 
appears to have materialised within the White Paper while at the same time 
seeking for a better involvement of the civil society, thus, postulating the 
opening up of a space for an "active dialogic participation"8 within the EU 
decision-making processes. 
Institutional avenues of political participation such as voting at national and 
EU level, referenda, filling petitions and addressing complaints to the EU 
Ombudsman, have implied in Chapter Four a `bottom-up' approach to the 
construction of a Union closer to its people and less bureaucratically 
dominated. Additionally, the emergence of a civil society/citizen association at 
the EU level, even if still very much in its infancy, in terms of definition, 
internal organisation and representation, has a potentially significant role in 
rendering European politics more legitimate. 
In terms of a `deeper' discussion of the putative role for civil society within the 
institutional framework of the EU, Chapter Five has attempted to 
operationalize the discussion by focusing on the regulatory tasks assigned to 
7 See supra note 2. 
8 See Curtin, D. (1999) Academy of European Law (ed. ) `Civil Society' and the European 
Union: Opening Spaces for Deliberative Democracy, Collected Courses of the Academy of 
European Law, Volume II, Book 1, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 191. 
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the social partners. By pronouncing that the social partners participating in the 
Social Dialogue can conclude agreements, Article 139 EC introduces some 
corporatist characteristics into the existing Union decision-taking practice. 
What we essentially have found was decision-making by a limited numbcr of 
private actors, replacing the public arena, that is, the EP to a not insignificant 
extent. Yet, the theory of meta-national democracy makes the suggestion that 
the very nature of the multi-level governance structures of the EU assert 
against any concentration of consultative interest representation at any one 
focal point in the policy-making process. 
As for the enhancement of forms of substantive legitimacy of social policy 
legislation within the EU, the wide-ranging representation of participating 
associations is desirable. In view of the inherent deficits within the notion of 
representativity, the Council and the Commission must examine whether such 
deficits have an undue effect upon the results of negotiations. If this is the case, 
they must, for political reasons, be called upon to deploy their right to reject to 
implement an agreement. The Commission and the Council should, above all, 
pay attention to the protection of the under-represented interests within 
negotiations. 
Furthermore, management and labour negotiations have been affirmed in the 
field of employment which, by employing labour market regulation, is 
considered to be complementary to social policy. The use of the social partners 
in this area has been proved to be the best ` tool' to strike a balance between 
issues of flexibility and employment protection rights. Considering the 
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institutionalists' perspective that Institutions do indeed matter, we highlighted 
that the social partners' involvement takes place within and through the 
framework of a governance structure: the so-called `open-method of co- 
ordination' which facilitates such a discursive process. 
From this case study we concluded that the Union is concerned with improving 
the quality of its legislation. Policies at the EU level can no longer be cffcctivc 
(output legitimacy) unless they are prepared, implemented at the most 
appropriate level (input legitimacy) and enforced in a proportionate manner. 
We also became aware of the fact that passing legislation on employment is a 
part of a broader socio-political concern, that is, to offer employment to all. 9 
Consequently, a combination of formal rules with other non-binding policy 
tools such as recommendations, guidelines, or even regulation within 
partnership arrangements is proved to be vital. 
In relation to concepts of political power, Chapter Six has sought to identify 
under the new theory a frame of reference which links ideas about integration 
as a process (and in particular the legal dimensions of that process) with 
constitutionalism. 
In this perspective, it has been suggested that it would be unwise to square the 
shifting terrain of multi-level, non-homogenous, interlocking communities, 
with the idea of a constitution that presents a high degree of coherence, 
consistency or completeness. Far more reasonable is a view of an on-going 
9 Goetschy, J. (1999) "The European Employment Strategy: Genesis and Development", 5 
European Journal of Industrial Relations 2, p. 117 at 135. 
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constitutional process that goes hand in hand with the European integration 
project involving the process of polity formation. 1° 
Indeed, the institutional and constitutional processes of European polity 
formation demand to be understood on their own terms, but in a way which 
still respects the institutional and constitutional diversity of the Mcmbcr States. 
The model of multi-level constitutionalism matching the form of mutli"lcvcl 
governance appears to satisfy such an assertion. Seen in the light of multilevel 
constitutionalism thus, it has been proposed that the founding Treaties must be 
seen as a passage towards the progressive 'constitution' of legitimate 
Institutions and powers at the EU level which are complementary to the 
national constitutions. 
The Charter supplements that picture of multi-level constitutionalism by 
signalling that the legitimacy of the EU is to be unconditionally based on the 
aspiration to effectively protect and promote individual fundamental rights. By 
rendering the rights of EU citizens explicit, the Charter reinforces a sense of 
belonging to a political community, (social legitimacy). Additionally, it invites 
them to engage into constitution making by making use of such rights. 
The body drafting the Charter, the Convention, established a novel, 
experimental, relatively deliberative and open forum for constitutional debate, 
1° See generally Joerges, C. Meny, Y. and Weiler, J. (eds. ) (2000) Nat Kind of Constitution 
for What Kind of Polity? 
- 
Responses to Joschka Fischer, Florence, Italy: RSC European 
University Institute: < URL hqp: //www. ieanmonneirroffam. orpigai2ers/00/syml2. htmi >. 
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contrasting quite starkly with the traditional State-dominated IGC processes of 
tough bargaining and closed diplomacy as the means for Treaty change in the 
EU. There were many limitations to the Charter process; the ambiguity of its 
aims, the suggestion of superficiality implicit in the showcasing idea, the 
exclusion of civil society representatives from substantive involvement and the 
strong position of the drafting group. Yet, the very act of the opening up of a 
new forum of this kind was suggestive of the potential for newer and more 
experimental forms of constitutional development in the EU. 
Significant developments were also suggested concerning accountability. The 
case study of institutional crisis in the Commission in spring 1999 illustrated 
that the power of the EP considerably increased, giving the EP a legitimate 
basis to keep the Commissioners responsible and accountable for their actions. 
It further revealed that it is not possible to legislate for a culture of integrity, 
responsibility and accountability as announced in the White Paper" if hearts 
and minds are not the crux of any discussion of an organisational culture. To 
that end, Chapter Seven reaches a complementary function to the White 
Paper's mere suggestions12 since it introduces some set of parliamentary 
mechanisms that could improve both confidence and openness in the 
Commission Institution. 
In arguing that transparency and openness are two additional key elements in 
the democratisation process of the EU, Chapter Eight concluded that a wide 
understanding of the importance of public access as fundamental right has 
11 White Paper loc. cit. supra note 2, pp. 10,32. 
12 Idem., 6,29-31,33-34. 
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progressively materialised in the recent years. The EU Ombudsman firstly 
promoted a culture of openness and awareness and later the Community Courts 
took over by recognising a general principle of Community law. 
The real significance of a development of the notion of a fundamental principle 
of public access has been the fact that it enables both EU and non-EU citizens 
to actively participate in the political process, thus, breaking down the link with 
European citizenship and nationality. This aspect has been not just part of a 
discourse on the standards of `good administration' nor indeed of a discourse 
on an emerging European political citizenship truly supplementary to that at 
the national level. It has also been part of relieving the `European Union's 
democratic deficit'. In essence, it has been about changing the mystical culture 
of the EU into a culture of openness, of an informed public and responsible and 
accountable Institutions. If the EU is claimed to be democratic under the new 
theory, it should be quite easy to understand 
- 
citizens have a right to know 
how and why decisions are made and implemented. Without freedom of 
information, access to documents, there is no accountability and without 
accountability there is no democracy. 
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ANNEX I 
A NOTE ON RESEARCII 
The research for this Thesis was completed at the cnd of July 2001. 
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ANNEX II 
A NOTE ON CITA TION 
In this Thesis, I refer to the post-Amsterdam numbering of Trcaty Articles. 
Articles in brackets correspond to the old EC Treaty numbering. A table of 
equivalence photocopied from Foster, N. EC Legislation, London: Blackstone, 
10th ed., 1999 is included in the Annex. 
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